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ABSTRACT
U.S. MILITARY AID AND THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ARMIES IN CIVIL POLITICS
Jennifer Jones Cunningham 
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
The recent expansion o f the Egyptian military’s role in civil politics has led to 
uncertainty regarding the relationship between U.S. military aid and democratization. 
However, studies focusing on the link between foreign aid and democratization often 
exclude military aid from their analyses. This omission is particularly problematic given 
that civilian control over the military is a vital precondition for democratic consolidation, 
and a high percentage o f U.S. military aid recipients are not yet consolidated democracies. 
Proponents of military aid point to the role security cooperation can play in diffusing 
democratic norms of professionalism. Critics worry military aid strengthens an institution 
that has the power to supplant elected governments using force. The civil-military 
relations literature suggests U.S. military aid should discourage military participation in 
civil politics by mitigating the external threats to recipients’ security, providing political 
support for civilian leaders, and contributing to the professionalization o f the armed 
forces. This dissertation tests these propositions by examining the evolution of civil - 
military relations from the end of World War II through 2014 in three military aid 
recipients: South Korea, Turkey, and Egypt. The findings suggest that even when military 
aid improves a state’s security, dominant regimes are tempted to choose a strategy of 
“deliberate politicization,” granting reserved domains to officers in exchange for loyalty. 
In addition, weak democratically - elected leaders are more likely to adopt a policy of 
“acquiescence,” accepting the military’s institutional prerogatives in exchange for 
approval. Efforts to professionalize foreign militaries focus primarily on improving their 
competence, with less impact on their coherency, mission exclusivity, and respect for 
civilian political authority. I argue that while military aid aims to facilitate the 
democratization process by building armies that support democratic governance, military 
aid provides incentives for dominant regimes to co-opt the military, and enhances the 
institutional power o f the military vis-a-vis the elected government in transitioning 
democracies.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When Egyptian citizens successfully forced the resignation o f President Hosni 
Mubarak in February, 2011, Pentagon officials expected that after three decades of 
cooperation with the Egyptian armed forces, its generals would play a stabilizing role in 
Egypt’s transition to democracy.1 The military demonstrated its inclination to return to 
the barracks after supervising the election of Egypt’s first civilian president, Mohamed 
Morsi, in June, 2012. Yet just twelve months later, the military was pulled into politics 
again, as the defense minister General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi warned Morsi that the 
generals would impose their own roadmap out of Egypt’s economic and political crises if 
his government did not meet the demands of the people in the streets.2 The military has 
since expanded its role in Egypt’s civil politics, and Sisi himself won 97 % of the vote in 
a presidential election observers reported fell short of international standards.3
These events highlight Washington’s potential and limitations when leveraging 
military aid to shape the behavior of foreign armies. Foreign aid is considered a vital 
instrument of American foreign policy, credited with facilitating Europe’s postwar 
recovery and free world defense against Communist expansion, but its record in 
promoting political development has been mixed, particularly in those countries that 
receive large outlays o f U.S. military aid. While the mission of development assistance is 
to support developing countries as they try to “build the economic, political, and social 
institutions that will improve the quality o f their lives,’’4 military aid is potentially 
inimical to political development, as it strengthens an institution that has the power to 
supplant the government using force. Since one of the most important objectives of 
American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been to encourage the
1 Karen Parrish and Jim Garamone, "Mullen: Egypt's Military Promises to be Stabilizing Influence," U.S. 
Department o f  Defense (2011), http:/Avww.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=62636; Karen Parrish, 
"Mullen Reiterates Confidence in Egyptian Military," ibid., www.defense.gov/news/article/aspx7id-i-62665; 
Elisabeth Bumiller, "Pentagon Places its Bet on a General in Egypt," The New York Times, March 10, 2011.
2 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, "Morsi Faces Ultimatum as A llies Speak o f  Military 'Coup'," 
ibid., July 1, 2013.
3 Mayy El Sheikh, "Egypt: Sisi Wins with 97 Percent," ibid., June 4, 2014.
4 Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002: Foreign Assistance Act o f  1961, 87-195, 19.
2transition to democratic regimes, the mechanisms by which military aid may undermine 
or promote democratization deserve greater attention.
Democratic consolidation5 requires that the military recognize the supremacy of 
civilian political authority.6 A state’s civil-military relations are not only affected by the 
balance o f power between civilian and military elites, but also by the military’s internal 
character and organization, as well as society’s attitude toward the military and the 
government. These factors, which interact to shape the military’s role in civil politics, are 
altered when another state commits to providing military assistance. In a state where the 
norm of civilian control over the military has been firmly established, military aid that 
increases the professionalism of foreign armies should have a positive impact on the 
recipient’s civil-military relations.7 This study will examine the relationship between U.S. 
military aid and the role o f the recipient’s military in civil politics in three states that, 
while committed in varying degrees to democracy, struggled with both civilian and 
military elites’ inclination toward authoritarianism. In doing so this study seeks to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and 
democratization, particularly as most existing studies exclude military aid from their 
analyses.
The intent of this study is not to provide a critique of American foreign policy, 
which involves balancing multiple global strategic interests and values, but rather to 
examine the mechanisms through which U.S. military aid may undermine, or enhance, a 
government’s ability to establish objective civilian control over its military, defined by 
Samuel Huntington as, “that distribution of political power between military and civilian
5 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan write that democratic consolidation has been accomplished when all 
political actors "become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution o f  conflict within the specific laws, 
procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process, "Problems o f  Dem ocratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6.
6 There is consensus among civil-military relations and democracy scholars that civilian control over the 
military is a necessary, if  not sufficient, condition for democratic consolidation. For example, Charles Tilly 
wrote, "So long as military forces retain extensive political autonomy, democratization does not advance." 
Contention and Dem ocracy in Europe, 1650-2000  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 200. 
See also Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics (London: Pall Mall, 
1962), 25; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: M ilitaiy Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, 
New  Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 12-15.
7 In his discussion o f  Samuel Huntington's work on civil-military relations, Zoltan Barany notes "the 
correlation between higher levels o f  professionalism and fewer instances o f  political meddling hold only 
for consolidated democracies." The Soldier and the Changing State: Building D em ocratic Armies in Africa, 
Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 28.
3groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior 
among the members o f the officer corps.”8 As Huntington explains, “The antithesis of 
objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as 
the military becomes progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional 
politics.” In doing so, this study should contribute to the ability of the academic and 
policy-making community to make better-informed judgments when considering the role 
of military aid and security cooperation in promoting transitions to democracy.
In the last decade, studies o f the relationship between foreign aid and political 
development have been divided over the question o f whether or not aid supports or 
undermines democratization. In particular, scholars have debated the extent to which aid 
creates a “moral hazard.” Critics assert aid, by providing non-tax revenue to governments, 
encourages rent-seeking behavior, diminishes the need for political accountability to 
constituencies, promotes the expansion of the public sector at the expense o f the private 
sector, and enhances authoritarian leaders’ chance of political survival by providing 
resources to pay for patronage networks.9
Defenders o f aid to developing countries insist it can play a positive role in 
political development, as aid includes non-fimgible aspects such as technology transfer 
and policy advice that can influence attitudes, and is less vulnerable to corruption; in 
addition, they argue, the risk of moral hazard is mitigated when donor countries send 
personnel to administer aid.10 Recent attempts to disaggregate democracy assistance from 
these studies point to the importance o f distinguishing the type of aid delivered.11 While
8 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 83.
9 Sarantis Kalyvitis and Irene Vlachaki, "When Does More Aid Imply Less Democracy? An Empirical 
Examination," European Journal o f  Political Economy, no. 1 (2012); Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, 
and Marta Reynal-Querol, "The Curse o f  Aid," Journal o f  Economic Growth 13, no. 3 (2008); Stephen 
Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?," International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2004).
10 Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa," International Organization  55, no. 1 
(2 0 0 1 ).
11 Steven E. Finkel et al., in Deepening Our Understanding o f  the Effects o f  U.S. Foreign Assistance on 
Dem ocracy Building (USAID-University o f  Pittsburg-Vanderbilt University, 2008); Marian Lawson 
observes in her 2013 report that policymakers' understanding o f  foreign aid effectiveness is obscured by the 
conflation o f  development assistance with aid designated for political or security purposes. "Does Foreign 
Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance," in Congressional Research Service (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service), 3.
4few have attempted to isolate military aid,12 which would be particularly useful for those 
cases in which military aid outweighs development assistance, some have noted that aid 
may be less successful when security interests weaken the donor’s commitment to 
political reforms.13 The presence o f foreign aid from authoritarian regimes that may be 
less likely to press for political reforms may also undermine democratic donors’ aims.14
Military aid intends to improve the capabilities of the coercive apparatus of the 
state, which has implications for civil-military relations that could potentially impede a 
transition to democracy.15 For example, an authoritarian leader may use the military to 
suppress his political opposition, or the military may use force to remove a 
democratically - elected government. A state’s armed force, as a highly - organized and 
disciplined corporate entity, can be a powerful domestic political actor, one that may be 
perceived by civilian elites as an attractive strategic partner or potential rival.
American policymakers believe military aid can have a positive impact on 
democratization. For example, one of the objectives of U.S. Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF), which provides grants for friendly nations to acquire American defense articles, 
services and training, is to “maintain support for democratically -  elected governments 
that share values similar to the United States for democracy, human rights, and regional 
stability.” 16 Another component of U.S. military aid, International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), which provides grants for foreign military and civilian defense 
personnel to attend military schools in the U.S., aims to expose students to “the important 
roles democratic values and internationally recognized human rights can play in 
governance and military operations,” particularly as these future leaders may play a
12 A notable exception is the 2008 report by Steven E. Finkel et al o f  165 aid recipients between 1990 and 
2004, which found the statistically significant, positive effects o f  democracy assistance on democratization 
were diminished in those states that receive large outlays o f  U.S. military aid. "The evidence suggests that, 
to the extent that USAID democracy assistance is provided in settings where U.S. geo-strategic concerns 
constitute a priority for bilateral relations, the effectiveness o f  democracy programs will decline." 47.
13 Stephen Brown, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," European Journal o f  
Developm ent Research  17, no. 2 (2005); Thad Dunning, "Conditioning the Effects o f  Aid: Cold War 
Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa," International Organization  58, no. 2 (2004); Finkel 
et al; Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," in New Challenges to 
Democratization, ed. Peter Bumelle and Richard Youngs (New York: Routledge, 2010), 73-92.
14 Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, "Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent," World 
Development 39, no. 11 (2011).
15 Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security."
16 "Foreign Military Financing," www.state.gov/t/pm /65531 .htm.
5“pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments.” 17 By 
contributing to the professionalism of foreign militaries and exposing them to democratic 
values, FMF and IMET are expected to encourage foreign militaries to support 
democratic governance and minimize their interference in civil politics.
What is the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role o f foreign armies 
in civil politics in those cases in which democratic norms have not yet been firmly 
established? This question is particularly relevant given that o f the 73 countries that 
received FMF in 2013, more than 67% were ranked only “partly free” or “not free” by 
Freedom Flouse.18 Many U.S. military aid recipients are stuck in what Thomas Carothers 
calls a political “grey zone,” characterized by diverse but entrenched political patterns 
that fall short o f well-functioning democracies.19 This study will examine the relationship 
between U.S. military aid and the role o f foreign armies in civil politics in three cases in 
which political institutions were underdeveloped when military aid was established:
South Korea, Turkey and Egypt. While these three countries have since achieved 
divergent levels of economic, political, and human development,20 each emerged from 
the Second World War vulnerable to external threats, with weak political institutions, 
populations of approximately 21 million,21 and modest natural resources.22 Over the next 
six decades, their civil-military relations would evolve in unexpected ways, with at times 
decisive impacts on the ability of democratically - elected leaders to establish objective
17 "International Military Education and Training (IMET)," U.S. Department o f  State, 
w w w . state. go v /t/pm/65533 .htm.
18 "Foreign Military Financing Account Summary," U.S. Department o f  State,
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c 14560.htm; "Freedom in the World Country Ratings and Status," in Freedom  
House, ed. Freedom House (2014).
19 "The End o f  the Transition Paradigm," Journal o f  Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 9-14. Carothers argues 
that rather than follow  a predictable transition model, states tend to become stuck with "feckless pluralism," 
or "dominant rule." In both cases the state is weak, political participation is shallow, and the economy is 
underperforming.
20 For example, according to the United Nations Human Development Report, in 2012 South Korea had 
achieved "Very High Human Development," ranking 16th out o f  187 countries included; Turkey is ranked 
69th and placed in the "High Human Development" category, while Egypt is ranked 108 overall, with 
"Medium Human Development." "Human Development Reports: Human Development Index Trends, 1980 
- 2013," http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-2-human-developmet-index-trends-1980-2013.
21 "United States Census Bureau: Countries and Areas Ranked by Population: 1950," 
www.census.gov/population/intemational/data/countryrank/rank.php.
22 Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa and the second-largest dry natural gas producer in 
Africa; however, while Egypt has been a member o f  the Organization o f  Arab Oil Exporting States since 
1973, and plays a key role in energy security because o f  its control o f  the Suez Canal, it does not have 
resource wealth comparable to that o f  the wealthy Persian G ulf oil producers."U.S. Energy Information 
Administration: Egypt Country Analysis," http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=EG.
6civilian control over their armed forces. Table 1 below gives an overview o f the military 
assistance to these three countries from 1946 through 2012.
Table 1: Military Assistance Obligations in Millions, current $US23
Post-War
Relief
1946-48
Marshall
Plan
1949-52
Mutual 
Security 
Act 1953- 
61
Total FAA 
1962-2012
Total
Loans and
Grants
1946-12
Of
Which
Grants
1946-
12
S Korea - 12.5 1,785.1 7,114.1 8,911.7 6,429.0
Turkey 68.8 553.2 1,463.4 10,900.3 12,985.7 7,175.8
Egypt 42,131.5 42,131.5 37,581.
5
Data from “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Foreign Assistance Data, Greenbook, Country Report,” 
eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/country_report.cfm
Overview: U.S. Military Aid
During World War II, the U.S. provided nearly $50 billion in military supplies 
and other assistance to thirty countries through Lend-Lease agreements.24 In response to 
Great Britain’s cessation of military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, President 
Truman, concerned about Soviet expansionism, announced the United States’ 
commitment to providing assistance to democracies facing internal or external security 
threats. In 1949, Congress authorized the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which would facilitate the acquisition of 
American-made defense articles, services and training. From 1949-1952, foreign 
assistance was primarily allocated under the Marshall Plan, and the Mutual Security Act
23 "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 1945 - 30 September 
2012," in U.S. Agency for International Developm ent (USAID) Greenbook, ed. Department o f  State 
(Washington D.C.).
24 "Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years o f  World War Two," U.S. Department o f  
State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/! 937-1945/lend-lease.
7regulated U.S. foreign aid from 1953 until 1961. Since 1961, foreign aid has been 
governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Traditionally, the U.S. State Department 
determines which countries are eligible to receive military assistance, while the 
Department o f Defense executes the programs.
Currently, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' 
Security Assistance Team (SAT) formulates military assistance policy in consultation 
with the Director o f Foreign Assistance, the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, and U.S. regional combatant commanders.25 The SAT manages 
three programs: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The funds designated for PKO 
compensate for UN funding shortfalls by enabling states with few indigenous capabilities 
to participate in multilateral peacekeeping, humanitarian, counterterrorism and regional 
stability operations, as well as post-conflict security sector reform. Because PKO is a 
relatively new program, and constitutes a small share of overall military aid, this study 
will focus on the military aid provided through FMF and IMET.
FMF packages consist of a mix o f grants and loans that enable foreign countries to 
acquire defense articles, services, and training through the Foreign Military Sales 
program. The Arms Export and Control Act (AECA) of 1968, establishes the terms and 
conditions for sales o f defense articles and services. For example, Section 4 requires U.S. 
defense articles and services be used only for “internal security” or “legitimate self- 
defense,” and to allow recipients to participate in regional or collective security 
arrangements in support of international peace and security, consistent with the United 
Nations Charter.26
A primary purpose of FMF is to build a foreign army’s capacity to meet external 
threats by providing not only modem weapons, but also equipment used for other 
defense-related purposes such as transportation, communication, and logistics. When 
foreign armies purchase these items they also often purchase training on how to use, 
maintain, and repair the equipment. This creates a community of operators and 
maintainers familiar with U.S. military doctrine, which ideally facilitates American
25 "Security Assistance Team," U.S. Department o f  State, www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/.
26 Ian F. Fergusson and Paul K. Kerr, "The U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform 
Initiative," in Congressional Research Service (Washington D.C.2014), 5.
8efforts at coalition - building by improving interoperability. FMF funds aim to establish 
an indigenous maintenance capability through technical training, but also include options 
for contracting American services until that capacity is realized. For example, aid 
recipients may need to use FMF funds to bring American technicians to their country to 
maintain and repair existing U.S.- manufactured equipment. The financing structures for 
FMF -  funded acquisitions, demand for American technical expertise, and dependence on 
American replacement parts for existing equipment creates a “shadow of the future,” that 
ideally contributes to the stability of bilateral relations, even when a state “graduates” 
from the FMF program and purchases defense articles and training through the Foreign 
Military Sales program.
In 1976, the International Security Assistance Act established a separate grant 
program, IMET, to provide professional military education to friendly countries unable to 
purchase training through the FMS program. At the time, emphasis was placed on the 
ability of IMET to improve bilateral relations and increase foreign armies’ self- 
sufficiency. In 1978, IMET’s purpose was expanded to include increasing foreign 
officers’ awareness o f “basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.”27 
IMET offers more than 4,000 courses, which take place at 150 military schools and 
installations; between six and seven thousand foreign students attend these schools 
annually.28 While the focus is predominately on professional military education for 
potential leaders among commissioned and non-commissioned officers, IMET funds are 
also used for English language classes and technical training such as flight school.
IMET provides just one of several means for foreign countries to take advantage 
of American military schools; foreign governments have been able to purchase military 
education and training or use FMF funds to acquire training through the Foreign Military 
Sales program as early as 1949. Thus it is important to recognize that while critics and 
advocates alike often focus their analyses on IMET specifically, IMET reports do not 
reflect all of the foreign personnel attending U.S. military schools. For example, in 1999, 
82 Egyptian students were trained through IMET, while 2145 students participated in
27 John A. Cope, International M ilitary Education and Training, vol. 44, McNair Paper (Washington D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995).
28 "Foreign Military Training," in U.S. Department o f  State and U.S. Department o f  Defense Joint Report 
to Congress, ed. U.S. Department o f  State and U.S. Department o f  Defense (2014), 2.
9training through the FMF program.29 Regardless o f how foreign governments acquire the 
training, military and civilian defense personnel are sitting in the same classes alongside 
their American peers. Even IMET and FMF reports cannot capture the full scope of 
participation in U.S. military training; the Department of Defense funds myriad training 
programs that fall outside of those purchased through the Foreign Military Sales program, 
such as regional centers for security studies, drug interdiction activities, disaster response, 
counter-terrorism, and humanitarian demining.30 Training can take the form of a joint 
exercise, on-the-job training between American forces and foreign military personnel, or 
formal classroom instruction. In fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated approximately 
$18.8 billion to fund “various security cooperation and assistance programs that supply 
military equipment and training to more than 100 partner countries.”31 For this reason 
this study refers to military education and training mindful of the fact that not all o f the 
efforts to improve the capabilities of foreign militaries and establish mutually beneficial 
relations with foreign defense personnel are captured by looking at the annual 
appropriations for the IMET and FMF programs.
Critics o f IMET point to the difficulty in proving program effectiveness,32 as well 
as the role some recipients o f U.S. military training have played in human rights abuses 
and military coups.33 For example, the U.S. Army School o f the Americas, originally 
established in 1946 to provide security training in Spanish for cadets, officers, and non­
commissioned officers o f Latin American militaries in the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal 
Zone, faced intense criticism when some of its training manuals were released by the 
DOD in 1996, revealing counter-insurgency techniques that included blackmail, torture,
29 "U.S. Department o f  State and U.S. Department o f  Defense: Foreign Military Training and DOD  
Engagement Activities o f  Interest in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000," ed. U.S. Department o f  Defense and 
U.S. Department o f  State (Washington D.C.).
30 Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training, Prefix Joint Security Cooperation Education and 
Training, Department o f  the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (Department o f  the Army, the Navy, and 
the Air Force, 2011; 1-2; "Foreign Military Training," 3-6.
31 "DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further 
Enhance Program Management," in GAO Reports (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012).
32 Jennifer Morrison Taw and William H. McCoy Jr, "International Military Student Training: Beyond 
Tactics," in Rand National Defense Research Institute, ed. Rand (Washington, D.C.: Rand National 
Defense Research Institute, 1993), 11.
33 "United States Government Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees: International 
Military Education and Training," in GAO Reports (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011).
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and execution.34 Military aid may promote an increased role for the military in internal 
security and development, encouraging foreign military personnel to assume a greater 
nation-building role at the expense o f civilian actors.35 Other critics suggest American 
policymakers are over-optimistic about the ability o f Western military officers to shape 
the character o f foreign militaries.36
To address some o f these concerns, Congress mandated in 1991 that IMET 
include coursework that focused on human rights, democratic values, civilian control 
over the military, and military justice system reform.37 “Expended IMET” (IMET-E) was 
thus established, and students include civilian personnel such as legislators interested in 
military matters. The courses offered under IMET-E include instruction on civil-military 
operations, democratic sustainment, and civil affairs. Some of the courses are available at 
U.S. - based institutions like the National War College, the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
War Colleges, and the Center for Civil-Military Relations, while others are conducted by 
U.S. instructors in foreign countries via a “mobile education and training team.”38 IMET- 
E aims to improve civilian officials’ ability to manage defense resources and maintain 
control over the military. In 2001, Congress passed the IMET accountability act, 
requiring State and Defense to more closely monitor the professional progress o f IMET 
graduates. Congress also mandated that the Department o f State and Department of 
Defense jointly prepare an annual report that details the foreign policy justification for all 
military training provided to foreign military personnel.39
Advocates o f American military education and training programs point to the 
socialization process that occurs when personnel from foreign militaries study and train 
alongside American defense professionals, and propose a transfer of values occurs that 
should facilitate a transition to a liberal-democratic model o f civil-military relations. For 
example, Huntington credited U.S. military schools like the George C. Marshall Center in
34 Richard F. Grimmet and Mark P. Sullivan, "U.S. Army School o f  the Americas: Background and 
Congressional Concerns," (2001), 3. Under pressure from Congress, the school closed in 2000, and 
reopened a year later under a different name, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, 
located in Fort Benning, Georgia.
35 Taw and M cCoy Jr, "International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics," 8.
36 Norvell B. De Atkine, "Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Holes," 
MERIA Journal 17, no. 1 (2013).
37 FY 1991 Foreign Operations Act (PL 101 - 513)
38 Cope, International M ilitary Education and Training, 44.
39 "Foreign Military Training."
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Bavaria with “diffusing democratic norms o f military professionalism and civilian 
control,” which facilitated defense reforms in transitioning democracies, particularly at 
the end of the Cold War.40 They argue American military education can play a stabilizing 
role in transitioning democracies,41 for example by facilitating communication with and 
access to foreign military and political elites who may be in a position to promote 
political reform ,42 and introducing American political values such as respect for human 
rights.43
In an effort to institutionalize exposure to American values, the DOD established 
the “International Program” in the 1960s, which required each U.S. military training 
facility to have an International Military Student Officer (IMSO) to coordinate activities 
that would familiarize foreign military students with American life.44 The program has 
since been renamed the U.S. Field Studies Program for International Military and 
Civilian Students and Military Sponsored Visitors, and aims to impart foreign students 
with “an understanding of the responsibilities o f governments, militaries, and citizens to 
protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every individual” with the goal o f “promoting 
an understanding o f U.S. society, institutions, and ideals and the way in which these 
elements reflect U.S. commitment to basic principles o f internationally recognized human 
rights.”45 The guidance requires foreign students be assigned sponsors, and encourages 
exposure to local government institutions, the free market system, education, media, and 
the diversity in American life.
The idea of socialization is not limited to education and training, however. For 
example, for decades Egypt and the United States have conducted yearly exchanges, 
alternating between Cairo and Washington, D.C., to give senior officers, including the 
chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces and the American chairman o f the joint chiefs 
o f staff, an opportunity to discuss what type of American-made equipment the Egyptians
40 Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal o f  D em ocracy (1995): 12-13.
41 Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, "U.S. Professional Military Education and Democratization 
Abroad," European Journal o f  International Relations 16, no. 3 (2010).
42 Mark S. Riley and Ravi A. Balaram, "The United States International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) Program with Burma/Myanmar: A Review o f  the 1980-1988 Programming and Prospects for the 
Future," Asian Affairs: An American Review  40, no. 3 (2013).
43 Cope, International M ilitary Education and Training, 44.
44 Taw and McCoy Jr, "International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics," 9.
45 "Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training," 210.
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would like to purchase through the Foreign Military Financing program.46 During these 
visits, officers may bring along their families, and U.S. officials schedule non-defense 
related activities like shopping or ballgames to give the visitors a sense o f American 
culture. In addition, while the Department of State funds IMET and FMF, the Department 
of Defense may fund activities that increase the scope and depth o f foreign military 
exposure and training, such as service-sponsored activities like service-academy 
exchanges or the aviation leadership program.47 While these activities are reported to 
Congress annually, it is difficult to capture all o f the meetings, phone calls, emails, 
conferences, and workshops that often accompany the planning process for any type of 
activity in which two or more foreign militaries participate. This study cannot possibly 
discuss every activity, but does wish to make the point that for DOD officials in 
particular, the process o f planning a training exercise or joint activity is often considered 
just as valuable as the activity itself, reflecting the mindset that these interpersonal 
relationships will contribute to mutual understanding and improved communication and 
interoperability in the future. In other words, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the 
positive effects of interaction between American and foreign military personnel.
While this study will resist claiming that military education and training has a 
decisive impact on foreign military personnel’s respect for civilian control over the 
military, it can be safely assumed that these programs increase the competence, or 
expertise, o f military personnel, which is an important aspect o f professionalization. Still, 
a foreign military’s participation in professional military education courses may reflect 
the government’s desire to professionalize its military, and the general s taffs  desire to 
participate in the community o f democratic armies.
The Liberal-Democratic Model o f Civil-Military Relations
This study makes the normative assumption that objective civilian control over 
the military is preferable to a military’s presence in civil politics, based on the convincing 
arguments of both civil-military relations and democracy scholars that civilian control of
46 Bumiller, "Pentagon Places its Bet on a General in Egypt."
47 "U.S. Department o f  State and U.S. Department o f  Defense: Foreign Military Training and DOD  
Engagement Activities o f  Interest in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000."
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the military is a vital precondition for democratic consolidation.48 However, the 
assumption that contributing to the professionalism of foreign armies will discourage 
military interference in civil politics depends upon a clear definition o f what constitutes a 
“professional” military. Huntington’s discussion o f military professionalism in his 
seminal work, The Soldier and the State, focuses on the military’s competence, or 
expertise in the management of violence, its cohesiveness, or loyalty to “fellow- 
practitioners,” as well as the need for mission exclusivity, meaning a military cannot be 
experts at external defense while assuming internal roles in politics, statecraft, or internal 
security.49 Finer later argues these qualities alone are not enough to guarantee a military 
will refrain from intervening in politics: “The fact is... if the armed forces are not to 
intervene, they must believe in an explicit principle -  the principle of civil supremacy.”50 
This study will conceptualize professionalization as a process in which the armed 
forces work toward achieving the highest levels of competency, cohesiveness, mission 
exclusivity, and respect for civilian political authority. Competency is a product o f both 
the quality of personnel entering the military service, and their education, training, and 
experience, while cohesiveness is the extent to which military personnel act as one 
corporate body and respect the military hierarchy. Mission exclusivity is the extent to 
which the armed forces focus on defense from external threats rather than economic 
interests, internal policing, domestic intelligence or governance. Respect for civilian 
political authority includes the recognition that the civilian political leadership has the 
final say in foreign and national security policymaking, and the legislative body retains 
the right to oversee promotions and the allocation of funds for defense. Defining military 
professionalism in this way allows for an analysis o f how U.S. military aid might 
contribute to one aspect of military professionalism while undermining another. For
48 Tilly, Contention and Dem ocracy in Europe, 1650-2000; Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent 
Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," World Politics 55, no. 2 (2003); 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations; Finer, The Man 
on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics; Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: M ilitary Coups and  
Governments; Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations."; Zoltan Barany, "Democratic 
Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Com parative Politics 30, no. 1 (1997); 
Carl J. Saxer, "Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," 
Arm ed Forces & Society 30, no. 3 (2004); Aurel Croissant, "Civilian Control o f  the Military in Emerging 
Democracies: Theory and Empirical Evidence From Asia," Journal o f  European Studies 30, no. 2 (2014).
49 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations, 32.
50 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics, 25.
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example, in the early years of U.S. military aid, junior and mid-level officers may be 
more receptive to U.S. military doctrine and education than senior officers who have their 
own experiences and may be influenced by education from another foreign military. Thus 
while U.S. military aid may contribute to the competency of the foreign officer corps, at 
the same time it may be undermining the officers’ cohesiveness by creating tension 
between junior and senior officers.
A fully “professional army” as conceived by American policymakers should be 
synonymous with a “democratic army,” or one that will support democratic governance 
rather than a particular party. Carl Saxer refers to this type of army as one that submits to 
“democratic control.”51 As Zoltan Barany notes, “The crucial challenge for politicians is 
to ensure the unconditional obedience o f the military while at the same time allowing it 
sufficient autonomy to successfully discharge its functions and execute its missions.”52 In 
the “liberal-democratic” model of civil-military relations, civilian control o f the military 
is shared by the executive and legislative branches, which oversee defense spending and 
have the final word in foreign and national-security policymaking.53 As such the 
military’s top officer, the chief of the general staff, is subordinate to the civilian defense 
minister, who is a member of the cabinet.
Civilian control does not necessarily reflect “professional” patterns of civil- 
military relations. An authoritarian leader may “politicize” the military to minimize 
competition from ambitious, outspoken, independently minded officers. In doing so the 
political authority may establish competing security agencies, award top posts based on 
loyalty rather than merit, assign non-defense related duties, purge experienced officers, or 
take other measures that undermine the competency, coherency, and mission exclusivity 
of the armed forces for the sake o f subordinating the armed forces. In the liberal- 
democratic model, however, civilians recognize the expertise o f military officers and 
grant them a certain degree of autonomy in managing military affairs, and respect their 
legitimate corporate interests, such as fair pay, reasonable deployment schedules, housing 
allowances, health benefits, and opportunities for education. Society also plays a role in
51 "Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," 384.
52 Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas, 15.
53 For more discussion o f  the liberal model o f  civil-military relations, see Baranyibid., 25-39; Nordlinger, 
Soldiers in Politics: M ilitary Coups and Governments, 12-15.
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civil-military relations, one that intensifies as a country becomes more democratic, and 
the media and nongovernmental organizations have more freedom to weigh in on debates 
regarding defense matters.
An explicit purpose of U.S. military aid is to contribute to the professionalization 
of allied and partner armed forces, which should facilitate the establishment of 
democratic control over the military. Even though the process can potentially impede 
democratic consolidation, by improving one aspect of professionalism while undermining 
another, Huntington warns that a fragmented military is far more dangerous. Not only 
will it be less capable of defending against external attack, in the absence of objective 
civilian control, civilian groups may try to maximize their power over other civilian 
groups by “breaking the officer corps up into competing units, establishing party armies 
and special military forces, or infiltrating the military hierarchy with independent chains 
of command.”54 A professional military that is not only well - trained but also cohesive, 
focused on external defense, and respects civilian political authority complicates political 
elites’ ability to co-opt, corrupt, or mobilize the military against their political opposition.
While U.S. military aid aims to promote the liberal-democratic model of civil- 
military relations, recipients have nevertheless intervened in civil politics, either directly 
via coup d'etat, or indirectly, by expanding their “reserved domains” at the expense of the 
state and society. Reserved domains are informal or institutionalized privileges beyond 
those agreed upon by state and society that, for example, may give members of the 
military establishment a more prominent role in government, national security 
policymaking, and the civil sphere, and may insulate the military from civilian oversight. 
Reserved domains may be taken by military elites while in positions of political power or 
granted by political elites in exchange for loyalty. Military interference in civil politics 
exercised through these reserved domains not only undermines military readiness, but 
also society’s confidence in civilian democratic institutions.
What are the conditions under which U.S. military aid is more likely to support 
the ability of political leaders to establish democratic control over the military? While 
some experts focus on the internal character of the armed forces in explanations of how
54 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations, 80-82.
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professionalization can lead to intervention,55 others suggest that a military’s inclination 
to interfere in civil politics is the result of interaction between these endogenous variables, 
which may “push” the military into politics, and exogenous variables that “pull” the 
military into civil politics, such as external threats or weak political leadership.56 For 
example, in the presence of an external security threat, the government will likely divert 
funds to expand the military at the expense of other sectors, and society may be more 
willing to accept the legitimacy of a military role in the civil sphere.57 As the external 
threat diminishes, civil society may be less tolerant of military interference and demand a 
“return to the barracks.” Weak civilian political leaders will be more vulnerable to 
military influence, while civilian leaders with an active political base, distributional 
coalition, and/or patronage network will be more capable of limiting the political options 
for military interference in civil politics.
U.S. Military Aid and the Role of the Foreign Armies in Civil Politics
In considering how U.S. military aid might influence these endogenous and 
exogenous factors, particularly the level of external threat, the political strength of 
civilian leaders, and the professionalism of the military, one might develop some 
relatively positive expectations about the relationship between U.S. military aid and the 
role o f foreign armies in civil politics.
The purpose o f U.S. military aid is, first and foremost, strategic. By improving the 
capabilities o f the recipient states’ military, the U.S. is enhancing that state’s ability to 
deter and defend itself from external threats. For example, equipment, training, and 
education provided by the U.S. can bolster a friendly state’s ability to control access to 
strategic waterways, patrol its borders, manage its airspace, and monitor transnational 
flows of goods and people. In addition, U.S. military aid accompanied by mutual defense 
treaties, nuclear umbrellas, and American military personnel improve the recipient’s
55 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics, 25-28.
56 U lf Sundhaussen, "The Durability o f  Military Regimes in Southeast Asia," in M ilitary-Civilian Relations 
in South-East Asia, ed. Zakaria bin Haji Ahmad and Harold A. Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 271; Aurel Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing 
Korea," Arm ed Forces & Society  30, no. 3 (2004): 360.
57 Jongseok Woo, Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post- 
Democratization  (New  York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 10.
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security environment. Thus U.S. military aid should be expected to mitigate the external 
threat to the recipient state’s national security. Since a diminished national security threat 
decreases the government’s dependence on the armed forces and lowers society’s 
tolerance for military interference in civil politics, U.S. military aid should render it less 
likely the military would use an external threat to justify expanding its role in civil 
politics.
U.S. military aid is also an expression o f political support for foreign governments. 
Military aid is provided not only to enhance a recipient’s defense capabilities, but also to 
encourage the recipient’s political alignment, so Washington can count on the recipient’s 
support for U.S. policy preferences, which increase the force o f U.S. - led initiatives such 
as coalition - building or imposing sanctions against a hostile regime. Washington 
provides political support to the civilian leadership of the partner country not only to 
promote domestic and regional stability, but also because an opposition party might 
choose to alter the state’s political alignment in the future. The political support that 
accompanies U.S. military aid should contribute to the strength of the political leadership, 
thereby minimizing the options for the military to interfere in civil politics.
U.S. military aid directly contributes to the professionalization of the recipient 
state’s armed forces, which is a precondition for establishing objective civilian control. 
Education and training increase the competence, or expertise, o f individual military 
personnel; modernization programs not only introduce sophisticated weaponry to the 
recipient’s military, but also contribute to communications, logistics, and transportation 
capabilities. The equipment, education and training allow for force reductions, and a 
smaller, highly -skilled force means better pay and also increased competition for billets, 
resulting in a higher quality service, improved morale, and lower incidences of corruption. 
In addition, interaction and close cooperation with U.S. military and defense personnel, 
during training, joint exercises, and military campaigns, may contribute to a transfer of 
American political values conducive to the liberal-democratic model of civil-military 
relations. By contributing to the professionalism of foreign militaries, U.S. military aid 
should render military intervention in civil politics less likely.
Despite these positive expectations, some foreign armies that have received U.S. 
military aid have assumed a more prominent role in civil politics, either through direct
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intervention or by expanding their institutional prerogatives, or reserved domains, at the 
expense o f civilians. For example, more than ten years after receiving U.S. military aid 
and fighting alongside American troops in the Korean War, the South Korean military 
intervened to remove a democratically - elected civilian government in 1961. Turkey's 
military did the same in 1960, and intervened again in 1971, 1980, and 1997. Egypt's 
recent intervention to remove the democratically - elected President Mohamed Morsi 
came after more than three decades of substantial U.S. military aid.
This dissertation will examine these three cases in search o f explanations for why 
these military aid recipients deviated from our expectations. In each case, the study 
begins in the post-World War II period, even in the case of Egypt, which rebuffed efforts 
to enter a formal defense arrangement with the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s, but moved 
toward political realignment in the 1970s. A study of Egyptian civil-military relations 
during the 1950s and 1960s provides a valuable comparative opportunity, as U.S. 
officials struggled to maintain relations in the absence of military aid by providing 
political support to Egypt’s president, even while he sought Soviet military aid. While the 
case study on South Korea will end during the 1990s, when President Kim Young Sam, 
who successfully implemented civil-military reforms, peacefully transferred power to 
long-time democracy activist Kim Dae Jung, the studies o f Turkey and Egypt extend 
through 2014. Turkey has been a multiparty democracy since 1950, but its military 
assumed an active guardianship role from the coup in 1960 through the 1990s. While in 
the last decade Turkey’s elected civilian leaders have implemented dramatic civil- 
military reforms that reversed the institutional gains made through the 20th century, the 
coercive means through which civilian elites have subordinated the military fall short of 
satisfying the ideal liberal-democratic model. Egypt’s case study is extended through 
2014 to include a discussion of the recent military intervention, as well as the subsequent 
decision of former defense minister and coup-leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to run for 
president.
Each case study will be divided into three or four time periods, which allows for 
an examination of how a particular foreign government might influence civil-military 
relations despite continuity in U.S. military aid. During each period, the relationship 
between U.S. military aid and three factors that influence a military’s inclination to
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interfere in civil politics will be assessed. Specifically, each study will identify ways in 
which U.S. military aid mitigated the external threats to the recipient’s security, how U.S. 
support for civilian political leaders might have limited options for military interference, 
and how U.S. military aid contributed to the professionalization of the military. In those 
instances where the relationship between U.S. military aid and military intervention in 
civil politics does not conform to our expectations, this study will examine how the 
domestic and international political context might have constrained political leaders’ 
ability to subordinate the military despite external support from the United States.
For example, military officers that intervened might have been motivated less by 
external security concerns than economic or political crises, such as parliamentary 
deadlock or political violence. In addition, military aid may not prevent authoritarian 
elites from linking national security threats with their political opposition; in fact, the 
presence of U.S. military aid might lend credibility to elite claims that security concerns 
predominate, justifying an expanded role for the military in the civil sphere.
U.S. military aid may boost the political strength of the recipient's civilian leaders, 
ideally facilitating the establishment o f objective civilian control over the military. Yet 
this political support may be characterized by discontinuity between White House and 
Congressional views, which creates uncertainty and a sense of insecurity within the 
recipient government. Even when American support is unequivocal, authoritarian elites 
might not attempt to establish objective civilian control, opting instead to deliberately 
politicize the military to consolidate their authority and secure their regime. An elected 
leader who does want to establish objective civilian control may be too weak to reverse 
the institutional prerogatives of the military right away, and may instead adopt a policy of 
“acquiescence,” accepting the military’s reserved domains in exchange for tacit approval 
of their regime.
Finally, U.S. military aid may contribute to some aspects of professionalization 
more than others. Historically, U.S. military aid has had the greatest impact on foreign 
militaries’ competency, through modernization programs, education and training, and 
experience gained during joint operations. This expertise increases the military’s 
professionalism, but, particularly in lesser-developed countries, may undermine the 
coherency of the officer corps if some officers are more receptive to new ideas than
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others. In addition, while U.S. advisors may try to promote the military’s coherency by 
encouraging a sense o f national unity and responsibility, in the short term it may be 
difficult for U.S. instructors to overcome regional, kinship, service and/or patronage ties, 
or the influence of other foreign actors that shaped the identity of the armed services 
and/or contributed to ideological splits within the military. Increasing an armed forces’ 
competence may also encourage the military to expand its role in internal security and 
national development, which undermines the mission exclusivity o f the armed forces at 
the expense o f the civil sector. While U.S. schools emphasize the importance of respect 
for civilian control, education and training may give personnel a feeling of superiority as 
they outpace their civilian peers, encouraging military officers to expand their "reserved 
domains," or autonomy from civilian oversight, if  given the opportunity.
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CHAPTER II
SOUTH KOREA: U.S. MILITARY AID AND THE ROAD TO OBJECTIVE
CIVILIAN CONTROL
Introduction
The significance of U.S. military and political support for South Korea emerged 
in the early postwar period, as American and Soviet occupation forces, tasked with 
receiving Japanese surrenders, struggled to agree on a political roadmap for a unified 
Korean provisional government. As Koreans in the south, anxious for a return to self- 
governance, protested the presence of American troops, the commander of the U.S. 
military government cautioned that the Soviets were training a North Korean Communist 
army o f at least 150,000, and reorganizing and re-equipping the Chinese Communist 
army in Manchuria.1 While future president Syngman Rhee appealed to President 
Truman that South Korea was as strategically significant as Greece, and as such should 
benefit from the Truman Doctrine,2 Secretary of War Robert Patterson warned the 
presence of American military personnel was aggravating the “intense desire for Korean 
independence,” and, believing that the risk of internal problems was greater than the 
external threat, advised American troops be withdrawn while the U.S. was still in a 
position to set the terms of their redeployment.3
The Truman administration referred the “Korean problem” to the United Nations, 
and U.S. troops would return to the United States by the end of 1948, leaving behind a 
small contingent o f U.S. military advisers. Only when Soviet-backed North Korean
'"Message from Commander General U.S.A.F.I.K. General Hodge sent in Telegram from General o f  the 
Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary o f  State, July 2, 1947," in FRUS (U.S. Department o f  State: 
University o f  Wisconsin Digital Collection).
2 "Letter from Syngman Rhee to President Truman, March 13, 1947," in FRUS  (U.S. Department o f  State: 
University o f  Wisconsin Digital Collections).
3"Letter from the Secretary o f  State to the Political Advisor in Korea, July 2, 1947," in FRUS (U.S. 
Department o f  State: University o f  Wisconsin Digital Collection); "Letter from the Secretary o f  War to the 
Acting Secretary o f  State, April 4, 1947," in FRUS (U.S. Department o f  State: University o f  Wisconsin 
Digital Collection).
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forces invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, did the American commitment to 
the nascent state as a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia crystallize. Once the 
United States invested blood and treasure to protect the sovereignty of South Korea, it 
would thereafter possess a strategic interest in providing U.S. military assistance to 
strengthen its armed forces.
The United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, which 
committed the U.S. to helping South Korea defend itself in the event o f renewed North 
Korean aggression. Along with stationing tens of thousands of American Army and Air 
Force personnel in South Korea, including two divisions that patrolled the three- 
kilometer wide demilitarized zone that divided north from south, the United States 
provided billions in training, education, equipment, and weaponry over the next four 
decades. Washington also provided political support for South Korea, not only to bolster 
South Korea’s civilian leadership, but also to build the Korean people’s confidence in 
their future as a viable, self-sufficient, democratic state. American military aid also 
contributed to the professionalization of South Korea’s armed forces, enabling them not 
only to defend themselves against possible Communist aggression, but also to serve as a 
force for stability throughout Asia.4 The Korean military expanded rapidly from a modest 
constabulary force o f 50,000 in 1948, to a standing army of nearly 700,000 during the 
Korean War, making it by far the most developed institution in Korean society. The close 
relationship between the Korean military and the U.S. military, which began in the late 
1940s, deepened during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
U.S. military aid thus had a significant influence on those factors that might shape 
a military’s inclination to intervene in civil politics. By mitigating the external security 
threat, providing political support for Korea’s civilian leaders, and professionalizing its 
armed forces, U.S. military aid should have rendered military intervention in Korea’s 
civil politics less likely. However, in the decades following the initial strategic 
partnership, members o f South Korea’s armed forces directly intervened in Korean 
politics during the coups of 1961 and 1979, acted on political leaders’ behalf by imposing 
martial law and using force against members o f the political opposition, and expanded
4 National Security Council: Evaluation o f  Alternative Military Programs for Korea, January 14, 1957, 
FRUS 23, no. 196.
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their participation in Korea’s civil sphere throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
This chapter will examine the evolution of South Korea’s civil-military relations 
from 1947 until 1998, in an effort to explain the apparent negative relationship between 
U.S. military aid and the military’s presence in Korea’s civil politics. U.S. military aid 
decisively mitigated the external threats to South Korean security. The South Korean 
army, which emerged from the Korean war as the largest standing army in the Asian 
“free world,” had a psychological impact not only on the citizens of South Korea, but 
also on other non-Communist Asian states that were struggling with their own political 
and economic challenges and felt threatened by the newly Communist China and the 
Soviet Union. Mutual security programs created a global arc to “resist Communist 
penetration or domination o f the free world.”5 Along with U.S. commitments to the 
Republic of China, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa, the 
presence of U.S. forces along with a strong Korean military capability would serve as “a 
major symbol o f determination to resist further Communist expansion in the Far East.”6 
Nevertheless, political leaders continued to link the external threat with the domestic 
political opposition to justify authoritarian behavior and the presence o f the military in 
civil politics. In addition, the military interventions in 1961 and 1979 were reactions to 
the political weakness of civilian leaders rather than an escalation of the external threat.
Washington also provided political support to Korea’s civilian leadership. 
American prestige during the Cold War was tied to South Korea’s successful political 
development, which included respect for democratic norms such as fair and free elections 
for civilian leaders, a multi-party political system, and respect for human rights. A 
democratic South Korea would be a bulwark against the expansion o f Communist 
ideology in East Asia, and provide a liberal democratic model for non-Communist 
countries in the developing world. Despite American support for Korea’s civilian 
leadership that should have facilitated the establishment of objective civilian control over 
the military, Korea’s presidents from the 1950s through the 1980s instead chose to 
deliberately politicize factions within the military, to preserve the option of using force 
against members o f their opposition. Until the presidency of Kim Young Sam, those
5 National Security Council 5525 Status o f  National Security Programs, June 30, 1955, FRUS 10, no. 6.
6 "National Security Council: Evaluation o f  Alternative Military Programs for Korea."
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leaders who did want to return to democratic processes and follow a liberal-democratic 
model of civil-military relations were too weak to implement civil-military reforms, and 
instead adopted a policy o f acquiescence, allowing politicized officers to protect and 
expand their reserved domains.
Finally, U.S. military assistance had a decisive impact on the competence o f the 
Korean military. The U.S. drove the rapid expansion of the Korean military after the 
outbreak o f the Korean War by establishing numerous military training facilities as well 
as institutions for professional military education. The military’s technical and 
administrative expertise was also enhanced by exchange programs, on-the-job training, 
and modernization programs. The presence o f an American general as the Commander in 
Chief, United Nations Command, contributed to the close military-to-military relations 
between American and Korean military personnel. However, improving the competence 
of the military during Korea’s early stages o f development produced powerful incentives 
to intervene when civilian elites were unable to maintain social order and economic 
growth. In addition, factions with un-democratic ideologies challenged American efforts 
to encourage a sense o f unity and mold the Korean military into a cohesive institution.
This case study examines the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role 
of the South Korean military in civil politics during three periods: from the beginning of 
Syngman Rhee’s presidency in 1948 until his resignation in May, 1960, from the coup 
that unseated democratically - elected Prime Minister Chang Myon’s government on May 
16, 1961, until President Park’s assassination in October, 1979, and from the subsequent 
coup of December 1979, until South Korea established democratic control over its 
military, which in this case will be defined as the peaceful transfer of power from pro­
democracy activist Kim Young Sam to opposition candidate and long-time dissident Kim 
Dae Jung in 1998, during which the military made no effort to interfere politically despite 
objecting to many of Kim Dae Jung’s more liberal policy preferences. During the first 
period, President Rhee exploited factional rivalries within the military to maintain control 
over the armed forces and intimidate his political opposition. Nevertheless, when the 
public demanded his resignation during the April revolution in 1960, the military refused 
to intervene on his behalf, and he stepped down.
In the second period, one of the military’s factions, led by Park Chung Hee, grew
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frustrated with the inability of the elected government of Chang Myon to deal with 
corruption, economic crisis, and political violence, and organized the country’s first 
military coup d’etat. Park resigned his commission and won three presidential elections 
(1963, 1967, and 1971). During this “honeymoon” period in bilateral relations, during 
which Park enjoyed strong support from both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
Park used U.S. military aid and the national security threat to mobilize the Korean public, 
implementing economic reforms and initiating an impressive period of state-directed 
economic growth. However, in the context o f Nixon’s Guam Doctrine and the American 
withdrawal from South Vietnam, Park pulled his military deeper into politics to centralize 
his authority and implement the repressive Yushin constitution, which severely restricted 
political activity and allowed Park to rule until his assassination in 1979.
In the third period, members o f the Hanahoe faction acted against senior military 
leaders and the acting president to seize power rather than return to constitutional 
processes, resulting in another coup d’etat in December, 1979. Nevertheless, President 
Ronald Reagan’s resolve to demonstrate anti-Communist solidarity brought with it a 
reinvigoration of U.S. -  Korean relations. By 1987, however, President Chun Doo Hwan 
was faced with pressure from not only an opposition that now included members of the 
new middle class, but from Reagan himself, as well as a professionalized military 
reluctant to use force against Korean society. Thus while President Chun enjoyed strong 
material and political support from the Reagan Administration, he responded to the 
demands for reforms in 1987 that provided for direct presidential elections. Chun’s 
successor and fellow faction member Roh Tae Woo preserved the reserved domains of 
the military rather than move to establish objective civilian control; yet Roh proved to be 
an effective transitional figure in that he allowed for the peaceful transfer o f power to the 
democratically-elected Kim Young Sam. Kim won support for sweeping civil-military 
reforms that finally allowed the government to achieve objective civilian control over the 
military by the late 1990s.
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A Tumultuous Alliance: The U.S., Military Aid, and the President 
Syngman Rhee, 1948 -  1960
“When you look at this little finger o f South Korea sticking out of 
mainland Asia, you recall that the statement made by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff ten years ago is as true today as it was then -  namely, the statement 
that while Korea is o f no military importance to us in general war, it is 
psychologically and politically o f such importance that to lose it would 
run the risk o f the loss o f our entire position in the Far East. Accordingly, 
we have got to carry on in the Far East.”7
During the period of President Rhee’s leadership, U.S. military aid shaped several 
factors that influenced the role o f the military in civil politics. The external threats to the 
Republic o f Korea upon its establishment in 1948 were acute. While the end of World 
War II heralded the peninsula’s emancipation from Japanese colonial rule, the temporary 
administrative division o f Korea along the 38th parallel hardened as tensions rose between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and created an economic burden on the isolated 
Koreans. On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was established; less than a month 
later the north declared itself the Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea. The peninsula 
was divided into hostile, ideologically opposed camps, and Communist guerilla fighters 
were known to penetrate the 38th parallel and instigate violence in the south. The U.S. 
reluctantly provided political support to the previously exiled, civilian leader Syngman 
Rhee, a western-educated, staunch anti-Communist who had long fought against Japanese 
imperial rule. The invasion by North Korea in 1950 would instigate a rapid expansion of 
training programs to transform the modest Korean defense force into the largest standing 
army in free East Asia, contributing to its professionalization.
This section is divided into three parts. The first will examine the external threat 
to South Korea’s security, how U.S. military aid aimed to mitigate that threat, and if the 
Korean military used the presence of the external threat to justify an expansion of its role 
in civil politics. The second part will discuss the political strength of President Rhee 
during his presidency, and ask if American political support for his presidency helped 
him establish objective civilian control over the military. The final part will look at how
7 President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a Discussion o f  the National Security Council, August 8, 1957, FRUS 
23, no. 239.
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U.S. military aid contributed to the professionalization of the Republic o f Korea’s armed 
forces, and if that professionalization made its intervention in civil politics more or less 
likely.
Meeting the External Threat: The U.S. Commits to ROK Security
In the immediate postwar period, the U.S. occupation forces intended to reassure 
a vulnerable Korean population that the U.S. was committed to assisting its transition to 
an independent, sovereign state. With anti-occupation sentiment growing among the 
South Korean people, however, U.S. policymakers, mindful o f the military and economic 
burdens o f the Truman Doctrine in practice, had decided to withdraw U.S. combat troops 
from the Korean peninsula. Unlike the Soviets, the Americans, focused on the Soviet 
threats to American interests in Western Europe and the Middle East, judged the Korean 
peninsula to be o f little strategic significance, and thought an invasion by North Korean 
forces to be unlikely. When North Korea invaded in the summer of 1950, U.S. military 
aid had a decisive impact on the survival o f the Republic o f Korea. The presence o f U.S. 
army, air force, marine and naval troops under UN command, the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
and millions of dollars in military aid throughout the next decade mitigated the external 
threat to South Korea’s security posed by North Korea and the Chinese Communists. 
While the military gained socio-political importance during this period, as an institution it 
did not use the external threat to justify intervention in civil politics; however, the civilian 
President Rhee used the external threat to justify his use of the military to intimidate and 
harass members of the political opposition, thus pulling the military into the civilian 
political arena.
From 1945 -  1947, the U.S. military government in South Korea, sent to Korea to 
receive the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, was focused on helping the 
Koreans below the 38th parallel maintain internal security until a provisional government 
could be established to govern an independent, unified Korea. While U.S. efforts were 
focused on creating a constabulary force during these early days, the U.S. presence was 
intended to reassure the defenseless Koreans that the U.S. was committed to restoring 
Korean sovereignty and maintaining its territorial integrity. The American government
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created a National Defense Command (NDC) within the United States Army Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK), with the goal of establishing a Korean defense force 
o f approximately 25,000 personnel capable of maintaining internal stability once U.S. 
combat troops withdrew. Koreans with prior military experience were invited to attend 
American-led schools that could produce officers capable o f communicating with NDC 
personnel, and become the core o f the Korean Constabulary as enlisted recruiting began 
in the spring of 1946.8
The prevailing sentiment among U.S. officials was that political and economic 
progress would strengthen the U.S. negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the 
Joint Commission, which was tasked with establishing a provisional government for the 
whole of Korea. Thus while the U.S. was concerned about Communist subversion, their 
focus was not yet on establishing an indigenous defense force capable o f repelling an 
outright attack from an outside force. The internal security challenges emanated from 
Communist insurgents, as well as numerous paramilitary groups opposed to the decision 
to put the country under joint Soviet-American trustee-ship.9
The failure o f the Joint Commission, combined with increasing political pressure 
from extreme right political groups led by Syngman Rhee, led to the referral o f the 
“Korean problem” to the UN, which agreed to monitor public elections for a general 
assembly in March, 1948. When the South Korean government was established on 
August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea’s army absorbed the constabulary, and its forces 
numbered 50,000.10 While U.S. troops were scheduled to withdraw later that year, 
General Douglas MacArthur told President Rhee at his inauguration ceremony in August, 
“If Korea should ever be attacked by the Communists, I will defend it as I would 
California.” 11
Rhee, who had incited anti-American sentiment and repudiated American 
occupation just a year earlier, sought to delay the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces, 
particularly in light of the Communist uprising in Yosu just two months after his
8 Se-Jin Kim, The Politics o f  M ilitary Revolution in Korea  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1971), 36-37.
9 Ibid., 38.
10 Ibid., 39.
11 Russell D. Buhite, Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America's East Asian Policy  
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 103.
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inauguration.12 Rhee wrote Truman personally to request a delay in troop withdrawal 
until Korean forces could adequately provide for South Korea’s defense. In December, 
the UN recognized the South Korean government and called for the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops within 90 days. Rhee made an effort to condition the withdrawal o f U.S. troops on 
a commitment o f U.S. military aid, but U.S. officials resisted making any such 
commitments to the capricious Rhee. The government and the Korean people grew 
concerned for their security as American troops began to leave; by the end of June, 1949, 
only the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) remained on 
the peninsula, with a contingent of less than five hundred soldiers and enough equipment 
to arm 50,000 Korean soldiers.
The attack on the Republic of Korea by Communist North Korean forces, in the 
context o f the Soviet testing of an atomic weapon in 1949, as well as the defeat o f the 
Chinese Nationalists in 1949, forced U.S. policymakers to confront the possibility that 
the Soviet and Chinese Communists would expand their sphere o f influence in Asia by 
force, with implications for the use of force against U.S. allies in Europe. Communist 
aggression that went unchecked by the United Nations, the nascent collective security 
organization conceived to maintain order in the international system, would undermine 
the credibility o f U.S. security guarantees that ameliorated the security dilemma in a 
recovering Europe and elsewhere.
While skirmishes between North and South Korean military forces along the 38th 
parallel were not uncommon, the Americans were unprepared for the invasion of South 
Korea, and the first week of fighting was disastrous for the South Korean army. The 
South Korean army, which numbered 95,000 men on June 25, could only account for
22,000 by the end of June as troops fled south, abandoning weapons and equipment along 
the way. The U.S. quickly organized a United Nations coalition of 16 countries to defend 
South Korea, and drove North Korean forces back across the 38th parallel. General 
Douglas MacArthur, authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume operational control 
of the U.S. military in Korea, urged President Truman to immediately commit U.S. 
ground forces, and U.S. troops stationed in Japan were ordered to Korea on June 30th.
12 Richard J. H. Johnston, "Korea Orders Martial Law, Army Moves on Red Rebels," The New York Times, 
October 21, 1948.
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MacArthur assumed command o f the United Nations Unified Command, which 
was established in Tokyo on July 24th The UN forces consisted primarily o f Korean 
troops, but included substantial contributions from the United States, the British 
Commonwealth, and Turkey. NATO allies such as France and the Netherlands, and 
smaller contingents from the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Thailand also assisted.13 Mass 
conscription and accelerated military training ensured that by the end o f July, the South 
Korean army had regained its prewar strength of about 95,000. UN forces assumed 
defensive positions along the Pusan Perimeter (a 100 mile by 50 mile rectangle in the 
southeast intended to thwart a North Korean drive for Pusan), regrouped, and prepared to 
wage a counteroffensive. By the beginning o f September, the UN command was 180,000 
strong.
While the UN force was successful in driving North Korean troops out of the 
Republic o f Korea’s territorial space, it was unable to fulfill President Rhee’s dream of 
“liberating” the North from the Communists. After an early successful offensive that 
reached the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and Communist China, the 
Chinese entered the war and drove the UN forces back across the 38th parallel. By July 
1951, the war had reached a stalemate, with negotiations dragging on for two more years, 
largely due to disagreements over prisoner repatriation. Yet Rhee was so determined to 
unify the peninsula during his lifetime that U.S. officials had considerable difficulty 
convincing him to agree to the armistice that ended the combat phase o f the war.14 
American policymakers were concerned Rhee would try to unilaterally unify the 
peninsula by force, and the U.S., which had already invested heavily to preserve the 
sovereignty of South Korea, would be put in the difficult position of choosing between an 
indefinite continuation of hostilities with the concurrent risk o f escalation, or 
withdrawing from the conflict altogether. For this reason the U.S. agreed to a Mutual 
Defense Treaty, promised military aid, and kept two U.S. Army Infantry divisions in 
Korea to facilitate American command over the Combined United Nations - ROK forces 
tasked with defending the country.
13 Jeffrey Grey, "UN Coalition Warfare During the Korean War," in The Routledge Handbook o f  American 
M ilitary and Diplom atic History, 1986 to the Present, ed. Antonio S. Thompson and Christos G. Frentzos 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 218.
14 Telegram from the Acting Secretary o f  State to the Embassy in Korea, May 15, 1953, FRUS 15, no. 524.
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For the remainder of Rhee’s presidency, U.S. officials struggled to balance two 
imperatives: the need to maintain American control over a Korean force large and 
capable enough to bolster anti-Communist governments throughout Asia, and the need to 
reduce the financial burden o f maintaining that force on both the American and Korean 
budgets. Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers and President Rhee disagreed on the best way 
to meet the external threat. U.S. officials believed normalizing relations with Japan and 
downsizing the armed forces were necessary preconditions for economic growth, which 
would provide greater security for South Korea in the long-term.15 The Agreed Minute of 
Understanding between the U.S. and the ROK, signed on November 17, 1954, stated that 
the total number o f ROK military personnel would be adjusted once a reserve force was 
strengthened; American officials preferred to organize a sizeable reserve force with the 
capacity to augment a more modest active force in case of emergency.16
Rhee, however, was opposed both to rapprochement with Japan and force 
reductions, two policies which would be very unpopular with the Korean public. General 
Chung II Kwon, the Korean Army’s Chief o f Staff, explained the Rhee government was 
“troubled by Communist China,” which seemed to be steadily increasing its capabilities, 
and that the downsizing of Korean forces would have an “irreparable effect on public 
morale.” 17 President Rhee was so opposed to force reductions he resorted to blackmail 
tactics to stall U.S. military aid reductions. “While I am aware that there are economic 
considerations that make a reduction in our armed forces desirable,” Rhee wrote to 
President Eisenhower, “I seriously question the wisdom of doing so at this tim e....It is a 
tragedy indeed when Asian people and countries turn against America. This must not 
happen in Korea where the friendly sentiment o f the people o f America provides one of 
the strongest bulwarks against the further spread of Communism.” 18 Korean officials 
insisted any force reductions implemented prior to equipping both Korean and American
15 Letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, January 31, 1955, FRUS 23, no. 8. President 
Eisenhower, in a personal letter to Rhee, emphasized the importance o f  a “restoration o f  a feeling o f  
genuine harmony and friendship between Japan and Korea,” which would facilitate bilateral trade relations 
and provide a much-needed boost to the South Korean economy.
l6Memorandum from the Deputy Director o f  the Office o f  Northeast Asian Affairs (Noel Hemmendinger) 
to the Assistant Secretary o f  State for Far Eastern Affairs (Walter Robertson): Forthcoming JCS 
Recommendations on Future Force Levels for the ROK Army, October 24, 1955, FRUS 23, no. 96.
17 Memorandum o f Conversation on the Security o f the Republic o f Korea, FRUS 2, no. 59. The Korean 
armed services at this time numbered 720,000, with 658,000 personnel in the army alone.
18 Letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, August 2, 1957, FRUS 23, no. 238.
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forces with the most modem weapons available (something prohibitively expensive even 
for the United States) would be repeating the mistakes of 1950.
Rhee claimed the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Policy Declaration were 
not enough to assure Koreans the U.S. would defend South Korea if attacked from the 
north, insisting the only way to deter a new attack would be a substantial American 
combat troop presence combined with a strong South Korean military. In 1957, U.S. 
officials discussed with Rhee a plan to cut 100,000 personnel from the Korean armed 
forces in exchange for a modernization program that would upgrade transport and 
communications equipment and provide advanced weaponry. General Lyman Lemnitzer, 
the Unified Nations Force commander, explained that the U.S. forces in Korea would be 
equipped with atomic-capable weapons, which would enable the Korean army to reduce 
its manpower and redirect resources toward economic development.19 President 
Eisenhower assured Rhee the U.S. was deeply invested in the security of the ROK, but 
that, “It has become imperative for our own budget... that the costs of maintaining the 
forces o f the Republic o f Korea at their present combat power be reduced....I know that 
you will welcome the increasing effectiveness of our aid program and the expansion to 
your own economy and over-all strength which will be consequent on these military 
reductions.”20 President Eisenhower insisted that the current level of aid was 
unsustainable, put a heavy burden on the Korean economy, and actually weakened 
Korea’s defensive capabilities because it led to equipment deficiencies.2' The frustrated 
Americans modified their original proposal to reducing the Korean force level to 660,000, 
with nearly 600,000 troops dedicated to the Korean army.22 After two difficult years of 
negotiations, the U.S. and South Korea agreed the U.S. would provide support for
630,000 ROK forces, down from 720,000, for FY1959.23
While the military as an institution did not use the external threat to justify 
expanding its political role during this period, President Rhee insisted on drawing the 
military into civil politics to meet the alleged Communist threat posed by his political
19 Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department o f  State, June 21, 1957, FRUS 23, no. 224.
20 Letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, August 23, 1957, FRUS  23, no. 243.
21 Ibid.
22 Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (General George Decker) to the 
Department o f  the Army, November 6, 1957, FRUS 23, no. 253.
23 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 4 1 1th Meeting o f  the National Security Council: U.S. Policy Toward 
Korea, June 25, 1959, FRUS 18, no. 277.
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opponents. Rhee justified using the armed forces to arrest and detain assemblymen in his 
bid to amend the constitution in 1952, by accusing his political opponents o f Communist 
subversion.24 He ordered a military presence outside of the National Assembly in an 
effort to intimidate his opposition, and claimed Communists were plotting to elect 
opposition member Chang Myon as president because Chang was willing to form a 
coalition government that would negotiate with North Korea. A report on Korea’s 
internal security noted, “Political activity in the ROK is characterized by conspiratorial 
tactics....False allegations of secret alliance with the Communists have often been made 
by one group against another for political purposes.”25 Later in the decade, Rhee and his 
Liberal Party used the Communist threat to justify a National Security Law that included 
“dangerously loose definitions of espionage activity;” Korean citizens could be punished 
for “disturbing the people by reporting or spreading false facts or distorted news.”26 
Rhee’s Liberal Party insisted the bill was necessary to meet the threat of Communist 
subversion, while the opposition Democratic Party recalled the tactics employed by Rhee 
during the constitutional crisis o f 1952.
The Congressional authorization for FY 1960 would not support the force 
modernization that U.S. officials had promised would compensate for force reductions. 
The American ambassador to Korea, Walter Dowling, insisted the reduction in the 
Military Assistance Program “severely retards scheduled development o f ROK-self- 
defense capability,” and warned U.S. officials that South Korea’s military leaders were 
worried American interest in the defense o f Korea was declining. Dowling argued, “We 
cannot expect ROK forces to maintain high morale, state of alertness and training 
standards if cutback in MAP and counterpart support requires maintenance forces at bare 
subsistence level or less.”27 Thus by the end of Rhee’s presidency in 1960, a level of
24 Woo, Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post- 
Democratization, 28; Murray Schumach, "Van Fleet Confers with Rhee on Acts; Arrest o f  Legislators 
Prompts Visit - Assembly Votes, 96-3, to End Pusan Martial Law; General Van Fleet Confers with Rhee 
After Arrest o f  8 Assemblymen," The New York Times, May 28, 1952.
25Staff Study Prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group for the Operations Coordinating Board: 
Analysis o f  Internal Security Situation in Republic o f  Korea, November 16, 1955, FRUS 23, no. 99.
26 Airgram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department o f State, November 26, 1958, FRUS 18, no. 249; 
ibid.
27 Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department o f  State, September 15, 1959, FRUS 18, no. 
281.
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uncertainty existed regarding the future U.S. commitment to South Korea’s external 
security.
The Political Authority o f President Rhee
The U.S. military government in postwar Korea grew frustrated with Rhee’s 
efforts to disrupt the negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the establishment o f a 
provisional government in Korea. As negotiations broke down over the issue o f which 
political parties would be consulted to form the government o f a united Korea, U.S. 
officials were left with little alternative than to back the influential, nationalistic Rhee, 
who commanded the respect o f large swathes o f Koreans for his anti-Communism and 
anti-colonial efforts during Japanese occupation. The United States’ appeal to the 
international community to defend President Rhee and his government against attack by 
North Korea’s Communist regime had a decisive impact on the Republic o f Korea’s 
survival. While after the war Rhee continued to antagonize U.S. policymakers, U.S. 
officials feared withdrawing political support for Rhee would destabilize his government, 
with implications for U.S. interests in the Far East. As Koreans became increasingly 
discontent with Rhee’s authoritarianism, U.S. officials encouraged Rhee to resign the 
presidency, ideally paving the way for free elections and a turn toward more democratic 
governance. While the military as an institution did not take advantage of Rhee’s 
declining popularity to intervene in politics, throughout his presidency Rhee deliberately 
politicized particular senior military personnel by using them to monitor and harass his 
opposition, fund his political base, and ensure his election. Despite Rhee’s patronage of 
select senior military officers, at the end of Rhee’s presidency, the armed forces as an 
institution refused to act on his behalf against growing domestic opposition.
Syngman Rhee would test the patience o f both the Truman and the Eisenhower 
administrations. He made life difficult for the military government in Korea, rallying 
Koreans around “anti-trusteeship,” publically admonishing the American military 
government commander, Lieutenant General John Hodge, and staging at times violent 
anti-American rallies and demonstrations. His antics threatened relations between the 
Soviet and American negotiators to the point that Secretary o f War Patterson warned in
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April 1947, “the current situation in Korea is potentially explosive,” and advised the U.S. 
“get out o f Korea at an early date.”28 Extreme right-wing groups that rejected the Soviet- 
American trusteeship and the presence of the U.S. military government dominated the 
majority o f the Legislative Assembly, an interim body established by Hodge to give 
Koreans experience in political processes.
When Rhee became president, however, he staunchly opposed the withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from the peninsula, recognizing their absence would put the new Republic of 
Korea in a vulnerable position. During and after the Korean War, Rhee wanted to 
preserve the large Korean military as well as U.S. military support to reach his primary 
goal, the unification of the peninsula, which he thought was only possible through the use 
o f force. The fact that the policy of the U.S. was to reach a political solution to the 
Korean problem, and that the Eisenhower administration explicitly stated it would not 
back the Republic of Korea if it initiated a military confrontation with North Korea, was a 
constant irritant to Rhee and undermined his main political platform, unification. The 
American effort to reduce the number of active American and Korean military forces 
after the Korean War threatened Rhee by giving the impression o f declining American 
political support and increasing the insecurity o f Korean society.29 Rhee was even less 
amenable to rapprochement with Japan, a controversial topic with Koreans that U.S. 
officials believed was necessary for long-term regional stability and economic growth.
Despite their irritation with President Rhee, American officials understood that 
Korea’s political alignment, which allowed for U.S. command over the more than
600,000 strong Korean armed forces, had important implications for U.S. interests in the 
Far East. The large military establishment in South Korea had a psychological and 
political impact on non-Communist regimes in Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and 
other Far Eastern countries.30 The American ambassador to the Republic o f Korea, 
William S. B. Lacy, warned in 1955 that any discussion of force reductions would strain 
bilateral relations and diminish U.S. influence on Korean affairs, particularly U.S.
28"Letter from the Secretary o f  War to the Acting Secretary o f  State, April 4, 1947."
29 Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department o f  State, May 30, 1955, FRUS 23, no. 54. 
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officials’ ability to serve as a restraining influence on the Rhee regime. Since those 
relations were exercised though the Unified Command, the withdrawal o f ROK forces 
from the UN Command in response to reductions in U.S. military support could render 
the resumption o f North-South hostilities more likely. In addition, since the vast majority 
of Korean society felt the U.S. military presence was vital for their national security, any 
appearance o f a wavering American commitment might have a destabilizing impact on 
the Rhee regime ahead of the 1956 elections, rendering him more vulnerable to 
Communist political subversion.31
American officials thus tried to balance the need to preserve both domestic and 
regional political stability with the fact that in the long term, U.S. military aid would have 
to decrease.32 White House officials, not wanting to give the impression of declining 
political support, often emphasized the restraining influence U.S. public opinion and the 
American Congress had on their ability to provide U.S. military aid. For example, in 
1955, Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles met with President Rhee and his cabinet to 
emphasize that many American Congressmen believed that the aid program should be 
reduced.33 Expenditures in Korea were making it more difficult to support the forward 
deployment o f U.S. forces in other parts o f the world, which was a vital part o f the U.S. 
strategy to meet the Soviet threat.34
Rhee responded to pressure from the U.S. by stirring up anti-American sentiment 
within Korean society, accusing the United States o f favoring Japan as well as 
underestimating the strategic value o f the Korean peninsula.35 He staged riots outside of 
the American Embassy in Seoul,36 and wrote, “Now that our best hope, the United States, 
is turning towards Russia, Red China, India and Japan for co-existence, which we cannot 
support, we have to depend upon ourselves for better or worse.”37 It was clear that the
31 Ibid.
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political objectives of the United States and President Rhee diverged. While the U.S. 
wanted to maintain the present territorial integrity of the Republic o f Korea and minimize 
Soviet gains, Rhee wanted Washington to back him in a bid to reunify the peninsula.
Rhee opposed force reductions and rapprochement with Japan. Rhee believed the United 
States should take a stronger stance with the Soviets in response to the Hungarian 
uprisings, rather than pursuing “peace at any price.”38 Rhee told Eisenhower that until a 
“unified, independent and democratic government in Korea” was established, “we feel 
compelled to bear the tremendous burden of maintaining the present level of our defense 
forces,” which would, of course, require large outlays of U.S. military aid indefinitely.39
Rhee not only relied on the external political support provided by the United 
States to maintain his rule; as the Korean War progressed, the military became an 
attractive strategic partner. Rhee deftly maintained control over the increasingly 
competent and popular military by removing uncooperative officers from the armed 
forces and placing loyal officers in key positions.40 For example, in 1948, he named 
officers with experience in the Japanese Imperial Army to be the first Army Chief of 
Staff and first Chief o f General Staff, passing over those with experience in China who 
were loyal to Rhee’s political rival, Kim Koo.41 Rhee also used a “divide and rule” 
strategy, deliberately politicizing factions within the military and using loyal troops to 
intimidate his political opposition.
During the Korean War, Rhee co-opted loyal officers to support his constitutional 
amendment that would allow for the popular election of the president, which would 
circumvent the increasingly anti-Rhee National Assembly. By declaring martial law in 
Pusan in May 15, 1952, Rhee politicized elements o f the military, which were put in the 
difficult position of either acting on behalf of one political party against another, or 
refusing to follow the orders o f their civilian political leadership. The order to arrest eight 
assemblymen was a clear violation of the liberal model o f civil-military relations, as was 
the presence o f military personnel outside the National Assembly to intimidate Rhee’s
38 "Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department o f  State."
39 "Letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower."
40 Kim, The Politics o f  M ilitary Revolution in Korea , 57-59.
41 Ibid., 44-48.
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political opposition.42 The mobilization of the military for political purposes exacerbated 
ideological divisions within the military organization, as some officers believed the 
armed forces should remain politically neutral, while others were eager to back the right- 
wing Rhee.
Rhee also manipulated the organization o f the armed forces to exercise greater 
influence and consolidate his authority. For example, he established a military police unit 
within the Department of National Defense, rather than within the Army, to monitor the 
entire military establishment, enabling him to circumvent the agreement between the U.S. 
and the Republic of Korea in which the Korean Army was subordinate to the United 
Nations command. The military police unit, headed by a Joint Military Provost Marshal 
(JMPM), only answered to the civilian Minister o f Defense, who reported directly to the 
President. Rhee assigned a loyal officer to the post as well as to the head o f the Counter- 
Intelligence Corp (CIC), and encouraged rivalry between the two entities. The CIC and 
JMPM engaged in extralegal and violent tactics, “not excluding the outright murder of 
politically undesirable people.”43 Rhee also moved the headquarters o f the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, which included the three chiefs o f the three service branches, to the rear quarters of 
his presidential mansion, giving him direct access to all military units.
As the 1950s progressed, Rhee’s leadership became increasingly authoritarian as 
he sought to maintain his dominant role in Korean politics with heavy-handed measures. 
Undemocratic behavior, such as Rhee’s constitutional amendment in 1954 that abolished 
the two-term limitation, undermined public support for his presidency.44 Rhee attempted 
to compensate for this loss by relying more heavily on the military establishment. As one 
historian put it, “The intensity with which Rhee interfered with the military gained 
momentum in direct proportion to the attrition of his popularity in the civilian arena.”45 
Rhee was re-elected on May 15, 1956, amidst accusations of electoral fraud. The 
election o f opposition party member Chang Myon (also known as John Chang) as Vice
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Democratization, 28; Schumach, "Van Fleet Confers with Rhee on Acts; Arrest o f  Legislators Prompts 
Visit - Assembly Votes, 96-3, to End Pusan Martial Law; General Van Fleet Confers with Rhee After 
Arrest o f  8 Assemblymen."
43 Kim, The Politics o f  M ilitary Revolution in Korea, 72-73.
44 Woo, Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post- 
Democratization, 31.
45 Kim, The Politics o f  M ilitary Revolution in Korea, 75.
39
President reflected the declining popularity of Rhee’s Liberal Party. Meanwhile, 
negotiations between Seoul and Washington grew more contentious; by late 1956, 
President Eisenhower was “thoroughly fed up” with Rhee’s behavior, and warned, “we 
will not be blackmailed.”46 Rhee denounced ongoing U.S. efforts to decrease military aid, 
warning he was “re-examining relations with the U.S.” and considering unilaterally 
pursuing unification even at the risk o f “committing national suicide.”47
As the Korean public became increasingly restive, Rhee and his party increased 
efforts to co-opt the military into suppressing the opposition. Late in 1958, a draft o f a 
new National Security Law included “dangerously loose definitions of espionage activity;” 
Korean citizens could be punished for “disturbing the people by reporting or spreading 
false facts or distorted news.”48 Ahead of the vote in the National Assembly, Rhee 
ordered the police director to ban all outdoor gatherings in Seoul, citing a Communist 
plot to subvert the country. On December 24, opposition assemblymen were forcibly 
ejected from the assembly hall while LP members passed the National Security Law.49 
The move prompted a stem letter from President Eisenhower on Dec 25, 1958, criticizing 
the methods through which the law was passed, and warning that such un-democratic 
behavior could undermine the American and international public support necessary to 
sustain military aid in the future. “To the extent such doubts are raised we are 
handicapped in our efforts to muster the strong support we desire for Korea in the United 
Nations and elsewhere.”50 Rhee’s response was defensive; he accused U.S. officials of 
favoring the opposition Democratic Party, and “intimated that anti-American 
demonstrations might result should the U.S. persist in its views.”51
Public worries mounted that the 1960 presidential and vice presidential elections 
would be manipulated by the ruling party, and that Rhee would not allow for the transfer
46 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 304th Meeting o f  the National Security Council, November 15, 1956, 
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of political power to the Democratic Party through constitutional processes.52 In mid-
1959, the opposition’s concerns that the Liberal Party would restrict freedoms ahead of 
the 1960 elections were realized when the government closed the principal opposition 
newspaper, Kyonghyang Sinmun. In an effort to discourage such behavior, Assistant 
Secretary of State Walter S. Roberston publicly linked un-democratic action by Rhee’s 
government and Congressional disapproval of aid for Korea.53
Meanwhile, Rhee’s grip on the military was waning. Not only was Rhee unable 
to secure increased U.S. spending on the military establishment, but he also failed to 
convince military personnel to use force against protestors during the April Revolution in
1960. While senior military personnel had benefitted from Rhee’s patronage, the bulk o f 
the military establishment resented Rhee’s efforts to corrupt and politicize the armed 
forces. Opposition candidates had accused Rhee and his party o f electoral fraud during 
the presidential election in March, and members of the middle class and military 
personnel joined students and university professors in demonstrations, which started in 
the Southeastern part o f the country and quickly spread to Seoul.
Rhee ordered martial law and brought heavily armed troops into the capital, but 
the military and the police refused to follow the orders o f the martial law commander.54 
Army Chief of Staff General Song Yo-chan tried to maintain neutrality, and Defense 
Minister Kim Jung-youn, along with the U.S. ambassador, urged Rhee to resign. While 
Rhee still had loyal personnel throughout the military and intelligence establishments, the 
military as an institution refused to be an instrument of Rhee’s political party and 
intervene against members of Korean civil society. The military’s decision not to act on 
behalf o f President Rhee had a decisive impact on his authority; Rhee resigned on April 
26, 1960.
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The Korean Military: From Constabulary to the Largest Standing Force in East Asia
U.S. military aid from the postwar period through the end of Rhee’s presidency 
had a transformational impact on the Republic of Korea’s military’s competence and 
coherency. The unprecedented scale o f Korean mobilization raised the socio-political 
importance of the military in relation to other sectors of Korean society, as military 
service became one o f the principal means for upward social mobility. Yet despite great 
progress in becoming a professional fighting force, factions based on prior military 
experience, regional ties, service and graduating classes form the Korean Military 
Academy not only persisted, but were exploited by President Rhee, who used a “divide 
and rule” strategy to maintain control over the top echelons of the military. Rhee’s 
mobilization of military officers to intimidate the opposition and ensure his electoral 
victories in 1952, 1956 and 1960 undermined the coherency o f the military, violated the 
principle of mission exclusivity, and led many within the military establishment to resent, 
rather than respect, the civilian political authority.55 Rhee’s determination not to 
downsize the armed forces after the war led to low standards of living, slow promotion 
rates, and corruption, undermining military readiness and leading to discontent within the 
ranks.
In the immediate postwar period, the U.S. Army’s Military Government in Korea 
was anxious to organize an indigenous defense force in anticipation o f the restoration of 
Korea’s sovereignty at the end of American trusteeship. The goal was to raise the level of 
competency and coherency of the armed forces to more effectively meet South Korea’s 
security needs. Rather than build a formal army, which State Department officials feared 
would provoke the Soviets, the military government, under the leadership o f General 
John Reed Hodge, was initially authorized to build a 25,000-man constabulary.
Despite the number of Koreans who had fought with the Japanese army during 
World War II, at the end of the war Koreans with prior military experience were scattered 
and disorganized, with some grouped into various ill-equipped militias throughout South
53 Yong-Sup Han, "The May Sixteenth Military Coup," in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation
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Korea’s nine provinces.56 The Americans extended invitations to these groups to attend 
the Military English Training School, with the goal of creating a cadre o f officers who 
could communicate with the newly - established National Defense Command (NDC).57 
The sixty candidates who met in Seoul on December 5, 1945, as part of the first class of 
the English School, included former Korean independence fighters who had served in 
China, Koreans who had served in the Japanese Imperial Army, and former police 
officers.
It was here that Americans trained the officers who would dominate the highest 
ranks of the South Korean military for the next twenty years. While the primary goal of 
this school was to teach English language skills, some time was devoted to military 
training. Students were urged to adopt the “American style of military discipline,” rather 
than the Japanese methods many learned while serving in the Japanese imperial army.58 
The scope of military training was expanded when the South Korean National Defense 
Officers’ Training Academy replaced the Military English Language School on May 1, 
1946. U.S. military training manuals were translated into Korean, and instruction not only 
emphasized combat skills, but also national pride, responsibility, and unity. For example, 
students were taught the Korean national anthem and studied subjects like Korean 
history.59
The Korean Military Academy replaced the Officer’s Training Academy soon 
after the South Korean government was established on August 15, 1948, and by March 
1949, the Korean Constabulary, which now numbered more than 50,000, was converted 
into the Republic o f Korea Army.60 U.S. officials allowed Koreans to join the 
constabulary regardless of ideological affiliation,61 but officers were encouraged to be 
politically neutral, and constitutional prohibitions were in place to discourage military 
interference in civil politics. Select officers were sent to American training schools in the 
U.S. One of the first officers to visit, Yi Hallim, who eventually became a lieutenant
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general in the Korean Army, recalled his determination to use the United States Military 
Academy at West Point as a model for South Korea’s military academy, and believed the 
exposure to “the true nature of a democratic society” was more powerful than the military 
training.62 However, not every officer felt like Yi when he visited the U.S. Many were 
ambivalent, and resented American efforts to discourage traditional Japanese military 
practices. While these officers might have agreed with the U.S. objective o f building a 
disciplined and capable indigenous military force, they did not advocate blindly 
following American advice.
Along with the groups from the English Language School, officers from the 
Manchurian Defense Force, which was created by the Japanese in Manchuria, and 
personnel from North Korea who had escaped before and during the Korean War, joined 
the South Korean military.63 Within these groupings, personnel might also coalesce 
around their home region, service, or graduating class from the Korean Military 
Academy; these disparate groups often competed for influence. For example, following a 
crisis instigated by the South Korean Labor Party, who entered the military between 1947 
and 1949 to start a “war of national liberation,”64 thousands o f military personnel 
suspected o f Communist or leftist sympathies were expelled from the then - 80,000 man 
force, bolstering the influence o f the fiercely anti-Communist officers from North 
Korea.65 A Communist cell operating among the 2500 Korean army soldiers based at the 
south coast port town of Yosu had revolted, killing hundreds o f police in Yosu and 
Sunchon before being stopped by soldiers and police outside the provincial capital of 
Kwanju.66
The Korean War would be a transformative experience for the South Korean 
military, which fought alongside American and coalition troops against the Korean and 
Chinese Communists for three years. All eligible Korean men from ages 17 -  40 were 
mobilized, and the Korean army expanded from a fledgling force o f approximately
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100,000 men at the start o f the war to 250,000 by 1952.67 By the end o f the war the 
standing army alone would number nearly 650,000.
The first weeks o f the Korean War were devastating as the Korean military was 
forced to abandon equipment and personnel as it retreated from the areas surrounding 
Seoul toward the Pusan perimeter. As U.S. military personnel arrived on the peninsula, 
Korean and American forces were able to regroup; with the KMAG empowered to 
strengthen all branches of the ROK armed forces, training centers turned out hundreds of 
new recruits daily. New staff colleges gave American advisers an opportunity to expose 
senior officers to U.S. military doctrine, inculcate a sense of loyalty to South Korea, and 
discourage a role in politics. Branch schools not only taught valuable technical skills but 
also socialized military personnel by encouraging self-discipline, character, and 
patriotism.68
The Korean Military Academy gave U.S. advisers an even greater opportunity to 
influence the character o f the officer corps. Along with military history and tactics, the 
four-year program provided a liberal education, including English language classes as 
well as Korean language and Korean history, and emphasized the importance of 
developing moral, mental, and physical character. The goal was not only to create a 
disciplined class o f professional soldiers, but also to encourage a sense o f national 
responsibility. Two graduates of the first KMA class to attain a full four-year education 
were Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo; they went on to be loyal supporters o f Park 
Chung Hee, co-conspirators in the 1979 coup, and presidents during the 1980s.
After the Korean War, military education was expanded, with new institutions 
like the National Defense College added to facilitate the military’s professionalization. 
According to historian Gregg Brazinsky, the goal of these institutions was to “produce 
officers who were technically proficient, devoted to their nation’s well-being, and 
receptive to American influence.”69 When arguing against a reduction o f U.S. military 
aid, Ambassador Lacy wrote in 1955 that American influence was largely exercised 
through the personal relationships established “between American civilian and military
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officers and individual ROK military leaders.” 70 Schools were modeled on similar 
schools back in the U.S., and became increasingly specialized, providing technical 
training that gave soldiers high-level skills they could take into the private sector after 
their service. Officers were given administrative and managerial opportunities beyond 
anything they could have found in the private sector at the time.
While U.S. officials were committed to the professionalization o f the armed 
forces, they believed the size of the Korean army was unsustainable.71 President Rhee 
resisted all efforts by U.S. officials to downsize the forces, not only because he wanted to 
preserve the option of unifying the peninsula via force, but also because psychologically, 
the Korean people felt more secure with a large standing army, even if it was poorly 
equipped and underpaid, than with a smaller, more elite, modem, and mobile force. One 
consequence of maintaining an oversized military force in a developing country is that 
low-paid military personnel are more vulnerable to corruption. Some military personnel 
sold extra weapons or supplies on the side to augment their salaries, despite efforts by the 
Americans to enforce a strict accounting for defense materiel.72 Rhee shielded loyal 
military members from government auditors and the National Assembly as they marketed 
commercially valuable war materials (provided by U.S. military aid) such as petroleum, 
foodstuffs, automobiles and automobile parts. In exchange these personnel contributed to 
funds that supported Rhee and his party.73 The military thus eventually became a source 
o f financial support for Rhee.
Another issue that undermined the military’s professionalism was the disparity in 
promotion rates as the 1950s progressed. The rapid expansion during the Korean war 
reduced promotion time for higher-ranking officers from 1948 onward; yet once these 
officers assumed the top posts, they slowed promotion rates for their subordinates, 
causing discontent among many of the middle-ranking officers who later supported the
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coup in 1961.74 When President Rhee stepped down after the April 19 Student 
Revolution of 1960, some of these officers, put in the position o f maintaining security in 
an increasingly volatile political arena and frustrated by the failure o f the political 
leadership to implement anti-corruption reforms, began to imagine that their education 
and experience put them in a unique position to confront the multiple challenges facing 
the country. Thus despite the monumental strides made toward professionalization of the 
armed forces, a faction within the military would soon emerge to challenge the post-Rhee 
democratically elected civilian government.
The Park Era: The Military’s Role in Korea’s Transformation
"It must be realized that if  the coup is permitted to be successful, Park, 
whose real loyalty remains to be determined, may emerge as the most 
powerful man in Korea."
-  Brigadier General Carter B. Magruder, Seoul, May 17, 196175
After President Rhee’s resignation, some American officials hoped that a political 
transition would provide a fresh start, re-invigorate South Korean democracy, and usher 
in a more cooperative era of U.S. -  South Korea relations. The Korean government 
adopted a parliamentary system, and amended the 1948 constitution on June 15, 1960. 
The new constitution redistributed power between the executive and legislative branches, 
weakening the presidency.76 Within a few weeks, a national election was held to elect a 
new National Assembly, which would then elect a president. The opposition Democratic 
Party became the ruling party, and in August 1960, after five months o f an interim 
government, long time opposition leader Chang Myon became the Prime Minister.
During the interim period and after, “reformists” within the officer corps, 
including Major General Park Chung Hee, demanded the senior military leadership, 
including the army chief of staff, be held accountable for their the role in the vote rigging
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of 1956 and 1960. In August, they appealed to the military establishment and the newly 
inaugurated Chang to launch an anti-corruption campaign and allow the reformers to 
oversee the selection o f a new army chief o f staff and defense minister.77
While Chang’s attempt to establish a more democratic system was supported by 
the United States, Chang was politically too weak to realize his objectives. In 1960 and 
1961, as students and labor unions held thousands o f demonstrations, many Koreans grew 
alarmed by radicalism and pro - Communism within these groups.78 Political uncertainty, 
economic crisis, and widespread public unrest frustrated those in the military who found 
Chang Myon’s government unable to address civilian corruption, incompetence, and 
economic stagnation. This group o f officers, led by future president Park Chung Hee, 
came to the conclusion they would have to act outside of the military hierarchy.79 On 
May 16, 1961, this group acted against the senior military leadership and intervened 
directly to overthrow the civilian government.
U.S. military aid ideally would have decreased the role of the army in civil 
politics by mitigating the external security threat raised by a hostile North Korean 
government, providing political support for Rhee and Chang’s civilian leadership, and 
appropriating millions to expand, professionalize, and modernize the Korean armed 
forces. For example, reducing the threat o f invasion by North Korea might have 
minimized the likelihood the military would use the Communist threat to justify a 
political role for itself. Yet Park and his co-conspirators were motivated by the weakness 
of the civilian political leadership. In addition, while U.S. military aid had been decisive 
in protecting South Korea in the 1950s, Korea’s leaders understood that U.S. military aid 
would likely decline over the next decade. Park and his associates believed that South 
Korea’s poor economic standing heightened the psychological and military threat posed 
by North Korea. To meet this threat, they believed the Republic o f Korea needed a strong, 
authoritarian state to mobilize society toward economic development. Park and his 
associates believed they were uniquely qualified to shape the future of the South Korean 
state.
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The first part of this section will examine the relationship between the military’s 
role in Korean politics and the external threat to security, which U.S. military aid 
mitigated through the 1960s and 1970s. While Park’s faction in 1961 did not use the 
external threat to justify their coup, Park did link the external threat posed by Communist 
North Korea with his political opposition to justify the centralization of his authority as 
his presidency progressed. In addition, Koreans anticipated a decline in U.S. military aid 
in the context of Sino-American detente, the Guam Doctrine, and the withdrawal of 
American military personnel from South Vietnam; this expectation influenced Park’s 
decision to pull the military deeper into politics. The next part will examine if American 
political support for the civilian President Park after 1963 enhanced Park’s ability to 
establish objective civilian control over the military. While Park’s political strength may 
have minimized the options for anti-Park elements within the military to intervene, Park 
deliberately politicized hand - picked, loyal military personnel to monitor Korean society 
and preserve the option of using force against his opposition. Discontinuities in American 
political support during the 1970s, as increasing American public and Congressional 
criticism of Park’s government undermined the credibility o f Nixon and Ford’s 
reassurances, led the Korean president to rely even more heavily on the military to secure 
his regime. The final part will discuss the professionalization of the Republic of Korea’s 
armed forces. In 1961, Park’s faction behaved much like Stepan’s “new professionals”80 
by intervening to overthrow Chang’s government with the intent of reshaping Korean 
society. Over the next two decades, U.S. military aid, along with Park’s determination to 
insulate most o f his officers from politics, allowed the military as an institution to 
improve in all four aspects of professionalism. However, Park’s support for the Hanahoe 
faction would undermine the coherency of the military, leading to another coup following 
Park’s death in 1979.
80 Alfred Stepan, "The N ew  Professionalism o f  Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Armies 
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Park’s Presidency and the American Commitment to Korea’s Defense
Throughout his presidency, Park would use the external threat posed by the 
Soviet-backed, Communist North Korea to justify the presence of the military in politics 
and neutralize his political opposition. Ideally, the Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence 
of U.S. troops, and Foreign Military Financing for the procurement of defense articles, 
services, and training, should have encouraged Park to initiate a gradual civilianization of 
the Korean government, as economic growth provided new avenues for social mobility 
and Koreans sought a greater voice in their government’s policies. However, by the end 
o f the 1960s, Park was concerned about the U.S. commitment to Korea’s external defense, 
particularly in the context of the Guam Doctrine, detente, and the anticipated withdrawal 
of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. In response, Park drew the military deeper into 
politics to consolidate his power and implement the repressive Yushin Constitution, 
which remained in force until his assassination in 1979.
At the time of the military coup in May, 1961, the head of the UN command in 
Korea wrote, “Basically my mission is to protect Korea from external aggression. To this 
end the Korean Forces appear to be steadfast. I feel that it is also a part o f my mission to 
protect Korea from internal subversion by Communists. The uprising does not appear to 
be Communist inspired.... Accordingly, I do not propose to direct FROKA (the first 
Republic o f Korea army) to suppress the uprising on my own authority only.”81
The Korean military officers who intervened to unseat the democratically - 
elected government o f Prime Minister Chang Myon established the Supreme Council for 
National Reconstruction (SCNR) to govern until new elections could be held. The U.S. 
response was cautious. A sympathetic National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the 
U.S.- trained military group might “inject a new sense of drive and discipline into the 
ROK Government’s economic and administrative efforts, and may make some headway, 
especially in curbing corruption.”82 U.S. officials were to emphasize that U.S. assistance
81 "Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Brigadier General Carter B. 
Magruder) to the Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff (General Lyman L. Lemnitzer)."
82 Special National Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term Prospects in South Korea, May 31, 1961, FRUS 22, 
no. 224.
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was conditioned upon Korean cooperation with the Kennedy administration’s new aid 
concepts, which included decisive action to implement economic reforms.83
The Kennedy Administration’s desire to shift its emphasis from U.S. military aid 
to economic development,84 with the long-term goal of helping South Korea develop the 
capacity to defend itself against Communist aggression, aligned with Park’s belief that 
economic growth and industrialization were necessary to meet the threat o f Communist 
North K orea.85 To this end Park was also amenable to normalizing relations with Japan. 
While Park proactively sought American economic expertise, he followed American 
advice selectively, and frequently asked for reports from Korean business leaders, 
scholars, and journalists, as well as academics such as the Swedish economist Gunnar 
Myrdal.86 Park was contemptuous of Rhee’s laissez-faire attitude toward the economy, 
and called for a “great national awakening” in which all sectors o f society were mobilized 
for economic development, which he linked to Korea’s national security.87 For example, 
Park encouraged Korean business leaders to view export-led growth as a national duty, 
and maintained control over Korea’s industrialization by providing incentives to 
companies that exported manufactured goods. Park also achieved economic gains 
through the Basic Japan-South Korea Treaty in 1965, when the Japanese government 
committed $300 million in unconditional grants and $200 million in low-interest loans to 
South Korea.88 Within two years, Japan became South Korea’s largest trading partner, as 
well as a significant source of both foreign investment and technology transfer.
Park used the external threat posed by Communism to purge potential political 
rivals, for example by launching a “purification campaign” to rid the government of
83 Memorandum from Robert H. Johnson o f  the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow), May 23, 1961, FRUS  22, no. 221 ,,ibid.
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Communist sympathizers.89 Park assigned loyal military personnel to head important 
posts, such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which he established in 
June 1961, to monitor Korean society through a network o f informers in business, media, 
universities, and labor unions.90 While justified as a means to prevent Communist 
subversion, the KCIA affirmed the loyalty o f Park’s associates and monitored his 
political opposition while Park pursued his economic goals.
While the Kennedy Administration had sought reductions in military aid in favor 
of economic development projects, Johnson and his successor relied increasingly on 
military aid to encourage South Korea to provide and sustain a Korean troop presence in 
South Vietnam. U.S. military assistance to the Republic o f Korea nearly doubled from 
1965 to 1966.91 Park hoped that in addition to the military and economic benefits of 
assuming a greater share of the burden in Southeast Asia, Korea’s contribution to the war 
would discourage the U.S. from withdrawing troops from South Korea.92
From 1967 -  1971, however, Park would come to doubt the American 
commitment to Korea’s external security. Beginning in the spring o f 1967, North Korea 
increased its armed infiltrations, including an assassination attempt on Park by North 
Korean commandoes. Captured North Koreans revealed Pyongyang was preparing for a 
Vietcong-inspired “war of liberation.”93 Thus President Nixon’s speech in Guam on July 
25, 1969, where he articulated his expectation that Asian nations take more responsibility 
for their own defense,94 seemed ill -  timed from the perspective o f South Koreans. The 
Guam Doctrine, later known as the Nixon Doctrine, was interpreted by President Park as 
a warning the Americans would be withdrawing their military forces from South Korea in 
the near future. These fears were confirmed when the U.S. announced it would withdraw
20,000 o f its 64,000 troops, including a division guarding an 18 mile stretch o f the
89 Woo, Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post- 
D em ocratization , 70.
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92 Min Yong Lee, "The Vietnam War: South Korea's Search for National Security," in The Park Chung Hee 
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demilitarized zone understood to be “one of the historic invasion corridors into South 
Korea,” just 35 miles north of Seoul.95 While the Pentagon hoped the $500 million saved 
annually by redeploying these troops would convince Congress to approve a 
modernization plan for the South Korean armed forces, South Korean leaders believed it 
sent a clear message of declining American resolve to protect its ally.
Responding to the External Threat: the Centralization o f Park’s Authority
Nixon delayed the next phase o f American troop reductions from Korea because 
he needed Park to maintain a Korean troop presence in South Vietnam. Nevertheless,
Park understood that when U.S. operations in Vietnam ended, he would lose his leverage 
over the U.S. administration and U.S. military aid would likely decline. This sense was 
reinforced by pressure from the U.S. for Korea to assume a larger share o f the financial 
burden o f maintaining its armed forces.96 When the 1971 Korean presidential elections 
revealed just how much Park’s political opposition had grown, Park used the threat posed 
by North Korea, in the context o f declining American support, to justify the centralization 
o f his authority.97
Park mobilized the military and intelligence services to suppress opposition 
politicians and university students, and his party rushed a bill through the National 
Assembly that increased presidential powers during national emergencies.98 He used the 
Army Security Command (ASC), whose mission was counterintelligence and counter­
subversion within the military, to investigate opposition politicians and root out their 
supporters within the military. The next year, Park declared martial law, dissolved the 
National Assembly, closed universities and colleges, censored the press, and suspended 
political activities in anticipation of a referendum to approve constitutional amendments
95 "Koreans Dubious on Intent o f  U.S.," The New York Times, November 29, 1970; Lee, "The Vietnam 
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that gave him the power to take emergency measures in response to a broad range of 
internal and external security and economic issues."
Park named the new constitution “Yushin,” which means “restoration” or 
“revitalization,” and emphasized the importance o f discipline and self-reliance for 
Korea’s security.100 Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil explained to President Nixon, 
“We had to solidify our position at home to maximize our strength” while pursuing 
negotiations with North Korea regarding possible reunification. In the context o f detente 
and American reengagement with the People’s Republic o f China (PRC), as well as 
ongoing negotiations with North Vietnam, Nixon agreed that a strong, stable South 
Korean regime was in the best interest of the U.S.101
Despite President Ford’s effort to “reaffirm the continuation of U.S. policy, 
reaffirm modernization program, and reiterate no intention to withdraw U.S. 
personnel,” 102 Park worried Congress’s refusal to pass the aid package to South Vietnam 
as North Vietnamese forces were advancing on Saigon in 1975 was an invitation to North 
Korea to test the American commitment to South Korea’s defense, and that Congress and 
the American public could force troop withdrawals, deny funds, or refuse to send U.S. 
troops to defend Korea in the event o f an attack. The U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Richard 
Sneider, noted that the Park government “has utilized the present crisis as further rational 
for adopting what comes naturally -  tighter authoritarian regime intolerant of 
opposition.”103 South Korea’s insecurity was exacerbated by the fact that in the absence 
of U.S. military support, Korea lacked any viable alternatives to self-reliance.
The North Korean attack on American and Korean military personnel in 
Panmumjom on August 18, 1976, further heightened Korean insecurity. The incident, 
which took place in the Joint Security Area o f the Demilitarized Zone, left two American
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officers dead and several American and Korean personnel injured. North Korean officials 
tried to manipulate the incident to gain political support from the non-aligned nations to 
call for a withdrawal o f U.S. troops from the peninsula. The U.S. military responded to 
the provocation with a show of force that included sending F-l 11 bombers capable of 
dropping nuclear munitions to South Korea, warships off o f North Korea’s coast, and B- 
52 bombers on practice bombing runs just far enough to register on North Korean radars.
Despite the show of force, Korean insecurity persisted. Shortly after his election, 
President Jimmy Carter made the controversial announcement that he planned to 
withdraw all 32,000 American troops over a period o f four to five years, including all 
ground combat units and tactical nuclear weapons; while reasserting the firm U.S. 
commitment to Korean defense, the Carter Administration judged the Korean people 
were capable o f defending themselves, and argued the Mutual Defense Treaty plus 
military aid would be enough to guarantee Korea’s security. In September 1977, 1000 
American troops were withdrawn from South Korea, but by the spring of 1978 it was 
clear Congress would not pass the aid package necessary to compensate for the military 
withdrawal, and Carter cut the number o f troops to be withdrawn by two - thirds. Facing 
conservative Congressional opposition as well as criticism among Korean and American 
military and civilian personnel in Seoul, the Carter administration announced in the 
summer of 1979 that no more American troops would be withdrawn from the peninsula 
until at least 1981.
Political Support for Park Chung Hee
While Chang Myon may have wanted to follow the liberal model of civil-military 
relations, his tenure was too brief and his political stature too weak to establish objective 
civilian control over the military. Park, like Chang and Rhee, also had a vested interest in 
maintaining the competency o f the military, but did not seek objective civilian control 
because he relied on his faction to secure his regime, and the loyalty of the military 
establishment for political support. During much of the 1960s, Park enjoyed strong 
political support from the United States; while elected three times, however, his victories 
over the opposition were always narrow. After a “honeymoon period” with President
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Johnson, Park grew anxious that American political support was declining in the context 
of the Sino-American detente and Nixon’s Guam Doctrine. Discontinuities in American 
political support, along with increasing domestic political opposition to his rule, 
challenged Park’s presidency, leading to a centralization of authority that drew the 
military deeper into civil politics as Park implemented the repressive Yushin constitution. 
As Park became increasingly unpopular at home and criticized by Congress and President 
Carter for human rights abuses, his grip on his inner security circle weakened, 
culminating in his assassination in 1979.
The Chang government’s inability to address social disorder and economic 
stagnation frustrated U.S. officials as well as the plotters of the military coup. Chang 
Myon’s fragmented Democratic Party could not reconcile the demands of the “April 
Revolution” Koreans, who demanded radical reforms, with more conservative forces that 
prioritized political stability and national security.104 Nevertheless, on the morning o f the 
coup, the head o f the UN command, General Carter Magruder, called on all military 
personnel under his command to support Chang Myon’s government and restore order in 
the Korean armed forces. Magruder, along with the Charge d'Affaires, Marshall Green, 
emphasized that the U.S. supported the constitutional government o f the Republic of 
Korea as elected by the Korean people, believing that a coup attempt undermined the 
political stability o f South Korea and damaged its reputation within the international 
community.
However, U.S. officials hesitated to act on Chang’s behalf when they observed, 
“the strange unwillingness o f the President, armed forces leaders and other key officials 
to take any action to suppress coup or to take sides at all.. .Irresolution of those officials 
who have it in their power to deal with uprising and apparent indifference general public 
to fate of Chang government provide poor foundation for exerting U.S. influence on 
behalf Chang Myon.” 105 Magruder worried if he acted without any direction from Chang, 
he might be restoring a government “with no one to run it and lacking popular
104 Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post-Democratization, 
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support.” 106 The State Department concluded it would not intervene on behalf o f Chang’s 
government unless it demonstrated the ability to reassert its authority.
The U.S. officials in Seoul were instructed to provide “moderating, balancing, and 
restraining influences” to the SCNR in an effort to establish a “broadly based, responsible 
non-partisan government of national unity and of predominately civilian composition.” 107 
U.S. officials were to encourage the military junta to pursue maximum possible 
civilianization of the regime.108 While cautious at first, the Kennedy administration 
ultimately embraced the interim regime while insisting Major General Park retire from 
active duty and run for president as a civilian. Park retired from the military just before 
his election on October 15, 1963, and the so-called transition to civilian rule dismantled 
the military junta.
Park’s political strength would rest on his control over the 600,000 man armed 
forces, the bureaucracy (including the intelligence services), the ruling Democratic 
Republican Party (DRP), which had branches down to the village level, as well as the 
external political support provided by the United States. Many o f Park’s supporters 
followed him into retirement, and were active in the DRP, holding nearly twenty percent 
of the seats in the National Assembly. Retired military officers and senior officers were 
appointed to key government positions and served as ambassadors to foreign countries, 
and Park established the KCIA to monitor army officers, civilian politicians, students, 
intellectuals, and the media.109
The Kennedy Administration’s goals aligned with Park’s determination to 
legitimize his rule by achieving rapid economic growth and industrialization, which 
included the necessary, but controversial, normalization o f relations with Japan.110 As 
Korea’s primary military aid provider, U.S. officials were able to maintain access to Park, 
and communicate American advice with respect to political and economic
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development.111 Even though Washington minimized its conditions on military assistance, 
U.S. officials successfully linked economic assistance to the establishment o f numerous 
special committees that facilitated exchanges between American advisors and a broad 
range o f Korean government officials. The stabilization agreement o f April 1963, for 
example, enabled USAID to take on a substantial role in the allocation o f South Korea’s 
resources, as well as other economic matters such as revenue collection and monetary 
reforms.112
Park relied heavily on military personnel to guarantee political order, monitor 
potential challengers to his authority, and reassure himself o f his associates’ loyalty.
While insulating the bulk of the armed forces from a “praetorian guard” function, the 
most trusted personnel were put on what Joo-Hong Kim terms the “counter-subversive 
security path,” where they would eventually command military intelligence units such as 
the Army Security Command (ASC), the Capital Garrison Command (CGC), the Korea 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Presidential Security Service (PSS).113 Park, 
inspired by how the Japanese colonial administration had used intelligence networks to 
penetrate Korean society, preserved this mission for his security institutions.114 While the 
bulk of the armed forces provided military deterrence against North Korea, the security 
services and the bureaucracy dominated South Korean politics, over time diminishing the 
role o f the political parties.115
The Johnson Administration was motivated to provide political support to Park’s 
government to gamer backing for the U.S. military campaign in South Vietnam. Park 
believed Korea’s troop contribution would encourage the U.S. to sustain the American 
troop presence on the Korean peninsula.116 When Park’s opposition in the National 
Assembly protested the decision to send a combat division to Vietnam, Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey travelled to Seoul to emphasize American support and give Park
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additional leverage against his opponents.117 In addition to providing grants, loans, and 
suspending the funding requirements for the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the 
U.S. also helped secure foreign loans and provided South Korean businesses the 
opportunity to manufacture goods for American and South Vietnamese forces and 
reconstruction projects in Vietnam.118 The Park regime, which relied on its economic 
development agenda for its legitimacy, welcomed such incentives, which bolstered 
Korea’s transition to export-led industrialization.
Park was elected to a second term in 1967. During this term, while his party 
occupied the majority in the National Assembly, Park revised the constitution to permit a 
third presidential term.119 Opposition politicians, intellectuals, students, and even 
politicians within the ruling party opposed the measure, which undermined party politics. 
However, Park was laying the groundwork for the centralization o f political authority that 
would enable him to maintain control through a new period of uncertainty in Korean 
foreign affairs: North Korean provocations, the Guam Doctrine, American reengagement 
with the People’s Republic o f China (PRC), and increasing isolationist sentiment within 
the American public and Congress, accompanied by the weakening o f U.S. presidential 
power.
Hardliners within the Park regime criticized the United State’s decision to 
negotiate directly with North Korea to release the crew o f the USS PUEBLO, which 
North Korea had seized in January of 1968. 120 In response to their call for the withdrawal 
o f Korean troops from South Vietnam, special envoy Cyrus Vance travelled to Seoul to 
affirm an increase in military aid, transfers of military equipment, and the commitment of 
U.S. troops in South Korea to prevent North Korean military forces from reaching
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Seoul.121 Yet the Guam Doctrine, followed by the announced withdrawal o f nearly one- 
third of the American troops stationed in Korea, was politically destabilizing for Park in a 
country where the vast majority o f Koreans believed the American troop presence was 
crucial for their survival.122 Park agreed to keep Korean forces in South Vietnam in an 
effort to delay further troop withdrawals,123 prompting Nixon to instruct the Defense 
Department to delay further redeployment o f U.S. military personnel ahead of the 1971 
South Korean elections.124 The U.S. also agreed on a military modernization program for 
the Korean armed forces to compensate for the reduction in U.S. military personnel. 
While such measures may have contributed to Park’s narrow election victory against 
opposition leader Kim Dae Jung on April 27, 1971,125 the net effect o f the perceived 
wavering American support on Korea’s domestic political stability prompted Park to 
centralize his authority soon after the elections.
The 1971 elections revealed the extent of public opposition to Park.126 The 
perception of a democratic opening in anticipation o f the elections led to increased 
activity among the opposition, particularly within the media, universities, and labor 
unions. Park enhanced his own political base by pulling more members of the military 
establishment into key government positions, nominating forty-one retired generals as 
DRP candidates ahead of the National Assembly elections in May 1971.127 Yet the 
opposition party made gains in the May elections, and Park’s party no longer enjoyed 
enough seats in the National Assembly to conclusively shape future legislation.128
Park understood his leverage over the U.S. troop levels in South Korea would 
decline as the U.S. withdrew from South Vietnam; with his party no longer dominant in 
the National Assembly, Park moved swiftly to consolidate and centralize his political 
authority in preparation for a major effort to reduce South Korea’s dependency on the 
United States. Park mobilized the military to deal with socio-economic turmoil in
121 Kim, "The Armed Forces," 175.
122 "Koreans Dubious on Intent o f  U.S.."; Lee, "The Vietnam War: South Korea's Search for National 
Security," 427; Im, "The Origins o f  the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled," 238.
123 Lee, "The Vietnam War: South Korea's Search for National Security," 424.
124 William Beecher, "U.S. Will Hold Up Korean Pullouts - Wants to Avoid Impression o f  Hasty Retreat in 
Asia," The New York Times, January 3, 1970.
125 Lee, "The Vietnam War: South Korea's Search for National Security," 428.
126 Kohli, State-D irected Development: Political P ow er and Industrialization in the G lobal Periphery, 95.
127 Joo-Hong Kim, "The Armed Forces," 186.
128 "Koreans Say Opposition Gains will Help Democratic System," The New York Times, May 30, 1971.
60
Kwangju in August o f 1971, and in response to student demonstrations Park sent soldiers 
to ten different university campuses, arresting more than four thousand students, many of 
whom were forced into the military.129 At the end of the year, his threat to impose martial 
law helped his party rush a bill through the National Assembly that increased his 
emergency powers.130
In October, 1972, Park declared martial law throughout South Korea, sending 
tanks and military personnel to key government buildings and major intersections in 
downtown Seoul. He justified the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution o f the 
National Assembly, as well as other measures to restrict political activity by insisting 
they were necessary to pursue a North-South dialogue that could put the country on a 
path to reunification.131 The next month voters approved the “Yushin” Constitution, 
paving the way for Park to be “re-elected” by an electoral college, the National 
Conference for Unification, whose members were selected by Park and dominated by the 
military.132 The new Constitution limited parliamentary power and drew the military 
ever more deeply into civil politics. From 1972 to 1979, the Korean society was 
organized “into a kind of garrison state,” including the comprehensive military education 
o f the male population to support the regular armed forces and the reserves.133
While the policies of the Nixon administration had created uncertainty with 
respect to America’s ability to provide for Korea’s external defense, Nixon and his 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized the importance of providing 
unwavering political support. When Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil, possibly 
anticipating American criticism for Park’s actions, assured President Nixon, “We are 
restoring our National Assembly and will have elections in March,” Nixon responded, “I 
won’t lecture you like some do on your internal affairs. Some people here were disturbed 
but that’s your decision. I understand your problem.” 134 Kissinger, recognizing that
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rapprochement between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China was unsettling for 
Park’s government,135 met with Park at the Blue House on Nov 16, 1973, to assure him, 
“you can count on the fact that we will not make any prior decisions without consulting 
you,” and if Pyongyang launched a surprise attack to secure a stronger post-conflict 
negotiating position, “As long as this Administration is in office we would give you 
strong support so as to return to the status quo ante.” 136
Kissinger also recommended to President Nixon a gradual transition from grant 
aid to foreign military sales rather than the rapid change favored by the State and Defense 
departments.137 He instructed Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger to reassure the South Koreans o f American support and 
refrain from adjusting force levels. He insisted, “We will do nothing that will harm South 
Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to the max extent.” 138
Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s assurances, the discontinuity between White 
House and Congressional and public attitudes contributed to Park’s growing unease. Park 
was caught in a vicious cycle: American public criticism and pressure for political 
liberalization undermined Park’s control over Korean society, prompting him to use the 
military to suppress dissent, which led to even more American criticism. The Central 
Intelligence Agency noted in February 1974, that Park’s ability to mobilize the coercive 
apparatus to suppress his opposition was eroding.139 As domestic opposition to the 
Yushin system mounted, including coordinated large-scale demonstrations at Seoul 
National University, Sungkyunkwan University, and Ewha Woman’s University, Park 
responded by issuing an Emergency Decree and ordering the arrest of student activists,
135 Park worried the U.S. would reach an accommodation with the Chinese at Korea’s expense. China had 
publically supported Pyongyang’s one Korea policy and called for the withdrawal o f  U.S. troops from the 
Korean peninsula.
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State Rogers and Secretary o f  Defense Schlesinger: U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, July 18, 
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many of whom were tried by emergency court-martial.’40 Members of Congress argued 
the U.S. should not give aid to regimes that imprison its people for political purposes.141
President Ford travelled to Seoul to personally assure President Park that he had 
the support o f Ford’s administration.142 However, the increasing encroachment of the U.S. 
Congress on Presidential foreign policy prerogatives continued to worry Park for its 
impact on the U.S. president’s credibility. The American Ambassador to Korea, Richard 
Sneider, wrote that Park and his supporters believed the United States, which did not 
understand the need for internal discipline, was encouraging the opposition and trying to 
undermine position of President Park personally; Park worried the decline in American 
political support would prompt North Korea to test “the strength o f ROK internal support 
for Park government.” 143
Park’s government’s anxiety grew when two senior KCIA officers defected, 
refusing orders to return to Seoul, where they likely faced imprisonment for their role in 
exposing an operation that included spying on Korean nationals and collecting 
information about U.S. Congressmen.144 Korean officials were frustrated that the U.S. 
government, despite President Ford’s personal affirmation of political support for Park’s 
government, was not making a stronger effort to contain the harsh criticism of the Park 
regime in the American press.145
The Carter campaign’s emphasis on human rights did not bode well for President 
Park, although opposition to his policies among American and Korean personnel in 
Korea and from conservative Congressmen ultimately led Carter to postpone plans to 
withdraw U.S. troops from Korea. Park, with his control over the press, downplayed
140 Richard Halloran, "South Korean Students Protest Anew," New York Times, April 4, 1974.
141 Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Defends U.S. Aid to Seoul: Tells Senators Security Factors Override 
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Carter’s human rights concerns, and celebrated Carter’s visit to Seoul in July 1979 as a 
political victory.146
After the parliamentary elections in 1979, when the opposition party NDP won 
more votes than the ruling DRP, hardliners within the National Assembly censured 
opposition politician Kim Young Sam for criticizing the government in an interview with 
the New York Times. The move prompted massive demonstrations in Kim’s home region 
o f Pusan and Masan; in response Park’s government imposed marital law in Pusan on 
October 18, and a garrison decree in Masan on October 20. The ambitious and aggressive 
Presidential Security Services’ Chief Cha Ji-Chul, who had played an increasingly 
dominate role in military and political affairs and argued for a military response to the 
protests, clashed with the more moderate KCIA director, long-time Park associate Kim 
Chae Gyu, who advocated for a political solution. Kim assassinated both Park and Cha on 
October 26, 1979, marking the abrupt and unexpected end of the Park era.
The Professionalization of the Armed Forces Under Park
While U.S. military training had discouraged a political role for Korean officers 
from 1948 - 1960, a sense of national responsibility coupled with technical and 
administrative capabilities led a group of “reformers” to assume a central role in civil 
politics, beginning with the 1961 coup. From 1961 -  1979, the U.S. continued to exert a 
major influence on the Korean armed forces through a modernization program, schools 
both within South Korea and in the United States, during combat operations in South 
Vietnam, and while maintaining security along the border with North Korea. Economic 
growth, as well as U.S. military aid, particularly to support the Korean troop presence in 
South Vietnam, allowed for an improvement in standards of living that boosted morale 
and decreased corruption. Thus the competence o f the Korean armed forces during this 
period was dramatically improved, as the quality o f military personnel as well as their 
training and experience increased. Unfortunately, U.S. advisers’ emphasis on discipline,
146 James P. Sterba, "Carter's Visit Hailed in Seoul; South Koreans Dismiss Human Rights Criticism," The 
New York Times, July 3, 1979.
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unity, and responsibility could not overcome the pervasiveness o f factionalism, which 
Park relied upon to maintain control over the military.
Park depended upon a tight-knit group of loyal supporters from his faction for 
intelligence gathering as well as mobilization against his opposition, and ensured the 
institutional support o f the military by preserving its corporate interests and providing 
structural incentives such as privileged positions in government and industry following 
military service. Factionalism undermined the cohesiveness o f the military, and 
protection from civilian oversight eroded its respect for civilian political authority. 
However, Park also sought to improve the professionalism of the military as an institution. 
Thus, while a small group within the military enjoyed reserved domains granted in 
exchange for personal loyalty to President Park, the bulk o f the more than 600,000 strong 
Korean armed forces became more competent, more cohesive, focused exclusively on 
external defense, and amenable to a return to democratic processes.
At the time of the coup, it is unlikely that any other institution could have 
mustered the political authority necessary to maintain social order and reform the Korean 
economy. With the help of U.S. military aid, by 1961, the South Korean military, which 
had exploded from less than 100,000 to nearly 700,000 by the end of the Korean War, 
was overdeveloped relative to other sectors o f society. While hundreds o f officers and 
defense personnel were exposed to a liberal-democratic model that emphasized military 
subordination to civilian authority, the impact of U.S. military training and education on 
the professionalism of the South Korean armed forces could not overcome the persistence 
of factions based on regional origin, kinship, or prior military experience. Park’s faction 
coalesced around the eighth class o f the Korean Military Academy, and was heavily 
influenced by the Japanese Army’s political ideology from World War II.147
Park’s faction acted not only against Korea’s civilian government, but also against 
senior commanders who had remained politically neutral a year earlier when President 
Rhee had sought their assistance in suppressing student demonstrations.148 Major General 
Park, who had been educated at the Japanese Military Academy in Manchuria, and had
147 Yung Myung Kim, "Patterns o f  Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea," in The 
M ilitary and D em ocracy in Asia and the Pacific, ed. R. J. May Viberto Selochan (Canberra Australia: The 
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attended the Tokyo Military Academy,149 was influenced by Japan’s state-centric 
capitalism, in which the government worked closely with private industry to launch and 
manage major infrastructure projects. He believed his group could reform not just the 
military but also the nation, ridding it o f its crippling corruption, and moving it along a 
path o f economic growth that would contribute to long-term security and a stronger 
position vis-a-vis North Korea.
While the Constitution mandated that the armed forces maintain political 
neutrality,150 Park undermined the military’s cohesiveness and mission exclusivity by 
relying on select military personnel embedded in the military and intelligence services to 
guarantee political order during crises. For example, KMA alumni from Park’s native 
eastern Youngnam region held key positions in the security establishment, and were 
granted accelerated promotions. These officers included Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae 
Woo, members of a secret society named “Hanahoe,” formed by members of the eleventh 
KMA class in 1963 to support Park’s presidential campaign.151 The eleventh class was 
the first to receive a full four years o f professional education from the Korean Military 
Academy, from 1952 -  1955. These officers were part o f Park’s inner power circle, and 
would later act against the military establishment to organize the 1979 coup after Park’s 
assassination.
Despite the loss of nearly 5,000 Korean troops in South Vietnam, Park’s 
commitment of troops to the Vietnam War had a largely positive impact on the military. 
The U.S. provided financial support to the tens of thousands o f Korean troops 
participating in the war, enabling the military to raise living standards, modernize, and 
transform into a more sophisticated fighting force. More than 300,000 soldiers gained 
combat experience in Vietnam, and their material capabilities increased significantly.152
Park provided structural incentives to consolidate the political support o f the 
military establishment. For example, graduating from the Korean Military Academy was 
seen not only as a means to a military career, but also an opportunity to gain important 
positions within government or industry upon retirement. Between 1964 and 1979, 118
149 Kohli, State-D irected Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the G lobal Periphery, 87.
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out of 314 government ministers had a military background.153 Park established the 
Special Junior Officer Recruitment System in 1977 to encourage junior officer loyalty. 
For this program, the Ministry of National Defense made available civil service positions 
to KMA graduates once they had served their five-year obligations. Park’s emphasis on 
discipline, austerity and self-reliance, his strong anti-Communist national security 
rhetoric, as well as the confidence that he would protect the corporate interests o f the 
military, ensured that military personnel could be relied upon to be an important part of 
Park’s political base. This was particularly true when opposition leaders such as Kim Dae 
Jung proposed dismantling the KCIA as well as other pillars of military socialization, the 
militia-like Civil Defense Corps and a paramilitary training program for high school and 
university students. By the early 1980s, more than 8 million South Koreans had 
experienced some military training.154
Park’s “Total National Security” approach reinforced the dominance o f the 
military in Korean politics, and puts the American effort to diffuse democratic norms and 
socialize military members through education, training, and interpersonal relations into 
perspective. South Korea had its own powerful method of socialization that privileged 
national security, even linking economic development to national defense. However, as 
the Yushin system concentrated Park’s personal political power, his options for 
responding to pressure from Korean civil society became more limited. Within the 
military there was disagreement over how to respond to the increasingly widespread 
protests and demands for greater political freedoms in the second half of the 1970s. 
Hardliners wanted to continue using force to suppress members of the opposition, while 
others favored a more moderate approach. This ideological split contributed to, and 
would persist beyond, Park’s assassination on October 26, 1979.155
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The Post-Park Era o f Democratic Consolidation
By the end of President Carter’s term, Carter, under pressure from Koreans, U.S. 
officials in Korea, and conservative members of Congress, had backed away from 
attempts to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula. Just months after President Park’s 
assassination in October 1979, fellow Hanahoe members Chun and Roh thwarted 
attempts to return to democratic processes, and executed a coup not in response to a 
heightened external threat, but to protect their reserved domains gained under Park’s 
patronage. Nevertheless, President Reagan, mindful of the strategic implications of 
domestic instability and convinced “quiet engagement” would give U.S. officials more 
opportunities to influence Korean policy, offered political support for President Chun, 
and increased the number o f American troops in South Korea. The Reagan administration 
contributed to the professionalization of the Korean armed forces by supporting a 
modernization program, joint exercises, and the sale of American training, equipment, 
and weaponry.
Several factors contributed to the democratic opening in 1987 that paved the way 
for South Korea’s democratic consolidation in the 1990s. Bolstered by over two decades 
o f economic growth, a broader swathe of Korean society joined the opposition to the 
authoritarian, military - dominated government. President Reagan altered his approach to 
human rights, which minimized the political options for the military when the public 
demanded reforms in 1987. Finally, moderates within the military prevailed over 
hardliners, eventually allowing for a transition to objective civilian control o f the military 
under future president Kim Young Sam.
This section is divided into three parts. The first examines the relationship 
between the balance of military capabilities on the Korean peninsula and the military’s 
role in civil politics from 1979 through 1997, when long-time opposition leader Kim Dae 
Jung was elected in the absence of any interference from the military establishment. The 
second part looks at how U.S. political support for Korea’s civilian leaders might have 
shaped the options for the military’s role in civil politics. The final part will discuss how 
the professionalization of the military ultimately facilitated Korea’s transition to 
democratic control over its armed forces.
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Reinvigorating the Alliance: Reagan, U.S. Military Aid, and the Weakening of the
External Threat
The 1980s marked a dramatic shift in the tone of U.S. policymakers toward their 
ally, as the Reagan administration determined unwavering support for South Korean 
security was necessary to demonstrate American resolve to the Soviet Union and 
Communist North Korea. In addition, the rapid expansion of the South Korean economy 
that included the development of an indigenous defense industrial base meant Presidents 
Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung would enjoy a 
more favorable security environment than their predecessors. By the early 1990s, South 
Korea had established ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China, leaving North 
Korea isolated and dependent on the ambiguity surrounding it nuclear program for 
deterrence. American support was steadfast as U.S. troops remained on the peninsula to 
assuage Korean fears over Pyongyang’s continued hostility. The weakening of the 
external threat, coupled with increasing domestic and international pressure for political 
liberalization, limited the opportunities for South Korea’s leaders to link the external 
threat with their political opposition or for military officers to use the external threat to 
justify an expansion of their role in civil politics.
President-elect Ronald Reagan’s transition team judged that political instability in 
South Korea was in danger o f inviting aggression from North Korea, and believed this 
would be a top issue for Reagan when he assumed the presidency in January, 1981. His 
administration believed Carter’s emphasis on human rights had undermined the alliance 
and threatened American strategic interests.156 Presidential Reagan, determined to 
demonstrate strength and resolve in the context o f the Cold War and relative to the 
outgoing president, invited President Chun to the White House to reassert the U.S. 
security commitment to the Republic of Korea, confirming that he had no plans to 
withdraw U.S. troops. 157 In conjunction with the visit, American and South Korean units 
began a joint military exercise, which included 100,000 members of the ROK Army,
156 Tamar Jacoby, "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986 1986.
157 Caroline Rnad Herron and Michael Wright, "Reagan and Chun Exchange Favors," The New York Times, 
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Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Reagan restored bilateral diplomatic and economic 
activities, and would eventually add 2,000 personnel to the 39,000 American troops 
already serving in South Korea.
As Seoul assumed greater financial responsibility for the acquisition of defense 
articles, services and training, the most important aspect o f U.S. military support for 
Korea’s external security rested in the presence of American military personnel on the 
Korean peninsula.158 While Presidents Nixon and Carter had planned a more dramatic 
reduction in U.S. military personnel, both in response to demands from the American 
public and to cut expenditures, President Reagan was determined to demonstrate his 
resolve to protect American allies in the context of the Cold War. In response to 
escalating Cold War tension that included the downing o f a Korean airliner in September, 
1983, and the assassination of several Korean cabinet members in a bombing in Burma a 
month later, President Reagan travelled to South Korea, where he toured the 
demilitarized zone and emphasized the American commitment to Korean security. In a 
symbolic demonstration of that support, the U.S. and South Korea conducted joint 
exercises in December.
General Chun exploited the external threat to justify the neutralization of his 
opposition, including Kim Dae Jung, who was sentenced to be executed for his alleged 
role in provoking the Kwangju uprising.159 Immediately after he seized power in 
December, 1979, he had his major political opponents arrested, accusing them of 
Communist sympathies. However, rather than being motivated by the external threat, his 
intervention was primarily driven by his desire to preserve the reserved domains he 
gained as a member o f the secret Hanahoe faction during Park’s presidency.
Once he became president, however, Chun would have a more difficult time than 
his predecessors in linking the opposition to external threats for two major reasons. First, 
the opposition to Chun’s political authority had a broader base in Korean society. Along
158 The United States assumed responsibility for funding its troop presence in South Korea throughout the 
Cold War, but as the Korean economy grew and the Cold War ended, American legislators called on South 
Korea to contribute to the cost o f  maintaining American forces. In 1991, South Korea agreed to burden 
sharing, and in 1995 agreed to increase its contribution by 10% annually to support the then 37,000  
American troops stationed in the country (from $300 million in 1995 to $399 million by 1998. By 2014  
South Korea was paying for nearly 40%, or $867 million, o f  the cost o f  maintaining 28,500 U.S. troops.)
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with radical students and labor activists, conservative Koreans sought a political system 
that reflected Korea’s new prosperity, and workers who for years accepted low wages in 
support o f Korea’s export-led growth demanded a share of the wealth and improved 
living standards. After being subject to the repressive Yushin system under Park for 
nearly a decade, Korean society was less likely to accept national security and economic 
growth as justifications for the lack of political liberalization.160
Second, South Korea was no longer in as vulnerable a position as it had been for 
most o f Park’s rule. By the early 1980s, South Korea’s economy, population, and military 
spending had surpassed that o f North Korea. In addition, the security commitment of the 
United States was stronger than ever under President Reagan. Thus while Chun continued 
to rely on loyal military personnel to lead Korea’s intelligence and security posts, he was 
unable and unwilling to mobilize the military when widespread demonstrations calling 
for free elections erupted in 1987.
Several developments in the late 1980s reflect the sense among Korean officials 
that the external threat had declined. Seoul had successfully increased its outreach to 
Eastern European, Warsaw Pact countries while hosting the 1988 Summer Olympic 
Games in Seoul. In a significant departure from its stance the previous four decades,
Seoul accepted the American troop cuts proposed by the George H.W. Bush 
Administration in 1989, and Korean officials were amenable to President Bush’s pressure 
to increase burden-sharing in light of South Korea’s strong economic performance.
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met with Chun’s successor, President Roh Tae Woo, 
in San Francisco briefly in June 1990, giving Roh hope that diplomatic relations would 
be restored, paving the way for Korean reunification.161 In response to Roh’s offer to 
provide economic aid in support of the faltering Soviet economy, Gorbachev personally 
visited South Korea, where the two leaders agreed to negotiate a mutual cooperation 
treaty and called on Pyongyang to allow international inspectors to visit its nuclear 
facilities.162 While hostilities with North Korea persisted, the 38th parallel was no longer 
the front line in the Cold War, and South Korea was no longer the bulwark against
160 Susan Chira, "South Korea's Politics o f  Prosperity," ibid., September 6, 1987.
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Communist expansionism. Even more important, however, was the fact that North Korea 
was isolated and its economy crumbling, while South Korea had expanded its diplomatic 
ties and its economy was thriving.
While President Roh did not implement any major military reforms during his 
presidency, he refrained from linking critics of his government to external security threats 
to justify the mobilization of the military against his political opposition, even though 
there remained legitimate concerns regarding Korean security. The dominant security 
issue throughout the 1990s was North Korea’s intransigence on the nuclear issue. In this 
context South Korean officials had reservations about President Bush’s efforts to 
denuclearize the peninsula, and in November, 1991, U.S. plans to withdraw troops was 
postponed indefinitely. Despite these concerns, the Korean military did not interfere 
when Kim Young Sam, the long-time pro-democracy advocate with no military 
background, was elected in 1992.
U.S. policymakers remained committed to South Korean security as efforts 
toward reunification were stalled by North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty in the Spring of 1993. In response, the Clinton 
administration committed to sending Patriot Missiles to South Korea, and negotiated an 
agreement with North Korea which exchanged economic aid and financing for new 
nuclear reactors for an agreement by Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program.163 Despite 
the nuclear concern, and the breakdown in peace talks between North and South Korea, 
the dominant issue during the 1997 Korean presidential elections was the economic crisis, 
and Koreans elected long-time dissident and pro-democracy activist Kim Dae Jung, 
whose “Sunshine Policy” promoted greater social and economic outreach to the North 
Korean regime.
Senior military personnel were well known for their opposition to Kim’s 
“Sunshine Policy,” and had hinted they would intervene if Kim Dae Jung was elected 
when he ran against Park Chung Hee in 1971, and Roh Tae Woo in 1987. However, 
during the presidential campaign in 1997, military representatives made no overt attempts 
to interfere, nor were there rumors of potential military interference. Some analysts
163 David E. Sanger, "Clinton Administration Reports a Breakthrough in North Korea Nuclear Arms Talks," 
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consider Kim’s election as the marker of democratic consolidation in Korea, while others 
argue the fact that the military did not intervene during his five-year term is a stronger 
indicator that the South Korean government established objective civilian control over 
the military. While South Korean policymakers and successive American administrations 
would continue to be challenged by the North Korean nuclear problem, the military 
refrained from interfering in Korea’s civil politics.
American Political Support and the Struggle for Political Power After Park
American political support for South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan was a 
contentious issue throughout President Reagan’s term, as pro-democracy activists 
criticized his engagement of the regime that perpetrated the massacre at Kwangju and 
derailed a return to democratic processes in the wake of Park’s assassination. However, 
Reagan judged his administration would have more influence over President Chun behind 
the scenes, where U.S. officials negotiated the release of Kim Dae Jung and encouraged 
Chun to accept democratic reforms in 1987. Support for Chun’s successor, Roh Tae Woo, 
continued despite Roh’s involvement in the coup against the military establishment in 
December 1979. While Roh did not attempt to establish objective civilian control over 
the military during his term, his restraint, particularly with respect to the imposition of 
martial law, made him an important transitional figure that paved the way for the election 
o f Kim Young Sam. Kim benefited from a favorable post-Cold War security environment, 
strong political support from the U.S., and a public mandate for anti-corruption measures 
and civil-military reforms that enabled him to take dramatic steps toward subordinating 
the military to civilian political authority.
After Park’s assassination, party leaders anticipated a return to electoral politics; 
however, the real struggle for political power was taking place within the military.
General Chun Doo Hwan, along with other Hanahoe members from the eleventh and 
seventeenth graduating classes o f the Korean Military Academy, was pitted against the 
traditional military establishment, which included higher-ranking officers and coalesced 
around the martial law commander.164 Chun had the advantage o f leading the Defense
164 Joo-Hong Kim, "The Armed Forces," 197.
73
Security Command, which coordinated the security intelligence agencies of all three 
branches o f the armed forces. On December 12, 1979, Chun, in collaboration with other 
members o f the Hanahoe, ordered the arrest of the Army Chief of Staff and martial law 
commander, then sent Roh to lead loyal armed troops from the Ninth Infantry Division 
into Seoul. By the next day, Chun’s group occupied the Ministry o f Defense and army 
headquarters, and Chun became the head o f the armed forces.
Chun did not assume leadership o f South Korea’s government immediately, 
however. The civilian acting president, Choi Kyu Hah, maintained his post and insisted 
the military was subordinate to civilian authority, even when a special national security 
committee dominated by military officers formed in May, 1980, and appeared to put the 
military leaders on equal footing with the civilian cabinet.165 Choi was forced to resign 
when Chun’s group assumed power under nation-wide martial law on May 17th. 
President Carter was highly critical of the military junta and its heavy - handed treatment 
of the media and protestors. U.S. officials urged Chun to become a civilian before 
arranging for himself to be elected by an electoral college, and President Carter sent a 
personal letter to Chun through Ambassador William H. Gleysteen Jr. that called for 
progress toward political liberalization. Chun’s political legitimacy was undermined by 
the loss o f life in Kwangju, where Chun’s dispatch o f troops to brutally suppress anti- 
government demonstrators led to the loss of nearly 200 lives.166 Carter administration 
officials stressed that American political support for the South Korean leadership would 
be very difficult if the regime carried through its plan to execute well-known dissident 
Kim Dae Jung.
Thus Chun was given a much-needed boost when newly - elected President 
Reagan invited him to the White House. Reagan refrained from public criticism but 
privately negotiated the release o f Kim, warning his execution would have an irreparable 
impact on U.S. -  Korean relations. Reagan’s preference for “quiet diplomacy” with 
respect to human rights issues would evolve, but during this sensitive period it was 
effective in both restoring a critical Cold War alliance and stabilizing South Korea’s 
domestic politics. Reagan’s visit to South Korea in 1983, in the context o f escalating
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tension with North Korea, was another boost for Chun’s regime. Joint military exercises 
demonstrated to the domestic and international audience that the United States was 
committed to supporting South Korea.
While Chun’s government maintained the institutional prerogatives, such as 
privileged access to government funding, necessary to discourage the military from direct 
intervention in his government, Chun sought to restore public confidence by pursuing 
modest political reforms. He made an effort to accommodate the opposition by holding 
semi-competitive elections in 1985, which gave opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and 
Kim Dae Jung an opportunity to mobilize the new urban middle class.167 Structural 
factors within Korean society had changed; the military was no longer the primary 
avenue for education and professional development within Korean society. After two 
decades of economic growth, civil society was more organized, and the private sector 
offered more opportunities for education, training, and a comfortable standard of 
living.168 However, when the 1985 National Assembly elections revealed strong support 
for the newly-formed opposition, the New Korea Democratic Party, Chun began to retreat 
from political liberalization ahead o f the 1987 elections.
In June 1987, large - scale demonstrations were held to protest President Chun’s 
decision to postpone the constitutional reform process, prompting Chun’s likely 
successor, Roh Tae Woo, to declare his support for liberalization, including direct 
presidential elections, the release o f political prisoners, and freedom of the press.169 
President Reagan wrote a personal letter to Chun on June 19th, 1987, encouraging 
compromise between the ruling and opposition parties, supporting the right to freedom of 
assembly, and discouraging military intervention.170
The Reagan administration praised Roh’s proposals, and prior to the elections in 
1987, President Reagan met briefly with presidential candidate Roh in Washington to 
express American support for democratic reforms.171 While the Reagan administration
167 Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," 369.
168 Ibid., 367.
169 Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy," in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: 
Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, ed. James Cotton (Canberra: Allen and 
Unwin, 1993), 7-9.
170 Ibid., 11.
171 Neil A. Lewis, "Offer by Korean is Praised by U.S.," The New York Times, June 30, 1987. "Reagan 
Holds Talk with Key Politician from South Korea," The New York Times, September 15, 1987.
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emphasized the meeting was not an endorsement for Roh’s candidacy, Reagan wasted no 
time congratulating Roh when he won the election in December o f 1987, after the 
opposition vote was split by rivals Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung.
President Roh would play a key role in Korea’s transition to democracy. Despite 
his association with authoritarian presidents Park and Chun, Roh had gained the support 
of pro-democracy forces with his proposed “Declaration of Democratization and 
Reforms,” on June 29, 1987,172 and reached an agreement with democracy activist Kim 
Young Sam on a constitutional revision that was approved by the National Assembly in 
October, 1987. Roh preserved the institutional prerogatives of the military, minimizing 
the likelihood of direct intervention as Roh implemented modest political reforms. 
During his five-year term, Roh ensured the military’s financial, organizational, and 
personal interests were protected from civilian oversight. He maintained seats for retired 
military in the cabinet and National Assembly, and the military retained control over 
defense and national security policy, with minimal oversight by the National Assembly. 
The military was granted amnesty with respect to human rights abuses, and the DSC 
continued to interfere in domestic politics by monitoring politicians, labor leaders, 
academics, religious leaders, reporters and others.173
Yet public sentiment began to have a greater impact on the role o f the military in 
civil politics. For example, in 1992, the head of the Agency for National Security 
Planning (ANSP) was fired when the public reacted strongly to the illegal campaigning 
of several agents. The outcry compelled the ANSP to pledge political neutrality in future 
elections.174 Still, by the end of Roh’s term in 1993, most of the military’s reserved 
domains remained, and the military was able to exercise institutional and political 
autonomy, even though it had been discouraged from openly political activities.
Kim Young Sam was the first president without a military background to be 
inaugurated in 32 years. During his campaign, he promised to embark on a new era of 
civilian government. Because he enjoyed greater democratic legitimacy than his 
predecessor, as well as a ruling majority in the National Assembly, he was able to go
172 Woo, Security Challenges and M ilitary Politics in East Asia: From State Building to Post- 
Dem ocratization, 107-08.
173 Saxer, "Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," 390.
174 Ibid.
76
farther in reducing the discretionary powers of the armed forces leadership and 
establishing objective civilian control over the military.175 After gaining support for his 
reforms from top officers, he fired the Chief of Staff and the head of the DSC, ordered 
military-associated intelligence agencies (so long responsible for monitoring domestic 
politics) to report to the civilian defense minister, dismantled the Hanahoe, and purged 
corrupt officers.176
Public outrage over a series of corruption scandals exposed from 1993 -  1995 
allowed Kim to decisively overcome resistance to his reforms. For example, after two 
defense ministers were found to have profited from corrupt military procurement 
procedures, Kim introduced a mechanism to monitor financial activities and real estate 
deals, which for decades had been used to anonymously funnel money from big business 
owners (chaebol) to corrupt politicians.177 The “Real-Name Financial Transaction 
System” revealed that former president Roh held approximately $650 million under 40 
false-name accounts, a discovery that sparked massive demonstrations. With support 
from civil society groups and the National Assembly, Kim’s anti-corruption drive 
culminated in the arrest o f former presidents Chun and Roh, as well as fourteen former 
associates. Kim enjoyed broad public support for his “Campaign to Rectify the 
Authoritarian Past,” which included naming the December 1979 seizure o f military rule a 
“coup d’etat,” and establishing the anniversary o f the Kwangju uprising as a public 
holiday. The punishment of the high-ranking officials, which included imprisonment and 
death, was sobering to military officers and discouraged future attempts to influence 
politics, paving the way for long-time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung’s candidacy ahead 
o f the 1997 presidential elections. The primary issue during the 1997 presidential 
campaign was the financial crisis, and the public focused on which candidate could 
restore growth. Upon his election, the military accepted Kim’s Sunshine Policy, which 
proposed offering economic and humanitarian aid to North Korea and promoting greater 
cultural, education, and economic exchanges. Many analysts consider South Korea’s
175 Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," 372.
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democracy was consolidated when Kim’s term ended in February 2003.178 The 
percentage o f retired military officers in core political institutions declined, along with 
the strategic position of the armed forces as an institution.
Military Professionalism During Korea’s Transition
The professionalization of the Korean armed forces proved to be a decisive factor 
in the government’s ability to implement civil-military reforms in the 1990s. By the time 
Kim Young Sam approached senior military leaders for their support in establishing 
objective civilian control over the military, the armed forces’ competence, coherency, 
mission exclusivity and respect for civilian political authority had been enhanced by 
several modernization programs, two wars, and professional education and training at 
both Korean and American military schools. U.S. American military doctrine, which 
included an emphasis on unity, responsibility, and respect for civilian control over the 
military, had permeated Korea’s armed forces for more than four decades, and a greater 
share of the armed forces’ officers were convinced that the presence o f the military in the 
civil sphere undermined their effectiveness in countering threats to Korea’s national 
security.
Chun deployed his loyal Hanahoe faction to seize power from the senior military 
establishment and impose martial law for 456 days following Park’s assassination. 
Because the military suppression of demonstrators opposing martial law in Kwangju had 
damaged Chun’s legitimacy, Chun would refrain from mobilizing the military to crack 
down on dissent in an effort to “soften the brutal image of dictatorial rule.” 179 For 
example, when students from a total of 27 universities and colleges in Seoul 
demonstrated on the fifth anniversary o f the Kwangju uprising, nearly 5,000 students 
clashed with 1,000 riot police, yet military personnel were not tasked with restoring 
order.180
178 Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea," 378.
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Chun’s decision not to use the full force of his loyal faction against pro­
democracy demonstrators in the summer of 1987, may be a reflection o f the military 
leadership’s split between “hardliners” who favored heavy-handed tactics, and “softliners” 
who were uncomfortable with such interventions and/or preferred to protect their 
reserved domains by returning to the barracks. A former intelligence chief claimed he and 
other generals prevented military intervention during the demonstrations o f 1987, 
because they opposed the use of military force against political opponents of the regime, 
and sought to end the military’s involvement in politics.181
The restraint shown by military officers may have also been influenced by the fact 
that the opposition had a more conservative character than in the past, and as such did not 
undermine Korea’s national security.182 In addition, the military balance on the Korean 
peninsula was in favor o f South Korea, which had surpassed North Korea in terms of 
military capabilities by the early 1980s.183 The alliance with the United States was strong, 
and South Korea possessed an indigenous defense industrial base that rendered it less 
dependent on foreign sources of military hardware.
During the peaceful transfer o f power from President Chun to President-elect Roh, 
the likelihood of military intervention was low. Roh had been a close associate of Chun 
and Park’s, and while he had proposed democratic reforms he could also be expected to 
preserve the military’s reserved domains. Yet Roh would also refrain from imposing 
martial law, stating in 1989 that he was opposed to using emergency powers under the 
Korean Constitution even when confronted with violent protests by radical students, 
during which six riot police officers were killed.184 Thus while retaining many of the 
military’s institutional prerogatives, Roh refrained from directly politicizing the military 
by tasking it with using force against Roh’s political opposition. The more years that 
passed in the absence of martial law, the more extreme the measure may have seemed 
from the perspective o f the government, military, and society.
Long-time opposition leader Kim Young Sam joined Roh’s ruling Democratic 
Liberal Party two years before the presidential elections in December, 1992, which may
181 Saxer, "Generals and Presidents: Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control in South Korea," 388.
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have convinced the military elite he would not threaten their corporate interests. 
Professional senior military officers welcomed the civil-military reforms proposed by 
Kim shortly after he assumed the presidency in 1993. Corruption, factionalism, and 
politicization undermine the military readiness of the armed forces and reflect poorly on 
their reputation as a professional fighting force. Given that Kim Young Sam’s foreign 
policy did not imperil the external security of South Korea, the senior leadership could 
take advantage o f the broad public support for Kim’s reforms to dismantle the insular 
Hanahoe faction. Under Kim’s leadership, objective civilian control over the military was 
finally achieved.
Conclusions
From the beginning of bilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and South 
Korea throughout the remainder o f the Cold War, U.S. military aid, as well as the 
presence of U.S. troops, mitigated the external threat to South Korea. The American 
security guarantee and political alignment continues to the present day. The U.S. has 
fought alongside, trained and educated countless members of the Korean military, 
contributing to the professionalization of the Korean armed forces. U.S. military doctrine 
remains dominant among Korean military planners and within Korean military 
institutions. Why, then, did the role of the military in civil politics expand from 1961 
through the 1980s, including two instances of direct military intervention via coup d'etat?
This case reveals several interesting insights regarding the relationship between 
U.S. military aid and the role of the recipient’s military in civil politics. In particular, it 
challenges several assumptions one might make about this role based on the civil-military 
relations literature, particularly with respect to the influence that the presence of an 
external threat, the political strength of the civilian political authority, and the 
professionalism of the armed forces have on the inclination of the military to intervene. 
This section will offer some conclusions based on observations of the three periods 
covered in this case study. The goal is that these conclusions may inform expectations in 
future cases when U.S. military aid is deemed necessary in support of American strategic 
interests.
80
The External Threat
In the two instances of direct intervention by military officers, in 1961 and 1979, 
the military faction did not explicitly justify its intervention based on the presence o f an 
external threat, but rather believed it was uniquely capable o f restoring domestic order 
and meeting the nation’s economic, political, and social challenges. Nevertheless, the 
regimes that evolved from these interventions linked the external security threat posed by 
the Soviet-backed North Korea with its political opposition, pulling the military deeper 
into politics both as a means o f monitoring and suppressing dissent and consolidating 
political power. While President Park used officers from the “counter-subversion track” 
to secure his regime for nearly two decades, however, President Chun, who enjoyed 
strong political support from President Reagan, barely held onto power for seven years 
before conceding to democratic reforms and the peaceful transfer of power to a 
democratically-elected successor (albeit one from his own military faction.) While much 
credit is given to the vocal middle class willing to join students, intellectuals, and labor 
unions in demanding political liberalization, the perceived level of external threat, as well 
as the expectation of American support to meet this threat, remains important.
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, despite the presence o f U.S. troops and 
large outlays o f U.S. military aid, North Korea’s military capability was considered to be 
greater than South Korea’s, and the Soviet-backed regime frequently sent guerillas south 
to inject fear and uncertainty in Korean society. In addition, during the Nixon 
Administration, Park expected American material support as well as the U.S. troop 
presence would decline. This expectation leant urgency to the development of a viable 
economic base from which to build an indigenous defense capability, and mobilizing the 
public toward this effort would require strong state leadership. President Park recognized 
the geopolitical circumstances under which the alliance had been forged were changing, 
and South Korea would need to be capable o f meeting future challenges on its own. This 
would require Park to draw the military deeper into civil politics both to serve as his 
political base and to guarantee social order during crises.
The centralization of Park’s political authority allowed for a state-directed 
economic development program that would enable South Korea to support its own
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defense industrial base and provide for greater independence in national security 
policymaking in the future. Park was able to mobilize Korean society during the 1960s by 
linking national security with economic vitality, enabling him to justify close government 
cooperation with industry and sustain uncomfortable economic practices such as low 
wages for workers. Thus the presence of an external threat served as a powerful tool for 
the executive in maintaining a sense o f national unity and purpose. The support of both 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations during this period bolstered support for Park’s 
efforts.
However, Park worried about his capacity to deter North Korean aggression in the 
context o f the Sino-American detente, the Guam Doctrine, the massive American troop 
withdrawal from the peninsula, and the decline of U.S. military aid. During the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the balance of military capabilities still favored North Korea; in the 
minds o f most Koreans, only the U.S. troop presence prevented the North from a surprise 
assault on Seoul. Even as President Nixon tried to assure Park of his political support, the 
expectation o f a decline in U.S. military aid meant Park was more likely to risk American 
disapproval over his authoritarian behavior. This explains why Park consolidated his 
authority with the unprecedented expansion of presidential powers in the constitutional 
amendments o f late 1972, despite the fact that 1972 was the peak of U.S. military 
assistance, with more than three billion in constant 2012 $US allocated.185 The Yushin 
constitution was an effort to maintain control over society during what Park anticipated 
would be a decade o f extraordinary economic, social, cultural and political change.
President Chun enjoyed a far more favorable security environment from 1980 - 
1987. By the early 1980’s, South Korea’s military capabilities had surpassed North 
Korea’s, and President Reagan offered his government strong political support that 
included a commitment not to withdraw American military troops from the peninsula. 
Modest steps were being taken toward reconciliation with North Korea. In absolute terms, 
the U.S. granted Chun far less in annual military aid than it had the Park regime, and 
Reagan only added approximately 2,000 American troops to the 38,000 troops stationed 
in South Korea when he assumed the presidency. Unlike the Carter administration,
185 "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 1945 - 30 September 
2012.", ibid.
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however, the Reagan administration refrained from publically undermining Chun’s 
presidency and criticizing its human rights abuses, instead emphasizing repeatedly the 
importance o f the alliance. While tensions with North Korea persisted, the overall 
decrease in the external threat rendered it more difficult for Chun to justify the continued 
presence o f the military in civil politics and reject the demand for democratic reforms that 
reached its apex in 1987. In particular, Chun could no longer credibly link the external 
threat with his political opposition to the extent that both President Rhee and President 
Park had during their terms. The election o f fellow Hanahoe member, retired General 
Roh Tae Woo, ensured the more hard-line, conservative military officers would have less 
incentive to intervene, whether for reasons o f national security or to protect their reserved 
domains.
By the presidential elections of 1992, the Cold War had ended, South Korea’s 
economy had far outstripped North Korea’s, South Korea had established diplomatic 
relations with both Communist China and the former Soviet Union, and North Korea was 
isolated from the international community. Even in the context of Pyongyang’s 
recalcitrance vis-a-vis nuclear inspections, when long-time opposition member and 
democracy activist Kim Young Sam was elected, he was in a far more favorable position 
to implement civil-military reforms and establish objective civilian control over the 
military. South Korea continued to enjoy strong political support from the U.S., but 
overall military aid had declined sharply as U.S. policymakers demanded greater burden 
sharing on the part o f South Korea. In fact, by 1993, the U.S. provided only .4 million in 
constant 2012 $US, in the form of grants for IMET, although the U.S. still funded its own 
troop presence.186 South Korean officials could expect that over time the demand for 
burden - sharing would increase, with U.S. troops eventually withdrawing from the 
peninsula. Nevertheless, the structural conditions allowed for dramatic reforms, including 
the dismantling o f the Hanahoe faction, which limited the options for military 
interference in civil politics.
186 Ibid.
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Political Support fo r  the Civilian Leadership
U.S. officials accompanied military aid with political support for South Korea’s 
civilian leadership. Nevertheless, the military dominated civilian politics for more than 
three decades. In examining the relationship between U.S. political support and the 
interference o f the military in politics, several factors that contributed to this unexpected 
outcome emerge. A critical observation is that most of South Korea’s civilian leaders did 
not attempt to establish objective civilian control over the military. President Rhee, 
President Park, and President Chun sought to deliberately politicize the military in the 
service o f their own political objectives. The civilian leaders who would benefit from 
objective civilian control, Prime Minister Chang Myon, President Choi Kyu Hah, and 
President Roh Tae Woo, chose “acquiescence,” or tacit approval of the military’s 
reserved domains, to stave off military interference. Only Kim Young Sam had both the 
incentive and the domestic and international structural conditions necessary to implement 
civil-military reforms and achieve objective civilian control over the military. It is worth 
noting that American political support was not always consistent, and that discontinuities 
that influenced regime behavior existed across and within successive American 
administrations.
Like Rhee before him, as domestic and international criticism of Park mounted, 
the president pulled the military deeper into civil politics. While both mobilized loyal 
factions against the political opposition, Park established a sophisticated network 
comprised of select members of the military establishment, reserving prestigious 
positions in government and industry in return for loyalty. Thus Park deliberately 
politicized members o f the military throughout his seventeen years as president, 
establishing reserved domains for the military that future administrations would be forced 
to confront. Yet Park was also committed to the professionalization of the armed forces, 
and established a dual-track system that insulated the bulk of the military from political 
activity. Thus the non-politicized military officers were reluctant to intervene on behalf 
of President Chun in the face of widespread pro-democracy demonstrations in 1987.
Transitional regimes that would benefit from objective civilian control over the 
military are not always in a position to implement civil-military reforms. Prime Minister
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Chang Myon enjoyed strong political support from the United States, but his tenuous 
position precluded the de-politicization o f senior military officers who had benefited 
from President Rhee’s patronage. His government’s reluctance to implement anti­
corruption reforms or hold accountable military officers who participated in vote - 
rigging under Rhee angered the faction within the military that ultimately intervened in 
May, 1961. Thus while Chang chose “acquiescence,” protecting certain military officers’ 
reserved domains to maintain political stability, the factionalized military was unable to 
provide coherent support to his government. The government was so weak, in fact, that 
the United States, the Korean public, and the military establishment ultimately decided 
not to intervene on Chang’s behalf.
President Choi Kyu Hah, who assumed his post after the assassination of 
President Park, put forward a timetable for political liberalization that included a revision 
of the Yushin constitution and presidential and parliamentary elections. U.S. officials 
were highly supportive of Choi’s efforts to implement democratic reforms. Yet in May, 
1980, Choi acquiesced to the formation of a “Special Committee for National Security 
Measures” that was dominated by the military, led by Chun, and which granted the 
military body political authority equal to that o f the civilian cabinet. Not three months 
later, Choi assumed responsibility for the Kwanju uprising, and, facing pressure from the 
army, abruptly resigned, clearing the way for Chun to be elected by the National Council 
for Unification, the electoral college established by Park in 1972.
President Roh Tae Woo also enjoyed consistent U.S. political support, but chose 
not to implement civil-military reforms. Ultimately this may have preserved South 
Korea’s democratic consolidation; there were rumors that if dissident Kim Dae Jung were 
elected in 1987, the military may have intervened. While Roh preserved most of the 
military’s reserved domains and institutional prerogatives, minimizing the risk o f a direct 
intervention that would have been highly contentious and destabilizing domestically and 
internationally, he refrained from using his emergency powers to impose martial law, 
which would also have drawn the military deeper into civil politics. By the time of Kim 
Young Sam’s election, the risk o f direct intervention was much lower, and Kim enjoyed 
greater domestic political support for civil-military reforms.
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Another important factor to consider is that political support from the United 
States has not always been consistent. The extent to which U.S political support 
influenced regime behavior is evident when comparing the absolute amount o f U.S. 
military aid with the discontinuities in American political support. During the Carter 
administration, for example, the U.S. contributed more in annual U.S. military aid than 
did the Reagan administration. However, President Carter’s criticism of the Park 
government’s human rights record and his call for the withdrawal of American troops 
undermined President Park’s control over Korean society as well as his inner security 
circle. In contrast, President Reagan quickly embraced both President Chun and President 
Roh, and emphasized repeatedly the American commitment to South Korea’s security. In 
addition, Reagan refrained from publically admonishing their governments, and his high- 
profile meetings with the South Korean leaders leant legitimacy to both former generals.
Discontinuity also existed within administrations. While President Nixon and 
President Ford tried to assure Park’s government o f their unwavering support, the 
American media and members of Congress criticized Park’s authoritarian practices, 
questioned the justification for the American political commitment, and were particularly 
vitriolic in response to the lobbying scandal in 1976. President Eisenhower faced a 
similar problem during Rhee’s government. Understanding the political and 
psychological impact o f U.S. military aid, Eisenhower wanted to implement a 
modernization program that would give Koreans greater confidence in their security, 
allow for South Korea to gradually reduce the size of its military, and ease the burden of 
a large Korean force on both the Korean and American budgets. Congress, however, did 
not feel that an increase in military aid to Korea was justified, and the allocations for the 
military assistance program dropped precipitously from nearly three billion in constant 
2012SUS in 1957, to just 491 million in 1958. These types o f fluctuations created 
uncertainty within these regimes, which often led to an increased reliance on the military 
for domestic political support.
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Professionalization
U.S. military aid was instrumental in professionalizing the Korean armed forces, 
which is a precondition for achieving objective civilian control over the military. 
American military advisors established schools that raised the competency of the armed 
forces, contributed to the military’s cohesiveness, emphasized the importance of mission 
exclusivity and respect for civilian political authority. However, more than four decades 
would pass before South Korea established objective civilian control over the armed 
forces, in large part due to the dominance o f the military as an institution relative to other 
sectors of Korean society. The massive effort to increase the competency of the Korean 
armed forces after the invasion from North Korea in 1950 may have created internal 
tension that ultimately challenged the military’s cohesiveness, mission exclusivity, and 
respect for civilian political authority.
U.S. - established military schools as well as the military experience gained 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars helped advance the capabilities o f the Korean 
military. Military education was one of the only means of upward mobility in Korean 
society through the 1950s and 1960s. The training had net positive effects for Korea’s 
economic development, as Koreans rotating out o f military service brought technical and 
administrative education and skills to the civilian workforce. However, during the 1950s, 
as Korea was still recovering from Japanese colonial rule and the Korean War, the 
civilian sectors of the economy had difficulty absorbing these personnel; meanwhile, 
while the military was the primary beneficiary of U.S. aid, living standards for military 
personnel were low, exacerbated by the costs o f maintaining a force o f more than 
700,000 troops. Promotions for mid-ranking officers were slowed by higher-ranking 
officers, particularly those who benefitted from President Rhee’s patronage. Many were 
also resentful of Rhee’s attempts to use the military to intervene against the opposition on 
his behalf.
In this context, the military establishment chose to condone the coup o f 1961, 
which was instigated not by the military as an institution, but by a faction led by Park, 
who was heavily influenced by his time with the Japanese Imperial Army. Despite the 
American preference for the liberal-democratic model o f civil-military relations, Park
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pursued an alternative model in which the state penetrated society through extensive 
intelligence networks, and played a major role in guiding the country through 
industrialization. Park purged military officers who disagreed with his policies and 
rewarded loyal military personnel, enabling him to overcome opposition from within the 
military ranks. Thus he at once subordinated the military to his civilian authority while 
also deliberately politicizing select members to consolidate his political base.
Yet Park valued the professionalization of the armed forces, and established a 
dual-promotion track that insulated field officers from politics. The field officers would 
remain focused on meeting the external threat o f North Korea, contributing to a sense of 
mission exclusivity. Thus while Park relied heavily on his inner circle for regime security, 
the military as an institution continued to advance in its professionalization. For example, 
the military’s competency and coherency were strengthened by its participation in the 
Vietnam War, both because of the experience gained and the increase in U.S. military aid 
during this period.
Hanahoe members Chun and Roh also satisfied the corporate interests o f the 
military, which served as a fundamental part of their political base. Yet the military as an 
institution continued to evolve. “Softliners” in the late 1970s and through the 1980s 
preferred to remain outside the political arena; this sentiment was reinforced by a 
growing number of moderates in the government, particularly after the 1985 National 
Assembly elections. Even though the military tried to protect its institutional prerogatives 
under Chun and Roh, the military did not intervene directly when Kim Young Sam 
reasserted civilian institutional control of the military, and did not protest after the 
election of long time opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, even though his sunshine policy 
was anathema to the military’s strong anti-Communist ideology. The mandate for 
political reform enjoyed by both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, bolstered by a 
robust Korean middle class and the post-Cold War geopolitical environment, allowed the 
civilian presidents to roll back the institutionalized role of the military in South Korea’s 
civil politics. O f particular importance was Kim Young Sam’s ability to finally dismantle 
the Hanahoe, which for so long had undermined the cohesiveness of the armed forces. 
Under Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, politicized officers were in a much weaker 
position to fight for their reserved domains.
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In retrospect, the strongest relationship between the external threat, U.S. military 
aid, and the military’s inclination to intervene rests in the decision to expand and 
professionalize the military. While a professionalized military is a precondition for 
objective civilian control, a professionalizing military, one that gains socio-political 
importance relative to the rest of society and benefits from the diversion o f state 
resources as well as external aid, may conceive of itself as uniquely capable o f assuming 
a nation-building role if civil society is weak and civilian elites are considered 
incompetent, unpopular, and incapable o f bringing economic growth. U.S. military aid 
that contributes to the competence of the military may undermine coherency in the short 
term, as tensions grow between junior officers with new ideas and senior officers who 
prefer the status quo. This dynamic can be exacerbated when promotion rates are slow, 
living standards are poor, and there exist few alternatives for upward mobility outside of 
the military hierarchy.
In addition, a competent and cohesive military that is well-funded (both by 
domestic and foreign government resources) is an attractive strategic partner for civilian 
elites who seek the active political support of the military and wish to preserve the option 
o f using force against political opponents. This relationship is important to consider when 
training and equipping partners’ and allies’ militaries in the context o f regimes that have 
not yet achieved democratic consolidation.
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CHAPTER III
TURKEY: CAN THE GUARDIANS OF THE REPUBLIC FOLLOW THE 
LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC MODEL?
Introduction
The United States and Turkey found they had shared strategic interests based on 
common threat perceptions of the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II. From 
Ankara’s perspective, Moscow’s termination of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty o f Neutrality 
and Friendship in the Spring of 1945, Stalin’s effort to modify the Montreux Convention 
that governed the use of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, and the Soviet Union’s 
demand that Turkey hand back the border districts of Kars and Ardahan, raised concerns 
of Soviet regional domination.1 American policymakers were concerned Turkish 
neutrality might give Soviet naval vessels privileged access to the Mediterranean from 
the Black Sea, as well as facilitate expansion to the Balkans and the Middle East.
To meet Turkey’s immediate security needs, President Truman authorized $45 
million in security and economic aid through the Lend-Lease act o f 1941. Upon learning 
that the British government could no longer extend financial aid to Turkey, President 
Truman declared in March o f 1947, that Turkey was “essential to the preservation of 
order in the Middle East,” and through the Truman Doctrine increased aid to $75 million 
for fiscal year 1948.2 Turkey was a vital strategic ally for the United States not only 
because o f its geographical location on the Eastern Mediterranean, but also because o f its 
proximity to the Middle East. Most importantly, though, the Turkish government and 
military demonstrated early on that they were willing to fight by contributing the 1st 
Turkish Brigade, with more than 5,000 personnel, to the U.S.-led UN coalition defending 
the Republic of Korea in the Korean War, where the Turks were lauded for their tenacity 
and skill on the battlefield.
1 Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945 
- 1952," The Journal o f  American H istory 71, no. 4 (1985): 808.
2 Aid to Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947.
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Recognizing the need to institutionalize strategic cooperation with Turkey, U.S. 
policymakers encouraged Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Article V 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, the U.S. commitment of material aid, and the presence of 
U.S. military personnel in Turkey played a decisive role in mitigating the principle 
external threat to Turkey’s national security posed by an increasingly domineering Soviet 
Union. U.S. military aid was also an expression of political backing for Turkey’s civilian 
leadership, one that was often reinforced by public statements of support, official visits 
by government leaders, and institutionalized cooperation, particularly through NATO. In 
addition, close cooperation between the U.S. defense establishment and the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF), access to advanced modem weaponry and equipment, as well as 
grants for International Military Education and Training (IMET) contributed to the 
professionalization o f Turkey’s military personnel. Previous studies of civil-military 
relations suggest mitigating the external threat, increasing the political strength of a 
civilian regime, and enhancing the professional character o f the armed forces will 
decrease the likelihood o f military intervention in civil politics. Yet since U.S. military 
aid began in 1948, there have been three direct coups, one “postmodern” coup, and an 
attempted “e-coup.” In addition, from 1960 through the 1990s, the Turkish military 
expanded its reserved domains, strengthening its political power in relation to the rest of 
the Turkish government, and allowing for a dominant role in national security 
policymaking and foreign relations.
How can we explain the apparent negative relationship between U.S. military aid 
and the institutionalization of civilian control over the military? American policymakers 
in the early days of bilateral relations with Turkey sought political, economic, and social 
development along with the modernization of Turkey’s armed forces. The transition from 
single-party to multi-party rule, which led to Turkey’s first free elections in 1950, was 
considered a positive indicator of Turkey’s democratic consolidation. This chapter will 
examine some of the paradoxical effects o f U.S. military aid on Turkey’s political 
development.
In the first decade of U.S. military aid, civilian leaders prioritized extensive force 
modernization over political, economic, and social reforms, preferring to maintain an 
underpaid but oversized military establishment with the latest military technology, even if
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the Turkish troops lacked the training to operate the new equipment. This suggests 
despite NATO and American security guarantees that mitigated Turkey’s external threats, 
Turkey’s leaders were anxious to take advantage of the opportunity to expand Turkey’s 
military capabilities, as well as use foreign aid to launch ambitious development projects. 
However, when the government attempted to use the military to suppress public 
opposition to its increasingly authoritarian policies, the military, as the most powerful 
state institution and the guarantor o f domestic stability, was compelled to intervene and 
reestablish order. Military capabilities continued to be crucial for protecting Turkish 
Cypriots, confronting left and right - wing extremist violence, contributing to NATO and 
U.S.-led military operations, and protecting Turkish citizens from attacks by Kurdish 
separatists. In this context the prestige and influence of the military establishment grew, 
granting greater legitimacy to its presence in Turkey’s civil politics. Had Turkey refused 
U.S. military aid and maintained a neutral position in the Cold War, the armed forces 
may not have wielded so much influence in Turkish politics.
During the 1950s, the military refrained from interfering in civil politics; however, 
rather than establish objective civilian control over the military, the prime minister 
attempted to use the military to harass the opposition and quell public dissent. The 
military, highly resentful of this attempt at politicization, intervened in 1960 with the 
stated intention o f restoring democratic processes. While the military junta did allow for a 
return to competitive elections, it also assumed an active guardianship role that would last 
for more than four decades. The reserved domains necessary to carry out this role 
persisted into the 21st century, and pressured successive prime ministers to assume a 
policy of “acquiescence” rather than establish objective civilian control over the military. 
In addition, discontinuities between Congressional and White House political support for 
Ankara has traditionally been perceived as an expression of America’s wavering 
commitment to its ally, leading Turkish authorities to question the credibility o f the U.S. 
security guarantee.
Finally, U.S. military aid that contributed to the competence of the Turkish 
Armed Forces may have undermined its coherency in the short-term, as some Turkish 
officers became motivated to assume a greater role in Turkey’s nation - building. 
Kemalism, an ideology named for the Turkish Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal
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Attaturk, pre-dates U.S. military aid and bolsters the sense that Turkish officers are 
uniquely qualified to guarantee Turkey’s secular orientation. The TAF’s legal role as the 
“guardian of the constitution” and the “guardian of the republic” has been used to 
legitimize its political intervention for decades.3 The TAF’s strong Kemalist ideology, 
combined with the prevalence of internal security challenges, has undermined the 
military’s mission exclusivity as well as its respect for civilian political authority.
Because o f the emphasis on westernization, modernization, secularism and national unity 
in the Kemalist ideology, the military often clashed with both Communist and Islamist 
political parties. For this reason, the transition to multi-party politics actually increased 
the likelihood of military intervention in civil politics, as senior military leaders 
perceived far-left and far-right parties to threaten the republic. U.S. military assistance 
increased the military’s ability to intervene by improving the technical and administrative 
skill of military personnel, enhancing the TAF’s cohesiveness and organizational 
capacity, and bolstering the legitimacy and prestige o f senior military personnel.
This study will examine the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role of 
the military in Turkey’s civil politics during four periods: from the early days o f the 
Truman Doctrine until the first coup d'etat in 1960, from the post-coup period of military 
rule until the military intervention in 1980, after the 1980 coup until 2000, and from 2001 
to the present. The first period, during which the U.S. established its strategic relationship 
with Turkey, highlights the primacy o f military and economic development in Turkish 
decision-making. While the TAF experienced an impressive period of force 
modernization and became integrated in the North Atlantic Alliance, the Turkish 
economy stagnated and Turkey’s multiparty politics became increasingly contentious, 
motivating the military to intervene in 1960 to restore order. The second period is 
characterized by tension in U.S. -  Turkey bilateral relations, particularly in response to 
the Cyprus issue, which caused serious fluctuations in American military aid and 
culminated in the imposition of an arms embargo by U.S. lawmakers. This period also 
ends in a direct intervention by the TAF in civil politics, in reaction to widespread
3 For more discussion o f  the military's traditional sense o f  responsibility for Turkey's modernization and 
secular orientation, see Metin Heper, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?," 
Turkish Studies 12, no. 2 (2011): 241-52; Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," Armed 
Forces & Society (2010); William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 80.
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political violence and the ascension of influential Islamist leaders who threatened to 
reorient Turkish politics. During the third period, civilian leaders, backed by senior 
military personnel, are finally able to implement liberal economic reforms; subsequent 
growth enables Turkey to develop its own defense industrial base and reduce its 
dependence on U.S. military aid. With the end of the Cold War, the bulk o f U.S. military 
assistance is cut, although International Military Education and Training (IMET) and 
bilateral security cooperation in response to regional security concerns, including 
counterterrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, continues. Broad public support for 
European Union accession, along with negative memories from the 1980-1983 period of 
military rule, leads to a decrease in the public’s tolerance of the armed forces’ role in 
civil politics, although the rise of political Islam leads to a “post-modern coup’’ in 1997. 
The final period witnesses the resumption of U.S. military aid in response to complex and 
volatile regional security issues; while the military unsuccessfully attempts an “e-coup” 
in 2007, under the premiership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s political leaders 
accomplish an unprecedented subordination of the military to civilian authority.
U.S. Military Aid and the Challenges of Multi-Party Politics, 1948-1960
U.S. military aid, including shipments of advanced weaponry and equipment, 
education and training, and the presence o f American military personnel, mitigated the 
risk o f external aggression from the Soviet Union, provided political support for civilian 
leadership during the first decade o f multi-party politics, and made great strides in 
modernizing and professionalizing the Turkish Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the Turkish 
military intervened directly in civil politics to remove the leadership o f the ruling 
Democrat Party in 1960. This section will examine the relationship between U.S. military 
aid and the evolution o f civil-military relations in Turkey up until the first coup d’etat.
This section is divided into three parts. The first will examine the relationship 
between U.S. military aid, Turkey’s external threats, and the role of the military in 
Turkish politics. While bilateral aid, along with NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later 
renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO), dramatically improved Turkey’s 
security environment, the military intervened in reaction to what it perceived was the
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increasing authoritarianism, corruption, and incompetence o f the civilian government of 
Premier Adnan Menderes. The second part will review if the political support provided 
by the United States for Turkey’s civilian leaders minimized the options for the military 
to interfere in Menderes’ government during the 1950s. While political support from 
Washington and Turkish society bolstered the civilian regime and minimized the political 
options for the military to interfere through most of the decade, in the late 1950s, as the 
Turkish public was decrying the undemocratic practices o f Menderes’ Democrat Party, 
Menderes tried to mobilize the military against his political opposition. This attempt to 
politicize the military ran afoul o f Turkish officers, motivating them to remove the 
elected leader despite the political support of the Eisenhower administration. The third 
part will look at how U.S. military aid contributed to the professionalism of the Turkish 
armed forces. While American technical assistance, education, and training contributed to 
the competency of the armed forces, its coherency was undermined by divergent views 
among military officers o f the armed forces’ role in nation - building. In addition, the 
deeply - ingrained belief that the military is the guardian of Turkey’s democracy pulled 
the military away from an exclusive focus on external defense and, in the minds of many 
officers, entitled it to scrutinize and ultimately unseat the civilian political authority.
U.S. Military Aid and Turkey’s Postwar Security
The Truman Doctrine, NATO membership, and the Baghdad Pact oriented 
Turkey’s national security firmly with the West in the postwar period. U.S. military aid 
decisively mitigated the external security threat posed by the Soviet Union to the extent 
that by the early 1950s, Turkey’s civilian leadership placed greater emphasis on the need 
for economic aid over military aid when conferring with American policymakers. 
Washington was hopeful that Turkey’s more democratic orientation, particularly under 
the Menderes government, would render Ankara amenable to economic reforms. A stable 
economic base would be vital to ensuring allies could eventually reduce their dependence 
on U.S. aid, given that U.S. resources were finite and the Cold War security architecture 
was growing. As the decade progressed, President Eisenhower questioned the need to 
continue the pace of military aid, concerned that the Turkish Armed Forces were unable
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to absorb the sophisticated equipment and weaponry being provided. Meanwhile, despite 
enjoying a more favorable external security environment, Turkey’s civilian leadership 
responded to domestic pressure by pulling the military into politics, using the armed 
forces to intimidate and harass opposition politicians. This attempt to use the military for 
political purposes incurred deep resentment within the TAF, ultimately leading to the 
military coup that removed Premier Adnan Menderes and President Celal Bayar from 
power.
Turkey maintained its neutrality up until the end o f World War II, receiving 
modest military aid from the United Kingdom and the U.S. to maintain a large but ill- 
equipped defense force. In February 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan, 
and became a founding member of the United Nations. In early 1947, the UK formally 
declared it could no longer give aid to Greece and Turkey; the U.S., fearing a return to 
Turkish neutrality, believed military aid could bring Turkey more resolutely in the 
American sphere, providing strategic depth to the American policy o f containing Soviet 
influence.4
While U.S. officials did not necessarily believe Turkey was in imminent danger of 
a Soviet attack, military planners recognized the strategic significance o f Turkey’s 
location in the event war unexpectedly erupted between the Allies and the Soviet Union.5 
Bilateral relations deepened in 1950, when Turkish forces joined the United Nations 
effort in the Korean War. The contribution to the collective security effort in Korea was 
instrumental in demonstrating Turkey’s willingness to fight, and proved to American 
policymakers Turkey could be an effective and indispensible Cold War partner by 
controlling access to the Turkish straits and deterring Soviet advances toward the Middle 
East. Turkey’s transition to multi-party rule helped American policymakers convince 
their allies to support Turkey’s full membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.
From Washington’s perspective, U.S. military aid would not only bolster the 
security of Western Europe, but also potentially facilitate a NATO-friendly, anti - 
Communist security architecture in the Middle East. American policymakers hoped by
4"Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs o f  Staff to the Secretary o f  War (Patterson) and the Secretary o f  the 
Navy (Forrestal): United States Economic and Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: the Truman Doctrine, 
March 13, 1947," in FRUS  (U.S. Department o f  State: University o f  Wisconsin Digital Collections).
5 Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945 - 1952," 
113, 16.
96
joining Turkey in an alliance with Pakistan, the westernmost member of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a “Northern Tier” could be established, forming a 
line o f countries capable o f repelling Soviet advances toward the Middle East. Turkish 
co-bellicosity would slow down any potential Soviet moves toward the Suez and North 
Africa, and allow NATO forces a platform from which to launch air attacks against 
strategic Soviet targets.
U.S. military aid was geared toward establishing viable Allied bases and logistics 
networks within Turkey, and contributed to modernizing air landing strips, facilities, and 
roads to facilitate troop mobilization. In the early days of the alliance, more than thirty 
defense-related installations were established. In exchange for U.S. security guarantees, 
including protection under the American “nuclear umbrella,” Turkey would allow the 
U.S. and its NATO allies to station troops and equipment in Turkey, with some 25,000 
U.S. troops stationed in the country by the mid-1960s.6 These troops would bolster 
Turkey’s defense and contribute to its intelligence-gathering capabilities. U.S. bilateral 
aid was also instrumental in increasing Turkey’s indigenous capabilities, which had 
atrophied during WWII. American military advisors sought to reorganize the 
approximately 400,000 Turkish troops, build up their combat effectiveness, and provide 
them with “much greater mobility and firepower.”7
American support for Turkey’s external defense from the announced Truman 
Doctrine in 1947 on contributed to the country’s improved security environment to the 
extent that by July, 1949, nearly twenty percent o f the personnel in the Turkish Armed 
Forces were demobilized, and Turkish leaders began emphasizing the need for economic 
assistance rather than military.8 Nevertheless, during a visit to Washington in 1954, 
Premier Menderes pressed for more military aid to meet the Soviet threat; Washington
6 Jim Zanotti, "Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges," in Congressional Research 
Service, ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, D .C .), 38.
7 Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945 - 1952," 
817.
8 "Turkey Stresses Needs o f  Economy: Aid Under 'Point Four' Plan Held More Urgent Than Military 
Assistance," The New York Times, July 18, 1949; "Turkish Security Seen in Arms Aid," The New York 
Times, January 4, 1950.
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responded by nearly doubling its promised military aid to Turkey and accelerating the 
shipment o f weapons and equipment.9
Turkish and American policymakers struggled to balance American commitments 
to improving Turkey’s military capabilities with concerns over the burdens those 
capabilities placed on both the American and Turkish budgets. Supporting Turkey’s 
military consumed a large percentage o f the Turkish government’s budget, at the expense 
o f economic development, and the Menderes government hoped Washington could help 
compensate for this burden. Turkey’s other Western allies, aware that Turkey’s economic 
development had long-term implications for its ability to provide for its own defense, 
contributed to the maintenance of NATO’s second largest army by extending more than 
$500 million in short-term credit.10
Nevertheless, as the decade progressed, it became increasingly apparent 
Washington and Ankara possessed different ideas about the number of armed forces 
necessary to meet the external threat. President Eisenhower believed Turkey’s 
deteriorating economic conditions were “aggravated by the amount of military force 
being maintained in that country.” 11 The American president believed a collective 
security program could not function if member states were unable to carry their share o f 
the economic burden. The Turkish government insisted U.S. military aid was necessary 
for Turkey to carry out its NATO force goals, but Eisenhower could not understand why 
Turkey would continue to press for more aid when its external threat had been mitigated 
by its bilateral relationship with the U.S. as well as NATO membership. Eisenhower 
wrote, while “Turkey has reaped significant benefits in terms o f the overall security 
provided by NATO, modernization under our military assistance efforts and protection 
afforded by the growing U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability,” “her force goals have 
increased. This to me represents an illogical end result which requires careful 
reappraisal.” 12
9 Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Will Double Arms Aid to Turks, Speed Up Delivery: Increase Viewed as 
Personal Triumph for Menderes, Who Ends Capital Stay," ibid., June 6, 1954.
10 Ibid.
11 Letter from the President to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe (Norstad), July 15, 1956, 
FRUS 24, no. 360.
12 Ibid.
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U.S. military aid, Turkey’s military readiness, and economic development were 
inextricably linked. Turkey had hoped to use American military aid to not only bolster 
the capabilities o f the Turkish armed forces, but also to initiate a modernization program 
that the Menderes Government would expand upon through ambitious development 
projects. By 1956, however, these projects, along with the size o f the army, created an 
outsized burden on Turkey’s finances, to the extent that prices on every-day staples were 
exorbitant. At the same time, while Washington emphasized its commitment to the 
Baghdad Pact by joining its Military Committee, the American military aid program was 
decreasing.13
While U.S. military aid had bolstered Turkey’s military capabilities and thus 
improved its regional security environment, by the end of the decade, Turkey’s internal 
security situation was deteriorating. Economic stagnation and political violence in 
reaction to the government’s increasingly authoritarian policies were causing massive 
social disruptions.14 The Menderes government responded to domestic pressures by 
attempting to pull the military into politics, calling on the armed forces to impose martial 
law and harass and intimidate opposition leader Ismet Inonu.
This effort to use the military for political purposes provoked a strong reaction 
from the armed forces. For example, despite a ban on demonstrations that the military 
was supposed to enforce, a thousand army cadets marched alongside protesting students 
in Ankara.15 The military’s intervention to expel Premier Menderes and President Bayar 
was thus not in reaction to an increase in the external threat, but a response to widespread 
public discontent combined with the government’s attempt to politicize the armed forces.
U.S. Political Support and Turkey’s Multi-Party Politics
U.S. military assistance coincided with the determination by members o f Turkey’s 
political elite to continue moving the country toward democracy, which included 
establishing objective civilian control over the country’s military. On May 30, 1949, the
13 Henry R. Lieberman, "U.S. Widens Role in Baghdad Pact: Joins the Military Committee," The New York 
Times, June 4, 1957.
14 "Arc o f  Crisis," ibid., May 1, 1960.
15 "Revolt in Turkey Long Simmering: Menderes' Curt Intolerance o f  Criticism o f Regime Built Up 
Rebellion," The New York Times, May 28, 1960.
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country’s political leaders, including the highly respected Turkish politician and former 
chief of the Turkish General Staff, Ismet Inonu, initiated a new Turkish law that 
subordinated the chief o f the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to the Minister o f Defense.16 
This law, intended to harmonize Turkey’s civil-military relations with those o f its new 
liberal democratic partners, represented the intent of Turkey’s leaders to achieve 
objective civilian control over Turkey’s military, rather than adopt a policy of 
“acquiescence” or “deliberate politicization.” President Inonu’s dedication to this policy 
was also evident when several senior members of the military, upset by the victory o f the 
opposition Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, pressed Inonu to annul the results. Inonu’s 
refusal contributed to the ability o f Turkey’s civilian leaders to maintain authority over 
the Turkish Armed Forces throughout the 1950s, until attempts to politicize the military 
prompted a direct intervention in May, 1960. 17
In addition to support from such influential former military leaders and politicians 
such as Inonu, Premier Menderes and President Celal Bayar of the Democrat Party also 
enjoyed political support from the United States. Washington promoted Turkey’s 
membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, praised Turkey’s contribution to collective 
security in the Korean War, and bolstered Turkey’s standing in the Middle East through 
its support o f the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower administration’s decision to double 
military aid to Turkey and expedite delivery o f weapons and equipment to Turkey’s 
400,000-man army was perceived as a political victory for M enderes.18 In addition, 
Menderes and Bayar enjoyed steady support from Turkey’s NATO allies, particularly 
Britain, France, Italy and Western Germany.
When Menderes’ Democrat Party won the 1954 elections, the DP increased its 
parliamentary majority, and the Menderes government used the opportunity to implement 
more ambitious social, political, and economic reforms, such as relaxing some of the 
strict secular policies o f the Ataturk era, reforming the civil service and state-run 
enterprises, and passing laws that would encourage greater foreign investment. However, 
the Menderes’ government’s perceived deviation from the secular nature o f the republic
16 Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," Arm ed  
Forces & Society 22, no. 4 (1996): 444.
17 Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," ibid. (2010): 8.
18 "Turkish Premier Here to Push Aid: Menderes to See President, Dulles and Weeks Today - Confers with 
Stassen," The New York Times, June 1, 1954.
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exacerbated tension between the DP and its secular opposition. In addition, rapid 
economic expansion from 1949 -  1954, bolstered by U.S. aid, good crops, and high 
international prices for agricultural exports, encouraged the government to launch over- 
ambitious infrastructure projects. A drought in 1954, combined with the inflationary 
pressures o f aid and the government’s quantitative easing, precipitated a sharp decline in 
growth that caused the economy to stall for several years while inflation soared. U.S. 
policymakers grew concerned about Turkey’s ability to absorb the vast amounts of 
money and equipment flowing into the country.19 In 1956, when Prime Minister 
Menderes asked for $800 million in military assistance over a period o f four years, 
officials responded they could only commit to one-fourth o f a four-year program.20
As Turkey’s economic problems worsened and criticism among the secular elite 
mounted, the ruling party began to restrict opposition views in the press and impose 
restrictions on public assembly ahead o f the October 1957 elections.21 The DP passed a 
media law that prohibited publishing anything that might damage the prestige o f the 
government. Journalists, editors and media owners could be fined and even imprisoned 
under the new law.22 Menderes responded to criticism from abroad by saying these were 
internal matters to be “settled among us Turks.”23
Increasing hostility between the two major political parties, the ruling DP and the 
opposition Republican People’s Party (RPP), resulted in parliamentary deadlock, and 
Prime Minister Menderes attempted to mobilize the army to restrict the opposition. For 
example, he used the army to bar a political tour by RPP leader and former President 
Inonu in the spring; four senior officers who objected to the army being used for political 
purposes resigned in protest. The Menderes government also used police to remove Inonu 
from the floor of the National Assembly. In April 1960, Menderes banned all opposition 
political activity, and established a parliamentary commission to investigate the RPP.
19 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 238th Meeting o f  the National Security Council, February 24, 1955, 
FRUS 24, no. 319.
20 Memorandum o f  a Conversation, American Embassy, Ankara, January 13, 1956, FRUS  24, no. 334.
21 Ben Lombardi, "Turkey - the Return o f  the Reluctant Generals?," Political Science Q uarterly 112, no. 2 
(1997): 204.
22 Jay Waltz, "Turkey and Press in N ew  Struggle: Government's Plan to Aid Small Papers Viewed as Peril 
to Freedom," The New York Times, September 15, 1958.
23 Sam Pope Brewer, "Menderes Declares N ew  Curbs in Turkey are an Internal Issue: Premier Says That 
Criticisms Abroad o f  Restrictions on Press Offend Nation," ibid., July 14, 1956.
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The increasingly authoritarian nature of the DP leadership led civil and military 
bureaucrats, university students, and academics to organize a series o f large-scale 
demonstrations, which on April 28, 1960, led to violent confrontations with police forces. 
Many of the protestors hailed the student uprisings that had recently ousted South Korean 
President Syngman Rhee. Menderes responded by closing the universities and imposing 
martial law on the first of May. Military cadets demonstrated solidarity with their civilian 
counterparts by staging a sympathy march in Ankara.
Even though U.S. political support for Turkey’s civilian leaders might not have 
been as strong in 1960 as it had been ten years earlier, it was the loss of Turkish public 
support along with the military’s refusal to use force on behalf o f the Democrat Party that 
led to the collapse o f the Menderes government. Even if Washington had committed to 
providing all of the military aid requested by the Turkish prime minister, the outcome 
would have likely been the same. Menderes’ decision to shift from a policy of objective 
civilian control over the military to a policy o f deliberate politicization violated the 
military’s conviction that the armed forces should exist above party politics.
U.S. Military Aid and the Professionalism of the TAF
The Turkish military is the only institution to have been carried forward from the 
Ottoman Empire into the modem Turkish Republic established by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk in 1923. Its first military academy was established in Istanbul in 1834, as part of 
an effort to modernize the Ottoman army officers.24 Thus while U.S. military aid 
contributed to the competency of a force that had not engaged in battle since World War I, 
the Turkish Armed Forces possess a sense of professionalism that pre-dates U.S. military 
assistance and contributes to its ideological coherency. Turkey’s civil-military relations 
are also informed by the role the Turkish military assumes as the guardian o f the republic, 
and the guarantor o f Turkish democracy. This renders military officers highly sensitive to 
civilian leaders’ attempts to politicize the military to serve their own interests, but also 
pulls them away from an exclusive focus on external defense. Thus Premier Menderes’ 
mobilization of the military to suppress the opposition, combined with his increasing
24 "Turkish Military Academy History," www.kho.edu.tr/eng_about_tma/history.html.
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authoritarianism, which seemed to threaten the democratic nature of the republic, 
provoked the military to intervene in civil politics in May of 1960.
While historically the Turkish military has been a driver of modernization, 
through World War II Turkey had little money to provide modem equipment or training 
for its military, the standards of living were low, and the competency o f the armed forces 
had declined.25 American military aid provided weapons, equipment, and improved 
transportation and communications infrastructure; in addition, American military advisers 
taught technical and administrative skills to Turkish military personnel.26 Turkish 
officers and senior enlisted were sent to schools in the U.S., Germany and Canada. The 
quality of the Turkish military force was also enhanced by the education o f otherwise 
illiterate military recruits, who often learned to read and write during their service. By 
facilitating the education o f these recruits, U.S. military aid also contributed to Turkey’s 
private sector. In fact, military schools provided one of the only merit-based opportunities 
for professional development, particularly for poorer Turks from rural parts o f the 
country. Yet some experts argue the military’s exposure to the armies of its western allies 
also made Turkish officers more aware o f Turkey’s lack of economic, financial, and 
technological development.27
The Turkish military’s western orientation was reinforced by the close 
cooperation with American military advisors that began in the late forties and deepened 
while fighting alongside American military personnel during the Korean War. The heart 
o f the U.S.-Turkish security relationship was the Turkish commitment and willingness to 
fight. In 1952, the chief o f the Turkish General Staff (TGS) Nuri Yamut assured U.S. 
Ambassador George McGhee that Turkey would intercept a Russian attack on the Middle 
East.28 Turkey’s soldiers earned a reputation for bravery while fighting on South Korea’s 
behalf during the Korean War, during which Turkey sent a full brigade, more than 5,000 
men, the largest contingent after the United States, Britain, and Canada.
25 William Hale, "The Turkish Republic and its Army, 1923-1960," Turkish Studies 12, no. 2 (2011): 195.
26 Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945 - 1952," 
817.
27 Ozan O. Varol, "The Military as the Guardian o f  Constitutional Democracy," Columbia Journal o f  
Transnational Law  547 (2012-2013): 597.
28 Memorandum o f  Conversation by the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) Aboard the Turkish President's 
Train, May 6-8, 1952, FRUS 8, no. 464.
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While U.S. military aid had a decisive impact on the competency o f the Turkish 
military, the tradition o f subordination to civilian authority pre-dated U.S. aid. In May 
1923, the Turkish parliament passed a law that required military officers to resign from 
active duty prior to running for public office.29 The military chief o f s taffs  seat in the 
cabinet was abolished, and the chief became accountable to the Turkish president. While 
Ataturk considered the army the guardian of the state, he discouraged the military’s 
interference in civil politics, in part to consolidate his own political authority and 
neutralize potential political rivals in the upper ranks of the TAF. Huntington writes,
“The party (Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party, the RPP) came out o f the womb of the 
army, political generals created a political party, and the political party put an end to 
political generals.”30 The army was subordinate to, and worked in harmony with, the RPP 
from 1923 -  1950. While initially reluctant to back the victorious Democrat Party in 1950, 
the military was convinced by the highly respected statesmen Ismet Inonu to submit to its 
authority.
By the mid-1950s, American authorities in Turkey grew concerned the Turks 
were trying to modernize and improve their capabilities too quickly. Admiral Radford 
observed a “serious lack in the Turkish armed forces of career soldiers, sailors and 
airmen with sufficient technical skill to make profitable use of many of the modem 
weapons for which the Turkish Government was making requests,” and President 
Eisenhower suggested it might be better for the Turks to invest in human capital, using 
U.S. military aid for training and troop pay, rather than sophisticated military 
equipment.31 Rapid force expansion had led to the deterioration in salaries and working 
conditions for the officer corps.
While the Turkish armed forces’ strong Kemalist identity contributes to its 
ideological coherency, the expansion of junior officers’ experiences, during the Korean 
War and while attending both American and NATO military training programs, may have 
undermined the cohesiveness o f the military as junior officers grew frustrated by senior
29 Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," 7; Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 72.
30 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
258.
31 "Memorandum o f  Discussion at the 238th Meeting o f  the National Security Council."
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officers’ resistance their ideas.32 While the coup is often associated with junta leader 
Lieutenant General Cemal Gursel, it was driven by a group of mid-level military officers, 
many of whom advocated for extended military rule after the coup. Gursel, bolstered by 
support from other senior military leaders, insisted the purpose of the coup was to restore 
the constitutional liberties that had been violated by the Democrat Party, and brought in 
civilian academics and law experts to work alongside the Turkish Committee of National 
Unity (CNU) to form a provisional government and draft a new constitution.33 The junta 
reaffirmed its commitment to its western allies, emphasizing the anti-Communist 
character o f the Turkish armed forces. In Istanbul and Ankara, Turks, many o f whom 
believed the Turkish armed forces to be the ultimate guarantor o f both Turkey’s territorial 
integrity and internal security, cheered the army as the troops marched through the 
streets.
Assertive Guardianship and an Unstable Alliance, 1960-1980
The next two decades of Turkish -  U.S. relations were characterized by 
discontinuity and crisis. The Cyprus issue in particular, which pitted one NATO ally 
against another, was destabilizing not only for U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, but for 
Turkey’s civil-military relations, as the armed forces were tom between the pressure to 
protect the minority Turkish Cypriot community and their dependence on U.S. military 
aid. The Cuban Missile Crisis, detente, and Congressional objections to the foreign aid 
program in general also generated uncertainty among Turkey’s political elite, including 
those military officers who would assume a more active guardianship role in Turkish 
civil politics.
This section is divided into three parts. The first will discuss how expectations 
with respect to the U.S. commitment to Turkey’s security declined through the 1960s and 
1970s. While Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union improved, the Turkish Cypriot 
community was threatened by the majority Greek Cypriots, and political violence, fueled 
by Communist subversion, escalated. The political leadership’s inability to manage these
32 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Role o f  Junior Officers in Coup is Held a Result o f  Education and Environment," 
The New York Times, June 5, 1960.
33 "Junta in Control: Leader Endorses Ties to West - Colleges to Reopen Today," ibid., May 28, 1960.
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threats prompted the military to intervene in 1970 and again in 1980. The second part will 
discuss how Turkey’s turbulent domestic and international political environment, 
including discontinuities in American political support, combined with the institutional 
prerogatives expanded by the military during its 17 months in power to inhibit the ability 
of civilian leaders to achieve objective civilian control over the Turkish armed forces. 
Turkey’s civilian prime ministers had little choice but to assume a policy of acquiescence, 
as the military assumed a more assertive guardianship role through President Cemal 
Gursel and the newly-established National Security Council.34 Finally, this section will 
conclude with a discussion of the TAF’s transition to assertive guardianship, which 
facilitated the expansion o f the military’s reserved domains, violated the principle of 
mission exclusivity, and undermined its respect for civilian political authority. In addition, 
the Turkish military’s coherency was threatened as some junior officers pressed for 
military rule and continued to plan military coups.
Expectations, Bilateral Relations, and Military Intervention
American military aid was uninterrupted by the May, 1960, coup and the 
subsequent 17-month rule o f the military junta. Vice President Johnson personally 
assured Turkey’s leaders of American support in modernizing their armed forces, but 
emphasized the importance o f self-reliance, as foreign aid allocations were increasingly 
difficult to pass through Congress. While Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union 
gradually improved, leftist political groups increasingly clashed with the extreme right, 
leading to escalating political violence from the late 1960s through the 1970s, and 
spurring agitation at the presence o f American military personnel in Turkey. Turks were 
also deeply disturbed by the vulnerability o f Turkish Cypriots, the restraints imposed by 
Washington, including the “Johnson letter,” and the arms embargo imposed in 1975.
Thus throughout this twenty-year period, Turkish confidence in the American 
commitment to Turkey’s external defense was shaken, undermining the ability o f the 
United States to discourage military intervention in Turkey’s civil politics.
34 Report o f  the NSC 1290-D Working Group: Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, February 16, 
1955, FRUS  10, no. 2.
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In August, 1962, Vice President Johnson travelled to Turkey, met with Turkish 
President Cemal Gursel and Premier Ismet Inonu, and committed to supplying the 
Turkish armed forces with F-104 jet fighters and other modem equipment.35 Amicable 
U.S.-Turkish relations survived the coup d’etat, and Turkish leaders were impressed by 
President Kennedy’s handling o f the Cuban Missile Crisis.36 They were disturbed, 
however, by the appearance of a bilateral Soviet - American arrangement at Turkey’s 
expense; the U.S. had discreetly agreed to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey without 
consulting Ankara, where leaders insisted the missiles were defensive in nature and thus 
should not be the object of bargaining.37 Recognizing the deterrent and psychological 
impact of the missiles to the government of Turkey, U.S. officials agreed to provide 
submarine-based Polaris missiles to compensate, offering to visit Turkish ports to 
reassure the Turkish public “they are constantly guarded by this undersea force.”38 
Secretary o f State Dean Rusk also authorized the U.S. embassy in Ankara to promise 
advanced fighter aircraft if  the Turks agreed to the Jupiter proposal.
The most contentious issue during this period, however, would involve Cyprus. 
Fighting had broken out on the island in response to Cyprus President Archbishop 
Makarios’ proposals to amend the Constitution, overturning the Turkish Cypriots’ right to 
veto legislation. The Greek and Turkish troops stationed on the island were drawn into 
the fighting on behalf of their respective Cypriot communities, and jets from Turkey’s 
southern bases flew low over Cyprus as a warning while Turkish naval vessels steamed 
toward the island.39 While President Gursel urged Turkey’s allies to use their influence to 
stop the fighting, the Turkish military demonstrated its willingness to augment the 600- 
man contingent permanently stationed on Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority. On 
June 5, 1964, President Johnson sought to deter Ankara from further military intervention 
by sending a letter to Prime Minister Inonu. Johnson warned, “NATO allies have not had 
a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet
35 Peter Braestrup, "Johnson Assures Turks on U.S. Aid: Pledges Help for Economy and Defense Forces," 
The New York Times, August 28, 1962.
36 "Turkey Relieved at U.S. Firmness," ibid., October 29 ,1962 .
37 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department o f  State, November 13, 1962, FRUS.,ibid.
38 Telegram from the Department o f  State to the Embassy in Turkey, January 8, 1963, FRUS  16, no.
387.,ibid.
39 Lawrence Fellows, "Turkish Soldiers Based on Cyprus Join in Fighting," The New York Times,
December 26, 1963.
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Union” if Turkey were to intervene in Cyprus.40 In other words, a Turkish invasion that 
led to conflict with Greece might provoke Soviet involvement, in which case NATO may 
not act on Turkey’s behalf, despite the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article V guarantee.
The letter, which became public two years later, exposed the limitations o f the 
American commitment to Turkey’s external defense, which from the Turkish perspective 
was astounding given Turkey provided the greatest number of troops to NATO after the 
United States. Even though the U.S. provided over one billion dollars in military 
assistance in 196741, the American ambassador to Turkey, Robert Komer, whose car was 
later burned by Turkish students at Ankara’s Middle East Technical University,42 warned 
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers that U.S. policy was not 
only weakening Turkey’s military posture, but signaling a “loss of U.S. interest in 
Turkey.” 43 He worried more Turks were questioning the value of Turkey’s alignment 
with the West, and creating an opportunity for militant left-wing entities to attack not 
only the American presence, but also Turkey’s democratic institutions. For example, in 
June 1970, militant left-wing workers staged riots in opposition to proposed labor 
reforms, and revolutionary student groups joined the Confederation of Workers’
Syndicate in attacking security forces, factories, and government buildings.44 This kind of 
violence pulled the military into politics, as martial law was imposed to protect property 
and restore order.
The general staff grew concerned the ruling party, led by Prime Minister and 
Justice Party leader Suleyman Demirel, was incapable of dealing with increasing violence 
between radical-left and radical-right elements. The chief o f the air force, General 
Mushin Batur, proposed a program of socioeconomic reforms to Gursel’s successor, 
former chief o f staff Cevdet Sunay, in a November 1970 memo, in which he called for an 
expansion of the NSC’s powers to restore public order.45 Between 1968 and 1971, civil
40 Quoted in "Johnson, in Stem '64 Letter, Warned Turkey on Cyprus," ibid., January 16, 1966.
41 In constant 2012 $US. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 
1945 - 30 September 2012.",ibid.
42 Antony Lewis, "Turks' New Mood is Puzzling: Anti-U.S. Sentiment Evident in Land ofN A T O  Ally," 
The New York Times, February 17, 1969.
43Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department o f  State: For President and Secretary from 
Komer May 7, 1969, FRUS  29, no. 422.
44 "Istanbul Has Martial Law After Leftist Labor Riot," The New York Times, June 17, 1970.
45 Political Situation in Turkey, December 23, 1971, FT?US' 29, no. 439.
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demonstrations had become more disorderly, with extremist violence from both sides of 
the political spectrum paralyzing Turkish politics. Violence escalated through 1970, and 
early in 1971 there were murders and bombings o f government buildings. On March 4th, 
four U.S. servicemen were kidnapped.46 The inability of the National Assembly to 
effectively deal with the disorder prompted chief o f staff Memduh Tagmac to send a 
memorandum to Prime Minister Demirel on March 12, 1971, threatening to intervene 
directly if  DemirePs government did not resign. The TGS called for a strong and credible 
government consistent with Ataturk’s principles; Demirel conceded, and the TGS asked 
Nihat Erim, a member o f the Republican People’s Party, to form a caretaker government.
The new Prime Minister, Erim, met with President Nixon on March 21, 1972, and 
implored Nixon not to let the military assistance program lag; he insisted the best way to 
guarantee Turkey’s security was to strengthen the military. Erim insisted extremists were 
being “fed from abroad,” and that modernizing Turkey’s military forces was the best way 
to boost the morale of the TAF and prevent extremists from infiltrating the military.47 
While sympathetic, President Nixon explained that the U.S. Congress was in an 
isolationist mood, and suggested economic assistance, technical advice, and support from 
international lending parties could play a greater role in helping Turkey than military 
assistance.
U.S. lawmakers were incensed in the summer of 1974 when Turkish Premier 
Bulent Ecevit deployed the Turkish military, equipped with American-made weapons, to 
invade and occupy two - fifths o f the island of Cyprus in response to a coup that brought 
a hard-line Greek-Cypriot faction to power, threatening the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority. The invasion, which was highly popular with the Turkish public, displaced 
nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes. Congress threatened to cut off all 
military aid to Turkey unless “substantial progress” toward relieving the humanitarian 
crisis and reaching an agreement on the Cyprus issue was made by February 5, 1975.48
President Ford reminded members o f Congress o f the strategic importance of the 
U.S. -  Turkey relationship: “Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a
46 Lombardi, "Turkey - the Return o f  the Reluctant Generals?," 205-06.
47 Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Nihat Erim o f  Turkey, March 21, 1972, FRUS 29, 
no. 454.,ibid.
48 Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Fails to Achieve Delay in Turkey Aid Cutoff," The New York Times, 
February 2, 1975.
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favor to Turkey; it is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim o f the 
Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security o f the eastern 
Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe, and the collective security o f the 
Western alliance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical to our own security as 
they are to the defense of NATO.”49 The cessation of military equipment and spare parts 
deliveries dealt a substantial blow to the Turkish military’s operational readiness.
The Turkish government was unprepared for the embargo because policymakers 
believed it clearly ran against U.S. interests as well as Turkey’s: a decline in Turkey’s 
military readiness would undermine NATO’s second largest army’s ability to secure 
NATO’s southern flank and capacity to control Soviet access to the Mediterranean. When 
a resumption of aid was not forthcoming, the Turkish government responded by closing 
U.S. defense and intelligence installations on Turkish territory. Yet Turkey had limited 
options for maintaining its capabilities. Economic problems (inflation, a trade deficit, and 
a drop in foreign exchange reserves) would impede Turkey’s ability to increase domestic 
arms production or purchase weapons from alternative sources such as West Germany, 
France and Italy, or wealthy Middle Eastern states such as Iran and Libya.
By July 1975, nearly 25 American installations were closed. Secretary o f State 
Henry Kissinger worked with Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan S. Caglayangil to reach an 
agreement in March of 1976, which would allow American installations to reopen in 
exchange for nearly $ lbillion in U.S. grants and loans. The U.S. pledged $250 million 
annually for four years, with most of the funds directed toward force modernization.50 
Kissinger hoped that the agreement would motivate the government of Turkey to 
persuade the Turkish Cypriots to make some concessions to the Greek Cypriots.
Congressional support for Kissinger’s initiative was lukewarm, however, as 
legislators demanded greater progress in handling the refugee crisis on Cyprus. The Ford 
administration was at least able to secure Congressional approval for $125 million in 
military credits for Turkey in 1976, and Carter was able to get $175 million in military 
credits in May. Nevertheless, by November o f 1977, the Turkish Government was 
growing impatient with the lack of progress in obtaining Congressional approval for the
49 Address by President Gerald R. Ford Before a Joint Session o f  the Congress Reporting on United States 
Foreign Policy, April 10, 1975.
50 "U.S. and Turkey Reach an Accord on Bases and Aid," The New York Times, March 27, 1976.
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four-year agreement, and warned they might begin expelling the approximately 7,000 
American military personnel still stationed in Turkey.51 Ankara’s frustration was to a 
point where U.S. officials worried Turkey might withdraw from NATO and opt for 
neutrality, particularly in light of recent improvements in relations with its Arab 
neighbors and the Soviet Union.
While delays in restoring U.S. military aid aggravated Turkey’s ability to provide 
for its external defense, Turkey’s internal security was deteriorating. In December of
1978, Premier Ecevit was forced to impose martial law in 13 provinces in response to 
sectarian violence and riots that had left 93 people dead in the city of Kahramanmaras.52 
Over a thousand residents had been hurt as political extremists exploited rivalries 
between the majority Sunnis and the Kurdish-speaking Shiite minority. On January 3,
1979, the Interior Minister, Irfan Ozaydinli, resigned amidst criticism that the 
government was unable to stop the wave o f violence, which took 700 -  1000 lives in 
1978.53 By the end of 1979, the political violence had spread throughout Turkey, with 
2300 people killed during the 22 months of Mr. Ecevit’s rule.54 The military finally 
intervened in 1980, not only to restore order, but also to purge Islamic extremists who 
challenged the secular nature of the state and sought to reorient Turkey’s alliances away 
from the West and Israel, and toward other Muslim states.55
Discontinuities and Political Instability
American political support for Turkey from 1960 until 1980 was characterized by 
discontinuity. While Washington was largely supportive of the military junta that 
intervened to remove the increasingly authoritarian Menderes government, the position 
taken by the Johnson administration with respect to Cyprus, as well as lawmakers’
51 Richard Burt, "Turkey Threatens to Expel U.S. Troops: Ankara Aides, in Private Warnings to State 
Department, Call for Progress on Arms Accord," ibid., November 30, 1977.
52 "Martial Law is Set in 13 Turkish Cities: Cabinet Acts after 93 are Killed in Political-Religious Clashes," 
ibid., December 26, 1978.
53 "Turkey's Interior Minister Quits Following Riots and Martial Law," The New York Times, January 3, 
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54 Marvine Howe, "A Day in the Political Life o f  Turkey: Shootings and Reprisals by Left and Right," ibid., 
October 30, 1979.
55 "Stem Army Rule in Turkey Stills the Voices o f  Islam," ibid., November 14, 1980.
imposition of an arms embargo over White House objections in 1975, deeply offended 
Turks, who determined the United States was a capricious ally. Extremists exploited 
frustration with American policy to mobilize members of Turkish society against the 
country’s major political parties, the center-left Republican People’s Party and the 
conservative Justice Party, the successor to Adnan Menderes’ prohibited Democrat Party. 
By the late 1960s, anti-Americanism had become more prevalent, forcing a decrease in 
the number of American military personnel stationed in Turkey. Meanwhile the military 
assumed a more active guardianship role, promulgating a new constitution in 1961, 
establishing a National Security Council, and through the presidency, which retired 
senior military officers held throughout this period. In response to increasing political 
violence, economic instability, and the rise of political Islam, the military intervened 
twice, once by memorandum to dissolve the government of Justice Party leader 
Suleyman Demirel in 1971, and again in 1980.
American policymakers’ reactions to the coup in May 1960 were restrained. In a 
statement, U.S. State Department officials declared, “We believe merely carrying on our 
usual relations with Turkish Government officials constitutes recognition. No other 
formal act o f recognition is considered necessary. We expect that our close and friendly 
relations will Turkey will continue as in the past.”56 The junta had reaffirmed Turkey’s 
commitments to NATO and bilateral relations with the U.S., avowed it was anti- 
Communist, and announced the Turkish Constitution would be amended to provide for 
two legislative chambers instead of one. U.S. officials also seemed satisfied by Gursel’s 
insistence that the leader of the RPP, Inonu, had nothing to do with the coup; in other 
words, the coup did not appear to be the result of one political party using the army to 
gain an advantage over another. The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Raymond Hare, 
described the military intervention “rational and bloodless,” although U.S. officials were 
unsuccessful in discouraging the new regime from imposing death sentences on the 
deposed leaders, including former Prime Minister Menderes and former Foreign Minister 
Fatin Zorlu.57 Despite President Kennedy’s objections, on September 16, 1961, former
56 Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Recognizes Turkish Regime: Informal Statement Grants Approval - Capital 
Pleased by Gursel's Actions," ibid., May 31 ,1960 .
57 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department o f  State, August 7, 1961, FRUS 16, no. 368.
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Foreign Minister Zorlu and former Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were executed; the 
following day former Prime Minister Menderes was executed.
The constitution of 1961, which was passed by a referendum on July 9, 1961, 
both expanded the reserved domains o f the military and granted Turkish citizens greater 
individual freedoms. The constitution was also inclusive, allowing for broader political 
representation in the Turkish government, inviting greater participation from Islamist, 
nationalist, and socialist parties. A Constitutional Court was established to provide a 
check on parliamentary power, and a Senate was added to the National Assembly to form 
the Grand National Assembly. While most members of the Grand National Assembly 
would be elected, fifteen of the Senate seats would be permanent, and reserved for former 
Turkish presidents and members o f the military junta, the Committee of National Union. 
The military would have a greater role in national security policymaking through the 
newly established National Security Council (1955), #857), which would consist of 
leading members o f the civilian government and the high command of the TGS, and 
serve as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers.58 The chief o f the TGS would now 
be accountable directly to the prime minister rather than the defense minister, reversing 
the change Inonu had insisted upon a decade earlier to harmonize Turkey’s civil-military 
relations with its Western allies. The Grand National Assembly chose Gursel as president 
on October 26, 1961.
The strategy of the civilian political leaders during this period was that of 
acquiescence. No prime minister attempted to implement civil-military reforms; rather, 
each made an effort to consider and respect the role the military played in monitoring 
Turkey’s domestic politics. This is in part due to the weakness of the civilian political 
leadership through the 1960s and 1970s. The broadening of political participation (eleven 
political parties registered to compete in the country’s first post-coup elections) rendered 
it more difficult to form durable coalition governments. The premiership changed hands 
multiple times, leaving little time for a civilian leader to accumulate personal political 
power. In addition, international political support was inconsistent; while relations with
58 Gareth Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," International 
Affairs 83, no. 2 (2007): 342.
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the Soviet Union and Arab neighbors gradually improved, NATO allies were critical of 
Turkey’s military interventions on behalf of the minority Turkish Cypriot community.
For their part, senior military personnel were tolerant o f the Justice Party’s 
electoral successes despite its being inhabited by many o f the same personnel as the 
banned Democrat Party. This tolerance has been attributed to the success Justice Party 
leader Demirel had in cultivating a working relationship with the military. In addition, 
while the Justice Party did not subscribe to the same strictly secular vision o f Turkish 
politics, and its base was in Turkey’s rural population rather than the established urban 
elite, the moderate party was firmly pro-Western and pro-business, with interests largely 
compatible with those o f the military establishment.
The Cyprus issue complicated Turkey’s domestic politics along with its external 
relations. The Justice Party criticized the government of then -  Prime Minister Inonu for 
failing to invade Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots in 1964. In response to these 
challenges, Inonu’s Republican’s People’s Party requested the White House release the 
Johnson Letter, so Turks would understand that Inonu was pressured by Washington to 
refrain from sending troops to Cyprus.59 The White House agreed, making public 
Johnson’s letter, as well as Inonu’s reply, on January 15, 1966.60 The Turkish newspaper 
Hurriyet subsequently printed Johnson’s letter for mass distribution, revealing Inonu had 
responded on June 13th that Turkey would honor the U.S. request and delay sending 
troops, even though his government feared the Turkish Cypriot minority was in danger of 
armed attack from the ethnic Greek majority.
While the “Johnson Letter” may have discouraged Turkey from military action in 
1964, the implication that the U.S. was trying to coerce Turkey by placing conditions on 
the NATO security guarantee infuriated Turkish officials, and inflamed anti-American 
sentiment within Turkish society. Public antipathy toward Johnson’s administration was 
evident when special envoy Cyrus Vance, sent to Turkey to help reach a Turkish-Greek 
accord over Cyprus, was greeted by protests and criticized in the Turkish media, although 
his efforts to reach a settlement between Athens and Ankara did ease some o f the
59 "Turks Confiscate Newspaper Issue: Act as Letter Attributed to Johnson is Published," The New York 
Times, January 14, 1966.
60 "Johnson, in Stem '64 Letter, Warned Turkey on Cyprus."
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tension.61 The anti-American current running through Turkish society was exacerbated 
by the presence o f approximately 20,000 Americans, including troops and their families, 
who seemed to enjoy a better standard of living than most Turks.62 Nixon’s effort to 
restore Turkey’s confidence in its bilateral relationship with the U.S. was constrained by 
Congress’s increasing antipathy for foreign aid. The perceived lack of U.S. political 
support for the Turkish position on Cyprus motivated the Turkish government to overtly 
demonstrate improved relations with the Soviet Union. For example, Premier Aleksei N. 
Kosygin and Premier Suleyman Demirel exchanged visits, and the Soviets began 
arranging cultural exchanges and sending economic aid, including $200 million in credits 
for purchases o f Soviet textile and machinery.63
The military’s call for the resignation of Prime Minister Demirel’s government on 
March 12, 1971, was a reaction to frustration with the civilian politicians in the National 
Assembly, who were unable to overcome their differences to pass much-needed reform 
legislation. The military once again insisted it did not wish to rule directly, but rather 
guide the democratic process by establishing a new coalition cabinet, which could 
implement a sweeping set o f socioeconomic reforms like those urged by General Batur in 
his November 1970 memo. Legislation was introduced to restrict forces on the left and 
right wings o f the political spectrum, particularly those that violated the spirit of 
Kemalism.64 After the intervention, the military was able to expand its reserved domains 
again through constitutional amendments in 1973, which gave greater weight to the 
military judiciary relative to the civilian judiciary. In addition, military spending became 
less transparent, and the primary function o f the NSC was expanded to include making 
recommendations to the government. Fahri Koruturk, a retired naval officer, was selected 
by parliament to serve as president.
Despite the military’s efforts to restore political order, Turkish politics continued 
to be characterized by fragmentation and a lack o f decisive authority throughout the 
1970s. When the military allowed parliamentary elections in 1973, the two major center
61 Sydney Gruson, "A Turnabout in Ankara: Vance's Efforts for Accord on Cyprus Bring Marked Shift in 
Turkish Views," ibid., November 30, 1967.
62 Hedrich Smith, "Turkey May Ask Changes in U.S. Military Pact," ibid., March 28, 1966.
63 James Feron, "Turkish Leaders Awaiting Kosygin: Russian's Arrival Tomorrow a Historic Occasion," 
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parties, rather than joining together to form a coalition, looked to the smaller fringe 
parties to form unstable coalitions that polarized Turkish politics. The Premiership would 
change hands eleven times in the decade after the 1971 intervention, with Suleyman 
Demirel serving from March 1975 -  June 1977, July 1977 -  January 1978, and 
November 1979 until September 1980. When the U.S. Congress set a deadline of 
February 5, 1975, to reach an agreement on the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s political disorder 
impeded the government’s ability to work toward any type o f settlement.65 On September 
18, 1974, Prime Minister Ecevit resigned, and a caretaker administration led by Sadi 
Irmak was tasked with running the country until a coalition government could be formed. 
While the military pressed for early elections in order to restore stability within 
parliament, the Ford Administration worried the caretaker government was “drifting 
aimlessly toward the February 5 Congressional deadline on military assistance.”66
Despite objections by the executive branch, Congress imposed an embargo on all 
military supplies to Turkey on February 5,1975.67 While deeply shocked and offended, 
Turkish officials initially took a measured response in the hopes that military aid would 
be restored in short order. In April, President Ford addressed a joint session of Congress, 
where he implored Congress to lift the arms embargo against Turkey. “United States 
military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by action o f the 
Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even 
to items already paid for—an unprecedented act against a friend.”68
The discontinuity in American political support for Turkey heightened popular 
demand for greater Turkish control over bases and for the renegotiation o f Turkish- 
American agreements, particularly as political parties exploited public sensitivities to the 
American military presence for short-term political gain.69 When Congress rejected a 
partial lifting of the embargo, the Turkish Government placed U.S. facilities under
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Turkish control, restricted some privileges of U.S. military personnel, and suspended 
non-NATO related operations.
The Turkish government hoped to pressure U.S. policymakers into reinstating the 
military aid program by meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin in December, 1975, and 
announcing that Turkey and the Soviet Union had “agreed on the preparation of a 
political document on the subject o f friendly relations and cooperation.”70 Prime Minister 
Demirel suggested that future American attentiveness to Turkey’s national interests 
would determine the nature of Turkey's relations with the USSR. While U.S. analysts 
believed Turkey preferred ties to the West, they could not rule out the possibility that 
Turkey would reconsider its NATO alignment and adopt a policy of neutrality in the 
event the U.S. continued to withhold military aid.
In an effort to mitigate the fallout from the embargo and the risk o f Turkey’s 
pulling its 500,000 troops out o f NATO, Carter sent Secretary of State Warren M. 
Christopher to Turkey. Yet Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, like many Turks, resented 
linking U.S. military aid to the resolution of the Cyprus issue.71 Ecevit refused to attend a 
summit meeting of alliance leaders planned for later in May in Washington, and 
announced his intention to visit Moscow in June. President Carter was finally able to 
convince Congress to lift the arms embargo in August 1978; in response Turkey allowed 
U.S. installations to reopen, and negotiations for a new DEC A began in the winter of 
1979.
Throughout the arms embargo, Turkey was plagued by economic crises and 
political instability. The sharp increase in oil prices after 1973, high inflation and high 
unemployment, and a trade deficit that ballooned between 1974 and 1977, had motivated 
many foreign creditors to slow lending, and Turkey was nearly out o f foreign exchange. 
By the end of 1977, the Demirel government was defeated on a vote o f no confidence, 
and President Koruturk turned to Ecevit, the leader o f the Republican People’s Party, to 
lead a new government in January of 1978. Yet Ecevit proved unable to reign in political 
violence, which claimed 1400 lives in 1978, and unwilling to implement economic
7,1 Report Prepared in the Bureau o f  Intelligence and Research: Kosygin's Visit to Turkey and Future 
Ankara-Moscow Relations, January 14, 1976, FRUS 30, no. 239.
71 "The Way Back from Cyprus," The New York Times, March 31, 1978.
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reforms to deal with soaring inflation and unemployment.72 By May o f 1979, martial law 
was in effect in 19 of Turkey’s 67 provinces.
Ecevit resigned again in November 1979, and his successor, Demirel, installed a 
technocratic government and proposed a stabilization program that included economic 
reforms intended to transform the state-controlled economy to a liberal free market 
system. The set o f reforms were approved by parliament and implemented by the Under 
Secretary of Planning, economist Turgut Ozal. Ozal travelled through the U.S. and 
Europe, meeting with officials from the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. government to win 
support for his plans and secure at least $380 million in credit to execute his economic 
program.
Despite efforts to resolve the country’s economic crisis, unrest continued, 
including violence in Ankara and Istanbul resulting from clashes between students and 
riot police. In an effort to restore law and order, teachers were arrested for organizing 
leftist activities, schools were closed, and nearly 4,000 were arrested in late 1979.73 
Between January and August o f 1980, measures crucial to addressing the wave of 
political violence were delayed by disputes between the Justice Party and the Republican 
People’s Party. The two parties continued to avoid forming a coalition with each other, 
preferring instead to form alliances with splinter parties like Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic 
fundamentalist National Salvation Party, or the neofascist National Action Party led by 
former Colonel Alparslan Turkes.74
The outspoken, charismatic Erbakan withdrew his support for Demirel amidst 
public backlash against the prime minister’s economic reforms, which in the short term 
increased unemployment, raised food prices, and sparked shortages and inflation as 
government subsidies and price controls ended. The reforms, which also sought to 
rationalize the work force to control labor costs, ran afoul o f the confederation o f Turkish 
Trade Unions. When the government tried to mitigate these disruptions by restricting 
union activity and public assembly, the social and political unrest intensified. For 
example, leftist militants broke into grocery stores and seized food trucks, redistributing
72 Nicholas Gage, "Turkey's Hopes for Ecevit Yield to Disappointment," ibid., May 25, 1979.
73 Marvine Howe, "6 Die, 4,000 Seized, in Turkish Rioting," ibid., December 25, 1979.
74 Lombardi, "Turkey - the Return o f  the Reluctant Generals?," 207.
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food to the poor.75 Erbakan became an outspoken critic of Demirel’s austerity measures, 
and demanded Turkey withdraw from the OECD and the IMF, cut ties with the European 
Economic Community, and create a common market of Muslim countries.76
Erbakan’s party then presented a bill that would call for a break in diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Turkey’s relations with Israel cooled in 1964, when Turkey sought 
support from other Muslim nations for its position in the dispute over Cyprus. After the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, Turkey loosened ties further, sending only a charge d'affaires to 
Israel, although military-to-military cooperation continued. As U.S. aid became less 
reliable, Turkey improved ties with Arab countries upon which Turkey was heavily 
dependent for oil, hoping to secure more financial aid while implementing economic 
reforms. However, an assertive pro-Islamist government completely opposed to ties with 
Israel, Europe, and the U.S. would endanger the political alignment that underpinned the 
article V guarantee o f the North Atlantic Alliance as well as U.S. military aid. While 
Turkey looked to Arab neighbors for investment, aid, and political support on the Cyprus 
issue, Turkey still relied heavily on the West for its security.77
As the attacks against Demirel’s government increased, collaboration between 
RPP leader Ecevit and Erbakan heightened the Turkish General S taffs fear o f an anti- 
Western, Islamic fundamentalist government forming. Ecevit and Erbakan revealed their 
determination to get rid o f Demirel’s government on September 5th, when they forced the 
resignation o f the foreign minister, Hayrettin Erkmen, who was accused o f being too pro- 
Western. The National Salvation Party criticized Erkmen for not ending diplomatic ties 
with Israel, and accused him of undermining relations with Turkey’s regional neighbors 
in favor o f a policy that tried to turn Turkey into “another province of the European 
Economic Community.”78 The military high command repeatedly warned party leaders 
they should put aside their differences to address the country’s political and economic 
problems. The chief of the TGS, General Kenan Evren, warned that the “weakening 
authority of the state was helping the spread of terrorism.”79
75 Marvine Howe, "Angry Turks Resist New Policies and Higher Prices," The New York Times, February 
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By September 1980, martial law was in effect in 20 provinces, and nearly 25% of 
the 500,000 - man Turkish military was involved in maintaining civil order. More than 
2,000 people had been killed by extremists in the last year. Police officials, judges, 
politicians, and members o f the armed forces were increasingly targets for extremist 
violence. On September 7, General Evren and the four service commanders agreed they 
would overthrow the civilian government on September l l . 80 Evran appeared on state 
television on September 12, 1980, to extend martial law to all 67 provinces and announce 
the military leaders were dissolving the government. Evren explained the intervention 
was necessary to deal with domestic political anarchy, and that a new program would be 
based on civil order, national unity, and a secular state based on social justice and human 
rights. Evren declared the coup was in accordance with article 34, and the military 
appointed a civilian cabinet while taking administrative control o f the state through a 
five-member NSC. The public, exhausted by years of violence and disorder, by and large 
welcomed the military’s intervention.81
Professionalism of the Turkish Armed Forces
Some observers o f the Turkish armed forces have suggested that the exposure to 
Western military education and training, while attending schools in the U.S. and other 
allied countries, as well as the Turkish military rotations in South Korea, imbued younger 
officers with ideas about the modernization and organization of the services as well as 
Turkish society in general.82 While the education and experience improved the 
professional competence o f the Turkish Armed Forces, ideological differences began to 
undermine its coherency, leading to several unsuccessful coup attempts throughout this 
period. Some of these officers held a deep disdain for Turkey’s civilian leaders; others, 
including General Cemal Gursel, sought to preserve Turkey’s democracy while assuming 
a more active guardianship role through the National Security Council, the upper house 
o f the Grand National Assembly, and the presidency. While the military junta expanded
80 Ibid.
81 "Stem Army Rule in Turkey Stills the Voices o f  Islam."; Marvine Howe, "Quiet Euphoria in Turkey as 
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its institutional prerogatives during its 17th month rule, and forced Justice Party leader 
Suleyman Demirel to resign in 1971 and 1980, its tolerance o f the Justice Party 
throughout this period reveals that while Turkey’s senior officers felt entitled to a 
privileged role in Turkish politics, it retained a deep respect for the electoral processes 
that brought the Justice party to power. Only when an extremist party began to seriously 
challenge the secular nature of the state and Turkey’s fundamental foreign policy 
orientation did the military completely assume responsibility for Turkey’s governance in 
September, 1980.
President Gursel’s commitment to transitioning to civilian government reflects a 
respect for civilian political authority. However, different visions of the extent to which 
the military should play a role in Turkey’s politics undermined the coherency of the TAF, 
threatening to also disrupt its competence, or military readiness. For example, in August, 
1960, the Committee of National Unity purged more than 7,000 field officers, and 235 
generals.83 While the official explanation for the forced retirements was that the armed 
forces were unnecessarily top-heavy, the expulsion o f nearly half of the officer corps was 
unprecedented, as many of these officers had valuable experience working with NATO 
and within other international institutions. In October, 14 members o f the CNU were 
dismissed and offered civilian posts abroad. While the CNU later admitted the massive 
August purge was a mistake that nearly destroyed the Turkish military,84 few questioned 
Gursel’s assertion that the 14 officers who advocated for extended military rule were 
conspiring to remove him as head of state.85
The August purge seriously undermined the cohesiveness of the military, 
particularly as even those who remained on active duty felt their peers had been treaty 
unfairly. In 1962 and 1963, nearly 100 retired officers organized around the Land Forces 
War Academy commander to mobilize academy cadets to attempt a coup in 1962 and 
1963. On February 23, 1962, a group o f young army officers, frustrated by the slow pace 
of reform, seized buildings in Ankara. The coup-plotters included commanders o f the 
War Academy, the Gendarmerie Officers’ school, a tank battalion school and some signal
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units, and were motivated by the belief that the government would not be able to pass 
necessary reform legislation in a fragmented Parliament, since no single party had a clear 
majority. While the military was frustrated by Parliament’s inability to pass necessary tax, 
education, land and agricultural measures, the military as an institution, commanded by 
the chief of the TGS, General Cevdet Sunay, as well as the air force, navy and most of 
the army, stood behind the civilian government o f Ismet Inonu, and crushed the rebellion. 
Subsequently, Inonu addressed the nation and declared the military’s “prime duty is to 
protect and defend the Constitution and the entity of the motherland, and they will fulfill 
their duty.”86
Even those who favored a return to civilian government condoned the exercise o f 
military influence over Turkish politics. In the immediate post-coup period, officers from 
the CNU circumvented civilian cabinet members when presenting requests for military 
budget support. In addition, the CNU ignored the advice of the Turkish Finance Minister 
and executed a pay raise and other military benefits, even though the measures could 
potentially undermine the government’s financial stability.87 The military’s guardianship 
role would be enhanced through the presidency, as the president’s seven year terms 
provided continuity compared to the relatively short tenures of the prime ministers during 
this period, and allowed for them to serve as a restraining influence on party leaders.
When Gursel fell ill in 1966, he was replaced by TGS chief Sunay, who served until 1973. 
While it appeared the military hoped to reserve the presidency for the armed forces’ chief 
of staff, the military did respect the role o f the parliament in electing the president in 
1973. When JP leader Demirel disapproved of the military’s favored candidate, Chief of 
the General Staff General Faruk Gurler, a compromise candidate was found in 
independent former navy admiral, Fahri Koruturk.88 The military also acquiesced when 
Demirel, the Prime Minister they dismissed in 1971 via the “coup by memorandum,” was 
reelected in October, 1973.
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Yet the military did not hesitate to demonstrate its power to take over the 
government to protect a core interest, which included the constitution passed in 1961. For 
example, army, corps and division commanders were put on alert to indicate the 
military’s willingness to intervene if parliament amended the constitution to restore the 
political rights o f former president Celal Bayar.89 The bill, which had broad political 
support within the National Assembly, was subsequently dropped.
The American embargo on arms shipments to Turkey had a negative impact on 
military readiness. Over 90% of Turkey’s military equipment, valued at over $3 billion, 
had been supplied by the United States since 1950, and at the time of the embargo, an 
additional $1 billion in military aid had been approved. Nearly a third o f the undelivered 
aid was designated for spare parts and maintenance of existing equipment, which 
included American-made tanks, aircraft, artillery, personnel carriers, and naval vessels.90
The military’s mission exclusivity was also seriously undermined as Turkey’s 
internal security deteriorated. For example, military units stationed at Turkey’s borders 
with Bulgaria and Greece were ordered to Istanbul as police forces were overwhelmed by 
rioting militant left-wing workers from the Confederation of Workers’ Syndicates, who 
rejected proposed changes to labor legislation. Tanks were moved into the city to protect 
infrastructure, including important factories and government buildings, as thousands of 
protestors marched through the city.91 Political violence from both extremes of the 
political spectrum reached a fever pitch in 1979 -  1980, pulling the military deeper into 
the civil sphere.92 Yet while junior officers may have pressed for intervention to address 
political dysfunction and violence during the 1970s, the military’s leadership refrained 
until it appeared that the Republican People’s Party might enter a coalition with 
Necmettin Erbakan’s far right party, imperiling Turkey’s fundamental foreign policy 
orientation as well as granting expanded power to a group motivated by religious 
fundamentalism. The intervention carried out by the military institution in 1980 was thus
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not merely motivated solely by security concerns, but also by a threat to the secular 
nature o f the state.
Order, Economic Growth, and an Alliance in Transition, 1980 -  2000
The presence of a military junta mitigated the risk that an anti-Western 
government, hostile to U.S. interests, European Community integration, and cooperation 
with Israel, would come to power just as political alignment with Turkey in the context of 
the Cold War was arguably most critical. The military’s intervention to topple the 
Turkish government came just as Turkey’s geostrategic significance was starkly revealed 
by the events of 1979. The Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan raised the spectre o f a Soviet 
advance toward the Middle East, and the fall of the U.S. - friendly regime in Iran was the 
death knell for CENTO. In response, U.S. policymakers, rather than admonishing the 
generals, increased Turkey’s military assistance to historically high levels, making 
Turkey the third largest recipient o f U.S. military aid after Israel and Egypt.
This section is divided into three parts. The first will discuss the relationship 
between U.S. military aid and the threats to Turkey’s external security through the 1980s 
and 1990s, which included the emergence o f Kurdish separatism and the return of 
religious extremism, which was largely suppressed throughout the 1980s. While the 
damage done to U.S. - Turkish relations was largely repaired under the Reagan 
Administration, the George H.W. Bush administration’s decision to establish a safe zone 
for Iraqi Kurds following the Persian Gulf War had implications for Turkey’s security, as 
Kurdish rebels staged attacks on Turkish soil from safe havens in Iraq. The second part 
will examine the international and domestic political dynamics that facilitated the 
liberalization of the Turkish economy under Premier Turgut Ozal. Ozal’s economic 
reforms, which drew a broader swathe of society into Turkish politics, impacted the 
balance o f power between the secular political elite and Islamist parties, eventually 
prompting a military intervention in 1997 after what had seemed like progress toward 
achieving objective civilian control over the military under Ozal. The final part will 
review the professionalization of the armed forces, including its adherence to Kemalist 
ideals, which provided strong motivation to remove the Islamist government of Premier
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Necmettin Erbakan. While the military’s competency remained a crucial resource for 
NATO, the military’s focus on internal security in response to threats by Kurdish 
separatists and Islamist militants undermined its mission exclusivity and respect for 
civilian political authority.
U.S. Military Aid and Turkey’s Security Challenges
The election o f President Ronald Reagan promptly changed the tone o f Turkish- 
American relations despite the military intervention in September, 1980, and the nearly 
three years o f military rule that followed. On November 18, 1980, the U.S. and Turkey 
signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, and U.S. military aid 
continued to enhance the capabilities of the Turkish armed forces. Unfortunately, the 
Persian Gulf War exacerbated Turkey’s problems with terrorism from Kurdish separatist 
groups, who staged attacks from U.S.-guaranteed safe zones in Northern Iraq. This 
struggle pulled the military deeper into politics despite Premier Turgut Ozal’s progress in 
achieving objective civilian control over the military.
While serving as prime minister, Turgut Ozal sought to strengthen security ties 
with the West while also increasing self-reliance through economic reforms and 
deepening ties with Turkey’s regional neighbors. Even though the U.S. increased its 
military assistance to Turkey during the Reagan Administration, Ozal had good reason to 
expect that in the future U.S. military aid to Turkey would decline. For example,
Congress had again threatened to cut aid when the Turkish Cypriots decided to set up 
their third o f Cyprus as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.93
Ozal was thus motivated to mitigate Turkey’s dependence on the U.S. by 
establishing an indigenous national defense industry, dedicating a high percentage of his 
budget to defense development, and encouraging Turkish businessmen to invest in the 
security industry. The U.S. welcomed Turkey’s moves toward self-reliance and supported 
Ozal’s efforts; in June of 1987, Turkey, along with an American consortium, entered the 
aircraft industry as a producer by launching an F-16 project. By the late 1980s, Turkey 
had a sophisticated national defense industry, and was actually a supplier o f anti-aircraft
93 Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Condemns M ove and Asks for a Reversal," ibid., November 16, 1983.
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weapons, small arms, communication equipment, military vehicles and other equipment 
to NATO members as well as Egypt and Pakistan.
Recognizing the importance of the strategic relationship with Turkey, President 
Reagan continued to press Congress to approve more military aid to modernize Turkey’s 
armed forces, and in 1986 the U.S. reached an agreement on extending its rights to use 
Turkish military bases. The bases provided intelligence gathering sites, airfields, and 
coverage of the straights between the Mediterranean Sea and Soviet ports on the Black 
Sea. While Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Pakistan enjoyed greater protection from 
U.S. foreign aid cuts, by the late 1980s, Congress was cutting overall military aid by $1.6 
billion to about $5 billion overall.94 Between 1987 and 1992, U.S. military assistance 
averaged approximately $425 million in grants and $110 million in loans annually. 
Military aid facilitated the armed forces’ modernization, including a general upgrade of 
Turkey’s weapons systems.
The end of the Cold War, which neutralized the principal external threat to 
Turkey’s security, along with the emergence of a robust Turkish middle class and the 
election of Turkey’s first president without a military background since Celal Bayar, led 
some to speculate that the era o f military intervention in Turkey was over.95 Yet the 
military had not relinquished its guardianship role, and remained in the political arena to 
confront what they identified as Turkey’s most pressing security threats: the escalating 
insurgency launched by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the rise o f political 
Islam. In the mid-1980s the PKK began using force to fight for Kurdish autonomy, and 
by the 1990s, most o f southeast Turkey was administered by the military in response to 
PKK violence. After the Persian Gulf War, Kurdish rebels began using safe havens in 
northern Iraq to organize terrorist attacks against Turkey, escalating the confrontation 
between the military and the PKK.
Even though the Persian Gulf War underscored Turkey’s geostrategic importance 
to the U.S. and NATO, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants were phased into loan- 
only assistance in 1993, and loans were phased out after 1997. While the Clinton 
Administration argued aid cuts could “weaken and radicalize” Turkey, some members of
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Congress argued the U.S. should not provide aid that enabled the TAF to strafe villages, 
killing thousands of civilians.96 The U.S. and Turkey continued to collaborate on pressing 
post-Cold War issues, such as energy security and the outbreak of violence in the former 
Yugoslavia, during which NATO engaged in its first “out of area” operations.
Political Stability and Economic Change
So as not to undermine American and international political support for Turkey, 
U.S. officials insisted the generals had intervened reluctantly in September, 1980, and 
intended to retreat from civil politics once domestic political, social, and economic 
stability was restored.97 While the Reagan Administration maintained its political support 
for the military junta, Turkey’s European allies were highly critical o f the junta’s 
prolonged transition to civilian political government. Under the leadership o f Premier 
Turgut Ozal, however, along with former junta leader President Kenan Evren, Turkey not 
only restored ties with its traditional allies, but deepened relations with its regional 
neighbors. Ozal’s successful economic reforms during the 1980s also transformed 
Turkish politics, as a broader swathe of Turkish society, including workers, villagers, and 
traditional religious groups, entered the economy and challenged the political and 
economic hegemony o f the secular elite to the extent that by the mid-1990s, the balance 
of power had shifted, threatening the secular nature of the republic and provoking a 
military intervention in 1997.
The coup was initially well - received by a Turkish public exhausted by political 
violence and instability. Eventually, however, Turks grew weary of the military’s 
methods o f maintaining political and social stability. The military imposed curfews and 
forbade public activities, banned much of the print media, and suspended the activities of 
nearly all professional associations and trade unions. While the military had detained 
Demirel, Ecevit, and at least 100 other members o f parliament after the coup, they 
retained the architect o f the economic reforms initiated in January, 1980 -  Turgut Ozal -  
as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. They continued the unpopular economic
96 "America Arms Turkey's Repression," The New York Times, October 17, 1995.
97 Loren Jenkins, "Reluctant Generals M ove to Bring Order to Turkey; Turkish Military Reluctantly Staged 
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policies initiated by former Prime Minister Demirel, as they believed reforming Turkey’s 
protectionist and subsidized state economy and opening it to world market forces and 
investment was the path to restoring economic stability. By 1981, the military junta’s 
economic policies were showing signs of success; inflation dropped, exports increased, 
tourism revenues and Turkish construction activities abroad increased, and the current 
account deficit was sharply diminished.
By late 1982, the military was tom between pressure to return to democratic 
processes and their desire to minimize political uncertainty. The constitution passed by 
referendum in 1982 forbade political organizations based on religion, a religious sect, 
regional considerations, or Marxism. The generals wanted to avoid the parliamentary 
deadlock o f the 1970s by banning old political leaders such as Demirel and Ecevit from 
re-entering politics, abolishing several other parties, and encouraging more moderate 
center-right and center-left parties that could successfully form a coalition government 
and continue reforms. The junta carefully controlled the campaign for the first post-coup 
general election by implementing press controls and limiting the campaign to three weeks. 
Only former General Sunlap’s moderate, right-wing Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), 
Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (MP), and a liberal group called the Populists Party (PP) 
(led by a senior civil servant and expected to play the role o f loyal opposition) were 
authorized to participate. All three parties pledged to develop the economy, firmly uphold 
the “spirit o f September 12” action against political terrorism, and continue a pro- 
Western, pro-Islamic foreign policy that would reconcile Islam with Turkey’s Western 
orientation.
While President Evren favored the NDP, the military did not intervene when 
Ozal’s party won 45 % of the votes and 212 of the 400 seats in parliament during the 
elections on November 6, 1983.98 Evren, who served as president until November 9,
1989, announced at the opening session of Parliament that the armed forces were going 
back to their barracks “confident that democracy will be safeguarded.”99
Even though the military believed Kemalism was the key to restoring national 
unity, during their rule they pursued a conciliatory strategy that created space for religion
98 Marvine Howe, "Turks Electing First Parliament Since Coup," The New York Times, November 6, 1983.
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in the political life o f the nation in an effort to moderate the extreme right and left wings 
o f Turkey’s political spectrum. As prime minister, Turgut Ozal continued this policy, and 
endorsed a religious presence in Turkish society as well as an awareness o f Turkey’s 
Ottoman legacy. The departure from the strict adherence to Kemalism also had 
international political benefits: deeper ties with Turkey’s Muslim neighbors could both 
gamer political support for issues like Turkey’s protection of Turkish Cypriots and 
promote economic development. For example, Turkey’s economic success in the 1980s 
was bolstered by Saudi financiers, who gave preferential treatment to Islamic 
organizations.100 The Turkish construction sector dramatically increased its projects in 
the Middle East along with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The Turkish General Staff facilitated the successful implementation o f Ozal’s 
policies by guaranteeing a stable political environment. Between 1980 and the early 
1990s, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over five percent, the highest 
among the OECD countries. The volume of Turkish exports rose, and tourism flourished. 
Ozal’s popularity, along with the public’s increasing distaste for the military’s presence 
in civil politics, enabled him to make modest moves to subordinate the military to his 
political authority. In July 1987, for example, Ozal shocked the military by vetoing the 
appointment o f General Necdet Oztorun as chief of the Turkish General Staff. More 
importantly, he decided to support the United States in the Persian Gulf War over the 
objections of top military leaders.
Ozal sought to consolidate his power base prior to the general elections of 
November, 1988; anticipating the decline of the Motherland Party, Ozal had himself 
elected President so he could retain office after his party’s 1991 election defeat by 
Suleyman Demirel’s True Path Party. This would be the first time a non-prior military 
civilian would serve as president since Celal Bayar, who was removed from office by the 
coup in 1960. Ozal definitively demonstrated the extent to which he had subordinated the 
military to civilian authority during the Persian Gulf War. Despite opposition from then -  
chief o f staff General Necip Torumtay, President Ozal led Turkey to join the coalition 
effort against Iraq in 1990. According to Torumtay’s memoirs, he and other senior 
officers disagreed with Ozal’s decision because they believed Turkey “lacked the
100 Lombardi, "Turkey - the Return o f  the Reluctant Generals?," 197-98.
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indigenous military capability to sustain an independent foreign policy that risked a 
prolonged confrontation with its neighbors.” 101
Ozal, however, viewed the conflict as an opportunity to demonstrate Turkey’s 
political alignment with its Western allies. Relations with the U.S. had been strained by 
criticism of the Turkish position in the Cyprus dispute, the military campaign against 
Kurds, and the numerous references to “Armenian genocide” by American politicians and 
the media. Pro-Armenian Congressmen in 1984 had campaigned to declare 24 April as an 
official day o f mourning for the Armenians, who they claimed had been killed by the 
Ottoman Turks in 1915. Turks felt these public statements emboldened Armenian 
terrorists to continue attacks on Turkish interests. The Turkish public was so sensitive to 
the Armenian resolutions that after another attempt by pro-Armenian congressmen in 
1987, President Evren cancelled a trip to Washington, and the government restricted the 
use of the Incirlik air base in Adana.102 While a new Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement was eventually signed in 1988, bilateral relations continued to be tested by 
anti-Turkey lobbies in Congress.
While some Turkish politicians argued Turkey should not act as an agent of 
American policy and risk being drawn into a war, Ozal circumvented the government and 
consulted directly with the White House. As a result, Turkey cut the oil pipelines that 
carried 1.52 million barrels of oil a day between Turkey and Iraq, allowed the U.S. to use 
its bases for air strikes on Iraqi territory, and amassed Turkish troops on the border with 
Iraq, which drew Iraqi troops away from the southern front. Ozal convinced the Grand 
National Assembly to approve the government’s request to send troops to the Gulf; while 
the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and General Torumtay resigned in protest, 
Turkey’s participation was a testament to Ozal’s political authority.
Ozal’s unexpected death on April 17, 1993, prompted the return o f exiled political 
leader Necmettin Erbakan. As Turkey’s economy cooled, millions of rural workers that 
had migrated into Turkey’s cities during the economic boom of the 1980s were becoming 
frustrated by inflation, rising unemployment, and corruption; the charismatic Erbakan 
convinced many that Islam offered the solutions to Turkey’s social, economic, and
101 Quoted in Michael Robert Hickok, "Hegemon Rising: The Gap Between Turkish Strategy and Military 
Modernization," Param eters 30, no. 2.
102 Alan Cowell, "Amid Anger, Turkish C hief Defers U.S. Visit," The New York Times, May 9, 1987.
130
political problems.103 In 1994, Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP) won the largest share o f the 
vote in local elections, gaining control o f several prominent cities in Turkey, including 
Istanbul and Ankara. The WP also won in twenty-nine other major cities and 400 smaller 
towns; thus nearly two-thirds of the country’s population lived under municipal 
governments run by Islamic fundamentalists, some of whom were determined to prevent 
further Westernization. For example, in November 1994, at a rally in Eastern Turkey, 
Erbakan addressed thousands of Kurds and pled with them “to save the world from 
European infidels.” 104 After the general elections of December 25, 1995, the WP became 
the largest party in parliament.
The WP formed a coalition government with the True Path Party (TPP) in June
1996, and Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister. The dominance o f an 
Islamist party was anathema to the TGS, and through late 1996, leading commanders 
delivered public speeches warning secularism was under threat. Erbakan’s visits to Libya 
and Iran also alarmed the generals. In January, 1997, the commanders o f the armed forces 
held a meeting at the naval base in Golcuk on the Maramara Sea, where they finalized a 
strategy for forcing the WP from power. Rather than seizing power directly through the 
use of force, they galvanized civil society organizations and members o f the media to 
build opposition to the WP and urge public protests. Military elites used briefings, 
conferences, and regularly organized public declarations to emphasize the dangers of 
political Islam to the state. After one mayor, WP member Bekir Yildiz, gave a speech in 
support of Sharia law, the TAF sent a column of tanks through his town. On February 28,
1997, the military issued a series o f “recommendations,” a list of 18 anti-Islamist 
measures, which the government had no choice but to accept. The “February 28 Process” 
was prepared by the NSC Undersecretariat in cooperation with working groups in the 
Turkish general staff, and included curbs on the Islamist media, closure o f private 
religious schools and courses, and restrictions on state-run preacher training schools 
which the military believed were being used to encourage anti-secularist values. Erbakan 
agreed to forward the list to the Council o f Ministers, and on March 14, 1997, the
103 Lombardi, "Turkey - the Return o f  the Reluctant Generals?," 193-95; Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: 
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measures were approved by the parliament. The WP found it impossible to implement the 
measures without alienating its core supporters.105
In April and May, the TGS increased pressure on the WP, holding a series of 
briefings for the media, judiciary, and business community on the growing threat to 
secularism posed by the WP. On May 22, 1997, the public prosecutor applied to the 
Constitutional Court for the closure of the WP on the grounds that it was attempting to 
undermine the principle of secularism enshrined in the Turkish constitution. The military 
discreetly lobbied members of the TPP in an attempt to persuade them to withdraw from 
its coalition with the WP, and the subsequent resignations eroded the WP-TPP majority. 
On June 18, 1997, the government finally resigned, and was replaced by a tripartite 
coalition.
On January 16, 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court formally closed down the 
Welfare Party for violating the separation o f religion and state as mandated by the 
constitution, and banned Erbakan from all political activity for 5 years. The W P’s 
successor, the Virtue Party, was also banned, and the military imposed restrictions on free 
speech, for example by jailing Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then mayor o f Istanbul, after he 
gave an Islamist-nationalist speech in 1997. Erdogan, along with other junior members of 
the WP such Abdullah Gul, later formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
which they described as a center-right reformist party without an Islamist agenda, in 
August o f 2001.
The Institutionalization of Turkish Military Guardianship
The Turkish armed forces’ level of professionalism during this period was 
complicated by the institutionalization o f its guardian role in Turkish politics. Its 
professional competency was enhanced by U.S. military aid, which included a 
modernization program. However, the military junta expanded the Turkish armed forces’ 
prerogatives during military rule from 1980 -1983, not only through coup-leader General 
Kenan Evren’s presidency, which guaranteed political stability for the implementation of 
Premier Ozal’s economic policies, but also through the National Security Council,
105 Ibid., 346.
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including its expansive Undersecretariat staffed with military personnel. These 
institutional gains pulled the military deeper into civil life, reflected a lack o f confidence 
in civilian political authorities, and compromised the military’s mission exclusivity. Thus 
while the military worked largely in harmony with the civilian Turgut Ozal, its 
institutional subordination to civil authority was never established, a fact that became 
obvious when senior military officers, motivated by their strong Kemalist ideology, 
successfully removed Islamist Necmettin Erbakan and his party from office in 1997.
President Evren announced at the opening session o f Parliament that the armed 
forces were going back to their barracks “confident that democracy will be 
safeguarded.” 106 However, the military maintained an active guardianship role through 
numerous formal and informal mechanisms. While the five-member junta formally 
dissolved itself, Evren stayed on to serve as president until November 9, 1989, and the 
four other military leaders transitioned into a newly established organization, the 
Presidential Council.107 Article 118 o f the new constitution stipulated that the 
recommendations of the National Security Council, which met monthly, should be given 
priority consideration by the Council of Ministers. The NSC was comprised of five 
members of the military (the chief o f staff and the commanders of the land forces, navy, 
air force, and gendarmerie), four representatives o f the government, and chaired by the 
Turkish president.
While theoretically the composition of the NSC would allow for a balance 
between military and civilian views, in practice the military had substantial power over 
the agenda, not only because the president was former general and junta leader Kenan 
Evren, but because serving and retired military personnel dominated the NSC’s 
Undersecretariat, whose 400 members drew up briefing documents and background 
papers for distribution to the NSC.108 For examples, the recommendations given to 
Premier Erbakan to guard against the growing influence of Islamism on the state were 
prepared by the NSC Undersecretariat in cooperation with working groups in the Turkish 
General Staff, and included curbs on the Islamist media, closure o f private religious
106 Howe, "Turks Will Form First Civilian Cabinet Since 1980."
107 Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," 342.
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schools and courses, and restrictions on state-run preacher training schools which the 
military believed were being used to encourage anti-secularist values.
Law No. 2945 gave the NSC secretary general, a serving admiral or general, 
access to any civilian agency, as well as the authority to monitor the implementation of 
the NSC’s recommendations. By participating in other government bodies such as the 
Higher Education Council, the NSC monitored civilians and played a role in diverse 
social policy realms such as school curriculum development and regulating television 
broadcasting hours. The military even supplied one of the three judges on the panels 
responsible for hearing cases at the National Security Courts. The chief o f the Turkish 
General Staff was able to directly communicate the military’s concerns during weekly 
meetings with the prime minister and president.
By strengthening the authority o f the president and the NSC, the military 
bolstered the ability o f the executive and the military to overcome ideological divisions 
among elected officials in parliament, and deal swiftly with internal threats such as 
Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism. The arrangement would also ensure the 
Turkish defense budget would be insulated from parliamentary debate.
The military also retained an influence over Turkish politics through public 
declarations, as well as briefings for government and private groups such as the judiciary 
and the business community. For example, prior to the first presidential elections after the 
coup of 1980, President Evren departed from his position of public neutrality in a 
television address, in which he called on the public to elect an administration that would 
continue the military regime’s policies. Even though the military did not intervene when 
Ozal’s Motherland Party won 45 % of the votes, and 212 of the 400 seats in parliament, 
during the elections on November 6, 1983,109 the pattern of publically commenting on 
Turkish politics would continue, with perhaps a decisive impact in discrediting Erbakan 
and his Welfare Party in the mid-1990s. When Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamist 
prime minister, leading commanders delivered public speeches warning secularism was 
under threat. Rather than intervene directly to dissolve his party, they galvanized civil 
society organizations and members of the media to build opposition to the WP and urge 
public protests, emphasizing the dangers of political Islam to the state.
109 Howe, "Turks Electing First Parliament Since Coup."
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The military thus demonstrated that while it appeared to serve in a supporting role 
loyal to the civilian leadership, it still yielded a substantial influence over Turkish 
political life, one that undermined its professionalism by compromising its mission 
exclusivity and revealing a lack of respect for civilian political authority. While its 
professional competency was held in high regard, and Kemalism continued to serve as a 
unifying ideology, its presence in Turkey’s civil sphere detracted from its military 
readiness and rendered it nearly impossible to establish objective civilian control.
Civil Military Relations Transformed?
Erdogan and the Subordination of the General Staff
“Let them subordinate the army to the ministry o f sports if they 
want.. ..the army will still do what it needs to do.” 110
- Retired General Armagan Kuloglu
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought new focus on the importance 
of strong political and military ties with Turkey for several reasons. Turkey plays an 
important stabilizing role in the region, and is also often considered a model of good 
relations between the West and a predominately Muslim nation. Turkey’s geographical 
location continues to make it a crucial base from which to project power and establish 
supply lines to support operations in Iraq. The U.S. and Turkey have worked closely 
together on range of issues, from counterterrorism to nuclear non-proliferation. Turkish 
military personnel have contributed to the International Security and Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan and the intervention in Libya, and Turkey has worked to contain 
the violence and deal with the humanitarian crisis in Syria as well as address the recent 
threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria . The United States resumed grant 
military aid to Turkey, and continues to sell advanced weaponry and equipment through 
the foreign military sales program. The U.S. mitigated external threats to Turkey’s 
security by bolstering its military capabilities, extended political support to the civilian 
leadership o f the democratically elected Justice and Development Party (JDP), and
110 "The Turkish Army: Coups Away," The Economist, www.economist.com/node/15505946.
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contributed to the professionalization of the Turkish Armed Forces through International 
Military Education and Training as well as close NATO and bilateral security 
cooperation. Over this same period, the JDP has achieved unprecedented success in 
subordinating the Turkish Armed Forces to civilian authority. Arguably the single most 
important factor that has contributed to the institutionalization of civilian control over the 
military in Turkey has not been U.S. military assistance, however, but the political 
authority granted by the European Union accession process to Turkey’s civilian leaders.
This section is divided into three parts. The first reviews Turkey’s security 
environment, and looks at the relationship between external threats and the military’s role 
in Turkey’s civil politics. The second discusses how both international and domestic 
political support for the reforms of the civilian Justice and Development party leader, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, limited the political options for the military and thus decreased 
the likelihood that the military would interfere in politics. The final part looks at the 
relationship between U.S. military aid and the professionalism of the TAF. While aid 
continued to enhance the professional competency of Turkey’s armed forces, it was the 
EU accession process, rather than aid, that allowed the civilian political leadership to 
reverse the institutional gains made by the military junta in the early 1980s. While this 
may not reflect the military’s respect for civilian political authority, the institutional 
mechanisms available to the military to interfere in civil politics have been dramatically 
reduced. However, Erdogan’s reforms fall short of objective civilian control in that they 
have been overly coercive, relying on mass arrests and incarceration to subjugate the 
military and neutralize it as a political force. This unhealthy approach to civil-military 
relations may result in a renewed pattern of intervention should Erdogan’s political 
capital wane in the future.
Turkey’s Post-September 11 Security Challenges
Turkey has been challenged by numerous threats to its external security since the 
terrorist attacks o f September 11, 2001, as the “zero problems with neighbors” foreign 
policy approach o f Turkish academic Ahmet Davutoglu has given way to multiple 
regional security crises, from Iran’s nuclear ambitions to Syria’s civil war and
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ISIS’s caliphate ambitions. The perception among many Turks is that U.S. foreign policy 
has exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, these threats despite the fact that Washington 
resumed Foreign Military Financing to Turkey in 2002. Yet despite the increased 
complexity and threats generated by the U.S. -  led war in Iraq and the Arab Spring, the 
military has not expanded its role in civil politics.
Erdogan and his closest advisors, particularly Davutoglu, have very particular 
ideas regarding the conduct of their foreign policy. The foreign policy approach 
advocated by Davutoglu when he was Erdogan’s chief advisor imagined Turkey as “the 
centre o f its own sphere o f influence” and sought to establish “strategic depth” through a 
soft-power strategy based on strengthening geopolitical, cultural, historical and economic 
ties within the region.111 Yet Turkey’s external security situation has become more 
challenging. For example, the “zero problems with neighbors” policy promoted the 
deepening of diplomatic and security cooperation with Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, with 
particular attention to the role the latter three countries could play in mitigating the threat 
from Kurdish separatists. Yet pressure from Turkey’s Western allies to sanction Russia 
for its bullying of Ukraine, and Iran for its nuclear program, have complicated those 
relations. In addition, since 2011, Turkey’s attitude toward Syrian President Bashar al- 
Assad shifted completely, with Ankara admonishing Damascus for its brutal repression of 
peaceful Arab Spring demonstrators and the subsequent civil war that has sent hundreds 
o f thousands o f refugees flooding into Turkey. Putin’s support of Assad has put Russian 
and Turkish aims with respect to Syria squarely against each other. Iraq’s conflict with 
ISIS has altered Turkey’s relations with the Iraqi Kurds, who are among the most skilled 
at battling the militant Islamic group. While Turkey must cooperate with Iraqi and Syrian 
Kurds to battle ISIS, Ankara still worries about a post-conflict drive to create a separate 
Kurdish state that will compromise Turkey’s territorial integrity.
Despite U.S. military aid, Turks largely blame American foreign policy for many 
o f these security challenges. The extent to which Turkish politicians believe U.S. policies 
pose a threat to their security was revealed in 2003, when the Bush administration 
promised approximately $24 billion in U.S. aid and loan guarantees in anticipation of
111 Gareth Jenkins, "On the Edge - the AKP Shifts Turkey's Political Compass," Janes Intelligence Review  
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Turkey’s permission to stage American ground forces at Turkey’s border with Iraq, 
which would facilitate a second front during the 2003 Iraq War. Prime Minister Erdogan 
and the TAF supported the plan, but the Turkish Parliament could not muster the absolute 
majority necessary because nearly 100 members o f the Justice and Development Party 
either joined the Republican People’s Party members in voting against the U.S. request, 
or abstained from voting altogether. Some of the MP’s argued the rationale for war 
against Iraq in 2003 was less convincing than it had been in 1991. Also, the first Gulf 
War cost Turkey billions in trade with Iraq, sent refugees into Turkey, and emboldened 
Kurdish separatists who were able to stage terror attacks from safe havens in northern 
Iraq.
While President Ozal believed in 1991 that participation would strengthen 
Turkey’s security ties with the U.S. and NATO, prior to the Gulf War in 2003, NATO 
responded weakly to Turkey’s request for Article V commitments to defend Turkey in 
case o f an Iraqi attack.112 This was particularly disappointing since Turkey had allowed 
the U.S. to use its air bases for limited military action in Iraq since 1991, and Turkish 
troops participated in missions in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan. While Turkey did ultimately allow the U.S. to use Turkish airspace as well 
as Turkish bases and border crossings for non-lethal cargo transport, the U.S. - led Iraq 
War of 2003 led to sectarian violence and political instability, resulting in a weak state 
incapable of preventing attacks such as the cross-border ambushes in October 2007, in 
which 25 Turks in southeastern Turkey were killed by PKK terrorists. When Turkey sent 
approximately 100,000 troops to its border with Iraq to demonstrate its commitment to 
repelling such attacks, the Bush administration, fearing a Turkish invasion would 
jeopardize vital U.S. supply lines from Turkey to Iraq, committed to close 
counterterrorism cooperation with the Turks, including sharing intelligence on the 
movement of PKK operatives.113
While the EU accession process reversed many o f the TAF’s institutional 
prerogatives, the military did use informal means such as public statements to express its 
views on foreign policy and security issues. In other words, these security issues provided
112 Zanotti, "Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges," 41.
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an opportunity for the military to publically express its foreign policy preferences, which 
violates the spirit of objective civilian control over the military. For example, on January 
25, 2005, General Ilker Basbug warned that Turkey would not stand idly by if the Iraqi 
Kurds attempted to take control o f the oil-rich province o f Kurkuk or if  they persecuted 
the Turkish speaking Turkmen minority. During a visit to northern Cyprus, army 
commander General Buyukanit declared none of the approximately 35,000 troops 
deployed on the island would be withdrawn before a “firm and final” solution to the 
Cyprus problem had been reached.114
The Arab Spring, sparked in December o f 2010 and January o f 2011 by 
widespread, largely peaceful public uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, once again 
highlighted the importance of Turkey’s regional role. President Obama consulted 
frequently with Prime Minister Erdogan with respect to political change in Egypt, and 
Turkey was involved politically and militarily during the NATO intervention in Libya. 
While Prime Minister Erdogan initially opposed UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to 
protect Libyan civilians, after the initial U.S.-led intervention, Turkey decided to help 
implement the resolution as a part of a NATO-led coalition. On March 24, the Turkish 
Parliament voted to permit Turkish ground, air and naval forces in Libya for up to a year, 
supporting UNSCR 1973 and 1970.
Despite the collapse of the “zero problems” policy, the military has not assumed a 
more prominent role in Turkey’s foreign and national security policy-making; in fact its 
public presence has declined. This points to the ability of civilian political leadership to 
subordinate the military to its authority even in the presence of multiple external threats. 
The next section offers an explanation of how international and domestic political support 
for civil-military reforms allowed Turkey’s civilian leadership to take dramatic steps 
toward establishing objective civilian control over the Turkish armed forces, despite the 
general s taffs  uncertainty regarding the Justice and Development Party’s commitment to 
secularism.
114 Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," 349-53.
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Turkey’s Political Leadership and the Turkish Armed Forces
Prime Minister Erdogan’s ability to depart from a policy o f “acquiescence” and 
work toward achieving objective civilian control over the military has required both 
external and domestic political support. Despite American political support for Turkey’s 
civilian leadership, however, the most decisive support came from the European Union -  
accession process, particularly as entry into the EU enjoyed broad domestic support as 
Erdogan began implementing reforms that diminished the armed forces’ institutional 
prerogatives. The EU’s support compensated for any negative effects of discontinuities in 
American political support, such as Washington’s criticism of Ankara after the Turkish 
parliament failed to pass a resolution allowing U.S. troops to stage in Turkey prior to the 
2003 Iraq War.
The JDP, led by Prime Minister Erdogan, has been able to implement significant 
legal reforms that have reduced both the formal and informal role o f the Turkish military 
in civil politics despite the military’s prestige. The Helsinki Summit o f December, 1999, 
during which Turkey was officially named as a candidate for European Union 
membership, gave the government political authority to reduce the institutional power of 
the Turkish Armed Forces. While the “Copenhagen Criteria” had required Turkey to 
satisfy certain political preconditions to be considered for EU membership, the European 
Commission’s report in 2000 insisted Turkey’s National Security Council “exercised 
excessive influence over the government, and had little accountability to the parliament 
with regard to security and defense matters.” 115 The tripartite government that ruled prior 
to the JDP initiated some reforms, such as removing military judges from security courts, 
and in October 2001, parliament amended article 118 of the Turkish constitution to 
increase the civilian membership of the National Security Council. In addition, the 
requirement o f the Council of Ministers to give “priority consideration” to the 
recommendations o f the NSC was removed, and replaced by an obligation that the 
Council be merely “notified’ of them.
115 "2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession," in Commission 
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The JDP, voted into office during the general elections of November 2002, was 
able to go much further in subordinating the military to civilian authority, particularly 
because over 70% of the Turkish population supported EU membership in the early 
2000s.116 When the tripartite coalition government collapsed in the summer of 2002, the 
JDP successfully campaigned on a platform of economic and political reform. In the 
midst o f a severe economic recession, public confidence in the other parties was low, and 
in the November 2002 elections, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) won 
the general elections with a wide majority, becoming the first single-party government in 
more than a decade. While the TAF was unconvinced of the JDP’s commitment to 
secularism, its political options were limited, particularly because it did not want to 
jeopardize the EU accession process, and an alternative government could not be formed 
with the existing members of parliament.
Despite the tension between the Justice and Development Party and the Turkish 
General Staff, the desire to receive a date for the opening o f accession negotiations at the 
European Union summit in Brussels, scheduled for 16-17 December, 2004, led both sides 
to avoid an open confrontation, and the 7th Reform Package initiated major changes to the 
structure o f the primary institutional means through which the military influenced civil 
politics: the National Security Council.117 Also known as the “harmonization package,” 
the reforms abolished the requirement that the NSC secretary general be a serving 
member of the military. The NSC would meet less frequently, would no longer have 
unlimited access to civilian agencies, and could no longer send representatives to the 
Higher Education Authority or the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music. 
Appointments to the NSC’s undersecretariat would be more transparent, and the number 
of personnel serving would decrease, with the proportion of civilian employees to 
military personnel increasing. The nature of the NSC, which since 1980 had been an 
executive decision-making board, was also restored to the advisory role o f the 1960s and 
1970s.1'8
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The limitations of the military’s influence on Turkey’s foreign policy was 
revealed when the Turkish government failed to approve a resolution allowing the U.S. to 
transit Turkey during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, despite the Bush administration’s promise 
o f nearly $24 billion in U.S. aid and loan guarantees. Members o f the Turkish General 
Staff, along with Prime Minister Erdogan, worried not only that the U.S. might cut 
military aid, but also that Turkey would have little input on post-invasion policy 
regarding the Kurds in northern Iraq. The JDP further consolidated its political authority 
over the Turkish Armed Forces when the EU tackled a glaring violation of the liberal- 
democratic model o f civil military relations: the fact that the Chief of the Turkish General 
Staff was responsible to the prime minister rather than a civilian defense minister.119
The extent o f public antipathy for military interference in civil affairs was 
revealed in April of 2007, during an attempted “e-coup” prior to the presidential elections 
in 2007. Because the JDP’s parliamentary majority was re-elected during the general 
elections in 2007, foreign minister and JDP member Abdullah Gul was likely to be 
elected president, meaning the JDP, which the military saw as an Islamist party and thus 
a threat to the secular nature of the state, would have control over the legislature and the 
executive. The army chief, Yasar Buyukanit, posted on the Turkish General S taffs 
website that the Turkish Armed Forces were watching the Presidential elections with 
concern, and as the guardians o f secularism would not hesitate to publically demonstrate 
its position if necessary.” 120
The Turkish public was upset by the implicit coup threat in the “April 27 memo;” 
many believed it hurt Turkey’s prospects for EU membership, while others worried 
continued military intervention impeded Turkey’s democratic consolidation. Nearly a 
million people took to the streets, some protesting the government, some protesting EU 
membership, and some protesting the military’s interference in the presidential election.
In the end, the failed “e-coup” attempt damaged the military’s prestige. Emboldened by 
the presidential win and the damage done to the TAF’s reputation, the JDP ordered police 
raids in June that would lead to accusations against ten army generals and hundreds of
119 Heper and Guney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," 452; ibid.; Aylin 
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other officers, as well as various journalists and professors, for conspiring to undermine 
the government.
Turkey’s civilian leaders were able to exercise greater foreign policy 
independence not only because the influence o f the military was waning, but also because 
Turkey’s indigenous defense capability had grown, rendering Turkey less dependent on 
donors whose foreign policy preferences might not align with the JDP’s. For example, in 
2005, the state-owned Turkish Aircraft Industries bought out the remaining shares of 
TUSAS Aerospace Industries, which were partially owned by U.S.-based companies 
Lockheed Martin and General Electric International. Turkey became a major regional 
supplier o f military arms and equipment, assembling F-16s for Egypt and upgrading 
aircraft for Jordan.
Thus Erdogan’s government was able to withstand discontinuities in American 
political support. For example, President Obama, who had emphasized the importance of 
U.S. -  Turkish relations when he addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
April 2009, later warned Erdogan that Turkey’s “no” vote for sanctions against Iran, as 
well as Erdogan’s reaction to the Gaza flotilla incident, which publically strained ties 
between Turkey and Israel, would render it more difficult to gain Congressional approval 
for foreign military sales, including the drone aircraft the Turkish military used against 
the PKK. Despite pressure from the U.S. and the preferences of the Turkish General Staff, 
which worried a nuclear Iran would complicate security relations with the U.S., Israel, 
and Europe, in June, 2010, Turkey voted no to UN Security Council Resolution 1929, 
which would have provided for further sanctions against Iran.121 By 2010, FMF grant 
assistance was being fazed out, and IMET, International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs (NADR) funds were the primary sources o f annual U.S. military and security 
assistance to Turkey.
While the JDP has made substantial progress is reversing the institutional gains 
made by the Turkish armed forces, its progress in achieving objective control over the 
military has been undermined by the coercive nature of its effort to neutralize the military
121 Ariel Cohen, "Congressmen Talk Turkey," H eritage Foundation; Daniel Domey, "U.S. Issues Arms- 
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as a political actor. In September 2012, a Turkish Court convicted 300 military officers, 
sentencing them to up to 20 years for allegedly engaging in a plot to overthrow the 
government in 2002. The heads o f the navy, army and air force were each sentenced to 
twenty years. The “Ergenkon” network was allegedly comprised o f military members and 
civilians who were working together to overthrow the JDP government. Prosecutors 
argued the coup plot, known as “Sledgehammer,” intended to blow up mosques and 
instigate a military conflict with Greece that would lead to the dissolution o f Erdogan’s 
government.122 Turkey’s Constitutional Court later ruled the lower courts had violated 
the officers’ rights to a fair trial, and all 237 officers were released. Lawyers for the 
defendants maintained due process was violated, and that the digital evidence against the 
officers was fabricated.
Erdogan’s distinction o f being the first president in Turkish history to be elected 
by popular vote comes in spite of increasing accusations of corruption and 
authoritarianism. Recent laws addressing antiterrorism and criminal defamation give the 
government broad powers to punish those critical o f the regime, particularly journalists, 
many of whom were fired over their coverage of the Gezi Park demonstrations in May, 
2013, when a small group of environmental activists protested the government’s plan to 
replace a park with commercial developments.123 Citizens were alarmed by the state’s 
overreaction, during which police sent tear gas canisters and water cannons into crowds. 
In December 2013, Erdogan and four o f his cabinet ministers came under investigation 
for corruption and bribery; in response, Erdogan reassigned hundreds o f judicial 
personnel and clamped down on the media.124 The National Assembly passed a bill 
restricting Internet freedoms, allowing authorities to collect browser histories and block 
web pages without a court order.
While the military has been able to establish working relationships with civilian 
politicians such as Suleyman Demirel in the 1970s, and Turgut Ozal in the 1980s, the 
JDP’s coercive tactics, including arrests and incarceration, undermine the spirit of 
objective civilian control and the liberal-democratic model o f civil-military relations.
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While most of the military’s institutionalized prerogatives have been reversed, the 
public’s increasing ambivalence toward the EU accession process renders the external 
political support provided by the European Union less influential in discouraging military 
interference in civil politics. In the context of increased authoritarianism on the part of 
President Erdogan, if public support for the Justice and Development Party declines and 
the civilian opposition continues to be fragmented and thus ineffective, military 
intervention cannot be ruled out.
The Professionalism of the Turkish Armed Forces
The competency of the TAF, enhanced by U.S. military aid, continues to be 
lauded, particularly as the military demonstrated its skill while participating in NATO’s 
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, even assuming 
command in 2002 and 2005. The EU accession process, rather than U.S. military aid, 
provided a strong motivation for the Turkish Armed Forces to respect the political 
authority of Turkey’s civilian leaders even though the Turkish General Staff was 
unconvinced of the Justice and Development Party’s commitment to secularism. The 
mission exclusivity o f the military was improved by the civil-military reforms 
implemented during this period, which dramatically reduced the military’s presence in 
the civil sphere. However, the military’s ideological cohesion may have been 
compromised by the coercive tactics of the Erdogan government in neutralizing the 
military, particularly through mass arrests and incarceration, obfuscating the extent to 
which respect for civilian political authority has truly been internalized.
The Turkish military has played an important role in NATO’s command o f ISAF, 
a UN-mandated force established in December 2001, to provide security for the Afghan 
Transitional Authority in Kabul. ISAF’s mandate was extended to the rest o f Afghanistan 
by UN Security Council Resolution 1510 in October, 2003. Turkey has assumed 
command o f ISAF twice, from June 2002 through February 2003, and February 2005 
until August 2005, at which point thirty-six countries were contributing to ISAF. The 
only other NATO nations to assume command have been the United States, the United
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Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, and Italy.125 Lieutenant General Ethem Erdagi, 
who led ISAF in 2005, emphasized Turkey’s contribution was enhanced by its experience 
in counterterrorism operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as well as its 
history o f security cooperation with the Afghan military dating back to the days of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.126
The competence of the Turkish military, which continues to provide the second 
largest land force to NATO after the United States, cannot be understated. Its skill and 
willingness to fight and lead, bolstered by mandatory 15-month service for Turkish males 
and an “every Turk is bom a soldier” mentality, render it an indispensible ally in the 
region. Yet for much of the 2000s, it resisted JDP attempts to wrest control o f Turkey’s 
foreign and security policy and retreat from the civil sphere. While the military was 
reluctant to endanger the EU accession process, which enjoyed strong public support in 
the early 2000s, the leadership retained informal mechanisms for exerting pressure on the 
JDP and mobilizing opposition within Turkish society.127 For example, in what is 
commonly referred to as the “headscarf incident,” the chief o f the TGS, General Hilmi 
Ozkok, along with the force commanders, staged a silent protest in the office o f the new 
speaker o f the parliament, Bulent Amic. Amic’s wife had worn a headscarf while bidding 
farewell to President Ahment Necdet Sezera, who was flying from the Ankara airport to 
Prague for a NATO summit. The incident, which was covered by the Turkish media, was 
intended to convey Ozkok’s willingness to confront attempts by the JDP to challenge the 
secular nature o f the government.
The TAF also used public statements to articulate Turkeys’ foreign policy 
preferences and express the TAF’s commitment to protecting the principle o f secularism. 
These comments undermined Prime Minister Erdogan’s foreign policy initiatives on 
issues such as addressing Kurds’ demands for cultural and political rights as well as 
reaching a negotiated political solution in Cyprus. The EU commission noted, “The
125 "Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force: Aboout ISAF," www.isaf.nato.int/history.html.
126 Lieutenant General Ethem Erdagi, "The ISAF Mission and Turkey's Role in Rebuilding the Afghan 
State," The Washington Institute: Improving the Quality o f  U.S. M iddle East Policy, 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-isaf-mission-and-turkeys-role-in-rebuilding-the- 
afghan-state.
127 Begum Burak, "The Role o f  the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom and From What?," 
European Journal o f  Economic and Political Studies 4, no. 1: 164.
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Armed Forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series o f informal 
channels” in its 2004 commission report.128
While the chief o f staff, General Ozkok, later urged the TAF to respect the 
political authority o f the civilian leadership, his successor, General Yasar Buyukanit, was 
more assertive in voicing his opposition to the Justice and Development Party, and in 
2006, Buyukanit along with the commanders of the army, navy and air force, each 
delivered public statements that warned Islamic fundamentalism was a threat to 
Turkey.129 Buyukanit later admitted he personally wrote the April 27 memo that warned 
the military would react if  the secular nature of the republic were threatened by the 
results o f the Presidential election process.
Buyukanit’s successor, Ilker Basburg, who served as chief of staff from August 
2008, to August 2010, ordered his officers not to make public declarations, explaining, 
“According to Samuel P. Huntington, the most effective control over the military is 
‘objective control,’ which means rendering the military a professional institution and thus 
putting a distance between the military and politics.” 130 Ironically, Basburg was one of 
300 officers charged with leading an illegal network accused of conspiring to overthrow 
the government.131 Senior military leaders acquiesced when Prime Minister Erdogan 
challenged the military’s tradition o f appointing its own highest-ranking officials, 
including the Land Forces Commander and the Commander and Chief o f the Turkish 
General Staff, in August of 2010, and in September, Turkey passed amendments to the 
1982 constitution that increased military and judicial accountability to civilian and 
democratic institutions.132
While the institutional means for military interference in civil affairs have been 
reduced, it is uncertain that a sincere respect for civilian political authority has been 
internalized. Some officers may welcome following the democratic model o f civil- 
military relations, while others may harbor deep resentments based on the perception of
128 "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession," in Commission o f  the European 
Communities, ed. Commission o f  the European Communities (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), 15.
129 Jenkins, "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," 352-53; Heper, 
"Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?," 243.
130 "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?," 244-45.
131 Sebnem Arsu, "Ex-Chief o f  Turkish Army is Arrested in Widening Case o f  Alleging Coup Plot," The 
New York Times, January 5, 2012.
132 "Balance o f  Power," The Economist.
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mistreatment at the hands of the Justice and Development Party in the last decade. The 
sense that the Turkish military remains the only institution capable of preserving the 
secular nature of Ataturk’s republic is deeply ingrained; if  Turkey drifts toward 
authoritarianism, antagonizes its traditional allies, and embraces political Islam, the 
military, or elements within it, may reassert its guardianship over Turkish politics.
Conclusions
This chapter examined if U.S. military aid, by mitigating the external threats to 
Turkey’s security, providing political support for Turkey’s civilian leaders, and 
contributing to the professionalization of the Turkish armed forces, rendered it less likely 
the military would intervene in civil politics. Since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the 
Turkish military directly intervened to remove the government four times, in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997, and assumed an assertive guardianship role from 1960 through the 1990s. 
While in 1960 and 1980, senior military leaders completely assumed the responsibilities 
o f government through a military junta, in 1971 and 1997 the TAF used its political 
influence to pressure the government to resign. Flow can one account for the apparently 
negative relationship between U.S. military aid and the military’s presence in civil 
politics?
U.S. Military Aid, Turkey’s External Threats, and Military Intervention
One might argue that while the U.S. mitigated the external threat posed by the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, Turkey continued to face internal security threats that 
justified the military’s presence in civil politics. For example, while Turkey enjoyed a 
favorable security environment in 1960, civil unrest in response to the authoritarian 
practices o f Prime Minister Adnan Menderes pulled the military into politics, leading to 
the coup in May o f 1960. Similarly, political violence between militant groups o f the 
extreme right and left preceded the interventions in 1971 and 1980. Yet political violence 
wracked Turkey throughout the 1970s, and PKK terrorism that began in the mid- 1980s 
escalated into a full-blown insurgency in the 1990s. While the violence pulled the
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military into the civil sphere as martial law was imposed to restore order, the military did 
not attempt to dissolve the government in reaction to violence. Moreover, the military did 
not take over in late 1974 or early 1975, despite the threat o f an arms embargo imposed 
by the U.S. Congress, which would significantly undermine the military readiness o f the 
armed forces and thus imperil Turkey’s national security.
Rather, the prospect of Islamist political hegemony has been the single most 
powerful driver of military interference in civil affairs. While the military has shown a 
tolerance for political parties with roots in Islamism, such as Adnan Menderes’ Democrat 
Party, Suleyman DemireTs Justice Party, and Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, the 
prospect of political domination by an Islamist party is highly problematic for the armed 
forces. Menderes’ attempts to coerce and marginalize Ismet Inonu and his opposition 
party raised the spectre o f unchecked Democrat Party supremacy, for example. The 
prospect of a ruling coalition dominated by Necmettin Erbakan’s extreme right party in 
1980 and 1997 provoked military intervention, while the existence o f violence within or 
beyond Turkey’s borders did not. In 2007, despite the civil-military reforms generated by 
the EU accession process, the military attempted an “e-coup” to discourage the election 
o f JDP member Abdullah Gul, out of concern that an Islamist party would control both 
the legislative and executive branches of government. Some speculated that the image of 
the Turkish head o f state’s wife wearing a headscarf was enough to cause a panic among 
military leaders.
Undermining the thesis that escalating external threats render subordination of the 
military to civilian authority less likely is the fact that since the end of the Cold War, and 
despite the “zero problems with neighbors” policy, internal and external threats to 
Turkey’s security have multiplied, while the military’s role in civil politics has declined. 
The military has viewed the rise o f political Islam and Kurdish separatism as pressing 
internal security problems, as PKK terrorists have increased attacks on Turkish targets 
from northern Iraq, and Turkey has been flooded with refugees from violence in Syria 
and Iraq. The civil-military reforms of the past decade were implemented despite a 
relatively unfavorable security environment.
The impact of expectations of declining U.S. military aid should also be 
considered as a factor when examining the relationship between the external threat and
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the military’s role in politics. While destabilizing for bilateral relations, disruptions in 
military aid did serve to motivate Turkey’s leaders both to strengthen ties with regional 
neighbors as well as develop the industrial capacity to support indigenous defense 
production. This provided a strong common interest in economic development during the 
1980s, as junta leader and President Kenan Evren guaranteed a stable political 
environment for Turgut Ozal’s economic reforms, even though Ozal’s Motherland Party 
was not the favored party o f the Turkish general staff. This is particularly significant 
considering the difficulty politicians like Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit had in 
passing necessary reform legislation throughout the 1970s because o f the volatile 
political environment. It is often assumed that the middle class that emerges during 
periods of economic development will be less tolerant of behavior that undermines 
democratization, meaning civil society in 2010 would be more averse to military 
interference in Turkish politics than it was thirty years earlier. This suggests that in the 
long-term, the expectation o f declining U.S. military aid, despite the continued presence 
of external threats, could have positive implications for civil-military relations by 
motivating the government to implement economic reforms that promote development.
American Political Support fo r  Turkey’s Civilian Political Leaders
This case study has highlighted both the importance and limitations o f the 
American political support for Turkey’s civilian leaders that accompanies U.S. military 
aid. While external political support combined with strong domestic political support has 
successfully limited the political options for military interference, particularly in 1950, 
during Turgut Ozal’s premiership, and under Erdogan, discontinuities in American 
political support have given small but influential right and left-wing parties opportunities 
to undermine the more moderate parties at the center of Turkish politics. The resulting 
political instability pulled the military into politics in 1971, 1980, and 1997. This case 
also reveals the power alternative providers of external political support can have on a 
state’s domestic political stability, as the EU accession process facilitated the 
implementation of dramatic civil-military reforms in the 2000s.
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While U.S. political support for Prime Minister Menderes in the 1950s provided a 
boost to his government, particularly following visits with Washington leaders and 
commitments o f U.S. military aid, the Turkish public largely supported the military 
intervention in 1960, because the Democrat Party had lost legitimacy through its 
authoritarian policies. In the 1960s and 1970, U.S. support was characterized by 
discontinuity, particularly with respect to the Cyprus issue, and anti-Americanism was 
fueled both by the Johnson letter and the American military presence in Turkey. U.S. 
political support subsequently became a liability, rather than a precondition for political 
stability, and even traditionally Western-oriented parties such as the Republican People’s 
Party began to distance themselves from pro-West policies. The lack of strong external 
political support, combined with the military’s post-1960 institutional prerogatives, 
inhibited the ability o f civilian leaders to establish objective civilian control over the 
military. Rather, the multiple prime ministers who served during this period adopted a 
policy o f acquiescence, mindful of the military’s guardianship role in civil politics.
The Turkish military’s restrictions on political participation after the 1980 coup, 
combined with strong political support from the Reagan administration, changed the tone 
of Turkish-American relations, restoring to an extent the positive relationship between 
U.S. military aid and the political power of the civilian leadership. Ozal’s successful 
economic policies were grounded in neoliberal economic reforms favored by many of 
Turkey’s NATO allies as well as Western institutions such as the IMF and the OECD. 
While Ozal accepted the military’s institutional prerogatives, adopting a policy of 
acquiescence, it is possible that as president in the 1990s he might have been able to 
establish objective civilian control over the military, particularly as he enjoyed strong 
political support from the U.S. for Turkey’s participation in the Persian Gulf War.
Ozal’s liberalizing economic reforms drew millions from Turkey’s rural areas into 
its cities, not only creating a middle class less tolerant of military intervention, but also 
changing the landscape o f Turkish politics and challenging the hegemony o f Turkey’s 
secular elites. However, Ozal’s death preceded the return of Necmettin Erbakan, and 
popular support for his party worried military leaders, who orchestrated a “post-modern 
coup” in 1997. Ten years later, however, the military’s “e-coup” failed, partly because
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Erdogan, who has insisted the JDP is a center-right party without an Islamist agenda, 
enjoys greater external political support than Erbakan, who was considered an extremist.
Turkey’s civilian leaders now have more alternatives when seeking external 
political support than in the immediate post-World War II period. Turkey began 
diversifying its diplomatic relations in response to the Cyprus crisis, as it sought political 
support from Arab neighbors. Discontinuity in American political support also provided 
an impetus for renewed relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. The EU 
accession process gave the Justice and Development Party the political authority to 
implement civil-military reforms, and Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” 
promoted even deeper regional ties, with mixed success.
Rather than co-opt the military either through a policy o f acquiescence or 
deliberate politicization, Turkey’s civilian leaders in the 2000s have endeavored to 
subordinate the armed forces with the political authority granted by the EU accession 
process, as well as more coercive means such as mass arrests and prosecution. The 
civilian leadership may have calculated that since the “guardian of the secular state” 
ideology is so deeply ingrained within the military establishment, such extreme measures 
were necessary to wrest control of national security and foreign policy from the 
outspoken Turkish General Staff. As Turkey's allies increasingly adapt to Turkish 
civilians as the chief interlocutors for international relations, the Turkish Armed Forces’ 
influence in civil politics, even with a resumption o f major U.S. military aid, will likely 
continue to decline.
Thus at present the political options for military interference in Turkish politics 
have narrowed. Turkey enjoys strong external political support despite receiving minimal 
U.S. military aid, both the president and the prime minister belong to the Justice and 
Development Party, which has revoked nearly all of the institutional prerogatives 
expanded by the military in 1960 and 1980, and the opposition parties are divided and 
ineffective. While secular elites may long for the military to reemerge as a political actor 
in the absence o f a credible opposition, a critical mass within Turkish society rejects 
military interference, and believes some reconciliation between the secular nature o f the 
republic and society’s Islamic roots must be made. The military has enjoyed popularity 
among a public that strongly identifies the Turkish Armed Forces with Turkey’s modem
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nationhood; nevertheless, as a society that has been committed to democracy for more 
than six decades, the Turkish people chafe against overt interference in political affairs or 
assertive public statements that undermine elected leaders.
U.S. Military Aid and the Professionalism o f  the Turkish Armed Forces
Professionalism is understood by civil-military relations scholars to be a 
precondition for achieving objective civilian control over the military. U.S. military aid 
contributes to the professionalization o f the recipient’s armed forces by providing 
weapons, equipment, education, and training, improving the military’s competence, or 
ability to perform as an effective fighting force. Yet this case study reveals that military 
aid has a more limited, and sometimes contradictory, impact on other aspects of 
professionalism, namely, a military’s coherency, or sense of corporateness, its mission 
exclusivity, and its respect for civilian political authority. In other words, the civilian 
political leadership will have difficulty establishing objective civilian control over the 
military if the military is fragmented or characterized by factions, if the military is 
distracted by interests apart from external defense, or if the military fundamentally lacks 
respect for civilian political authority.
While U.S. military aid did not shape the Turkish military’s conceptualization of 
itself as the guardian o f the Kemalist republic, U.S. security cooperation did transform 
the TAF from an ill-equipped and underpaid defensive force in a politically neutral, post­
imperial, single-party state to a modem fighting force with the second largest standing 
army in the world’s strongest military alliance, NATO. This transformation had a 
decisive impact on the capacity o f the TAF to play an assertive guardianship role in 
Turkish politics, just as the transition to multi-party rule complicated Turkey’s domestic 
political stability. In the post-Second World War period, U.S. military aid had the same 
impact on Turkey as the presence of an imminent external threat: resources were 
dedicated to building the state’s military capabilities, even at the expense of other sectors 
o f society, leading to an imbalance in political power between civilian and military elites.
Since the founding of the republic, the Turkish military has imagined itself to be 
the guarantor o f Turkey’s territorial integrity and domestic stability, as well as the
153
guardian o f Ataturk’s secular democracy. As such it is driven by a strong ideology, 
Kemalism, that pre-dates American military aid and contributes to its coherency. Yet the 
education and training of Turkish officers in the late 1940s and 1950s, along with the 
Turkish military presence in Korea, may have contributed to a divergence in views 
between more junior officers and entrenched senior military leaders with respect to the 
role of the military in civil politics. Many junior officers marched alongside Turkish 
students protesting against Prime Minister Menderes, and it was in fact mid-level officers 
who organized the coup in May 1960. General Gursel expelled 14 officers who advocated 
military dictatorship from the Committee o f National Union, the junta that governed 
Turkey for 17 months. The Turkish military thwarted two more coup attempts by 
disgruntled officers in 1962 and 1963. This internal friction reflects a lack of coherency 
that could partially be attributed to U.S. military aid, although in the long-term the impact 
of education and training could be expected to contribute to greater continuity within the 
armed forces.
While in the late 1940s and 1950s the military was focused on building its 
capacity to provide for external defense and collective security, the assertive guardianship 
role assumed after the coup in 1960 undermined its mission exclusivity. General Gursel 
insisted the military would return to the barracks, but the armed forces intervened in 1971 
and 1980, each time expanding its institutional prerogatives and further undermining its 
mission exclusivity. For example, after the coup in 1980, the National Security Council 
extended its oversight into multiple civil spheres, from education to media. In addition, 
internal security crises frequently pulled the military into policing roles, particularly in 
response to political terrorism. Guardianship and maintenance o f martial law distract the 
military from what should be its main focus, external defense, and undermine its military 
readiness.
Finally, the Turkish military has struggled with how it defines respect for civilian 
political authority. Influential military figures such as Ismet Inonu and Cemal Gursel 
advocated for the supremacy of elected civilian government, but other officers have been 
frustrated by civilian corruption, incompetence, and pettiness, and have adopted a 
paternalistic attitude toward Turkish society. The military officers have often felt it is 
their duty to intervene when politicians who undermine secularism threaten to dominate
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Turkish politics. While the EU reforms of the past decade have limited the institutional 
options for military interference in domestic politics, the degree to which respect for 
civilian authority has been internalized remains uncertain.
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CHAPTER IV
EGYPT: MILITARY AID AND THE CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE IN
EGYPTIAN POLITICS
Introduction
American policymakers pursued a defense arrangement and political alignment 
with Egypt in the early postwar years, trying unsuccessfully to link U.S. military aid to an 
agreement that would keep the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the Middle East. 
While some Egyptian officials saw the benefits of political alignment with the United 
States, many in Egyptian society associated Western defense cooperation with Britain’s 
colonial domination. In addition, while the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
identified the Soviet Union as the primary threat to Middle East security, Egyptians 
perceived a greater threat from Israel. This disconnect complicated President 
Eisenhower’s efforts to reach an agreement on a defense arrangement, and provided an 
incentive for President Gamal Abdel Nasser to seek military support from the Soviet 
Union. Nasser’s pursuit of a pan-Arab agenda that undermined American interests in the 
Middle East prompted then-Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles to conclude, the U.S. 
must “let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet 
Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United 
States.” 1
Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, quietly held the view that alignment with the 
United States was in Egypt’s best long-term interest, and spent his eleven years as 
president pursuing the U.S. military aid that has underpinned the strategic partnership 
with Egypt since the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed in 1979. Strong bilateral ties 
between the U.S. and Egypt have contributed to regional stability by ensuring peace with 
Israel, privileged access to the Suez Canal by U.S. naval forces, and intelligence-sharing, 
interests that are just as critical in the post-Cold War period as they were in the 1980s.
'Memorandum from the Secretary o f  State to the President, March 28, 1956, FRUS 15, no. 223.
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Mubarak enjoyed the enhanced status that accompanied U.S. military and political 
support, which enabled him to play the role o f mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
While Egypt was initially isolated from the Arab world in reaction to its separate peace 
with Israel, its political, strategic, and economic importance has rendered it the object of 
rivalry as regional and great powers compete for influence in the post-Mubarak period.
This chapter will examine the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role 
of the Egyptian military in civil politics. U.S. military aid since 1979 has not only 
contributed to a balance of capabilities between Egypt and Israel, but also has encouraged 
security cooperation between the two states despite the fact that many Egyptians consider 
Israel to be the principle external threat to their security. In addition, political alignment 
backed by U.S. military aid bolstered President Hosni Mubarak’s regime stability by 
allowing him to satisfy the corporate interests o f his military while directing resources 
that might otherwise have been spent on defense toward welfare programs. American 
political support was also instrumental in leading international efforts to rescue Egypt 
from economic crises in the 1970s, late 1980s, early 1990s, and most recently during 
Egypt’s short-lived democratic transition. Defense cooperation that includes the biannual 
joint military exercise Bright Star, information sharing, International Military Education 
and Training, and the extension o f credits for the sale of modem equipment and 
weaponry have contributed to the Egyptian Armed Forces’ (EAF) professionalization.
By bolstering Egypt’s defense capabilities, supporting the political leadership, and 
contributing to the professionalization o f its armed forces, U.S. military aid should have 
rendered military intervention in civil politics less likely. However, since the end of 
Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, the military has deepened its involvement in Egypt’s 
political sphere by carving out a preeminent role in foreign and national security 
policymaking, protecting its corporate interests from civilian oversight in the 2012 and 
2014 constitutions, directly intervening to remove an elected president in the summer of 
2013, and co-opting the civilian security services to minimize political opposition ahead 
of the presidential elections in March, 2014.
How can we explain the expansion o f the Egyptian military’s role in civil politics 
despite more than thirty years of U.S. military aid? President Nasser was determined to 
depoliticize and professionalize the military after their disastrous defeat against Israel in
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June, 1967. The Soviet Union sent thousands of military and civilian technical advisors to 
Egypt, satisfying the military’s desire to prepare for a second war with Israel to reclaim 
territory lost in 1967. Yet Sadat’s determination to realign Egypt with the West led to 
panic in the officer corps as Sadat began expelling the Soviet advisors, and military aid 
from Moscow slowed in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Throughout the 1970s, the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations supported 
Sadat’s efforts to open Egypt’s economy and improve relations with Israel, with the goal 
of leading the “only world power in direct contact with both sides” o f the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.2 Sadat continued to subordinate the military to his political authority, but he did 
not establish objective civilian control; rather, he appointed top posts based on loyalty 
rather than merit, and assigned non-defense related activities to the armed forces. During 
President Mubarak’s rule, continuity in U.S. military aid ideally would have contributed 
to a stable domestic political environment within which Egypt’s government could 
establish objective civilian control over the military. Military aid steadily grew through 
the 1980s during the Reagan administration, and has been consistently $1.3 billion 
annually since 1987. Yet rather than attempt to establish objective control over the 
military, President Mubarak filled top posts based on loyalty rather than merit, and 
encouraged the military to expand its economic enterprises to ensure the military’s 
interests were linked with the survival o f his regime. Mubarak also granted the military a 
great deal of autonomy, which precluded civilian oversight over military affairs.
The expectation that U.S. military aid would continue regardless o f regime 
behavior, as it had from 1980 through 2010, may have reassured the Egyptian military 
leadership that aid would persist despite the expansion o f the military’s political role after 
the January 25 Revolution in 2011, including the intervention that removed 
democratically - elected leader Mohamed Morsi from power in July, 2013. Egypt’s 
leaders might also have been reassured by the multiple alternative suppliers o f military, 
political and economic support; regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and 
Iran vie for influence and U.S. rivals such as Russia and China seek closer defense
2 Terence Smith, "U.S. Jets to Arabs: Legacy o f  the Kissinger Years," The New York Times, February 17, 
1978.
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cooperation with the latest Egyptian regime, led by former defense minister Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi.
This case study examines the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role 
of the Egyptian military in civil politics during four periods: from the initial postwar 
effort to secure a defense arrangement with Egypt to President Nasser’s unexpected death 
in October, 1970, during Anwar Sadat’s presidency from October, 1970, until his 
assassination in October, 1981, during the Mubarak era, from October, 1981 until his 
resignation in February, 2011, and in the post-Mubarak period. While military aid, along 
with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty o f 1979, decisively reduced the likelihood of 
hostilities erupting between the two countries, Mubarak continued to link the 
transnational threat posed by militant Islamic extremism with non-violent Islamist 
opposition groups to justify their exclusion from Egyptian politics. Mubarak also relied 
on the police security services of the Interior Ministry, rather than the military, to monitor 
and suppress these groups, in an effort to keep the military out of politics and minimize 
the chances o f a political rival emerging from the officer corps. More recently, Egypt’s 
military leaders have linked non-violent Muslim opposition groups with the terrorist 
threat to justify violence against activists and pro-Morsi supporters, and have even 
extended these measures against virtually any party that criticizes the regime o f President 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
American political support, patronage networks that connect the interests o f the 
business elite and public sector with the survival o f the regime, and a willingness to use 
police to monitor and intimidate civil society, contributed to the regime stability of 
President Mubarak. U.S. military aid also allowed Mubarak to placate the military in 
spite o f its diminished political status by bolstering the development o f independent 
economic enterprises. While U.S. military aid facilitated military -  to -  military contacts 
that provided some opportunities to model liberal-democratic norms of civil-military 
relations, aid has been disproportionately spent on sophisticated weaponry at the expense 
o f training that might have increased the competency of the EAF. Keeping the military 
out of politics was likely beneficial to the military’s coherency, but the inclination to use 
American military aid to enhance the productivity of the military’s commercial 
enterprises has undermined the military’s mission exclusivity. The post-Mubarak era has
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been a test o f the military’s professionalism; while the initial observations gave Egyptians 
and U.S. officials reason for optimism, the expansion of military’s role in civil politics 
necessitates a critical reappraisal of the military aid program.
The Nasser Era
In the early postwar period, the United States sought to mitigate the potential 
Soviet threat to Egypt’s security by establishing a Middle East Defense Organization 
(MEDO) centered around Egypt. In anticipation of a formal arrangement for mutual 
defense, the U.S. provided political support to both the monarch and coup-leaders 
Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, until Egyptians’ reluctance to “take sides” 
in the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the perception of the 
Israeli threat prompted Nasser to turn to Moscow both for arms and political support. The 
professionalism of Egypt’s armed forces eroded as Nasser relied on officers’ personal 
loyalty to guarantee the security of his regime. After slowly losing control o f the armed 
forces to its popular leader, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Nasser used the military 
defeat in 1967 to purge politicized officers, and turned to a newly - empowered civilian 
security sector to protect his regime. Relations with the Soviet Union deepened as Soviet 
arms and advisors were invited to professionalize and modernize the Egyptian Armed 
Forces in preparation for the liberation o f the Sinai.
This section is divided into three parts. The first will recount the security concerns 
of Egypt’s government in the postwar period, as demands for the expulsion of British 
troops and the termination o f the Anglo-Egyptian treaty prompted the Egyptian 
government, the United States and its allies, and the Eastern bloc to pursue alternative 
defense arrangements that would provide for regional stability while advancing their own 
strategic interests. Despite the external threat posed by Israel, Nasser and his group of 
Free Officers were likely more driven to overthrow King Farouk because of growing 
resentment for the monarch, who regularly interfered in military affairs and was thought 
to be overly-deferential to the British; rather than build a professional army capable o f 
meeting the Israeli threat, Nasser relied on loyal, politicized officers to lead his nation- 
building efforts, which ultimately led to the disastrous military defeat in June 1967.
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The second part will examine both the external and internal political support that 
bolstered President Nasser’s government throughout his rule. While the U.S. wanted to 
maintain access and influence even in the absence o f military aid, the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations concluded that as long as Egypt remained a client state of the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. would provide only minimal political support for his presidency while 
increasing military and political support to Egypt’s regional rivals, including Israel and 
Saudi Arabia. Nasser’s inability to establish a broad social base of political support 
undermined his presidency, leaving him few options when the military’s senior 
leadership began to challenge his authority ahead of the 1967 war with Israel. Finally, the 
third part will discuss how Nasser’s politicization of the military undermined its 
professionalism despite Soviet attempts to modernize the EAF from the mid-1950s 
through the 1960s. Nasser blamed Egypt’s defeat in 1967 on the military’s presence in 
civil politics, and used the public criticism following the war to purge politicized officers 
and improve the military’s competency, coherency, mission exclusivity, and respect for 
political authority, in preparation for reclaiming Egypt’s lost territory.
Divergent Threat Perceptions: U.S. Versus Soviet Military Aid
With respect to American foreign policy in the Middle East, protecting the region 
from Soviet expansion and maintaining control over oil lanes in the Persian Gulf were the 
most important strategic objectives in the post-World War II, Cold War period. From the 
perspective o f Egypt’s leaders, however, the threats posed by the new Jewish state and 
other regional rivals were more urgent. The Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy 
administrations struggled to accommodate the rise in pan-Arab nationalism, minimize 
Communist gains, and maintain a balance of capabilities that would mitigate Arab-Israeli 
tension and bolster the region’s external defense. As Nasser’s Egypt increasingly began 
to resemble a Soviet client state, however, the Johnson administration’s policy shifted; 
U.S. support for a preponderance of Israeli capability contributed to Egypt’s disastrous 
defeat in 1967, precipitating a dramatic change in Egyptian civil-military relations.
In the early postwar period, U.S. policymakers envisaged Egypt, as the most 
populous Arab country and the gatekeeper of the Suez Canal, at the center o f a NATO-
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like defense arrangement that would keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. American 
war planners believed access to British military installations, particularly those in the 
Suez Canal Zone, would be critical for protecting the Middle East in the event o f war 
with the Soviet Union.3 However, Egyptians became increasingly discontent with the 
terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which committed the United Kingdom to Egypt’s 
external defense and legitimized the presence of nearly 75,000 British troops stationed 
alongside the Egyptian military to secure the Suez Canal. In January 1947, the Egyptian 
government appealed to the United Nations Security Council to terminate the treaty, and 
later that year the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, travelled 
to Washington to ask for U.S. assistance in modernizing the Egyptian Armed Forces and 
constructing a small arms production industry in anticipation of assuming greater 
responsibility for regional defense. Nokrashy Pasha desired close military -  to -  military 
relations, with Egyptian officers enrolled in U.S. Army and Navy training schools.4
While the U.S. was focused on the threat posed by the Soviet Union, however, 
King Farouk ordered an ill-prepared Egyptian military to join Palestinians in attacks on 
Jewish settlements, cities, and Jewish armed forces in response to the creation o f an 
independent state of Israel on May 14, 1948.5 The king’s order to attack against the 
advice of the military’s general staff incurred deep resentment on the part of Egyptian 
officers, particularly those belonging to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s secret society o f Free 
Officers.
Understanding that Arab-Israeli enmity was complicating efforts to negotiate a 
new defense arrangement, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France committed 
to the maintenance of stability in the Middle East through the Tripartite Declaration of 
1950, although American officials were reluctant to make Arab-Israeli peace a 
precondition for MEDO. State Department officials believed U.S. military aid would not 
only encourage Egypt to formalize ties with the U.S., but could also promote a balance of
3 Peter Hahn, "National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1949-1956," in The M iddle East 
and the United States, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 2012), 80.
4 Thomas J Hamilton, "Egypt Will Seek American Mission to Renovate Army," The New York Times, 
September 3, 1947.
5 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: M ilitary Coups and Governments, 71-72.
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capabilities between the Arab states and Israel that would lead to a more stable 
environment for future peace negotiations.6
U.S. policymakers were hopeful that the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 
the military junta established to govern after the coup in July, 1952, would be amenable 
to peace with Israel, as officers had confided to Washington officials that mitigating the 
external threat would allow them to focus attention on domestic reforms.7 In addition, 
some, including the Assistant Secretary o f State for Near East Affairs, predicted Egypt 
would request military aid once an agreement was reached regarding regional defense 
and the Suez base.8
Unfortunately, the nationalist sentiment that called for the abrogation of the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty worked against the government’s entry into a formal arrangement 
with the United States. Egyptians suspected Western efforts to establish the headquarters 
of a Near East Command in their country was another attempt to dominate their politics.9 
Many Egyptians preferred to maintain the country’s neutrality, and perceived approving 
the U.S. intervention in Korea, the Atlantic Pact, and MEDO as “taking sides,” which 
would preclude Egypt’s efforts to establish positive relations with Soviet bloc countries.10 
While Egypt’s leaders announced, “Egypt today stands in every respect with the West,” 
they insisted they could not join a formal defensive alliance because the Egyptian public 
would consider it “another form of colonial domination.” 11 The U.S. promised military 
aid to Egypt in return for assurances the Egyptians would secure the Suez Canal upon the 
withdrawal of British military personnel, and the Western powers agreed to sell defensive 
weapons to both Arabs and Israelis “without favoritism.” 12 A new Egyptian-British base
6 F.R.U.S.,Department o f  State Position Paper: Arab-Israeli Relations, May 7, 1953, FRUS 9, no. 609.
7 F.R.U.S.,Telegram from the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department o f  State, September 23, 
1952, FRUS 9, no. 492.
8 Memorandum o f  Conversation by the Assistant Secretary o f  State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and 
African Affairs (Henry A. Byroade), August 8, 1952, FRUS 9, no. 82.
9 James Reston, ’’Equality for Egypt in Defense Set-Up: Washington Sources Report N ew  Pact Would 
Replace London-Cairo Agreement," The New York Times, October 12, 1951.
10 Albion Ross, "U.S. Said to Lose Backing in Egypt: Korean War Turn is Reported to Have Switched 
Opinion in Favor o f  British," ibid., December 10, 1950.
11 "The World: Attlee's Report," ibid., September 5, 1954. Malik Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist 
Pan-Arabism," in The Middle East and the United States, ed. David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder, 
CO: W estview Press, 2012), 129.
12 "The World," The New York Times, September 5, 1954.
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treaty signed in October, 1954, would allow British military personnel to return if there 
was a Soviet attack on Turkey or any Arab state.13
Yet Israel’s Gaza raid on February 28, 1955, once again put the Arab-Israeli 
conflict ahead of U.S. Cold War concerns, and Nasser rejected the U.S. condition that a 
small U.S. military mission be allowed in Egypt to administer military aid.14 U.S. 
officials were frustrated months later by the revelation that Egypt had reached an arms 
deal with Czechoslovakia.15 President Nasser and Dr. Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian 
Ambassador in Washington, argued U.S. delays in providing military aid forced the 
Egyptian government to accept the Soviets’ offer to exchange arms for Egyptian cotton 
and rice.
The Eisenhower administration grew more alarmed as Nasser’s long-term vision 
of establishing a union of Arab republics became apparent. The anti-monarch campaign 
included efforts to overthrow the Hashemite families in Iraq and Jordan, and, most 
dangerously, the removal o f King Saud in Saudi Arabia, which would directly threaten 
American strategic interests.16 Despite these concerns, the U.S. intervened on behalf of 
Egypt during the Suez Crisis in late 1956, when Britain, France and Israel decided to use 
force to regain control of the nationalized Suez Canal. Israeli troops landed near Port Said 
and advanced into the heavily populated Gaza Strip on October 30, followed by British 
and French air attacks on October 31. The U.S. forestalled a Soviet intervention by 
pressuring France and the UK to accept a UN Security Council resolution calling for their 
retreat.17 Nasser agreed to host an emergency international UN Force (UNEF), composed 
of approximately 6,000 men from ten countries, to monitor the cessation of hostilities, 
and the U.S., Italy and Switzerland provided logistical support.
American policymakers continued to believe a balance of military capabilities 
between Israel and Egypt was crucial for Middle East stability, and John F. Kennedy 
pledged to maintain that balance in his presidential campaign.18 Yet regional conflict,
13 Hahn, "National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1949-1956," 84.
14 Malik Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," ibid., 130.
15 Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Aides Clash Over Egypt Arms: Versions Conflict on Events Leading to 
Weapon Sale by Czechoslovakia," The New York Times, November 14, 1955.
l6Message from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, March 15, 1956, FRUS 15, no. 197.
17 Hahn, "National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1949-1956," 86.
18 Douglas Dales, "Kennedy Bids U.S. Aid Mideast Peace: Tells Zionists Here Nation Should Make Clear 
It Will Act Against Aggression," The New York Times, August 26, 1960.
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including the overthrow of the Yemeni monarchy and Syria’s withdrawal from the United 
Arab Republic, complicated Kennedy’s efforts. Kennedy sent a circular to Arab leaders 
in August 1961, and Nasser, hoping to preserve bilateral ties, responded positively, 
leading to two years o f personal correspondence during which 75 letters were 
exchanged.19 Wary of the improvement in Egyptian military capability, however, in 
August 1962, the U.S. decided for the first time to provide a major weapons system,
Hawk missiles, to Israel. Kennedy also agreed to send a wing of jet fighters and bombers 
to Dhahran Airbase to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to Saudi Arabia’s defense 
after Egyptian air and naval forces bombed the Saudi cities of Najran and Jizan during 
Yemen’s civil war.
The Johnson administration grew increasingly worried that Soviet aid to Egypt 
was shifting the Arab-Israeli balance o f power, and Johnson decided to put more pressure 
on Nasser than his predecessor. He suspended American wheat shipments to Cairo 
(subsidized under U.S. Public Law 480), and proposed a generous military aid package to 
Israel that would convince Arab leaders they could not hope to win a regional arms race. 
Military assistance to Israel surged from $44.2 million in 1963 to $995.3 million by 
1968.20 The American commitment to supporting the Yemeni monarchy, also backed by 
the British, Israelis, and Saudis, pushed Egyptian forces, which had intervened to support 
the Yemeni revolutionaries, deeper into a quagmire as Nasser was forced to expand the 
Egyptian troop deployment. President Nasser, who accused Washington of making 
“astonishing” demands on the Egyptian government in exchange for aid, balked at U.S. 
efforts to undermine his regime.21
Nasser cut ties with the U.S. after Egypt’s defeat in 1967, blaming the Johnson 
administration’s support of Israel for the Israeli Defense Force’s overwhelming military 
superiority. On June 5, between 8 and 11:30 am, Israel sent 196 fighter-bombers into 
Egypt, and destroyed 85% of their air force. Over the next six days, the EAF lost 700 
tanks, 450 field guns, and 17,500 soldiers.22 Nasser then looked to Soviet weaponry and 
advisors to help prepare the Egyptian Armed Forces for their next war, during which they
14 Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen (London: Verso, 2012), 72-73.
20 Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," 141.
21 Lloyd Garrison, "U.S. Denies Pressure on Egypt," The New York Times, July 24, 1965.
22 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 79.
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would try to reclaim the territory lost to Israel. Rather than use the external threat to 
justify an expansion of the military’s role in civil politics, however, Nasser used the 
defeat to purge politicized officers and subordinate the military to his political authority. 
He believed that this was the only way to instigate the professionalization necessary to 
build an army capable of facing Israel.
Domestic and International Political Support for Nasser
The United States wanted to reach an agreement on military aid to Egypt in order 
to secure its political alignment at the expense of the Soviet Union. For Nasser, however, 
the pan-Arab movement was far more important, and he recognized early in the Cold 
War how to exploit the superpower rivalry to gain concessions from both that served the 
cause of Arab unity as he envisioned it. He capably took advantage of Washington’s fears 
of Communist party gains to neutralize regional rivals such as the Hashemite regime in 
Iraq. While the perception that American policymakers favored Israel at Egypt’s expense 
complicated U.S.-Egyptian relations throughout the Nasser era, U.S. political support was 
instrumental in bolstering Nasser’s regional prestige, for example when Washington 
tacitly condoned the military coup of 1952, and when the U.S. pressured Israel, France, 
and Britain to retreat during the Suez crisis in 1956. The Johnson Administration more 
assertively supported Israel as well as Saudi Arabia as Soviet aid to Egypt threatened the 
Egyptian-Israeli balance of capabilities, and as Nasser’s radical Arab nationalism 
disrupted Washington’s other Middle Eastern allies. Nasser increasingly looked to the 
Soviet Union for political support as U.S. -  Egyptian relations deteriorated in the mid- 
1960s, and Nasser found it difficult to extricate his military from Yemen’s civil war. The 
Six Day War would be the most disastrous political defeat of all, however, heralding the 
end o f Nasser’s pan-Arab movement. While Nasser had relied on the military for political 
support throughout his rule, it was that defeat that convinced him that politicization had 
ultimately weakened his presidency, and he turned to the Egyptian public, the Soviet 
Union, and a newly empowered Interior Ministry for support in the last years o f his rule.
The U.S. offered political support for Egypt’s leadership in the late 1940s, but 
Egyptians were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. In addition, Egyptian officials
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recognized they could manipulate the competitive nature of superpower relations to gain 
concessions that served Egypt’s interests. For example, after the start of the Korean War, 
Egyptian politicians suggested if Egypt blocked the passage o f Korean aid through the 
Suez Canal, the U.S. would pressure the Great Britain to concede to Egyptian demands to 
evacuate British troops. Legislators also proposed agreements with the Eastern bloc and 
the recognition of Communist China that could be used as leverage in negotiations with 
the Western powers.23 While Egypt finally made a statement condemning North Korean 
aggression on July 11, 1950, they made an effort to maintain their neutrality by 
abstaining from the UN Security Council resolution that authorized sending armed forces 
into Korea.24
Egyptian leaders insisted they could not formally align with the U.S. because their 
public would perceive it as another form of colonial domination. Yet along with the anti­
colonial, nationalist sentiment brewing among the Egyptian public was growing 
frustration with the political establishment. Between 1923 and 1952, Egypt’s 
constitutional monarchy had been governed by a tripartite arrangement that included the 
monarchy, the ruling political party (al-Wafd), and British authority. Egyptians were 
frustrated by what they perceived as the monarchy’s over-accommodating stance toward 
the British. U.S. policymakers, many of whom believed a strong, popular leader was 
necessary to drive Egypt’s post-colonial modernization, discreetly offered support to 
Colonel Nasser and the Free Officers in their bid to overthrow Egypt’s monarch.25 On the 
evening of July 23, 1952, eighty junior military officers from all service branches seized 
control of the Egyptian armed forces. The top military leaders were arrested, and officers 
who did not support the coup were dismissed.26 The coup-plotters had alerted the 
American Embassy shortly before, pledging to protect U.S. interests. When King Farouk 
appealed to the U.S. to intervene on his behalf, the U.S. refrained, and urged the British 
not to intervene. The king abdicated on August 2, 1952, and shortly thereafter the 
republic was bom.
23 Albion Ross, "U.S. Chides Egypt on Korean Policy: Caffery Serves Notice that Abstention Won't Further 
Suez Canal Ambitions," The New York Times', "Egyptians Propose Links with Soviets: Two Deputies 
Suggest Cairo Use Ties to Gain Western Concessions on Demands," ibid., December 12, 1950.
24 "Egyptians Modify Neutrality Stand: Foreign Minister Emphasizes Nation's Hope for Check to 
Aggression by Reds," The New York Times, July 12, 1950.
25 Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," 129.
26 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 15.
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Despite the support from the U.S., President Naguib (the senior officer asked to 
serve as figurehead for the more junior coup-plotters), and later President Nasser would 
continue to resist entering a formal arrangement with the U.S., possibly out o f concern 
this would endanger the political support from fellow Arab League states that they relied 
on for a range of issues, including British expulsion from the Suez Canal Zone.27 While 
some army officers had tentatively acknowledged the benefits of a peace agreement with 
Israel,28 by June, 1953, the prospects of a unilateral peace agreement between Egypt and 
Israel were fading, particularly as these Arab League states were against breaking the 
“united Arab front against Israel.”29
The charismatic Nasser won support for pan-Arab nationalism by evicting the 
British from Egyptian bases; however, he established a loyal domestic following by 
initiating redistributive land reforms and constructing a system of generous welfare 
benefits that included subsidies for basic commodities and guaranteed state employment 
for all university and high school graduates.30 The land reforms not only boosted his 
popularity among Egyptian peasants, but also diminished the political and economic 
power o f the landed elites. Remaining political challenges posed by monarchists or 
landlords were neutralized by loyal military officers. Nasser and the RCC also minimized 
political opposition from the private business and commercial sectors by nationalizing 
numerous companies and industries.31
The provisional constitution o f 1953 created a legal-constitutional framework that 
privileged a strong executive at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches of 
government. While Nasser enjoyed political support from the U.S., the USSR, and fellow 
Arab League states, he was determined to destroy internal political challengers before 
they could emerge. A1 -Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood were disbanded, and Nasser 
purged nearly anyone he thought could threaten his rule. Within the military he
27 "Naguib Promises to Evict British: Egyptian Leader Wildly Cheered in Wafdist Stronghold as He Pleads 
for Unity," The New York Times, September 30, 1952.
28"Telegram from the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department o f  State."
29Telegram from the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Director o f  the Office o f  Near Eastern Affairs 
(Parker T. Hart), June 23, 1953, FRUS 9, no. 629.
30 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f  Authoritarian Rule (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 13.
31 John Waterbury, The Egypt o f  Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy o f  Two Regimes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 76.
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established multiple overlapping security institutions, several o f which were tasked with 
domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering.
The U.S. provided nearly $86 million in economic assistance from 1952 -  1956, 
but military aid was stalled by Nasser’s unwillingness to accept U.S. conditions, 
particularly the presence o f a military mission to oversee its administration. U.S. officials’ 
grew frustrated when Nasser chose to purchase weapons from Czechoslovakia in 1955, 
and Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles concluded Egypt could no longer enjoy most 
favored nation status while obstructing U.S. interests in the region. Dulles thus retracted 
the offer to finance the Aswan High Dam, prompting Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez 
Canal.
U.S. support during the Suez War provided a political victory for Nasser that 
emboldened him to expand the public sector even further, and the crisis served as a 
pretext for government seizure of British and French assets in Egypt.32 Nasser’s decision 
to send Egyptian troops to the Syrian port of Latakia in October, 1957, in response to the 
massing of Turkish troops on the Syrian border, boosted his popularity throughout the 
Arab world and set the stage for the Egyptian-Syrian unification.33 Nasser’s anti- 
Communist speech on December 23, 1958, frustrated Soviet General Secretary Nikita 
Khruschev while reassuring Washington, where lawmakers subsequently approved 
millions in economic aid and development loans.34
Nasser’s political strength would ultimately be undermined by the failure o f his 
economic policies. While some within his closest group of advisors believed the state had 
gone far enough in public ownership, after launching Egypt’s Five Year Plan for 
economic development in 1960, Nasser announced the “socialist decrees” in July 1961, 
giving the state an unprecedented level o f control over the economy. All o f the 
remaining private banks and insurance companies were nationalized, along with shipping 
companies, firms in heavy and basic industries, pharmaceuticals, utility companies, and 
construction firms; companies were required to sell majority shares to public agencies, 
and the state took control o f all aspects of foreign trade. In addition, a new land reform 
law lowered the ceiling on individual land ownership even further. According to historian
32 Ibid., 68.
33 Hahn, "National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1949-1956," 132-33.
34 Malik Mufti, "The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism," ibid., 136-37.
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and political economist John Waterbury, Syria’s business community was so alarmed by 
the decrees they were motivated to align with Syria’s military to plot the coup that 
precipitated the end of the UAR in 1963, dealing a major blow to Nasser’s prestige.35 The 
collapse o f the pan-Arab union increased Nasser’s anxiety over political opposition 
emerging from the private sector, prompting him to sequester the property of 167 
“reactionary capitalists” and suspend the political rights of thousands o f bourgeoisie.36
Syria’s abrupt secession from the UAR may have prompted Nasser’s intervention 
in Yemen’s civil war, where Nasser hoped to keep the pan-Arab movement alive by 
supporting Nasserist Yemeni officers in their battle against Saudi-backed royalists. While 
the Kennedy administration offered greater economic assistance (including the three year 
PL-480 agreement to sell $430 million worth of surplus food) in exchange for Nasser’s 
continued anti-Communist stance, U.S.-Egyptian relations broke down once again as 
Washington, taking advantage of Nasser’s waning influence, strengthened relations with 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.
Nasser tightened his grip on Egyptian politics by forming a new political party, 
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Nasser ensured the 1964 constitution left little room for 
opposition forces to challenge his political authority. The constitution stipulated that only 
ASU members could participate in elections to the National Assembly, the body tasked 
with nominating the president, where half o f the legislative seats were reserved for 
“peasants and workers” tied to the government’s patronage networks.37 Rather than 
serving as an active political base, however, the ASU was filled with people looking for 
special privileges and rents from the state. Nasser relied on his security services to 
guarantee his election: his presidency would be affirmed by a popular referendum closely 
supervised by the Ministry o f the Interior and the ASU, which was staffed with military 
personnel and included a security organization called the Vanguard that was tasked with 
monitoring political trends among its members. State security courts were established to 
address political insubordination. Thus Egypt’s deteriorating security environment from 
1963 -  1967, including a weakening of U.S. support, prompted a greater reliance on the
35 Waterbury, The Egypt o f  Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy o f  Two Regimes, 73-74.
36 Ibid., 74-75.
37 Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f  Authoritarian Rule, 18-19.
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military for political support. Yet the military, under the leadership of Field Marshall 
Amer, would soon reveal itself to be a major challenge to Nasser’s presidency.
Khruschev’s visit to Egypt in May 1964, led the Johnson Administration to cut 
aid altogether. Meanwhile, Nasser’s socialist state began to crumble under the weight of 
its expansive public sector. The intervention in Yemen was becoming increasingly 
expensive, but Nasser could not find a face-saving way to extract his forces. His second 
five-year plan was put aside while he dealt with economic crisis, and he was losing his 
control over the military. The June war, which Nasser might have thought could provide 
a political victory for the Arab unity movement, was instead a decisive blow to 
Nasserism. The heavy losses o f military equipment and personnel, along with lost 
revenue from the Suez Canal, the Sinai Oil Fields, and tourism, exacerbated Egypt’s 
economic problems.38 Estrangement from the U.S. left Nasser with little choice but to 
deepen ties with the Soviet Union.39 The economic and political fallout of the war forced 
Egypt to retreat from its ambitious development programs and redirect resources to 
rebuilding the armed forces.40
The Nixon Administration made an effort to repair relations after the Six Day 
War. After trying unsuccessfully to negotiate a Middle East settlement by advancing the 
“Rogers Plan,” which called for Israel to withdraw to 1949 armistice lines, Nixon heeded 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s advice that the U.S. should not push Israel 
for concessions as long as the leading Arab state, Egypt, was aligned with Moscow.
The Politicization of the Egyptian Armed Forces
The Egyptian military played a dominant role in civil politics after the military 
coup o f 1952. President Nasser relied on loyal military personnel to fill political posts 
throughout the government and in the countryside, and the military staffed security 
institutions to monitor dissent within the government bureaucracy and society. Yet the 
military became increasingly loyal to the popular Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, who
38 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 79.
39 "Soviet Shadow Over Egypt," The New York Times, October 27, 1968; "Soviet Broadens Influence in 
Egypt," The New York Times, January 26, 1969.
40 Waterbury, The Egypt o f  Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy o f  Two Regimes, 112.
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established patronage networks among the officers and allowed their discipline and 
military readiness to deteriorate. Nasser’s lack of control over the military was 
frighteningly evident when Amer decided to stage a show of force in the Sinai against 
Nasser’s wishes. The military defeat gave Nasser an opportunity to fire Amer and set 
about de-politicizing the military, and Nasser looked to the Soviet Union to modernize 
and professionalize the military in preparation for its next war against Israel.
In the months after the 1952 coup, President Muhammad Naguib and other 
officers, particularly from the artillery and cavalry, favored a “return to the barracks,” 
with a gradual de-politicization of the military, return to constitutional government, and 
military subordination to civilian authority. Nasser and his circle of loyal Free Officers 
favored a revolution imposed from above, and believed an immediate return to multi­
party politics would allow al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood to reestablish the old 
order.41 Nasser used the post-coup governing military junta, the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), to contain Naguib and minimize his influence on policy. Despite a strong 
following among the public and within the military, Naguib was marginalized by Nasser, 
and eventually forced to retreat from Egyptian politics.42
Nasser undermined the mission exclusivity of the military by using loyal military 
officers to staff multiple competing security institutions with overlapping responsibilities. 
While independently - minded officers were reassigned to administrative positions or 
given civilian posts, loyal military personnel were given domestic intelligence and 
security responsibilities. For example, the Office o f the Commander in Chief for Political 
Guidance (OCC), tasked with monitoring suspicious activities and political views within 
the army, including the Free Officers, created a network o f politically ambitious officers 
that by 1967 exceeded 65,000 in num ber.43 A Republican Guard was established and 
given the task o f protecting the regime from the rest o f the military, and a National Guard 
was created to train civilians loyal to the revolution.
While initially the RCC formulated national policy, the constitution o f 1956, 
drafted once Nasser had thoroughly consolidated his political authority, gave Nasser the 
right to appoint and dismiss ministers, allowing him to replace many of the Free Officers
41 Kassem , Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f  Authoritarian Rule, 12-13.
42 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics, 37.
43 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 18-22.
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with civilians.44 Thus by this time there was a clear distinction between Nasser’s political 
authority and the military as an institution. The 1956 constitution created a political 
organization called the National Union, which ideally could be used to mobilize popular 
political support for the regime. Nasser staffed the National Union with loyal military 
personnel, enabling him to personally screen nominees for election to the National 
Assembly, which was reinstated in 1957 but dissolved by a new constitution in 1958.
There is little evidence that the military’s professionalism improved between its 
defeat in 1948 and the Six Day War in 1967. While the Egyptian armed forces were 
receiving some military aid from the Soviet Union, corruption and rent-seeking behavior 
ensured that funds that might have been used to bolster Egypt’s military capability were 
often spent on patronage networks or personal privileges. The military’s coherency was 
undermined by the fact that officers were in constant competition with one another, with 
promotions based on loyalty rather than merit. The focus on domestic intelligence, 
including monitoring political trends and neutralizing political challengers, violated the 
principle of mission exclusivity, which calls for a singular focus on defense against 
external threats. In addition, a good portion o f the officer corps came to lack respect for 
Egypt’s political authority.
By the time of the Six Day War in 1967, Nasser had lost his grip on the military, 
which had become increasingly loyal to its commander, Field Marshal Amer, a long-time 
confidante of Nasser. The ASU was becoming more dominant just as the Yemen 
campaign was eroding the political influence o f the military. To make matters worse, 
Egypt’s Arab neighbors accused the Egyptian forces of “hiding” behind the United 
Nations forces stationed in the Sinai since 1956. Amer believed the only way to restore 
the reputation of the EAF was a demonstration of force; thus when the Soviets reported 
that Israeli troops were positioning on the Syrian border, Amer, citing the Egyptian- 
Syrian mutual defense pact, demanded that Nasser order Egyptian troops to the Sinai.45
Amer calculated that the military’s presence in the Sinai would be enough to 
restore the popularity o f military, and advocated for the closing of the Strait of Tiran 
despite Nasser’s reservations. Even though the bulk of the armed forces were untrained,
44 Ibid.; Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f  Authoritarian Rule, 17.
45 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 75-77.
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undisciplined, and ill-prepared for battle, and lacked the skill to operate the military 
equipment provided by the Soviet Union, Amer told his chief o f operations, “There is no 
need to worry, this is nothing but a military demonstration.”46
Nasser used the defeat as an opportunity to force Amer to resign over the 
objections of Amer’s allies, some of whom were willing to stage a coup to oust Nasser. 
Nasser, who still enjoyed Egyptian public support, was not only able to expel Amer, but 
also purge his loyal security forces, arrest hundreds o f officers, and set about 
depoliticizing and professionalizing the military, to include restoring foreign intelligence 
gathering as the primary mission of the military intelligence services, which had been 
focused on domestic spying for over a decade.47 Nasser, along with the war minister and 
the chief of staff, reduced the number of higher-ranking officers, canceled the rank of 
field marshal, and assumed responsibility of the armed forces, including its personnel and 
defense budget.
Nasser recognized he had to demilitarize politics, and would assign another 
intelligence body to monitor political trends within the armed forces. Nasser had relied 
too heavily on the military to secure his regime; with the military subordinated, he would 
need to find another guarantor. Nasser chose to empower the Interior Ministry, and 
established a civilian security system with a massive coercive arm called the Central 
Security Forces (CSF).48 The CSF, a paramilitary force with antiriot shock units 
comprised o f military conscripts, responded forcefully to massive student and worker 
protests in February and November of 1968. The police forces’ use o f live ammunition to 
quell the demonstrations marked the transition from military to police repression.
Sadat’s Pursuit of U.S. Military Aid, Western Political Alignment, and the Subordination
of the Egyptian Military
By the time of Nasser’s unexpected death on September 28, 1970, the U.S. was 
perceived as increasing the principal external threat to Egypt by providing Israel with
46 Ibid., 79-80.
47 Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Egyptian Military, Part One: From the Ottomans Through Sadat," M iddle East 
Policy 18, no. 3 (2011).
48 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen , 93-97.
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military aid and withholding political, economic, and military support from the Egyptian 
regime. While the prospects for a coup had increased when Nasser was trying to expel the 
popular Field Marshal Amer, military intervention in civil politics was unlikely by 1970, 
as Nasser had thoroughly purged politically - minded officers, and the newly empowered 
Interior Ministry brutally suppressed dissenting views within society.
Anwar al-Sadaf s preference for alignment with the United States offered new 
opportunities for Washington to influence Egypt’s foreign policy and contribute to 
Egypt’s political stability and external defense. The widely-held perception that the 
“weak” Sadat’s tenure would be short-lived allowed Sadat to outmaneuver the well- 
entrenched powers within Nasser’s security establishment, including the leader o f the 
ASU and the Interior Minister.49 As the decade progressed, rapprochement with the West, 
accompanied by the political support of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, made Egypt 
safer from external threats by guaranteeing an Israeli-Arab balance of military 
capabilities and culminating in a peace treaty with Israel. Yet Egypt’s military was 
frustrated by Sadat’s post-October War concessions, and felt less secure after the 
conditions placed on their presence in the Sinai. Sadat’s foreign policy also isolated 
Egypt from the rest of the Arab world, and his economic policies provoked domestic 
discontent. His subordination of the military was taken to an extreme, as he purged 
talented, experienced officers and dismissed the professional expertise o f the military 
leadership.
This section is divided into three parts, the first of which explains how Sadat’s 
pursuit of U.S. military aid, which he believed would bolster Egypt’s security, required 
the subordination of the military to his political authority. The second part will review 
how Sadat continued Nasser’s practice o f minimizing potential political rivals by 
appointing only the most loyal personnel to top government and military posts, and 
relying on an expanding civilian security sector, a new capitalist elite, and external 
political support from the West to support his regime.50 The section will conclude by 
examining the impact o f Sadat’s policies on the professionalism of the military; while 
professional officers welcomed the de-politicization of the military, they became
49 Ibid., 99-111.
50 Hashim, "The Egyptian Military, Part One: From the Ottomans Through Sadat."
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increasingly alarmed as Sadat obstructed the promotion of the most qualified personnel, 
pushed for economic development roles for the military, and allowed the military’s 
competency to decline precipitously from its peak during the October War until Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981. Thus while Sadat successfully subordinated the military to his 
political authority, he did not establish objective civilian control, and his policies 
undermined the professionalism of the Egyptian armed forces.
Sadat’s Shift: Seeking U.S. Military Aid for External Defense
When Sadat assumed the presidency, the military high command was focused on 
preparing to liberate the occupied Sinai from what they believed to be the principle 
external threat to Egypt’s security. Israel. While Nasser and the military believed Soviet 
advanced weaponry was indispensible if the EAF was going to launch a successful 
campaign against the Israeli Defense Forces, Sadat quietly held the view that Egypt’s 
security would best be guaranteed by a U.S.-brokered peace agreement with Israel. From 
this perspective the 1973 war can be seen as a demonstration of Egyptian force designed 
to change the status quo just enough to bring the U.S. and Israel to the negotiating table. 
The Egyptian-Soviet client-patron relationship was terminated, and Egypt began 
receiving military aid from the U.S. Sadat’s efforts to find a political solution to the Israel 
problem culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty o f 1979.
While the Soviet Union continued to send military aid to Egypt, and a treaty of 
friendship was signed in 1971, relations were increasingly strained as Sadat moved 
further away from the economic and political policies Moscow favored. Moscow was 
irritated by Sadat’s lack of commitment to socialist principles and Communist ideology, 
and under pressure from allies who opposed sending Soviet military aid to non- 
Communist states.51 The tension culminated in a seemingly abrupt change o f policy when 
Sadat expelled 20,000 Soviet military experts (without prior consultation with his 
military) in July 1972.
51 Hedrick Smith, "Soviet to Increase Military Aid to Arabs," The New York Times, October 13, 1971; 
Rahmond H. Anderson, "Soviet Arms Aid $5-Billion, Cairo Says," ibid., March 31, 1972.
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However, in the context of Sadat’s repeated (but unsuccessful) overtures toward 
Washington, the move might be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate his 
determination to align with the West and pursue a political, rather than military, solution 
to the Arab-Israeli problem. While Sadat had been impressed with President 
Eisenhower’s ability to turn Egypt’s military defeat into a political victory in 1956, even 
his advisers who favored rapprochement with the West wanted to do so from a position 
o f strength, which they believed possible only with a strong, well-equipped military 
capable o f driving the Israelis out o f the Sinai by force.52
However, the U.S. did not have the same sense of urgency in reaching a political 
solution as did Sadat. The Nixon administration had decided not to pursue an Arab-Israeli 
negotiated peace as long as Egypt was a client state of the Soviet Union. National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was reluctant to endanger detente ahead of the 
Moscow summit scheduled for May 1972, and Nixon had no desire to spark an Arab- 
Israeli dispute prior to the 1972 elections. In addition, Kissinger believed that as long as 
Israel thought it could preserve its position, which along with the Golan Heights and the 
West Bank provided strategic depth, Israel would not pull back.
With the support o f the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the 
Organization o f African Unity, Sadat agreed to go to war in the Fall o f 1973, and Syria 
committed to joining Egypt in a military offensive. Sadat hoped launching a military 
campaign to free the occupied territory of the Sinai would be the catalyst that brought the 
U.S. and Israel to the negotiating table. By October 6th, Egypt was able to mobilize an 
army o f 1.2 million capable of executing “the largest crossing in military history,” and 
the senior military leadership recommended the forces advance quickly to the 
strategically indispensible Sinai passes before the Israelis would have time to react. Yet 
Sadat, hoping not for a spectacular battlefield victory but for a diplomatic intervention, 
halted the offensive on October 9.53
Unfortunately, Sadat’s hope for a political solution to the crisis did not come as 
soon as he had hoped. Kissinger and Nixon also wanted to negotiate from a position of 
strength, which would require a decisive Israeli military success. Kissinger passed along
52 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 121-23.
53 Ibid., 126-28.
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Sadat’s intentions to the Israelis, allowing them to regroup and focus their efforts on the 
Syrian front before turning their attention on the Egyptians. By this time the Americans 
had rearmed the IDF through one of the largest airlifts in history, and were aiding Israel 
through U.S. aerial reconnaissance. The IDF swept past the Egyptian front lines and 
drove all the way to the west bank of the canal. On October 24, when the Soviets 
threatened to intervene to prevent Egypt’s total defeat, Kissinger and James Schlesinger 
elevated the American combat alert, including the nuclear Strategic Air command, and 
sent another aircraft carrier to the U.S. Sixth fleet. Kissinger looked to Sadat to tell the 
Soviets not to intervene, which Sadat did on October 26.
Sadat insisted that Egypt’s performance in the war meant the country could 
maneuver both domestically and internationally from a position of strength.54 Sadat 
rejected Soviet requests to return military advisors to Egypt even though the Soviets had 
committed to replacing weaponry lost during the war.55 Soon, Sadat insisted, Egypt 
would no longer be exclusively dependent upon the Soviet Union for military aid.
While Sadat believed a political agreement that included the U.S., Egypt and 
Israel was the best way to mitigate the threat to Egypt’s external security, the military 
disagreed. The concessions Sadat made after the October War meant the EAR would not 
be able to train or operate in the most strategic part of the country: the Sinai. In addition, 
they believed Sadat was mismanaging relations with their security patron, the Soviet 
Union, which they depended upon for weapons and training.
The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty o f March 26, 1979, allowed Egypt to regain 
control of the Sinai in May 1982. The U.S. agreed to supply $800 million a year in credits 
for five years to modernize the Egyptian armed forces, allowing Cairo to purchase F-16 
fighter aircraft and M-60A3 tanks as well as other equipment.56 Despite Israeli objections, 
U.S. officials argued Egypt had legitimate security issues, for example along its border 
with Libya, a Soviet ally that had purchased billions of dollars worth of sophisticated 
weaponry from Moscow.
Yet from the armed forces’ perspective, the settlement reached at Camp David, 
which included demilitarization o f the Sinai, would impede Egypt’s ability to defend
54 Henry Tanner, "Sadat Says War Made Egypt Truly Free," The New York Times, April 4, 1974.
55 "Details o f  Soviet-Egyptian Arms Accord Are Disclosed," ibid., February 20, 1975.
56 Bernard Gwertzman, "Cairo to Buy F-16's N ow  and May Get F-15's Later," ibid., February 26, 1980.
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itself against a future Israeli attack. Aggravating the sense of vulnerability was the 
reaction from the rest o f the Arab world, which isolated Egypt and seemed to diminish its 
regional influence. But Sadat saw the negotiations from an entirely different perspective; 
for him the peace process presented an opportunity to deepen Egyptian relations with the 
United States, which in the long term would elevate Egypt’s regional standing.
By taking over the role o f security patron, Washington was in a position to 
maintain lines of communications with both sides o f the Arab-Israeli conflict, which U.S. 
officials believed would give Washington a preeminent role in the Middle East at Soviet 
expense. The security relationship was elevated in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran in early 1979, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year. In 
November 1980, Egypt agreed to conduct the biannual joint military exercise Bright Star 
with U.S. troops, which would facilitate interoperability and familiarize American 
soldiers with desert operations. In return, Egypt would be the recipient o f advanced 
military weaponry and equipment, including more than one hundred F-5 fighter aircraft.57 
Given the U.S. interest in maintaining a balance o f capabilities between Egypt and Israel, 
the intent was not to bolster Egypt’s ability to meet what many among the public and 
military continued to believe was the principle threat to Egypt’s security. Rather, U.S. 
military aid would contribute to the United States’ ability to co-opt Egypt into serving as 
a bulwark against Communist expansion (and later religious extremism) in the Middle 
East, and mitigate the risk o f renewed Egyptian-Israeli hostilities.
Sadat Builds Domestic and International Political Support
While Nasser had relied on military personnel to provide political support and 
regime security to his presidency, the pitfalls o f this approach became devastatingly 
apparent during the Six Day War in 1967. Nasser initiated a process of de-politicization 
and subordination of the military that would continue under President Sadat. Both 
reached the conclusion that a civilian security sector, under the control o f a loyal interior 
minister, should be expanded to take over the role of surveillance and domestic 
intelligence, to minimize the chance a political rival would emerge from the military. In
57 Terence Smith, "U.S. Jets to Arabs: Legacy o fth e Kissinger Years," ibid., February 17, 1978.
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addition, a paramilitary force, the CSF, would serve as the rapidly - deployable, coercive 
arm of the Interior Ministry. Unlike Nasser, Sadat believed political support from the U.S. 
was preferred over that from the Soviet Union, particularly as it facilitated the 
development of a new capitalist elite who, eager to seize investment opportunities with 
the West, would have a strong interest in actively supporting Sadat. This new business 
class would be nurtured by Sadat to form the base of the ruling party, which by 1981 was 
renamed the National Democratic Party. Despite increasing support from the United 
States, dependence on civilian security forces for internal security, and the support of the 
National Democratic Party, Sadat did not attempt to establish objective civilian control 
over the military.
Even though Sadat’s policy preferences differed substantially from his 
predecessor, he also maintained a personal authoritarian rule that did not allow for 
political opposition. For example, the constitution of 1971, like Nasser’s 1964 
constitution, legally gave the president a dominant position relative to other government 
and state institutions. The president had the authority to promulgate as well as object to 
laws, rule by decree, declare a state o f emergency, appoint and dismiss cabinet members, 
draft the state’s budget, and formulate the state’s policies. While the constitution allowed 
the legislature to question or dispute presidential authority, the president had the legal 
authority to bypass the People’s Assembly and call for a referendum of the people. A 
direct outcome of these policies was to undermine the ability o f other social sectors to 
support alternative political opponents.58 Sadat was thus able to preserve his 
policymaking autonomy by minimizing the political options of potential competitors.
Sadat also had control over the coercive apparatus of the state as the supreme 
commander of the armed forces as well as the supreme chief o f police. Sadat continued to 
worry that the public would rally behind a popular military figure, and habitually jailed 
potential rivals once he was certain he had secured the loyalty o f their replacements.59 
Sadat also limited the percentage o f military officers working in government ministries.
Sadat recognized while his loyal security officers could be counted on to quell 
dissent, they lacked the capacity to run the government. Long-term regime stability
58 Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f  Authoritarian Rule, 23-24.
59 Robert Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation o f  the Political O rder (Boulder: W estview, 1988), 
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would require an active social base beyond the peasantry, public sector, and security 
apparatus, particularly as none of those groups was enthusiastic about realigning Egypt’s 
foreign policy with the United States. Sadat’s intifah (economic open door) policy was an 
effort to win the support o f Egyptian entrepreneurs who were eager to establish business 
ties with the West.60 Intifah would enable Sadat to cultivate a social grouping of business 
elites that could serve as the base of Sadat’s ruling party. The interests of the new 
business class would be linked to the state, where the bureaucracy could provide 
privileged access to foreign trade and building permits, provide loans through public 
banks, offer tax exemptions, and allocate public land for private development.
After the October War, Sadat launched a campaign to convince the U.S. that 
Egypt could be a reliable partner. Sadat pledged to the Nixon administration he would 
abandon the Nasser-instigated effort to develop nuclear weapons, and in June 1974, Sadat 
ensured Egyptians lined the streets to welcome the American president, who promised 
cooperation on nuclear energy and rebuilding the Suez Canal Zone.61 A few weeks after 
meeting President Ford in Salzburg, Egypt reopened the Suez Canal to international 
shipping more than eight years after it was closed by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.62 In 
November, 1975, Sadat travelled with his family to the U.S., where he addressed 
Congress. After the People’s Assembly abrogated the treaty of friendship with the Soviet 
Union in the summer of 1976,63 President Carter advised Sadat that U.S. support would 
be facilitated by “a bold, statesmanlike move to help overcome the hurdles” facing peace 
talks, inspiring Sadat’s trip to Israel in 1977.64
Meanwhile Sadat’s effort to nurture a new Egyptian political elite was a success. 
A “multiparty” system was established by transforming the center platform of the old 
ASU party into the new National Democratic Party, creating two loyal “opposition” 
parties from the right and left o f the ASU. The fact that new parties would have to be 
approved by the secretary of the ruling party further ensured political stability, and when 
the ASU was dissolved, its six million members simply transferred to the NDP. In the
60 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 161.
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new political landscape, the business elites dominated the ruling party, which enjoyed 
privileged access to state resources, followed by former ASU personnel, rural allies, state 
employees and public sector workers.
Yet Sadat’s new economic policies provoked public outrage when Sadat lifted 
government subsidies on basic commodities. Rioting broke out on such a scale that the 
CSF was quickly overwhelmed. Despite his efforts to reduce his dependence on the 
military, Sadat was forced to call on the EAF to intervene to restore order.65 Minister of 
Defense Mohamed Abdel Ghani al-Gamasy, reluctant to use the armed forces against the 
civilian population, agreed to act only if Sadat committed to reinstating the subsidies. 
Sadat agreed, and the public’s confidence in its military that was restored by the October 
war was reinforced by its restrained reaction to the 1977 food riots.
Egypt’s new western partners sought to ease Sadat’s transition to a market 
economy.66 The IMF agreed to a three year, $720 million loan in May 1978, although 
failure to meet IMF conditions, particularly to cut subsidies to basic commodities and 
manufactured goods, caused the second and third payments to be suspended.67 
Liberalization did not mean the state reduced its role in economic life; rather, “it shifted 
its function from taking accumulated surplus toward development to becoming a 
middleman between public resources and acquisitive foreign and domestic capitalists.”68 
Corruption was endemic, as connected businessmen were awarded lucrative public 
contracts, then developed patronage networks by sharing profits with public employees in 
exchange for access to government resources such as bank loans and land. To secure the 
loyalty o f the new business class, Sadat allowed public assets to be passed into private 
hands at well below market value. For example, after intifah, more than half of the public 
land along the Mediterranean was allocated to private interests without any payment 
made to the state; this land would later be sold on the private market for billions. Real 
estate became the most profitable venture, instigating a process of deindustrialization.
While Sadat successfully built Western political support for his presidency and 
cultivated a business elite that, along with the public sector, had a vested interest in his
65 Raymond Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles fo r  E gypt’s Political Soul (Harvard University Press, 1990), 
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government, his policies were unpopular within the military, with the poor who suffered 
from declining subsidies, and among Islamists. Early in his tenure, part o f Sadat’s grand 
strategy to promote domestic political stability and broaden public support for his rule 
included the relaxation of some restrictions on Islamists, who he believed could balance 
the forces o f Arab nationalism and Marxism. While he continued to ban the Muslim 
Brotherhood from politics, he allowed them to publish a monthly magazine, gave 
members amnesty in 1975, and freed Muslim Brothers from concentration camps. Yet 
Sadat’s tactic o f appealing to the more pious members o f the Egyptian public faltered as 
these Egyptians rejected Sadat’s efforts to reach a peace agreement with Israel and 
objected to Sadat’s secular policies.
When a coup plot by the radical Egyptian Islamic Jihad was discovered in 
February 1981, non-state media was banned and Egyptian authorities arrested more than 
1500 people, including Jihad members, Coptics, intellectuals, and activists. Sadat fumed 
he was wrong to be lenient with religious fundamentalist groups, including those Islamic 
associations found in the universities, and pledged a state crackdown on those who 
fomented sectarian strife.69 Despite the crackdown, an extremist cell within the military 
survived, and collaborated with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to assassinate Sadat during a 
military parade on October 6, 1981.
The Marginalization of the Egyptian Armed Forces
The subordination of the military to the political apparatus initiated by Nasser 
after the 1967 war was continued under Sadat. Within the military there were many who 
understood that the deliberate politicization of the military in the early days of Nasser’s 
rule had contributed to the sorry state o f the armed forces under Field Marshal Amer. 
These officers welcomed a return to professionalism that included improving the quality 
o f serving military personnel, emphasizing discipline, competence, and technical 
expertise, merit-based promotions, and mission exclusivity. However, Sadat was often 
less concerned with professionalization than with marginalization and control, conscious
69 William E. Farrell, "Coptic Pope Deposed in Sadat Crackdown on Religious Groups," The New York 
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of the threat that a charismatic officer, particularly a popular “war hero,” could pose to 
his regime. Sadat’s habit of dismissing the most experienced and well-respected leaders 
deprived the military o f its expertise and undermined its quality as a professional 
institution. In addition, his designation of an economic role for the military after the 
October war violated the principle o f mission exclusivity, further imperiling military 
readiness.
The military, anxious to rearm itself with Soviet weaponry and redeem itself in a 
successful drive to liberate the Sinai, was furious Sadat decided to expel the Soviet 
advisors prior to the October War. Sadat’s willingness to forgo Soviet military aid 
suggests his priority was not a decisive military win, which risked bringing the military 
back to the center stage o f Egyptian politics, but rather to convey a willingness to change 
the status quo via force, which hopefully would be enough to induce Israel and the United 
States to reach a political solution.
Tensions between Sadat and his senior commanders grew as the military warned 
they could not successfully fight Israel without the advanced weaponry provided by the 
Soviet Union. They advised against launching a military campaign before they were 
ready, worried another loss to Israel would be demoralizing for both the military and the 
Egyptian people. After one particularly contentious meeting of the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces on October 24, 1972, Sadat dismissed all of the officers who had 
disagreed with him, as well as more than 100 high-ranking officers in the next few 
weeks.70 Sadat not only dismissed officers he felt were insubordinate; he also purged 
leaders whom the General Intelligence Service warned were becoming popular figures 
within the military. He appointed his long-time friend Ahmed Ismail, a man he knew 
could neutralize political factions within the armed forces, to be Minister o f War in 
October 1972.
For the military the struggle was existential. If Sadat pushed them into a war 
before they were prepared, the armed forces could be destroyed. They had been defeated 
in 1948, drawn into a protracted civil war on behalf of Yemen’s revolutionary forces in 
the 1960s, and humiliated by Israel in 1967. Sadat’s preference for a “limited war,” as he
70 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 117-20.
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understood it, would likely expose the EAF to grave danger, leaving them exposed and 
vulnerable to an Israeli counterattack.
The 1973 war demonstrates the extent to which the EAF had become 
professionalized. The military that successfully crossed the canal on October 6, 1973, 
was likely the most capable, well-trained and disciplined force assembled in Egypt’s 
modem history. Later, despite the misgivings of military commanders, the armed forces 
followed Sadat’s orders throughout the campaign. While the armed forces were eager for 
a battlefield victory, however, Sadat wanted a diplomatic victory. The performance of the 
EAF stands in stark contrast to the war in 1967, in which undisciplined troops broke 
ranks and the senior commanders acted independently of the political leadership.
After the October war, Sadat reiterated his expectation that the military would not 
intervene in politics at a meeting of the SCAF on November 21, 1973. Sadat declared the 
October War was “Egypt’s last war,” and that the military would now focus on the “war 
o f economic development.”71 He blamed military expenditures for Egypt’s stalled 
economic development, and announced his plan to reduce the defense budget and open 
the economy to foreign investors. The National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) 
was established in 1978, and included multiple commercial enterprises (construction, 
land reclamation, factories for civilian durables and weapons) that would be led by retired 
generals and colonels.
By October 5, 1978, the entire leadership of the October War had been replaced. 
The following May, Sadat furthered sidelined the “October generation” by issuing 
Presidential Decree 35, which stated officers in leadership positions during the October 
War would remain military advisors for life, meaning they could not occupy military 
posts within the armed forces nor would they be allowed to enter politics. Sadat did not 
bring a representative o f the military with him when he travelled to the United States for 
the Camp David accords, which prohibited the EAF from using any of the Sinai’s 
airfields or building new ones. When the highly respected Abd al-Ghani Gamasy and the 
rest o f the General Staff protested, they were fired.
Despite the progress made toward professionalization and de-politicization of the 
EAF, frustration with Sadat’s marginalization of the military and disagreement with how
71 Ibid., 138.
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Sadat was approaching relations with Israel led to multiple unsuccessful coup plots 
throughout the 1970s. For example, 14 paratroopers were arrested in July 1977, when 
former Chief o f Staff Saad al-Shazly, a well-respected and experienced war hero who had 
been exiled by Sadat, called for the army to rise against its dictator. Yet the military 
found it increasingly difficult to confront the new political apparatus that emerged under 
Sadat, which included a new business elite tied to the benefits o f preferential access to the 
state bureaucracy and public sector. In addition, the police capacity for domestic 
surveillance and intelligence gathering continued to grow, with the SSIS alerting Sadat 
when senior figures became too popular within the ranks, or when they criticized the 
president’s policies. Throughout the 1970s, thousands of officers were purged, the 
leadership constantly changed, and the loyal civilian security forces became more 
aggressive. Sadat no longer led a military regime; he led a police state.
In the tradition of Egyptian autocrats, Sadat chose a loyal but weak vice president, 
Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak was from the air force, which was considered to be the weakest 
o f the services and thus the least likely to plot a coup against the president. Mubarak 
supported Sadat’s rapprochement with the United States as well as the intifah. He would 
benefit from the increasingly stable configuration o f external and internal political 
support constructed by Sadat during his presidency.
The Mubarak Era: U.S. Military Aid, Political Stability, and the EAF
During the three decade long period of Hosni Mubarak’s rule, U.S. military aid 
contributed to the balance of military capabilities that underpins the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty. Considering the frequency of Egyptian bellicosity from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war 
to the October war o f 1973, and the decades-long struggle to negotiate an Arab-Israeli 
peace agreement, this has been a major accomplishment. Mubarak’s longevity has often 
been attributed to U.S. political support, and during the Arab uprisings of early 2011, the 
decades o f American-Egyptian military cooperation was credited with the restraint 
demonstrated by the Egyptian Armed Forces when called upon by Mubarak to defend his 
regime. This section will discuss the nature o f that military cooperation and examine
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other factors that might have contributed to the EAF’s decision to side with Egyptian 
people rather than Mubarak and the ruling party.
This section is divided into three parts, the first of which will examine if U.S. 
military aid, which mitigated the principal external threat to Egypt’s security by ensuring 
a balance o f capabilities between Egypt and Israel, discouraged the military from 
intervening in Egypt’s civil politics. The second part will ask if U.S. political support for 
Mubarak’s regime limited the political options for the military, rendering it more difficult 
for the military to expand its role in the civil sphere. The final part will scrutinize how 
U.S. military aid might have improved or undermined the professionalism of the 
Egyptian military. While U.S. military aid did enhance President Mubarak’s ability to 
subordinate the EAF to his political authority, Mubarak did not attempt to establish 
objective civilian control over the armed forces. Rather, in an effort to placate the 
military, Mubarak encouraged the expansion of its economic activities, undermining the 
professionalism of the EAF and creating a reserved domain that future leaders with an 
interest in establishing objective civilian control over the military would be challenged to 
overturn.
U.S. Military Aid and Egypt’s National Security
During Mubarak’s thirty years as President of Egypt, the United States provided 
billions of dollars worth of military aid through the Foreign Military Financing Program 
(FMF). This aid was conditioned upon Egypt’s respect for the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty, which included allowing Multinational Force Observers from twelve countries to 
monitor activity within four identified zones, three of which are in the Sinai, and one 
which is located in Israel along the international border. While the treaty placed 
limitations on military forces and equipment within each zone, U.S. military aid 
strengthened the EAF’s ability to meet external threats posed by, for example, a Soviet- 
aligned Libya, the Iran-Iraq war, and the First Gulf War in 1990-1991. The Egyptian 
Armed Forces, particularly under the leadership of defense minister Abdel-Halim Abu 
Ghazala, used the external threat to argue for the expansion of the military’s commercial 
economic interests in an effort to bolster defense spending. While the development o f a
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defense-industrial base was consistent with U.S. strategic interests and not necessarily an 
obstacle to objective civilian control, the spillover into military-run commercial 
economic enterprises created a reserved domain that the military establishment would be 
committed to protect. President Mubarak, meanwhile, used the increasing threat posed by 
transnational terrorism to justify the extension of his rule and the heavy-handed treatment 
of Islamist opposition forces within Egyptian society. In an effort to keep the military out 
o f politics and prevent the emergence o f a political rival, Mubarak relied on the massive 
police services managed by the Interior Ministry to secure his regime.
Mubarak had supported Sadat’s alignment with the United States and the peace 
process with Israel, and Washington committed to providing billions of dollars worth of 
military credits to facilitate the purchase o f advanced fighter aircraft such as F-5E and 
later the F-16.72 With the fall of the Iranian shah in 1979, along with the Soviet invasion 
o f Afghanistan, Egypt’s importance to U.S. efforts to prevent Soviet gains in the Middle 
East grew, and President Reagan called for increases in military aid to Egypt and Israel,73 
rendering Egypt and Israel the recipients o f the largest outlays o f U.S. military aid. 
Reagan met little resistance in Congress, which authorized $900 million in 1982.
Not everyone agreed that U.S. military aid and the peace accords made Egypt 
safer from external threats, however. For example, Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala, Egypt’s 
Defense Minister from 1981 until 1989, argued in December 1982:
Israel still adheres to the pre-peace strategy of military superiority over the 
entire Arab world, and its military strength is still growing...Therefore, as 
Egyptians and Arabs we must view very cautiously the peace treaty with 
Israel, because o f this steady Israeli military growth, and prepare ourselves 
to be strong and enhance our military deterrent capability so as to 
neutralize this force and create a balance in the area. Israel has still not 
declared the extent of Jewish immigration or defined its borders. It wants 
to create strategic depth for itself in this area.74
72 Henry Tanner, "Egypt Concerned But Hopeful About Reagan's Victory," The New York Times, June 30, 
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73 Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan to Offer Israel and Egypt More Military Aid," ibid., February 1, 1982.
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Abu Ghazala had supported the peace process with Israel but was disturbed by the 
1982 invasion o f Lebanon, “Operation Peace for Galilee,” that targeted Palestinian 
guerrillas but resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Palestinian civilians. He advocated for 
an all-Arab defense force with Egyptian troops at its core, a concept that almost came to 
fruition after the Damascus Declaration in March, 1991, but ultimately fell apart as the 
wealthy Gulf states preferred to reach bilateral security arrangements with the United 
States rather than rely on the EAF for their security. Abu Ghazala drove the effort to 
develop a military manufacturing sector that was facilitated by U.S. military aid, and 
negotiated a deal to co-produce the Ml A1 Abrams tanks, with tank kits being sent from 
the United States and assembled in factories in Egypt. Thus the external threat was used 
to justify the expansion of the military’s role in the civilian sphere, largely through the 
military’s economic projects, which not only included a defense-industrial base, but also 
extended into construction, food production, and other commercial enterprises.
While skeptical of Israel’s territorial ambitions, Abu Ghazala served as an 
important promoter of U.S. strategic interests during his tenure. Even though Abu 
Ghazala spent five years in the Soviet Union, where he earned a military degree, he was 
considered to be fiercely anti-Communist and pro-American. While serving as military 
attache in Washington under Sadat, he made many connections, including Texas 
Congressman Charlie Wilson, who worked with Abu Ghazala during the 1980s to 
covertly supply weapons to the mujahideen forces fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Fearing Ayatollah Khomeini’s hegemonic ambitions, Abu Ghazala also sold billions of 
dollars worth of weaponry to Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
to bolster their defenses against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, Egypt 
contributed nearly 34,000 troops to the U.S.-led coalition that confronted Saddam 
Hussein’s military in the first Gulf War.75 The presence of troops from the most populous 
Arab country served a military and political purpose in legitimizing the U.S. -  led 
operation that drove Iraq’s forces from Kuwait.
Nevertheless, Mubarak, Abu Ghazala, and other members o f the EAF were 
frustrated that U.S. military aid was designed to guarantee Israeli military superiority.
75 "Number o f  troops who served on active duty in the G ulf War theater o f  operations between August 2, 
1990, and June 13, 1991," in Nationmaster.com.
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Some military leaders believed Mubarak’s policies caused Egypt to fall behind Israel as 
well as other Arab states in the Middle East arms race, and lamented the decline in 
Egypt’s regional power. In addition, U.S. military assistance privileged the air force and 
the navy, and to a lesser extent the armored corps, at the expense o f Egypt’s air defense 
and the artillery. The demilitarization of the Sinai, which prohibited military airfields and 
Egyptian training exercises, also hindered the EAF’s capacity to defend its territory. The 
disclosure that President Reagan had authorized the sale o f weaponry to Iran during the 
Iran-Iraq war alarmed Egyptians and other Arab moderates, who worried an Iranian 
victory would destabilize the region by encouraging the spread o f revolutionary Islamic 
fundamentalism.76
An argument could be made that Mubarak was able to keep Abu Ghazala, a 
highly respected figure throughout Egypt and particularly within the military, out of 
politics because o f the extent to which U.S. military aid had reduced the external threats 
to Egypt’s security. However, Mubarak was unable to dismiss Abu Ghazala until a 
scandal erupted in which Abu Ghazala allegedly conspired with others to illegally import 
banned materials from the U.S. into Egypt. While no public explanation for Abu 
Ghazala’s removal was given, some Egyptians speculated he had become too influential, 
and Mubarak sought to distance Abu Ghazala from his military power base. This suggests 
the balance of power between the executive and the military had a greater impact on 
Mubarak’s ability to subordinate the military than the degree of external threat. Not long 
after Abu Ghazala’s departure, Mubarak designated the loyal and uncharismatic Hussein 
Tantawi to serve as his defense minister for the next two decades. The appointment 
reflects Mubarak’s determination to limit the military’s influence in politics; Mubarak 
preferred to rely on the civilian security services to secure his regime and suppress his 
political opposition, including Islamist groups that Mubarak regularly linked to the threat 
posed by transnational terrorism.77
For example, in 1995 the Egyptian government rounded up Muslim Brotherhood 
leaders ahead o f parliamentary elections, sentencing 54 to prison.78 Despite the Muslim
76 John Kifner, "Arabs Bitter Over Shipments to Iran," The New York Times, November 23, 1986.
77 Chris Hedges, "As Egypt Votes on Mubarak, He Faces Rising Peril," ibid., October 4, 1993; TheMichael 
Slackman, "Egyptian Emergency Law is Extended for 2 Years," ibid., May 11, 2010.
78 Douglas Jehl, "In the Face o f  Criticism, Egypt Sentences 54 Muslim Leaders," ibid., November 24, 1995.
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Brotherhood’s professed commitment to non-violent political change, President Mubarak 
linked the organization’s meetings and anti-government publications with recent terrorist 
attacks, and shut down the Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo. Mubarak insisted the 
leaders be tried in military courts, where sentences could not be appealed. Among those 
convicted to five years of hard prison labor were a highly - respected doctor, Essam al- 
Aryan, and a science professor, Mohamed Habib.
Mubarak also used the threat of Islamic extremism to justify banning the Muslim 
Brotherhood from politics just two years after their electoral gains in 2005, and to explain 
the extension of Egypt’s oppressive Emergency Law, which had been active continuously 
since the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Unfortunately, in Egyptian law the definition of 
terrorism included not only violent attacks but also “any threat or intimidation” capable 
of “disturbing the peace or jeopardizing the safety and security of the society.”79 Related 
law also prohibited activity that could inhibit the ability o f public authorities to carry out 
their duties. The laws allowed police to arrest and detain individuals in the absence o f 
formal charges, try civilians in military courts, and restrict freedom of speech and 
assembly.
From Washington’s perspective, military aid was successful in that it created an 
obstacle to Soviet expansion into the Middle East, provided an Egyptian-Israeli axis of 
stability within the region, allowed preferential access for U.S. warships through the Suez 
Canal, and allowed for the close bilateral intelligence sharing necessary for 
counterterrorism operations. From President Mubarak’s perspective, U.S. military aid 
bolstered Egypt’s capabilities and thus mitigated the threat posed by regional rivals. From 
the perspective of the Egyptian military, however, U.S. military aid, while furnishing the 
EAF with sophisticated weaponry, limited its ability project regional power, and favored 
Israel at Egypt’s expense. While the military did not use the external threat to justify 
interference in civil politics, the external threat did provide motivation for the 
development o f a military -  run defense-industrial base that spilled over into the civilian 
sphere, and gave Mubarak an excuse to neutralize the political threat posed by nonviolent 
Islamic groups.
79 TheMichael Slackman, "Egyptian Emergency Law is Extended for 2 Years," ibid., May 11, 2010.
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Mubarak’s Political Longevity
Like Sadat, Mubarak would rely not only on external political support from the 
U.S. for his regime stability, but also on a ruling party comprised of wealthy business 
elites, an expansive bureaucracy, and public sector workers. Mubarak also continued the 
tradition of domestic surveillance and repression, and like Sadat turned to the Interior 
Ministry rather than the military to secure his regime. This combination -  U.S. political 
support, generous patronage networks that ensured the loyalty o f his ruling party, and a 
repressive civilian security service - contributed to the stability o f his authoritarian 
regime, allowing him to maintain his rule, and the status quo, for nearly thirty years. 
Despite this stability, Mubarak would not attempt to establish objective civilian control 
over the military, preferring instead to link the military’s interests with the survival o f his 
regime by granting them an expanded role in commercial economic enterprises.
Regionally, however, alignment with the U.S. and the peace accord with Israel 
isolated Egypt from its Arab neighbors and diminished Cairo’s influence during the 
1980s. On March 31, 1979, the Arab League issued a communique that suspended Egypt 
from the twenty-two member Arab League; Arab states withdrew their ambassadors, the 
league’s headquarters was relocated to Tunis, and political and diplomatic relations with 
the Egyptian government were severed. Arab League members imposed economic and 
political sanctions upon Egypt, including revoking Egypt’s membership in several Arab 
financial and economic institutions like the Federation of Arab Banks, and the 
Organization o f Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The most populous Arab 
country, whose president in the 1950s and 1960s led the drive for pan-Arabism, now had 
very little control over Arab affairs. Egypt would not be reinstated in the Arab League 
until 1989.
President Reagan sought to strengthen the new Egyptian president’s position by 
inviting him to the United States shortly after Sadat’s assassination in October, 1981, and 
Reagan pledged to increase military aid to Egypt.80 Mubarak adeptly leveraged his role in 
the Middle East peace process for increased aid, and while economic aid would vary 
considerably, by 1987, the U.S. was committed to $1.3 billion in military aid annually.
80 Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan to Offer Israel and Egypt More Military Aid," ibid., February 1, 1982.
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Despite political and economic support from the U.S., however, Egypt suffered from 
mounting debt that rendered it nearly impossible to repay American loans, risking a 
cutoff in military aid.81 The First Gulf War cost Egypt billions in decreased regional trade 
as well as lost remittances from Egyptian migrants working in Persian G u lfs  oil sector.
Political support from the United States ultimately helped Mubarak manage 
economic crises throughout this thirty-year rule. Conscious of the massive rioting that 
followed Sadat’s attempts to decrease food subsidies in 1977, Mubarak found it difficult 
to meet the IMF’s terms for a balance-of-payments support in 1987. Exacerbating 
Egypt’s large foreign debt problem was the interest due on U.S military loans, $500 
million of which was to be paid back annually.82 As Egypt’s economic situation 
worsened, the U.S. led an effort to “reward” Egypt for its support of the U.S.-led 
coalition in the Persian Gulf War by arranging a package of debt forgiveness and 
international economic assistance.83 The U.S. not only forgave $7 billion in Egyptian 
debt, but also encouraged other governments to do the same.
Many o f Egypt’s creditors would only do so with an IMF “seal o f approval,” 
meaning Egypt had to commit once and for all to economic reforms. Washington and 
other government lenders pressured Mubarak to adopt the IMF-tailored Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, which called for reducing social welfare and 
selling public companies in order to bring state expenditure and debt under control.84 By 
1995, the government had cut three-quarters of the subsidies it had provided in the 1980s, 
and withdrew its commitment to hiring university graduates. Despite a fund established 
by 17 nations to mitigate the impact o f privatization, unemployment led to increasing 
discontent among Egypt’s youth as they graduated from university and found few 
opportunities. Fearing social disruptions, Cairo hesitated to implement the next phase of 
reforms, which were linked to another $3 billion in debt forgiveness.
The fact that Mubarak’s regime could remain so stable even when confronted by 
economic crises is a testament to the entrenched and interlinked interests o f the state 
bureaucracy, including the Interior Ministry, and the business leaders who formed the
81 "U.S. Aides Criticize Mubarak Program," The New York Times, March 12, 1985.
82 John Kifner, "Egypt and I.M.F. Reach Agreement," ibid., February 26, 1987.
83 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Egypt's 'Reward': Forgiven Debt," ibid., April 10, 1991.
84 William E. Schmidt, "A Deluge o f  Foreign Assistance Fails to Revive Egypt's Stricken Economy," ibid., 
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base of the ruling party. Despite the upheaval the economic reforms created within 
Egyptian society, the state’s ability to access rents and redistribute them to bolster 
patronage networks contributed to the Mubarak regime’s stability.85 While efforts such as 
worker retraining were discussed in order to mitigate the negative effects o f the reforms 
on Egyptian society, in many cases public sector firms were sold at a bargain to 
businessmen with close political connections to Mubarak and his family, and profits were 
used to pay off cronies’ bad debts. Some new jobs were created and the country’s 
economy grew, but many formerly middle class families became poor, public sector 
workers’ salaries stagnated, and those Egyptians without skills or connections saw their 
quality o f life deteriorate.
In addition to benefiting from the corruption that accompanied the privatization 
process, Mubarak’s regime stability was enhanced by the legal-constitutional framework 
that masked the extent of his authoritarianism and allowed him to retain his control over 
Egypt’s political institutions.86 Like Sadat, Mubarak retained the authority to appoint and 
dismiss cabinet members as well as judges, and only candidates “known” to the regime 
could run for the legislature. Mubarak’s grip on the public sector gave him mechanisms 
to restrict the freedoms of legislative members; for example, politicians who chose not to 
join the ruling party might have their debts unexpectedly called in by the Bank o f Cairo. 
As a result, the legislature was passive compared to the executive.87
While Mubarak had initially implied he would lead a gradual transition to 
democracy and that his presidency would not exceed two terms, by 1987, he insisted the 
country’s economic challenges required political stability, and by 1993 he dismissed the 
idea o f popular elections altogether.88 In consultations with the United States, Mubarak 
argued democracy risked bringing Communists, nationalists, and Islamists into the 
political arena. While opposition parties made some gains in 1984 and 1987, during the 
elections in 1990, 1995, and 2000, political participation declined, as did the 
representation of opposition parties in parliament.
85 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 206.
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No institution was more effective at guaranteeing the success o f the regime than 
the Interior Ministry, which was tasked with ensuring the NDP never received less than 
95% of the vote during elections. To distance themselves from the impression o f political 
interference, the police hired petty criminals to intimidate opponents prior to elections, 
creating what a U.S. State Department’s human rights report warned was a “culture of 
impunity” in which ordinary citizens were routinely bullied.89 Under President Mubarak 
the ministry exploded from 150,000 men in 1974 to more than a million by 2002, with 
450,000 military conscripts serving mandatory three-year obligations, 60,000 National 
Guards, and 12,000 Border Patrol soldiers. By 2010, there were more than two million 
security personnel available to the Egypt’s Interior Minister. Under Egypt’s Emergency 
Law, the Interior Ministry was authorized to break up labor strikes and public 
demonstrations, censor the press, detain civilians for extensive periods without trial, and 
try political prisoners in special courts. Within the Interior Ministry, the State Security 
Investigations Sector, SSIS, assumed a more prominent role, recruiting informants and 
scrutinizing candidates for government posts, university chairs, editorial boards, public- 
sector companies and banks, and even the military. Comparatively, the military was more 
removed from domestic matters, with the General Intelligence Service focused on foreign 
relations, and personnel numbering consistently around 460,000 throughout Mubarak’s 
presidency.
The George W. Bush administration’s pressure on Mubarak to allow for broader 
political participation has been credited with the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral gains in 
the 2005 elections. In the wake o f the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush 
administration linked democracy promotion with national security, and began openly 
criticizing President Mubarak for his undemocratic record. In 2002, President Bush 
explicitly linked Egypt’s aid to human rights.90 Congress increasingly demanded to place 
conditions on economic aid to pressure Egypt to initiate democratic reforms. In FY2005, 
Congress insisted, “democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior
89 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 195-97.
90 Christopher Marquis, "U.S., Protesting Rights Leader's Sentence, Halts N ew  Aid to Egypt," The New  
York Times, August 16, 2002.
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approval of the government of Egypt.”91 Responding to both external and internal 
pressure, President Mubarak announced multiparty elections would be held in 2005.
In the 2005 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood secured 20% of the seats in 
Parliament, which was stunning considering in sixty years no opposition force had won 
more than a tenth o f the vote. Years later a spokesman from the group revealed that state 
security had provided a list of districts in which Muslim Brotherhood candidates could 
run, and promised they would win most o f them.92 The most likely explanation for the 
SSIS’s behavior is it wished to offer a warning to those calling for democratization; in 
fact the Bush administration’s democracy rhetoric waned following electoral gains o f the 
Islamic parties in Egypt and the Palestinian territories. Mubarak subsequently banned the 
Muslim Brotherhood with an amendment to the constitution in 2007, which stipulated 
that “political activity within a religious frame of reference” would be is illegal. After the 
2010 elections, the number of Muslim Brotherhood seats in the People’s Assembly fell 
from 88 to zero.
In the final decade o f Mubarak’s presidency, the business elite began to cluster 
around Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal. The public resented Gamal, whose corrupt business 
associates dominated the ruling party, led business lobbies and ran the cabinet.93 Under 
the pretext of civilianizing the presidency, Gamal’s supporters recommended Gamal 
succeed his father, and constitutional amendments in 2005 and 2007 eliminated judicial 
supervision over the voting process, and outlined conditions for presidential elections that 
fit only Gamal. Mubarak retreated from promises o f political liberalization, and justified 
the two year extension of Egypt’s emergency law by insisting it was necessary to deal 
with the threat of terrorism.
The Obama administration reacted cautiously to the massive demonstrations in 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square following Tunisia’s successful overthrow of longtime autocrat Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initially advised against a “hasty 
exit” for Mubarak, warning it could lead to instability that would undermine Egypt’s
91 Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," in Congressional Research Service, ed. 
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transition to democracy.94 However, by February 1, it was apparent to President Obama 
that the Egyptian president would be incapable o f satisfying the demands o f his people, 
and he publically announced the transition to democracy would need to begin right away, 
signaling the end of the United States’ political support for Hosni Mubarak.95
U.S. Military Aid and the Professionalism of the EAF
The immediate concern for new President Mubarak after Sadat’s assassination 
was that the cohesiveness o f the military had been compromised by the rise o f extremism 
in the ranks.96 Mubarak was able to use U.S. military aid along with other economic 
incentives to satisfy the military’s corporate interests, thus minimizing discontent within 
the ranks and the risk o f military interference in civil politics. U.S. military aid 
contributed to the EAF’s professionalization by improving their competence, particularly 
their technical capability as they learned to use new, modem equipment and weapons. 
While American military advisors sought to model liberal-democratic norms such as 
mission exclusivity and respect for civilian political authority, throughout this period 
Mubarak undermined the professionalization of the armed forces by allowing active and 
retired officers to dominate the military-industrial-business-commercial complex 
(MIBCC), ordering the SSIS to spy on military personnel and purge independently- 
minded, talented and popular officers, and filling the top military posts based on personal 
loyalty rather than merit.
Starting in 1987, the $1.3 billion in annual military aid provided by the U.S. has 
been primarily directed toward acquisitions, upgrades to existing equipment, and support 
for maintenance contracts.97 In 1988, the U.S. and Egypt began co-producing the M1A1 
Abrams Battle Tank, with tank kits manufactured by General Dynamics in the U.S. and 
then shipped to Egypt, where they are assembled in Egypt’s military factories.98 The U.S.
94 Mark Lander, "Warning Against Hasty Exit for Mubarak," The New York Times, February 6, 2011.
95 David E. Sanger, "Obama Urges Quick Transition in Egypt," ibid., February 1, 2011.
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also sends hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Excess Defense Articles from the U.S. 
Department o f Defense, and $1 million is typically granted to fund the IMET program ."
From Mubarak’s perspective, however, U.S. military aid alone would not be 
enough to ensure the loyalty of his military. Sadat’s assassination brought forth new 
concerns that religious extremists might have gained a following in the armed forces. The 
Mubarak government initiated a study to gain a better understanding of the surge in 
Islamist militancy, particularly among enlistees and junior and middle -  ranking officers. 
The main problems, the study concluded, were related to the lack o f economic growth.100 
Mubarak subsequently encouraged the development of economic interests within the 
armed forces establishment. Under the direction o f the Minister of Defense, Abdul Halim 
Abu Ghazala, the military became more involved in the industrial, military and 
agricultural sectors, which gave the armed forces an independent source of revenue, 
untaxed and free from civilian oversight.
There has been disagreement among analysts of Egyptian politics over the extent 
and purpose o f the military’s economic interests. Some argue the commercial enterprises 
bolstered patronage networks that linked military officers to the Mubarak government, 
ensuring the interests o f the military were inextricably tied with the survival of the regime. 
They site as evidence the fact that when Mubarak, under pressure from the U.S., the EU, 
and the IMF, began implementing neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the military’s business 
interests remained untouched.101
Under this system, officers enjoyed privileges like discounted apartments and 
vacation homes, membership to fancy clubs, subsidized food and services, and perhaps a 
position in the bureaucracy or in one of the military-owned commercial enterprises after 
retirement. The MIBCC, a “vast military run commercial enterprise that seeps into every 
comer o f Egyptian society,” produces a wide range of items, including food, cement, 
gasoline, and infrastructure, with subsidized energy and cheap conscript labor.102 U.S. 
military aid, consistently $1.3 billion throughout this period, bolstered the EAF’s
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commercial enterprises.103 For example, the EAF uses the M1A1 tank factory not only to 
assemble the tank kits shipped from General Dynamics, but also to build construction 
vehicles for sale in its domestic market. In 2010, an EAF company, Arab American 
Vehicles (AAV), used U.S. military aid to purchase $33 million worth of unassembled 
Jeeps and other parts from Chrysler. The company not only produces armored versions of 
Jeep vehicles for military use, it also produces civilian versions for commercial sale. 
Revenues from AAV are tax-exempt and go directly to the military. A fleet of Gulfstream 
jets the EAF insisted was necessary for military purposes has been used for VIP travel.
Some analysts have argued that the military was willing to watch Mubarak lose 
his grip on power because his son and likely successor, Gamal Mubarak, posed a threat to 
the military’s material interests.104 The EAF suspected upon assuming the presidency, 
Gamal would use neoliberal reforms as a pretext for liquidating the military’s lucrative 
businesses, selling them on the cheap to his close, personal business associates. With 
Mubarak and Gamal gone, the military would be in a position to protect their autonomy 
and shield their economic interests from civilian oversight.
Others argue that the economic projects were necessary because the military was 
chronically under-funded under Mubarak. Military spending in the mid-1970s was as 
high as 33% of the GDP, but since then it has steadily declined. By 1980 it had fallen to 
to 19.5%, and by 2010 it was just 2.2% of the GDP, the lowest level in Egypt’s history 
and a reflection of Mubarak’s ambivalence toward the armed forces’ military 
readiness.105 The $1.3 billion from the U.S. has depreciated in real terms since the peace 
treaty was signed in 1979. The military companies allowed the armed forces to be self- 
sufficient and contribute to national economic development by providing cheap goods 
and services. Also, in the absence o f war, the army needed to find a way to employ its 
conscripts. During the 1980s, Defense Minister Abu Ghazala argued that officers 
struggled with high inflation and low defense spending compared to their counterparts in
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the upper middle classes, and that the military was barely able to cover basic necessities 
like soldiers’ wages, uniforms, housing and equipment maintenance.106
Whether the economic enterprises o f the military allowed serving and retired 
officers to grow wealthy at the expense o f the civilian entrepreneurs or maintain a 
minimum standard of living, the fact that the military has been allowed to cultivate such 
extensive economic interests has undermined its professionalism. The state should fund 
its military at a level high enough to attract quality personnel without granting privileges 
and preferential treatment to such an extent as to encourage corruption, clientelism, or 
patronage. Economic interests distract the armed forces from their primary responsibility, 
which is to defend the country from external threats. In addition, the economic 
enterprises have created a reserved domain that military leaders in the post-Mubarak 
period would publically refuse to submit to civilian oversight.107
The professionalism of the armed services was further eroded as Mubarak, like 
Sadat, appointed officers to top military posts based on personal loyalty rather than merit. 
He chose the professional Abu Ghazala, a former Free Officer who had participated in 
the 1948, 1956, and 1973 wars, to be chief o f staff in 1980 and defense minister the 
following year because o f his commitment to staying out of politics. Abu Ghazala had 
served as military attache to Washington between 1977 and 1980, so he was supportive 
o f Egypt’s ties with the U.S., unlike many military personnel who were still resentful of 
the concessions granted to the U.S. and Egypt during the Camp David Accords. Abu 
Ghazala was professional and attentive to his soldiers’ needs, raising wages and 
upgrading military facilities, vehicles and uniforms.
Over time Mubarak became resentful of Abu Ghazala’s popularity not only 
among the troops but also within U.S. policy circles. Abu Ghazala was a fervent anti- 
Communist, and emphasized the role a strong Egypt could play as a bulwark against 
Soviet expansion in the region. He advocated building up Egypt’s military power, 
particularly as Egypt sat at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the
106 Ibid.
107 For examples, seeNiveen Wahish, "Egypt Military Official Defends Army's Economic Interests," 
Ahram Online, http://english.ahram.org.eg/newscontentprint/3/0/37896/business/0/Egpyt-military-official- 
defends-armys-economic-int.aspx; Ahmed Aboulenein, "Military Denies Agreeing to Civilian Oversight," 
D aily News Egypt, April 23, 2013.
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Indian Ocean.108 He argued Egypt should contribute to safeguarding these three maritime 
routes to guarantee the uninterrupted flow o f oil to the non-Communist world. Abu 
Ghazala’s popularity was broadened by his image of devoutness and his criticism of the 
police’s treatment o f Islamists.
Mubarak was far less interested in building a powerful armed force, mindful of 
the threat a confident, popular and muscular military could pose to his regime. 
Nevertheless, when 20,000 CSF conscripts took to the streets on Feb 25, 1986, protesting 
rumors of a one-year extension to their three-year service obligation, the president was 
forced to call in the army. Abu Ghazala ordered his soldiers back to the barracks once 
order was restored, and his popularity soared. His men had been disciplined and efficient, 
in sharp contrast with the abusive, underpaid, illiterate conscripts in the CSF.
Abu Ghazala’s position would be downgraded not long after. Eventually Mubarak 
appointed Hussein Tantawi, formerly the head o f the Republican Guard, to the post of 
defense minister in May 1991. Tantawi held the job for 20 years, until he was dismissed 
by then president Mohamed Morsi in August 2012. Mubarak relied on the state security 
sector to monitor political trends within the officer corps, and alert the president if  any 
officer stood out as a potential challenger.
Mubarak refrained from calling in the military to combat religious extremism 
during the 1990s, relying instead on his security forces for counter-insurgency. While 
protective of their economic interests, the military was reluctant to intervene in domestic 
affairs, although they likely would have intervened if they perceived extremism was out 
of control.109 The military did, however, run tribunals to try terrorism suspects, train and 
advise paramilitary units, and sometimes lend expert units to local forces.
As Mubarak’s son Gamal gained the support of the business elite, the defense 
minister and chief of staff privately criticized the direction the regime was taking.
Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi advised Mubarak it would be unwise to force the 
people to accept the unpopular Gamal as president. The military leadership “fiercely 
resented Gamal Mubarak...who preferred to build his influence through business and
108 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 177; Hashim, "The Egyptian Military Part Two: From Mubarak 
Onward," 109.
109 "The Egyptian Military Part Two: From Mubarak Onward," 110-11.
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political cronies rather than through the military, and those connected to him gained huge 
profits from government monopolies and deals with foreign investors.” 110
When Egyptians began to gather en masse in the streets and Tahrir Square in 
January 2011, the military was faced with several options. They could oppose the 
revolution through the use of force, stay neutral, fracture into pro-revolutionary and anti­
revolutionary factions, or join the revolution. The impotency o f the CSF, which was 
quickly overwhelmed and demoralized by the numbers of Egyptians out in the streets, 
rendered neutrality tantamount to taking sides in favor of the protestors.111 The military 
was not necessarily on the protesters’ side from the beginning, as much of the senior 
military leadership benefited from Mubarak’s patronage. Yet the military, which retained 
its cohesiveness throughout the crisis, ultimately chose to support and defend the 
revolutionaries, demand the resignation of President Mubarak, and assume governance 
responsibilities until a civilian political leadership could be elected. The fact that the 
military retained its cohesiveness is important: cohesion suggests if  the military decided 
to defend Mubarak’s government and did not fragment, it would have likely been 
successful despite pressure from the Obama administration for Mubarak to resign. If 
some o f the military decided to back the revolutionaries while others were determined to 
defend the regime, the protests might have devolved into a civil war. With the military 
acting as one body, it would have a major influence in shaping Egypt’s post-Mubarak 
political order.
Beyond Mubarak: The Military Reemerges as a Political Actor
The primary strategic concerns for U.S. policymakers in the context o f the Arab 
Spring in Egypt was the maintenance o f the peace treaty with Israel, continued 
cooperation with the Egyptian Armed Forces in combating militant religious extremism, 
and continuity in the security o f the Suez Canal. The U.S. withdrew its political support 
for President Mubarak as it became increasingly apparent he could not survive the 
domestic upheaval represented by the Tahrir Square demonstrations in early 2011.
110 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 118.
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During and after the Arab uprisings in Egypt, a narrative emerged that the United States’ 
close ties with the EAF were decisive in the army’s decision not to fire on protesters in 
Tahrir Square.112 Analysts insisted decades o f funding, access to advanced military 
hardware, training from the world’s predominant military, and the socialization that was a 
natural product of close defense cooperation with the liberal-democratic American 
military had fostered a sense of professionalism among the members o f the Egyptian 
armed forces. Compared to the personalistic, patronage-based security services o f Bashar 
al-Assad in Syria or the weak, fragmented security forces o f Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, 
Egypt’s armed forces seemed competent and cohesive. The army’s conception o f itself as 
a professional entity dedicated to national defense rather than the guardian o f Mubarak’s 
regime was credited with the relatively peaceful outcome of the Egyptian uprisings. 
However, since then the influence o f U.S. military aid on the Egyptian armed forces’ role 
in civil politics has been less certain.
This section is divided into three parts, the first of which will discuss how U.S. 
military aid, which is intended to mitigate external threats to Egypt’s security, did not 
discourage the military from expanding their institutional prerogatives or removing 
democratically - elected President Mohamed Morsi from power. The military’s 
leadership has taken advantage o f the weakness o f Egypt’s institutions to consolidate its 
power and expand its foreign and national security making authority. In addition, like 
Mubarak, the military has linked the transnational threat o f militant religious extremism 
to non-violent Islamic political groups to justify the use of force against its political 
opposition.
The second part will discuss the Obama administration’s challenge to provide 
political support for Egypt’s revolving door of post-Arab Spring leaders while avoiding 
the appearance of condoning practices that violate democratic norms. This part will also 
expose the limitations of American political support as the democratically - elected 
President Morsi struggled to implement objective civilian control over the military, 
choosing instead a policy of “acquiescence,” whereby Morsi accepted the preservation of
112 Elisabeth Bumiller, "Calling for Restraint, Pentagon Faces Test o f Influence with Ally," The New York 
Times, January 29, 2011; Garamone, "Mullen: Egypt's Military Promises to be Stabilizing Influence";
Karen Parrish, "Mullen Reiterates Confidence in Egyptian Military," ibid.,
www.defense.gov/news/article/aspx7id-t-62665; "Top U.S. Military Officer Urges Caution on Egypt,” 
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the military’s reserved domains in exchange for tacit approval o f his presidency. The 
final section will review how events since the Tahrir Square demonstrations in early 2011 
have been a test for the Egyptian armed forces’ professionalism. While the military 
initially showed great competency and coherency in dealing with Egyptian demands for 
democratization, events since have exposed the negative implications of Mubarak-era 
policies that granted the military autonomy from civilian oversight and encouraged the 
development o f independent economic interests. These policies undermined the military’s 
mission exclusivity and rendered it hostile to attempts to impose civilian oversight. The 
brutal repression of Islamic groups and civil society in the post-Morsi period have 
seriously damaged the prestige of the Egyptian Armed Forces and the thesis that 
American military aid contributed to its professionalization.
External Threats and Military Intervention After Mubarak
The Egyptian Armed Forces’ willingness to remove President Mubarak from 
office rather than act on his behalf against Egyptian demonstrators was not related to an 
external threat, but a calculated political decision based on the desire to protect the 
military’s reserved domains, which include the retention o f $1.3 billion worth of U.S. 
military aid that allows the EAF to purchase and maintain advanced, American-made 
weaponry and contribute to the military’s economic enterprises. These reserved domains, 
rather than an external threat, also explain the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ 
attempts to expand their political authority, and willingness to retreat from civil politics 
once President Morsi provided assurances that those interests would be protected from 
civilian oversight.
The social disorder caused by Morsi’s controversial policies prompted the 
military to intervene again, yet this time, rather than retreat from politics, the military 
linked the threat o f transnational terrorism and religious extremism with Islamic political 
groups, using this threat to justify the maintenance of a central role in Egypt’s civil 
politics. The military under the leadership o f its new president, Morsi’s former defense 
minister and retired general Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, has extended this linkage to almost any 
individual who criticizes the state, justifying the arrest of anyone perceived as
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undermining Egypt’s security, broadly defined. With Egypt’s external security threats 
worsening, primarily in response to Morsi’s removal and the repression o f the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as spillover from conflicts in Syria and Libya, the military’s use of 
the external threat to justify a central role in Egyptian politics is likely to increase, despite 
the restoration o f American military aid that includes counterterrorism cooperation.
Three decades o f political stagnation under President Mubarak rendered the 
Egyptian Armed Forces the only credible institution capable o f restoring order during the 
Tahrir Square uprisings in January of 2011. The police forces under the Interior Ministry 
and the rest o f the state bureaucracy were loyal to Mubarak, and had thus lost legitimacy 
in the eyes of the pro-democracy revolutionary forces. The military’s return to Egyptian 
politics was thus less in reaction to an external threat than the result of being “pulled” in 
by Egyptians to usher their corrupt president from power and supervise a transition to a 
democratic system of government.
In a highly contested political arena, however, the military could not help but 
consider the implications of electing an untested, inexperienced president on the EAF’s 
ability to meet external threats to Egypt’s security. These threats included extremist 
activity in the Sinai, where groups linked to al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for rocket 
attacks on Suez Canal traffic, bombings o f oil and gas pipelines, and missile launches 
against Israel. Thus despite U.S. military aid, which ideally should contribute to the 
mitigation of those threats, the SCAF sought to establish a formalized role in foreign and 
national security policymaking, thus expanding the military’s presence in civil politics.
Just prior to the final runoff in the presidential elections in June, 2012, the SCAF 
announced its intention to revive the National Defense Council (NDC), a body that 
according to the 1971 constitution would meet during national security crises. The 
council would provide expertise on national defense, would be led by the president, and 
take decisions based on the absolute majority of the members in attendance. Early reports 
indicated that ten o f the council’s sixteen members would be from the SCAF.113
In exchange for returning executive and legislative authority to the government of 
democratically - elected leader Mohamed Morsi, the military pressed for an expansion of
113 Al-Masry Al-Youm, "SCAF to Revive National Defense Council," Egypt Independent, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/scaf-revive-national-defense-council.
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its institutionalized policy-making prerogatives, in direct violation of the liberal model of 
civil-military relations. The constitution drafted by Morsi’s constituent assembly 
stipulated that the NDC would have to be consulted before the president and parliament 
could declare war, and that eight of the fifteen seats on the council would be filled by 
officers o f the Egyptian Armed Forces.114 In addition, the minister of defense would be 
an actively serving military officer rather than a civilian appointee. Decisions regarding 
the defense budget, including the distribution of the U.S. military aid, would be kept out 
o f the legislative bodies and remain under the control of the military.
American policymakers avoided calling the controversial intervention to remove 
the government o f Mohamed Morsi a coup, out o f concern cutting military aid would 
threaten the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and undermine the fight against Islamist 
militants. Under increasing pressure, however, the U.S. suspended military aid for the 
first time in decades. $575 million was frozen until June, 2014, when Congress 
authorized the release o f the U.S. aid after the election of retired general Sisi in May, 
2014. Most of this aid would be used to pay for existing defense contracts."5 The U.S. 
also promised to send ten Apache attack helicopters to be used against militants in the 
Sinai peninsula. President Sisi continues to link the threat posed by transnational 
terrorism with non-violent Islamic political groups to justify banning them from politics 
and using force against activists.
The military leadership further strengthened its role in civil politics ahead of the 
presidential elections o f 2014. In February, interim president Adly Mansour issued a 
presidential decree that reconstituted the National Defense Council, which would be 
comprised of top military leaders and cabinet members. In addition, a decree from the 
SCAF stipulated that for the first time in Egypt’s history, the minister o f defense rather 
than the president would sit at the head of the SCAF.116 The SCAF would consist o f 23 
top military generals from the army, navy, air force, air defense, and military intelligence, 
and be responsible for all armed forces issues such as declaring war and sending troops
114 Yezid Sayigh, "Morsi and Egypt's Military," AlMonitor The Pulse o f  the M iddle East, www.al- 
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abroad. The defense minister has the prerogative to pick council members from among 
his own aides, and decides which deputies can join the SCAF. The National Defense 
Council (NDC) will also be a fixture in Egyptian politics. Led by the president, the 
fourteen-member council consists of top officials from the army, police, intelligence, and 
the cabinet. For the next two presidential terms, the SCAF retains the right to approve the 
defense minister, who must be chosen from the country’s most senior generals.
The 2014 constitution, passed by referendum in January, 2014, also strengthens 
the military’s role in national security policymaking. For example, Article 201 mandates 
that the minister of defense be an officer, violating the principle of civilian supremacy 
over the military. In addition, the responsibility for the military budget rests with the 
NDC rather than within the legislature, and the NDC must be consulted before any 
decision is made which affects the armed forces.117 The constitution grants greater 
powers for the military judiciary, increasing the opportunities to try civilians in military 
courts.
While U.S. military aid may help to mitigate the threat posed by transnational 
terrorists, the battle against extremism is likely to keep the EAF at the center o f Egyptian 
politics for some time to come. U.S. military aid and counterterrorism cooperation should 
help Egypt confront the transnational threat posed by militant extremist groups based in 
the Sinai, where the violence surged after M orsi’s Islamist government was forced from 
office. The militants have bombed oil and gas pipelines, sent rockets into Israel, and 
targeted security forces with suicide bombings and assassinations. The threat has grown 
to such an extent that Israel has permitted Egyptian forces to exceed the number o f forces 
allowed by the original peace treaty.
The effort to place new conditions on military aid to Cairo is undermined by the 
fact that Egypt’s military leaders do not have to rely exclusively on the United States for 
military aid. In August, el-Sisi travelled to Sochi, Russia, to discuss weapons sales with 
Russian president Vladimir Putin. Sisi was reportedly shown a selection of Russian 
military hardware available for sale, and the two discussed opportunities for military 
cooperation. Whether Egypt’s leadership truly seeks to diversify its weapons supplier or
117 "The 2014 Egyptian Constitution: Without Accountability, Checks or Balances," Egypt Independent,
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just wants to send a message to U.S. lawmakers who call for the reassessment o f U.S. 
military aid to Egypt is uncertain. However, the spike in extremist violence emanating 
from the Sinai after the collapse of Morsi’s government continues to pose a dangerous 
threat to Egypt’s national security. Fighters who have honed their skills battling against 
the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria are returning to the Sinai, and recruiters are seizing 
the opportunity to radicalize embittered young Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Reports 
indicate some extremists operating from Egypt are sympathetic to ISIS, the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria. Thus while external threats played a minimal role in the EAF’s decision 
to withdraw support for Mubarak, the threat posed by extremism is likely to keep the 
EAF at the center o f politics, as leaders conflate the Muslim Brotherhood with 
transnational terror groups, allowing them to justify a military presence in nearly all 
aspects o f civil life and neutralize their most powerful and organized political opposition.
Post-Mubarak Political Uncertainty
The Obama administration has struggled in its effort to be a stabilizing influence 
by providing political support to Egypt’s post-revolution transitional leaders without 
appearing to condone policies that violate democratic norms and inflame Egyptian public 
opinion. The decision to withdraw political support for Hosni Mubarak was taken in the 
context o f the “Arab Awakening,” during which citizens throughout the Arab world 
called for greater political representation and freedom from repressive, authoritarian 
governments. While Mubarak had been a “stalwart ally,” the repression of Egyptian 
society, and the economic stagnation and corruption that often accompanies autocratic 
regimes, likely fuels religious extremism and contributes to regional instability. The U.S. 
supported the Supreme Council o f the Armed Forces while also pressuring the military 
body to follow their roadmap to elections and refrain from violence against protesters. A 
post-Mubarak crackdown on democracy-promoting non-governmental organizations 
(NGO’s) created discontinuities in American political support, as outraged American 
legislators called for a reevaluation of U.S. military aid. Despite these pressures, military 
aid continued unabated, and the Obama administration reached out to the first 
democratically - elected Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, and encouraged an
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international effort to assist in Egypt’s economic recovery. Morsi, who had a powerful 
incentive to establish objective civilian control over the Egyptian military, chose instead 
to acquiesce to the armed forces’ demands for autonomy in exchange for their tacit 
approval of his regime. Yet this arrangement, along with U.S. military aid and the 
political support that accompanied it, was not enough to prevent Morsi’s removal a year 
later through a direct military intervention. Now U.S. officials are in the untenable 
position of supporting a regime that has used brutal force against its political opposition, 
reinstated an atmosphere of fear and suspicion in Egyptian society, and severely 
restricted the freedoms o f civil society.
After an initially cautious response to the Tahrir Square demonstrations in 
January of 2011, the Obama administration voiced its support for the democratic 
aspirations of the Egyptian people, and committed to $1 billion in debt relief and $1 
billion in loan guarantees to help Egypt’s transition to democracy. The Egyptian military 
formed the Supreme Council o f the Armed Forces, (SCAF) a committee o f twenty senior 
generals, and on February 11, 2011, the SCAF assumed all executive and legislative 
power. The SCAF suspended the constitution, disbanded parliament, and announced they 
would supervise elections for a new parliament and president as well as preside over the 
drafting o f a new constitution.118
The Egyptian military, after years o f being at the margins of Egyptian politics, 
was now front and center. After the uprising, SSIS was replaced by a “National Security 
Sector,” and hundreds of senior police officers were purged. Rather than completely 
dismantle the much-maligned, oversized civilian security apparatus, however, the 
military, concerned about its ability to maintain civil order and not wishing to get pulled 
into a policing role, decided to rely on the repressive Interior Ministry.119 The police, 
who had been ill - prepared for the massive demonstrations in January 2011, reemerged 
on June 28, 2011, when CSF units assaulted protestors who called for harsher measures 
against the old regime. This incident sparked a “Second Day of Rage” on July 8, with a 
million-man march followed by a three week long sit-in in Tahrir.
118 Rutherford, "Egypt: The Origins and Consequences o f  the January 25 Uprising," 43-45.
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In an effort to support Egypt’s transition to democracy, the Obama administration 
redirected some of Egypt’s economic aid to democracy assistance, and the United States 
Agency for International Development used Egyptian newspapers to encourage grant 
proposals for a $100 million economic development program as well as a $65 million 
democratic development program that would focus on civic activism, human rights, and 
elections. U.S. policymakers were taken aback by Egyptian officials’ hostility to the 
initiatives, however.120 The U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, explained that 
American NGO’s assumed that in a post-Mubarak environment, efforts to strengthen civil 
society would be welcomed.121 However, in July o f 2011, the Ministry o f Justice, 
supported by the military and the foreign ministry, began investigating the activities o f as 
many as 400 NGOs operating in Egypt.
Members o f Congress were even further outraged in December, when Egyptian 
security forces raided several NGO offices.122 In February o f 2012, Egyptian prosecutors 
charged 40 NGO personnel, including 16 Americans, with operating without a license. 
The SCAF also refused to lift the Mubarak-era “emergency law” that allowed the security 
services to send as many as 12,000 civilians to military trials. U.S. officials were also 
concerned by the SCAF’s announcement they would postpone the presidential 
elections.123 Obama administration officials wanted to maintain their ties with the 
military, but were reluctant to appear as if  they were condoning military rule, which 
would exacerbate their credibility problem with the Egyptian public. While President 
Obama and Secretary o f State Hillary Clinton had little success in reaching out to 
activists and opposition leaders, in anticipation of a Muslim Brotherhood victory, Clinton 
conveyed her willingness to cooperate with Islamist parties that were committed to 
nonviolence and respected democracy.
Lawmakers pushed for conditionality on U.S. military aid to Egypt, stipulating in 
the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2012 that the $ 1.3
120 Yaroslav Trofimov, "Egypt Opposes U.S.'s Democracy Funding," The Wall Street Journal Online, 
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billion in military aid would be contingent on the peaceful transfer o f power from the 
SCAF to elected civilian leaders, requiring Clinton to certify certain democratic 
principles were maintained throughout the transition.124 Yet Secretary o f State Hillary 
Clinton was outspoken in her opposition to imposing conditionality on military aid to 
Egypt:
The longstanding relationship between the United States and Egypt is of 
paramount importance to both of us. We support the democratic transition, 
and we don’t want to do anything that in any way draws into question our 
relationship or our support. We also believe that the army has played a 
very stabilizing, important role during this period....Egypt’s strong 
institutions, longstanding respect for the army, and the role the army 
played was absolutely critical for the revolution.125
President Obama had similar reservations about conditionality, which he believed 
would undermine his foreign policy prerogatives.126 Despite vociferous criticism from 
Congress, on March 23, 2012, Clinton waived the restrictions on U.S. aid to Egypt, 
emphasizing the importance of maintaining the continuity of U.S. - Egypt relations and 
the Camp David Accords.127 In addition, the U.S. brought more than 100 business 
executives to Cairo in September, 2012, to encourage trade and investment, although 
protests and demonstrations at the U.S. embassy discouraged new business activity. The 
U.S. and Europe also agreed to loan Egypt money once an agreement with the IMF was 
reached.
The SCAF supervised elections held for both the lower house (the People’s 
Assembly) and upper house (the Shura Council) o f parliament. The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the only opposition party with a strong 
national organization, won 45% of the seats in the lower house, and 58% of the contested
124 Mara Revkin, "Congress M oves to Condition Egypt's Military Aid on Power Transfer to Civilians," 
Atlantic Council, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/congress-moves-to-condition-egypts- 
military-aid-on-power-transfer-to-civilians; 112th Congress Public Law 10, Department o f  Defense and  
Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
125 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr After their 
Meeting," news release, September 28, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/09/174550.htm
126 "Statement by White House Communications Director Dan Pfeiffer, the White House Office o f  the 
Press Secretary," news release, December 14, 2011, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office-
2 0 1 1/12/14/statement-white-house-communications-director-dan-pfeiffer.
127 Victoria Nuland, "U.S. Support for Egypt," news release, March 23, 2012,
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186709.htm; Steven Lee Myers, "Despite Rights Concerns, U.S. Plans 
to Resume Egypt Aid," The New York Times, March 15, 2012.
211
seats in the upper house. The Salafists’ al-Nur Party won 25% of the seats in the lower 
house, and 25% o f the contested seats in the upper house.128 In May 2012, during the first 
round of presidential elections, the former military officer Ahmed Shafiq came a close 
second to Mohammed Morsi, the president o f the FJP. Two days before the runoff that 
was scheduled for June 16-17, the SCAF, citing the authority o f the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, dissolved the lower house of parliament. Morsi’s charge that the 
SCAF’s ruling was a violation o f democratic principles boosted his popularity, and he 
won 52% of the vote during the runoff election. The military accepted Shafiq’s loss, and 
Morsi assumed the presidency.
What intra-regime power arrangement would Morsi settle on to provide political 
stability? While the Muslim Brotherhood provided a well-organized base o f political 
support, members o f the former ruling party as well as the more liberal, secular elements 
o f the revolution withheld support, offering only criticism for Morsi’s policies. Morsi 
hoped to co-opt the Interior Ministry to ensure social order, and appointed Ahmed Gamal, 
a corrupt and “ruthless” police officer, to be the interior minister. Yet Morsi struggled to 
maintain control over the police forces, which failed to help him reign in the popular 
protests against him .129
In August, 2012, the military, in a sign of their willingness to withdraw from 
politics, accepted a decree that returned executive and legislative authority to Morsi’s 
government. Some analysts speculate President Morsi, along with the Islamist majority in 
the Constituent Assembly, protected the EAF’s autonomy in exchange for its tacit 
acceptance o f the new constitution, which expanded the military’s institutional 
prerogatives.130 For example, the constitution stipulated that eight o f the National 
Defense Council’s (NDC) fifteen seats would be designated for EAF officers. The NDC 
would have to be consulted before the president and parliament could declare war, and 
would retain oversight o f the defense budget. The arrangement gave the military the final 
say in military and national security affairs, and protected the military’s vast economic 
interests from civilian oversight. Thus rather than aggressively move to establish
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objective civilian control over the military, Morsi “acquiesced,” accepting their reserved 
domains.
The military’s quiet support provided a modicum of regime stability despite 
frequent challenges by the fragmented but outspoken liberal and secular opposition. 
Morsi’s prestige was bolstered by his role in brokering a cease-fire between Israel in 
Hamas in November, 2012. Later that month, however, President Morsi’s ill-advised 
decree that placed his actions above judicial review inflamed public opinion. While the 
controversial declaration, intended to prevent the dismissal of an Islamist-dominated 
constitution-writing panel by the Supreme Constitutional Court, allowed the panel to pass 
a draft charter that was approved in a national referendum on December 15, 2012,
Morsi’s legitimacy was seriously damaged, and protesters staged anti - Islamist sit-ins 
around the presidential palace.
The decree rendered the domestic political environment even more hostile to the 
economic reforms necessary for President Morsi to secure the $4.8 billion loan he 
desperately needed from the IM F.131 By the end of March 2013, Egypt was running out 
of the hard currency needed for fuel and food imports.132 Despite U.S. pressure, Morsi 
delayed implementing the reforms, which included tax increases and subsidy cuts, hoping 
to wait until after the parliamentary elections scheduled for April.133 Morsi was able to do 
this in part because o f aid from Qatar and Turkey, where leaders hoped to expand their 
influence on the Muslim Brotherhood - led regime at the expense o f their regional 
rivals.134
Meanwhile opposition groups such as the National Salvation Front (an umbrella 
opposition group that included Nasserists as well as former presidential candidate Amr 
Moussa) announced their intention to boycott the parliamentary elections. Tamarod 
(“Rebellion”) called for Egyptians to “take to the streets” on June 30, 2013, to force early 
presidential elections. Millions o f non-Islamist Egyptians, both supporters o f the old 
regime and revolutionaries, joined together to demonstrate against Morsi’s agenda. On 
July 26, the defense minister, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, sent the military out to
131 Kareem Fahim, "Egypt Requests $4.8 Billion from I.M.F.," The New York Times, August 22, 2012.
132 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Short o f  Money, Egypt Sees Crisis on Fuel and Food," ibid., March 30, 2013.
133 Farah Halime, "Egypt Shies Away from Economic Overhauls," ibid., March 6, 2013.
134 "Qatar Doubles Aid to Egypt," ibid., January 8, 2013.
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protect the demonstrations, later boasting not a single soldier defected.135 While the 
military had earlier been willing to quietly support Morsi’s regime, it was unwilling to act 
on the regime’s behalf against the protestors. The military removed Morsi from office on 
July 3rd, 2013. Almost immediately, though, clashes ensued between the military and 
Morsi’s supporters.
The Obama administration initially endorsed the military intervention; if officials 
called Morsi’s removal a coup, the $1.5 billion aid package bound for Egypt would have 
to be suspended, which risked exacerbating the economic crisis while costing American 
companies millions. On August 1,2013, Secretary of State John Kerry said Egypt’s 
military leaders were “restoring democracy” by removing Morsi on July 3rd.136 Morsi’s 
Defense Minister, General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, insisted he advised Morsi to change 
course, and explained he was only “carrying out the people’s will” by deposing him. 
Many Egyptians accepted the transitional government’s designation o f the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization because of the alarming rhetoric that had 
emanated from the pro-Morsi supporters at the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Cairo.137 
However, even those who welcomed Morsi’s departure were horrified by the bloodletting 
as security services cleared the sit-ins on August 14. The military and police then 
initiated a massive crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood organization before turning 
their attention to other “revolutionary” actors such as secular activists, artists, human 
rights groups, and foreign journalists. The military’s heavy hand exposed the limitations 
of American influence; Secretary o f Defense Hagel pleaded repeatedly with General Sisi 
to show restraint, but was virtually ignored.138
The violence against Morsi supporters, particularly the brutal clearing o f the sit-in 
at the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque in Cairo, escalated to a point where President Obama 
was forced to reprimand the Egyptian military and cancel the joint military exercise 
Bright Star, which was scheduled for September, 2013. The U.S. suspended the delivery 
o f four F-16 fighter jets to the Egyptian Air Force. Once again U.S. policymakers were
135 Hazem Kandil, "Sisi's Turn," London Review o f  Books 36, no. 4, www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n04/hazem- 
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138 Mark Landler and Peter Baker, "His Options Few, Obama Rebukes Egypt's Leaders," The New York 
Times, August 15, 2013.
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tom between the need to preserve relations with the EAF and their objections to flagrant 
human rights abuses. Obama stated, “While we want to sustain our relationship with 
Egypt, our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when civilians are being 
killed in the streets and rights are being rolled back.” 139
In March of 2014, Sisi expressed his intention to resign from the army and run for 
president. In the tradition of Egyptian autocrats, he sidelined a charismatic officer with 
the potential to develop his own popular following, General Ahmed Wasfi. Wafsi had 
suggested in a television interview that if  officers who had intervened in civil politics 
were subsequently promoted, that would seem to indicate the intervention had in fact 
been a coup.140 Sisi enjoyed the backing of the country’s business elite, and faced little 
opposition since the Muslim Brotherhood had been decimated and street protests were 
now illegal; in June, Sisi won 97% of the vote. An apathetic public ridiculed the low 
voter turnout online, and international observers reported that the “election fell short of 
international standards.” 141 With democracy activists and Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 
jails, public faith in democratic processes was at an all-time low. Nevertheless, by June, 
Washington announced Congress had approved the restoration of military aid, with 
Secretary o f State John Kerry stating, “the United States remains deeply committed to 
seeing Egypt succeed.” 142
While Americans continue to scrutinize its military aid for a regime that violates 
liberal-democratic processes, no Egyptian regime has to rely exclusively on political 
support from the United States. Regional competition for influence on Egyptian politics 
puts discontinuities in American political support in perspective, and explains the 
durability o f Egyptian patronage networks that underlie regime stability and impede 
economic and political development. For example, in the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, 
Saudi Arabia pledged $4 billion for development projects, including loans for small
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215
businesses and financing for Saudi exports.143 After President Morsi’s election, Qatari 
Prime Minister Sheik Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani announced Qatar would double its 
financial aid to Egypt, providing $8 billion to the Muslim-Brotherhood led regime.144 In 
an effort to support Egypt’s post-Morsi transitional government at the expense o f its 
Islamist rivals, the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates pledged $8 billion in cash and 
loans to Egypt.145 The pledge from the UAE came in the wake o f military violence 
against Muslim Brotherhood members protesting the removal of President Morsi. Putin 
supported Sisi’s bid for the presidency, and offered $2 billion worth o f arms to the new 
president.146
The Limitations of U.S. Military Aid on the EAF’s Professionalism
The Egyptian public’s demand for President Mubarak’s resignation in January 
2011 provided a test of the military’s professionalism, pulling the military into civil 
politics by forcing it to choose whether or not to act on behalf o f Mubarak to save his 
regime. Initially it seemed U.S. military aid, by establishing contacts between officers 
and providing a liberal-democratic model o f civil-military relations, had contributed 
decisively to the armed forces’ relative calm, discipline, and cohesiveness in the face o f 
massive assemblies o f people. This gave U.S. officials hope that the military could be 
good shepherds o f the historic transition to democracy. Unfortunately, Egypt’s domestic 
political turmoil since the January 25 revolution reflects the negative implications o f 
maintaining interests apart from national defense on a military institution’s respect for 
civilian political authority. The military’s economic interests, and the autonomy granted 
under President Mubarak to administer those interests, rendered the EAF’s top leaders 
contemptuous o f civilian oversight, and gave them a powerful incentive to negotiate for 
the expansion of the military’s institutional prerogatives in exchange for its tacit 
acceptance o f Mohamed Morsi’s presidency.
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Thus even though the armed forces demonstrated a willingness to “return to the 
barracks,” a positive sign of professionalization, within the military establishment exists 
the sense that the military deserves to be an autonomous political actor, entitled to a 
guardianship role in Egyptian politics. It remains to be seen if the newly civilian, former 
defense minister Sisi will be the transitional leader Egypt needs to restore its path to 
democratic consolidation, perhaps by allowing for a peaceful transfer o f power to an 
elected civilian leader at the end o f his term, but the early indicators suggest Sisi lacks the 
skill to manage Egyptian affairs without relying on Mubarak-era tactics o f coercion and 
repression. Egypt’s government is thus likely farther away from establishing objective 
civilian control over its military than it was prior to the Arab Spring, and the limits o f U.S. 
military aid in contributing to the professionalization o f the recipient’s military have been 
exposed.
The Tahrir Square demonstrations in early 2011 raised the prestige o f the 
Egyptian Armed Forces, thrusting them reluctantly back to the center o f Egyptian politics. 
However, in the months following, the SCAF relied on the repressive security services to 
keep the streets and squares free from demonstrations rather than take the opportunity to 
dismantle and reform the oversized, corrupt, and ruthless Interior Ministry.147 Riot police 
and plain-clothed thugs forced demonstrators to leave Tahrir Square sit-ins on March 9 
and April 8, and violently dispersed demonstrators in late June, when protesting families 
demanded security personnel be held accountable for violence against civilians. The 
Interior Ministry also hired thugs (posing as SCAF supporters) to harass a march to the 
Defense Ministry on July 23. Military-security violence against demonstrators became 
more routine as the year progressed, and the SCAF invoked the Sadat-era “emergency 
law” to allow police to arrest and detain civilians and try them before military courts.
The SCAF promised to lift the emergency laws and turn power over to civilians 
within six months, but within two months o f the revolution, the people began to grow 
frustrated that the military was not reigning in the security services nor bringing former 
government officials to justice.148 The SCAF’s commitment to democratic processes 
came under greater scrutiny when they released the “El-Silmi Document” ahead o f the
147 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, 234.
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217
parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2011. The document gave the SCAF 
legislative authority and complete autonomy over the military, protecting the armed 
forces from civilian oversight.149 While the military distanced itself from the document at 
the time amidst widespread public criticism, its principles resurfaced prior to the final 
round o f voting in the presidential elections, when the SCAF issued a constitutional 
declaration that granted itself legislative powers, freedom from civilian oversight, and a 
role in drafting the new constitution.150
SCAF member Major General Mamdough Shaheen explained Egypt’s new 
constitution must protect the armed forces against the “whims” of any future president, 
suggesting the military leadership’s desire to not only protect its reserved domains but 
also to establish a guardianship role for the military.151 The military’s subordination to 
civilian political authority was thus tenuous at best; retired General Hussam Sweilam 
stated in an interview with an American journalist, “We shall obey the president because 
he will be accepted by the people, but we will not accept any interference by the political 
parties in our military affairs.” 152
The military successfully negotiated a formal political role and expanded 
autonomy in exchange for tacit support of President Morsi and the Islamist majority in 
the Constituent Assembly.153 Violations of the liberal model o f civil-military relations 
include the stipulation that the minister o f defense be an actively serving EAF officer 
rather than a civilian, that the defense budget only need be approved by the National 
Defense Council (NDC), an entity led by the president but with 8 out o f 15 seats
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designated for EAF officers, and that the EAF retains the right to try civilians in military 
court if  they “harm the armed forces.” 154
Beyond these institutionalized violations of the liberal model of civil-military 
relations, the military’s professional competence has also been compromised by its 
reluctance to transform from a cumbersome conventional force to a smaller, more agile, 
rapid expeditionary force. In 2008, a secret American embassy cable warned General 
David H. Petraeus, then head of U.S. Central Command, that under Egypt’s long-time 
defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, “The tactical and operational 
readiness o f the Egyptian Armed Forces has decayed.” 155 While U.S. defense 
professionals have recommended spending U.S. military aid on training, counterterrorism, 
border security and counterinsurgency equipment, the EAF uses U.S. military aid to 
purchase sophisticated and showy weaponry like F-16 fighter jets, which require 
extensive training to fly and are also expensive to maintain.156 The Egyptian air force has 
one of the worst crash rates of any F-16 fleet in the world, and Egypt, which lacks an 
indigenous capacity to maintain its equipment, spends 15% of its military aid on 
maintenance contracts. This issue raises serious concerns about the ability o f the EAF to 
manage the surge in extremist violence, particularly in the Sinai, following the removal 
o f President Morsi and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.
While the military did briefly go “back to the barracks” during Morsi’s presidency, 
its leadership seems increasing comfortable with assuming a more prominent role in 
Egyptian politics, especially after more than forty years of marginalization by Presidents 
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. While the military has displayed extraordinary cohesiveness 
thus far, it is possible that junior and middle-ranking officers that sympathize with 
Islamists become increasingly disturbed by the military’s use of violence to subordinate 
Islamist groups. In addition, tensions between junior and middle-ranking officers and the 
privileged senior command could lead to factionalism and intervention, particularly if
154 Mirette F. Mabrouk, "The View from a Distance: Egypt's Contentious New Constitution," M iddle East 
Memo, no. 28 (2013); Zaid Al-Ali, "The N ew  Egyptian Constitution: an Initial Assessment o f  its Merits 
and Flaws," Open Democracy, www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/new-egyptian-constitution-initial- 
assessment-of-its-merits-and-flaws.
155 Quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller, "Egypt Stability Hinges on a Divided Military," The New York Times, 
February 5, 2011.
156 Eric Schmitt, "Cairo Military Firmly Hooked to U.S. Lifeline," ibid., August 20, 2013.
219
groups find common cause with pro-democracy civil society groups.157 The prospects for 
security sector reform on the whole, including the forces under Interior Ministry 
command, now seem dim. In declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, 
as well as banning public demonstrations and rounding up revolutionary activists, the 
military leadership has indicated its willingness to use force to remain at the center of 
Egypt’s politics.
Conclusions
From the signing o f the Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement of 1979, U.S. military aid 
has decisively rendered hostilities with Israel, a country that fought in four wars with 
Egypt since 1948, less likely. At the same time, American political support bolstered 
Egypt’s regional prestige and contributed to the stability of President Hosni Mubarak’s 
authoritarian regime, minimizing the chance that the military would intervene in Egypt’s 
civil politics. The billions o f dollars worth of credits for the purchase of American 
weapons, equipment, maintenance and training have contributed to the professionalism o f 
the Egyptian armed forces. Why, then, in the four years since the January 25 revolution in 
2011, have the military’s leaders expanded their role in Egyptian politics, and carried out 
a coup to remove a democratically - elected leader?
This case illuminates the relationship between U.S. military aid and the role of the 
recipient’s military in civil politics. In particular, it challenges several assumptions one 
might make based on the civil-military relations literature, particularly with respect to the 
influence that an external threat, political strength of the executive, and the 
professionalism of the armed forces have on the incentives and opportunity for the 
military to intervene. This section will offer some conclusions based on observations of 
the four periods covered in this study. The goal is that these conclusions may inform 
expectations in future cases when U.S. military is deemed necessary in support of 
American strategic interests.
157 Hashim, "The Egyptian Military Part Two: From Mubarak Onward," 121-23.
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Egypt’s Civil Military Relations and the External Threat
In the late 1940s, and early 1950s, different perceptions o f the external threat to 
Egypt’s security undermined U.S. efforts to reach a formal defense arrangement that 
would have been accompanied by U.S. military aid. While the United States was focused 
on meeting the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, Egyptians were more 
concerned with establishing their independence in foreign affairs and perceived Israel as 
a greater threat to their security than the Eastern bloc. Nasser’s Free Officers intervened 
to remove King Farouk from power not necessarily in response to an external threat, but 
rather to embark on a post-colonial nation building effort that would transform Egypt into 
the leader o f a pan-Arab movement.
Nasser, focused less on any external threat than on minimizing political 
challenges that would impede his ability to implement sweeping social, political, and 
economic reforms, deployed loyal military personnel to key political and economic posts 
throughout the country, and established a multilayered domestic security and intelligence 
apparatus to protect his regime. This massive politicization of the military undermined its 
military readiness, however, leading to the loss of political control over the military and 
culminating in the devastating loss of 17,500 military personnel and millions o f dollars 
worth o f military equipment in the 1967 war. Nasser subsequently looked to the Soviet 
Union to reform and modernize his military, as he purged the top-heavy, corrupt military 
leadership.
The most important observation regarding the relationship between the external 
threat and the military’s presence in civil politics is that Nasser successfully de­
politicized the military, subordinated it to his political authority, and enhanced its 
professionalism when the threat from Israel was arguably at its greatest. In other words, 
rather than using the external threat to justify a greater role for the military in Egyptian 
politics, Nasser used the external threat to justify removing the military from politics. In 
this case Soviet military aid was critical to his efforts to build up a military capable o f 
winning back the territory lost. This highlights the role that the political leadership in an 
authoritarian regime plays in determining the extent of politicization in the armed forces. 
Nasser believed that he needed to politicize his officers in the 1950s to maintain control
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over society as he was implementing his social and economic reforms. He learned, 
however, that this severely retarded military readiness, as promotions were based on 
patronage rather than merit, officers were distracted by interests apart from external 
defense, and the military’s leader, Field Marshall Amer, came to rival Nasser as a 
political figure, undermining Nasser’s control over the armed forces. Faced with a very 
real external threat, Nasser had to redefine his approach to civil-military relations.
The subordination of Egypt’s military to political authority that was initiated by 
Nasser was continued by Sadat, who relied on an expanding civilian security sector to 
guarantee domestic order. Sadat maintained control over the military even as its leading 
generals disagreed with their president’s managing of the impending military campaign 
against Israel. Sadat’s efforts fell short of attaining objective civilian control over his 
military, however. Rather than value the professional expertise o f his officer corps, Sadat 
downgraded the status of his armed force by assigning an economic development mission 
for the military, and sidelining experienced military officers. From Sadat’s perspective, 
the only way to truly mitigate the external threat posed by Israel was to reach a political 
solution, which could only be attained with the support of the United States. He could not 
afford to allow a political rival to emerge from the military who might challenge his 
authority to negotiate a peace agreement.
Mubarak benefited from the peace agreement with Israel as well as guaranteed 
access to military technology and training from the United States, thus enjoying a more 
favorable security environment than either o f his two predecessors. Nevertheless, he 
made no effort to establish objective civilian control over the armed forces. In addition, 
the reduced threat o f interstate war did not prevent him from linking the transnational 
threat posed by militant religious fundamentalism to his political opposition to justify 
excluding Islamist opposition groups from politics. Rather than use the military to 
suppress the opposition, as Nasser did for most of his presidency, Mubarak relied instead 
on the civilian security apparatus, which was far less likely to produce a rival political 
figure.
Domestic instability, rather than an external threat, pulled the military back into 
politics in early 2011. Despite early evidence the military was willing to return to the 
barracks, however, the military responded to continued domestic unrest by removing
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President Morsi from power; subsequently military leaders have linked the transnational 
terrorist threat to the Muslim Brotherhood to justify banning the group and its supporters 
from politics, just as Mubarak did during his rule. While such behavior risks American 
disapproval that could stem the flow of U.S. military aid, the military recognizes that the 
U.S. interest in continuing counterterrorism cooperation between Egypt, Israel and the 
United States means a cessation of aid is unlikely. In addition, Egypt’s wealthy regional 
neighbors have a vested interest in Egypt’s stability, and are willing to fund the purchase 
of arms from other sources such as Moscow or Beijing. The presence of alternatives 
continues to limit American influence on Egyptian policy.
Political Support
U.S. presidents from Truman to Obama have recognized not only the strategic 
importance o f Egypt, but its political significance as the most populous Arab state and 
historical leader o f the Arab world. Successive administrations have struggled to provide 
for the defense o f the Middle East while managing intra-regional rivalries, particularly 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt’s importance was such that the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations provided political support to President Nasser even in the absence of any 
formalized agreement on mutual defense. Despite this political support, which was 
decisive during the Suez crisis of 1956, President Nasser deliberately politicized his 
military to neutralize opposition from other sectors o f Egyptian society.
The dissolution of the United Arab Republic, the protracted military engagement 
in Yemen, estrangement from the U.S. during the Johnson administration, and economic 
crisis contributed to the erosion o f Nasser’s status both regionally and domestically. It is 
worthwhile to note that this political weakness rendered it more difficult for Nasser to 
maintain control over the armed forces ahead o f the 1967 war. It was only after the 
military had been humiliated that he was able to purge the military’s bloated top ranks 
and launch a campaign to de-politicize and professionalize the armed forces. Sadat’s 
ability to maintain political control over the armed forces throughout the 1973 war with 
Israel, despite employing a strategy at odds with the preferred approach of the military’s 
experts, is a reflection of the success of Nasser’s efforts.
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Presidents Sadat and Mubarak understood the risks inherent in politicizing the 
military to serve as a strategic partner for the regime, preferring instead to rely on 
political support from business elites and the expansive public sector backed up by the 
coercive arm of the interior ministry. Both presidents also recognized the need to satisfy 
the military’s corporate interests, which Sadat pursued through U.S. military aid and 
Mubarak augmented by encouraging the development of independent commercial 
interests. Mubarak benefited from continuity in American political support that helped to 
bolster his regime stability until the administration of President George W. Bush, which 
pressured him to open Egypt’s government to political competition. This galvanized civil 
society groups, particularly as it became increasingly evident Mubarak intended to pass 
the presidency on to his corrupt and profligate son Gamal. The extent to which the 
military as an institution felt its interests were distinct from President Mubarak’s was 
evident following the Tahrir Square demonstrations, when, in close consultation with 
counterparts in the U.S., its leaders ushered Mubarak from power.
The swiftness with which the military expanded its institutional prerogatives in 
the post-Mubarak period is testament to the extent to which a formal political role for the 
military had been denied since Nasser’s de-politicization campaign in the late 1960s. 
While initially willing to return to the barracks, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces first ensured it would retain a privileged role in foreign and national security 
policymaking through the National Defense Council. Egypt’s first democratically - 
elected leader, President Mohamed Morsi, had a vested interest in establishing objective 
civilian control over the military, yet instead adopted a policy o f acquiescence, allowing 
the military to retain its reserved domains in exchange for tacit approval of his 
government and the constituent panel in charge o f drafting Egypt’s new constitution. The 
constitution passed in 2012 would give the military even greater autonomy than in the 
past, and protect its interests from civilian oversight.
Capitalizing on Egyptians’ exasperation with military rule since the resignation of 
Mubarak, President Morsi set out to subordinate the military to his political authority, 
firing the defense minister and head o f the SCAF, Field Marshall Tantawi, along with the 
chief o f staff, and the chiefs of the navy, air force and air defense within six weeks of 
taking office. Despite this early success, Morsi ultimately failed to establish objective
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civilian control over the military. This failure stems not from a desire to politicize the 
military or co-opt the military as a strategic partner, but rather from political weakness. 
Morsi was elected by less than half o f the population, and while he enjoyed steady 
support from the Muslim Brotherhood, both revolutionary and Mubarak-era liberal and 
secular groups opposed his policies. His inability to secure the allegiance of the Interior 
Ministry resulted in the deterioration o f law and order, which exacerbated Egypt’s 
economic crisis as revenues from tourism and foreign investment plummeted. Had the 
military strongly resisted his presidency from the beginning, his tenure as president 
would have been even shorter.
Faced with mounting domestic opposition, Morsi was removed from office by the 
military despite having been the recipient o f American political support throughout his 
presidency. Any chance that Morsi might have had to reclaim his post evaporated when 
U.S. policymakers explained the military intervened to restore democracy. Events since 
have proven the military successfully exploited public demands for M orsi’s resignation to 
use force not only against Islamist political groups but all opposition groups within 
Egyptian society, resulting in an atmosphere of fear and repression and leaving the 
military as the predominant force in Egyptian politics.
The Egyptian public may be in a mood to settle for gradual reforms rather than 
revolutionary change. While most disapproved of the violent crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its supporters, few are eager to give the Islamist party another 
opportunity to govern. Also, the escalation of militant Islamist violence has highlighted 
the pitfalls o f democracy in the absence of a countervailing organized liberal opposition.
Recent discussions of conditionality emanating from the U.S. Congress in 
reaction to the gross human rights violations of the Egyptian armed forces is unlikely to 
change Egypt’s political landscape anytime soon, for several reasons. First, the United 
States, Egypt, and Israel have a stake in confronting the extremist violence that has 
surged in the Sinai since Morsi’s ouster. While the dominance of the Egyptian military in 
its civil politics is damaging for the social and economic welfare of the country, the U.S. 
and Israel know they can depend on security cooperation from Egypt’s government as 
long as the SCAF and NDC retain their decision-making authority. Second, U.S. military 
aid pays for defense contracts that have been negotiated months, if not years, prior to the
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delivery o f equipment and services. The termination of aid thus negatively impacts the 
American defense-industrial base, costing the U.S. millions in lost revenues and 
American jobs. Finally, even though Egypt relies on U.S. military aid for the 
maintenance o f existing equipment, wealthy regional neighbors are willing to provide the 
Egyptian government funds to purchase arms from alternative sources such as Russia.
The U.S. desire to retain the market for Egyptian military goods and services provides a 
powerful incentive to maintain the flow of American military aid.
Professionalism
U.S. military aid is expected to contribute to the professionalization of the 
recipient’s military, which is a precondition for establishing objective civilian control. A 
military’s professionalism has multiple dimensions, including competency, coherency, 
mission exclusivity, and respect for civilian political authority. This case revealed that the 
support of an outside power is critical for improving the competency o f the military in a 
developing country. Nasser and Sadat could not have prepared their military for its 
successful crossing of the Suez Canal at the outset o f the 1973 war with Israel in the 
absence o f military aid from the Soviet Union. This case also illuminates the extent to 
which the leader of an authoritarian regime has control over the level o f politicization of 
the military, with direct implications for the armed forces’ coherency, mission exclusivity, 
and respect for civilian authority. Nasser’s deliberate politicization of the military to 
secure his regime resulted in the fragmentation of his officer corps, where members were 
promoted based on loyalty rather than merit. The officers’ political roles distracted them 
from their mission of defense from external threats, leaving them ill-prepared for Israel’s 
military strike in 1967. Their lack of respect for civilian political authority stemmed from 
their role in directly supplanting the political structures that existed at nearly every level 
o f society during King Farouk’s rule.
Nasser’s post-June War de-politicization campaign dramatically improved the 
professionalism of the armed forces. No longer distracted by political affairs, the military 
became a more coherent body, and focused on the mission of preparing a force capable o f 
meeting the Israeli threat. The core group of military leaders who understood that
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professionalization enhanced the military’s readiness respected Nasser’s political 
authority, which Sadat was able to retain through the 1973 war. While the military’s 
respect of political authority is a precondition for the liberal-democratic model o f civil- 
military relations, Sadat’s frequent dismissal o f his most talented, experienced officers, 
including the “October Generation,” as well as his redirection o f the armed forces toward 
national economic development, undermined the professional competency o f the EAF. 
Designed more to marginalize the military than to actually serve a nation-building 
purpose, the military’s involvement in economic activities would evolve and expand 
under Mubarak until it festered into a reserved domain the military’s leaders would go to 
great lengths to protect. Whether these economic interests were intended to serve as a 
“coup-proofing” mechanism whereby the military’s interests would be linked to the 
regime’s patronage networks, or as a means to pay for the basic needs (wages, uniforms, 
food, housing) o f a 450,000 man military while keeping defense expenditures low, the 
cultivation of economic interests undermined the professional integrity of the EAF.
This case demonstrates that U.S. military aid contributed to the productivity of the 
military’s commercial ventures, placating the military and minimizing the likelihood the 
EAF would interfere with Mubarak’s presidency. When those interests were threatened, 
however, the military allowed Mubarak to step down while ensuring its interests would 
be formally protected in the new constitution. These economic interests thus cultivated a 
disdain for civilian political authority, as the military proved unwilling to submit its 
activities to civilian oversight. The argument can be made that these interests have also 
undermined the competency of the military, as more emphasis has been placed on 
procuring showy items like tanks and jets and items that contribute to the military’s 
commercial enterprises than training, logistics, and communications technology that 
would improve the military’s competency in counter-terrorism operations.
In exchange for tacit acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood, the military gained 
nearly complete autonomy from civilian oversight, more than four decades after being 
subordinated and marginalized by Nasser. The “tacit acceptance” proved short-lived as 
well, as the military abandoned Morsi, banned the Muslim Brotherhood, and rounded up 
democracy activists. Morsi’s defense minister retired, ran for president, and swiftly 
reasserted Mubarak-era authoritarian practices. While Sisi’s long -term vision for civil-
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military relations is uncertain, the military’s formal political role has been strengthened 
through the constitution passed by referendum in January, 2014.
What this case reveals is that de-politicization and subordination to political 
authority can occur, even in the absence o f U.S. military aid, and in the presence of an 
external threat, if  deliberately implemented by a regime with strong internal and external 
political support. The subordination o f the military under a weak democratic regime 
might prove more tenuous. It also reveals that de-politicization is not synonymous with 
professionalization; despite the presence o f large outlays of U.S. military aid, the 
professional competency of the military was allowed to erode out o f fear that a strong and 
capable military might pose a political challenge to the extant regime. After decades of 
comprehensive political repression that inhibited the ability o f opposition forces to 
coalesce, however, the military emerged as the only institution capable o f supplanting 
both Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. Despite being 
the recipient o f billions worth of U.S. military aid over the past three and a half decades, 
the Egyptian military is back in the center o f Egyptian politics.
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CHAPTER V 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This study began with some rather optimistic expectations about the role U.S. 
military aid might play in the civil-military relations of military aid recipients. As 
discussed, however, despite aid that mitigated the external threat to partners’ security, 
political support that bolstered civilian elites, and education and training that aimed to 
increase the professionalism of foreign armies, these three important allies, South Korea, 
Turkey, and Egypt, experienced multiple direct interventions, the expansion of their 
armies’ reserved domains, and periods o f direct military rule. Each case study includes a 
brief comparative dimension that examines the balance of power within the military and 
between military and civilian elites across periods, in part to account for the role of 
individual political elites in efforts to establish objective civilian control over the military. 
This chapter will examine the similarities and differences in the relationships between 
U.S. military aid and civil-military relations across cases.
External Threats and Civil-Military Relations
In addition to stationing U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea and Turkey, the 
United States provided material defense support that included advanced weaponry, 
logistics and communications equipment, and surplus military goods. The U.S. also 
contributed to military readiness by providing training for foreign troops and servicing 
equipment. While the presence o f American troops as well as improved military 
capabilities may have mitigated the external threat to the recipient nation’s defense, 
however, members o f the armed forces in South Korea and Turkey actually expanded 
their role in civil politics, particularly after 1960. Not until the 1990s did society’s 
tolerance for military interference decline to a point where civilian leaders were finally 
able to roll back institutional gains. In the case of Egypt, the U.S. has provided billions in 
military assistance since 1979. Thirty -  five years later, the Egyptian military is playing
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its most prominent role in Egypt’s civil politics since the Free Officers overthrew the 
monarchy in 1952.
The evidence from the case studies suggests several explanations for the 
seemingly contradictory relationship between US. military aid and the role o f the 
recipient’s military in civil politics, even when the United States mitigated the external 
threats to its partners’ security. These explanations are not necessarily analytically 
distinct from one another, but the discussion may provide some insight into the 
relationship between U.S. military aid and civil-military relations within a recipient state.
Military Motives: Beyond External Defense
Contrary to our expectations, the relationship between the external threat and 
military intervention is weak. In every instance of military intervention, the military, 
whether acting as an institution or a faction, responded to the political weakness o f the 
government as exemplified by its divisiveness, incompetency, corruption, political 
violence, and/or authoritarianism. Even when the recipient’s security environment was 
improved by U.S. military aid, these internal issues retained the power to pull the military 
into civilian politics. In addition, political leaders were able to implement civil-military 
reforms that reversed the institutional prerogatives of the military even when confronted 
by serious security challenges.
An example o f the primacy o f domestic political issues over external security 
concerns is the Free Officer intervention in 1952. Britain was Egypt’s security guarantor, 
and had successfully defended Egypt from Axis forces during World War II. Yet the Free 
Officers were angered by King Farouk’s obliging attitude toward the British, resentful of 
the corrupt civilian political elite, and disdainful of the king’s lack of respect for the 
military high command’s advice prior to the Arab-Palestinian war in 1948. Even though 
Egyptians considered Israel a hostile neighbor, and the West worried about Soviet seizure 
o f the Suez Canal, the Free Officers identified with the public surge of nationalism and 
called for the expulsion of all British troops from Egyptian territory. Had the Free 
Officers truly felt that Egypt faced an imminent external security threat, they might have 
been more amenable to British patronage, or accepted American offers to establish a
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Middle Eastern defense architecture centered on Egypt. Instead, President Nasser 
exploited the Cold War competition to gain concessions from both the United States and 
the Soviet Union.
The intervention led by Park Chung Hee in 1961, was fueled by officers’ 
frustration with the failure of the democratically elected government of Chang Myon to 
implement necessary economic and military reforms after President Rhee’s resignation in 
1960. While Rhee had insisted maintaining an oversized active force (as opposed to a 
smaller active force with a large reserve force) was necessary for South Korea’s security, 
Park shifted his focus to economic growth, working closely with the Kennedy 
administration to design a program that would improve South Korea’s self-sufficiency in 
the long-term. While Korea’s economic strength and national security were inextricably 
linked, the intervention in 1979, led by future president Chun Doo Hwan and members of 
the Hanahoe faction, occurred as South Korea was surpassing the North with respect to 
industrial capacity, modernization, and military capability. In other words, despite a 
dramatic improvement in South Korea’s security environment, members of the military 
were still willing to use force to maintain their political hegemony and institutional 
prerogatives.
Turkey perhaps enjoyed the most stable security environment of the three cases in 
1960. Not only were bilateral relations with the United States strong, Turkey had the 
second largest army in NATO, and was a core member of CENTO. However, the Turkish 
public was frustrated by the undemocratic behavior of the Menderes government, which 
had suppressed almost all opposition activity, and the military was offended by Menderes’ 
attempts to use the armed forces against his opponents. After the coup, Turkey’s military 
junta worked closely with the Kennedy administration on an economic program, and 
drafted the most liberal constitution in Turkey’s history. The junta’s purge of 
“reactionary” military officers was designed to maximize the military’s ideological 
cohesion, even though in the short-term it undermined military readiness. The 
intervention in 1971 was conducted after the civilian government failed to carry out the 
reforms recommended by the military in 1970, which focused on economic issues. While 
the direct intervention in 1980 is widely recognized as a reaction to escalating political 
violence, the military had refrained from intervening earlier in the decade, even when
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government weakness led to the American arms embargo that had a detrimental impact 
on the Turkey’s military capability. The military’s interference in 1980, 1997, and 2007 
was more a reaction to the rise o f political Islam, which the military considers a threat to 
the Turkish Republic as conceived by founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
This does not suggest that external, geopolitical circumstances had no relationship 
with military interventions. External threats were the impetus for U.S. military aid, which 
increased the strength o f foreign militaries in relation to government and society. The 
invasion of South Korea was the driving force behind the U.S. commitment to expanding, 
equipping, and training South Korea’s military during the Korean War, which rendered it 
an attractive strategic partner for Rhee and increased its capacity to dominate Korean 
politics. The threat o f Soviet dominance over Turkey in the postwar period drove the 
decision to modernize the Turkish military. The military aid that underpins the Israel- 
Egypt peace treaty is designed to guarantee a balance of capabilities between the two 
military aid recipients, who fought four wars against each other from 1948 through 1973. 
In doing so, however, military aid has contributed to the strength of the Egyptian military 
in relation to civil society and state institutions. In other words, while U.S. military aid 
mitigated the external threat, in doing so it increased the capacity o f the military to 
intervene.
Mitigating the threat also had the potential to disrupt dominant internal political 
narratives. For example, in South Korea and Turkey, it gave opposition parties an 
opening to challenge the “total national security” narrative that justified the centralization 
of political authority in Korea and political alignment with the United States in Turkey. 
Turkish opposition and radical groups exploited anti-American sentiment for domestic 
political gain, undermining the political authority of incumbent regimes. Thus the easing 
of tensions, or the sense o f a reduced threat, led to an increase in political contestation. In 
a country with populations vulnerable to extremist messages as well as underdeveloped 
political institutions incapable o f dealing with competitive politics, parliamentary 
deadlock and violence may pull the military into the civil sphere.
The weak relationship between the external threat and military intervention is also 
revealed by the fact that civilian leaders were able to subordinate the military to their 
political leadership even when the external threat was high. For example, when Egypt
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was arguably at its most vulnerable to external threats, after the devastating Six Day War 
in June 1967, Nasser became determined to de-politicize the military. Nasser blamed the 
politicization o f the military from 1952 onward for undermining the armed forces’ 
professionalism, leading to the undisciplined, divided, and ineffective force that provoked 
Israel’s offensive by marching into the Sinai. Nasser exploited the political weakness o f 
the military following its humiliating defeat to purge corrupt and politicized officers, then 
looked to the Soviet Union to modernize and professionalize the Egyptian Armed Forces. 
Nasser’s initiative was so successful that his unpopular successor, Anwar Sadat, was able 
to maintain firm control over the military despite disagreements with the EAF’s high 
command over the campaign against Israel in 1973.
Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey was able to implement civil-military reforms 
that dramatically reduced the TAF’s institutional prerogatives despite the collapse o f his 
“zero problems with neighbors” policy, which has brought Ankara at odds with Syria’s 
Bashar al-Assad. Turkey’s external security has been threatened by Kurdish terrorism, 
Syria’s civil war, Iraq’s sectarian violence, and most recently by ISIS, and complicated 
by Western pressure to sanction Iran and Russia, and Arab pressure to censure Israel. Yet 
despite relying heavily on the military to carry out his foreign policy, throughout his 
premiership Erdogan, bolstered by society’s support o f the EU accession process, 
removed many o f the formal and informal mechanisms the military has relied upon to 
shape Turkish politics since 1960.
Finally, while this study made the point that during President Chun’s term the 
balance of power on the Korean peninsula tilted in South Korea’s favor, the ROK is still 
threatened enough by North Korea that in 2014, Korea’s government requested the plan 
to transfer wartime operational control from American to Korean forces be delayed until 
the 2020s.1 The U.S. maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, and under the current 
arrangements, if war breaks out the 655,000-strong South Korean forces will fall under 
American command. The delay is in response to continued provocations by North Korea 
that include nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013, long-range rocket launches in 2009 and 2012, 
the sinking o f a South Korean naval vessel in March, 2010, that killed 46 Korean sailors,
1 Mark E. Manyin et al., "U.S. - South Korea Relations," in Congressional Research Service (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 7.
233
and the November 2010 artillery attack on the South Korean island o f Yeonpyeong-do 
that killed four Koreans.2
Linkages: The External Threat and the Political Opposition
While the relationship between the external threat and military intervention in 
civil politics may be weak, U.S. military aid still lends legitimacy to political elites’ 
claims that security issues justify the centralization of their authority and lends credibility 
to linkages between the external threat and the political opposition. In doing so these 
political elites may, or may not, politicize the military by mobilizing armed forces against 
their critics. In some cases leaders’ may rely on another coercive apparatus, such as a 
special civilian security force, to restrict the opposition.
For example, in 1952, in the middle of the Korean War, President Rhee accused 
Chang Myon and other politicians o f being Communist sympathizers, and used the 
military to arrest and intimidate legislators. President Park used the external threat posed 
by North Korea to discredit opposition leader Kim Dae Jung’s campaign in the 1971 
presidential elections. President Park justified the repressive Yushin constitution, which 
he relied on the military to implement, by citing the administrative efficiency and 
political strength necessary to conduct reunification negotiations with North Korea.
When General Chun Doo Hwan ordered the brutal military crackdown on pro-democracy 
activists in Kwangju in 1980, he insisted the demonstrators threatened to undermine 
Korea’s stability. In reality, he wanted to quell opposition forces within society to pave 
the way for his presidency.3
Authoritarian leaders do not necessarily pull the military into politics to suppress 
opposition activity, however. For decades President Mubarak o f Egypt linked the external 
threat posed by transnational terrorism with political opposition groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Presidents Sadat and Mubarak relied on the civilian security 
apparatus to harass and intimidate the political opposition, mindful of the pitfalls of 
pulling the military into civil politics. The SCAF that governed after Mubarak resigned in
2 Ibid., 10.
3 Mike Tharp, "A Year After Korean Uprising, Chun's Grip is Firm," The New York Times, May 27, 1981.
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2011 continued to rely on the security services, as they were reluctant to be pulled into an 
internal policing role. However, since the coup that removed President Morsi, the SCAF 
and President Sisi have used both the civilian security apparatus as well as the military 
against opposition groups. President Sisi justifies the brutalization of Morsi supporters by 
insisting they are all religious extremists, trying civilians in military courts, and 
conflating terrorism with political Islam to justify banning the Muslim Brotherhood from 
politics.
Prime Minister Menderes’ attempt to use the military against opposition leader 
Ismet Inonu provoked a strong reaction within the officer corps, and is thought to be one 
o f the reasons for the coup in 1960. Yet the military junta that intervened in 1980 also 
restricted political activity throughout its nearly three - year period o f military rule, 
arguing such constraints were necessary to minimize the risk o f political violence. In 
particular, the military wanted to avoid the participation of Islamist parties such as 
Erbakan’s National Salvation Party.4
The linkages between political opposition groups and external security threats are 
more difficult to defend when the threat recedes. For example, during the 1980s, as the 
balance of power on the Korean peninsula shifted toward South Korea, President Chun 
could not credibly accuse pro-democracy activists and other opposition groups of being 
North Korean sympathizers or Communists. Society was less tolerant o f martial law and 
national security rhetoric, and Chun eventually conceded to modest political reforms.
The Role o f  Expectations
The nature o f U.S. military support for Korea and Turkey provided in the 1950s 
and 1960s differed from the military support for Egypt appropriated in the last three 
decades. In the case of Korea and Turkey, U.S. officials wanted military aid to contribute 
to the modernization of their armed forces, which would allow for force reduction, 
creating less of a burden on the recipient’s budget in the long-term. U.S. policymakers 
believed economic and political factors would be just as important to the long-term 
security of their allies as having a strong military. Thus they emphasized the importance
4 "Stem Army Rule in Turkey Stills the Voices o f  Islam," ibid., November 14, 1980.
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of industrializing and developing indigenous defense production capabilities in order to 
be self-sufficient in the future.
Economic development has been credited with a role in facilitating transitions to 
democracy in the long-term.5 Over time, economic growth contributes to a favorable 
balance o f capabilities that renders it more difficult for ruling elites to credibly link the 
external security threat with their political opposition. While Korea and Turkey did not 
necessarily always follow Washington’s economic advice, the expectation that U.S. 
military aid would decline in the long term had a powerful impact on their leaders’ 
commitment to economic development. However, despite international pressure for 
Egypt to implement economic reforms, particularly since the late 1970s, there has been 
no comparable expectation on the part of Egypt’s leaders that at some point in the future 
they will have to take full responsibility for maintaining their own military capability.
In the case of South Korea and Turkey, government officials understood ffom the 
mid-1950s onward that their military assistance was in decline. The Eisenhower 
Administration very clearly did not want the United States to bear the economic burden 
o f its extensive network of allied nations indefinitely, as over time it would deplete the 
finances o f the United States, causing balance o f payments problems and other economic 
difficulties that would weaken the U.S. vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The profuse economic 
advice provided by U.S. officials to the governments o f South Korea and Turkey during 
these years reflects a desire by American policymakers to assist their partners in 
developing a viable economy that could provide for its own defense in the future. Thus 
policymakers in the recipient states were told repeatedly that while the American security 
guarantees and mutual defense treaties would endure, they could not count on the 
presence of U.S. forces and military grants forever. This lies in stark contrast with the 
expectations of President Mubarak’s government, which likely never considered its 
military aid to be in jeopardy. In this way state leaders’ expectations regarding the future 
of U.S. military aid flows may have impacted their decision-making with respect to 
economic development, motivating President Park and Prime Minister Ozal to implement
5 Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal o f  Dem ocracy 7, no. 1 (1996); M. 
Steven Fish and Omar Choudhry, "Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist 
World," Com parative Political Studies 40 (2007).
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economic reforms that would facilitate the creation of an indigenous defense industrial 
base.
President Rhee’s single-minded determination to unify the Korean peninsula in 
his lifetime meant he was willing to suffer the economic burden o f his armed forces, even 
though U.S. officials insisted his military was too large. Rhee pressed for more aid, more 
U.S. troops, and more materiel throughout his term, resisting American efforts to redirect 
resources to economic development. President Park, however, had a keen understanding 
of how dependence on U.S. aid undermined his national security policy-making 
autonomy, and knew the only way for Korea to be truly independent and face the North 
Korean and Chinese Communist threat was to industrialize. He emphasized the 
importance of self-reliance, and found the external threat posed by North Korea to be a 
powerful mobilizing tool for Korean society. By linking economic development to 
national security, Park legitimized the presence of members o f the military establishment 
in government and industry, and established broad-based support for his austerity 
measures and other uncomfortable economic reforms throughout his first two terms. The 
Guam Doctrine, along with the prospect o f American military withdrawal from South 
Korea, gave further impetus to his economic programs. When public support for his 
policies began to decline, Park restricted political activity and moved to consolidate his 
political authority in order to continue his economic programs through the 1970s.
Turkish officials also understood their economy would need to eventually support 
its own defense industrial establishment, but struggled to find a civilian leader with the 
political authority to implement unpopular economic reforms. Menderes’ effort to 
liberalize the economy met early success in the 1950s, but public support dwindled when 
the economy later stalled. Senior military leaders were so frustrated with the inability of 
parliament to implement economic reforms throughout the 1960s, they put forward their 
own recommendations in 1970, and forced Prime Minister Demirel to dissolve his 
government in 1971, when it proved unable to pass necessary legislation. Prime Minister 
Bulent Ecevit lost electoral support when he tried to introduce modest economic reforms 
in October 1979, and his successor Demirel’s austerity measures caused discontent 
among Turks as prices, inflation, and unemployment soared.6 When the military
6 Howe, "Angry Turks Resist N ew  Policies and Higher Prices."
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intervened in 1980, the junta appointed the architect of the plan, Turgut Ozal, to 
implement the reforms. Unlike after the intervention in 1960, the military restricted 
political activity to guarantee political order during Ozal’s premiership. The competent 
and respected Ozal, unlike Park, did not deliberately politicize the military to consolidate 
his political authority and guide the economic reforms; rather, the military acted 
autonomously to assume a guardianship role, even after military rule ended in 1983. 
President Evren and Ozal together were able to maintain political stability while 
implementing the economic reforms that allowed for a transformation of Turkey’s 
economy in the 1980s, and the development of an indigenous defense industrial base.
Egypt turned down American offers for security arrangements in the first two 
decades of the Cold War primarily because of domestic and regional political concerns. 
President Nasser found it more profitable to exploit the Cold War rivalry for concessions 
that would advance his interests, particularly with respect to his vision of pan-Arabism 
and neutralizing regional rivals. With both the United States and the Soviet Union 
offering economic and military aid, Nasser was free to realize his vision of socialism, and 
set about expanding the public sector and constructing a massive social welfare system 
that would undermine Egypt’s economy for the next five decades. Post-Suez crisis 
optimism emboldened him to launch his “Socialist Decrees” in 1961, initiating an 
unprecedented nationalization of private assets that further centralized the state’s control 
over the economy. Only after the economic crisis in 1965, and the devastating June war 
in 1967, did Nasser give up on his economic program and turn decisively to the Soviets 
for military and economic aid.
While Sadat, unlike Nasser, was convinced Egypt’s future was with the West, the 
economic reforms he implemented in the 1970s were targeted more toward linking the 
country’s entrepreneurs and business elites with his regime for his own regime security 
than developing a viable economy that could provide for its own defense. The reforms he 
did introduce, including reductions in government subsidies, were met with riots in 1977. 
Unlike Korea and Turkey, Egypt under Mubarak had no expectation that U.S. military aid 
would decline (although in real terms it has, because $1.3 billion in 1987 is worth more 
than $1.3 billion in 2014.) Once Egypt had secured what Mubarak perceived as 
unconditional material support for the Egyptian armed forces, Mubarak would make no
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serious effort to reform Egypt’s economy; in fact he worsened conditions by encouraging 
the development o f commercial enterprises within the military. The U.S. military aid to 
Egypt that began in 1979 should have helped Egyptian policymakers implement 
economic reforms by freeing government resources that could be invested in economic 
development. However, Mubarak chose instead to rely on the political legitimacy 
conferred by generous welfare programs and a bloated public sector, while securing the 
military’s loyalty by expanding and protecting its material interests.
When Mubarak was faced with increasing international pressure to privatize state 
assets in the 1990s, his closest associates were the beneficiaries, reinforcing his extensive 
patronage networks. Meanwhile, Egyptians graduating ffom university found few jobs, 
public sector jobs were decreasing, and the economy remained underdeveloped. In 
essence, Mubarak squandered the opportunity to modernize his economy, choosing 
personal political stability over long-term economic development. His attitude that the 
U.S. owed Egypt military aid in exchange for privileged access to the Suez Canal and 
peace with Israel undermined the ability of U.S. officials to influence Mubarak’s 
economic policies. In addition, U.S. policymakers had a markedly different attitude 
toward the aid appropriated to Egypt compared to the aid allocated to Korea and Turkey 
in the 1950s and 1960s: aid sent to Korea and Turkey would continue only until those 
countries’ economies were capable o f supporting their armed forces on their own, while 
aid to Egypt would continue indefinitely.
Undermining U.S. influence further has been the fact that Egypt has more 
alternatives for political and economic support than South Korea or Turkey did in the 
1950s and 1960s. South Korea has historically been the subject of great power rivalry in 
North East Asia, and Turkey’s postwar relations with its regional neighbors were either 
hostile or underdeveloped. Not only did Egypt enjoy support from the eastern bloc, other 
than the post-Camp David Accords period of isolation ffom the Arab League, Saudi 
Arabia and other GCC countries have been generous patrons, vying for influence over 
their most populous Arab neighbor and more than willing to make up for Egyptian budget 
shortfalls “with no strings attached.”
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U.S. Political Support and Establishing Objective Civilian Control
The American political support for civilian leaders that accompanies U.S. military 
aid should make it easier for leaders to establish objective civilian control over their 
military establishments. There are multiple ways in which Washington can demonstrate 
its political support: state visits, positive public statements, sponsorship in international 
institutions, economic aid, cultural or student exchanges, preferential trade agreements, 
scientific cooperation, or support for the recipient’s regional policy preferences. These 
expressions o f political support ideally provide a boost to civilian political leaders, 
lending legitimacy to their policies, and thus limiting the political options of anti- 
government forces within the military to interfere in civil politics. Reinforcing the 
political power o f civilian elites should render it easier to establish and maintain objective 
civilian control over the armed forces.
Unfortunately, despite more than 160 years of cumulative American political 
support to South Korea, Turkey and Egypt, there is only one example in this entire study 
of a civilian leader who successfully established objective civilian control over the 
military. This section identifies three primary reasons for this unexpected, and 
discouraging, finding. First, political leaders did not necessarily attempt to establish 
objective civilian control. In some cases they deliberately politicized the military to 
reserve the option of mobilizing the armed forces in support o f their party. In other 
instances, political leaders who had motivation to establish objective civilian control 
instead adopted a policy of “acquiescence,” whereby they accepted the military’s 
reserved domains in government or industry in exchange for the military’s tacit support 
of their government. Finally, American political support was at times characterized by 
discontinuity, even when the fundamental strategic alignment that underpinned military 
aid and bilateral ties persisted. These discontinuities could be highly disruptive to the 
recipient’s domestic politics, in some cases pulling the military deeper into politics.
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Deliberate Politicization
American policymakers may assume that civilian leaders want to establish 
objective civilian control over the military, as minimizing officers’ presence in civil 
politics ensures the military cannot pose a challenge to their authority. However, as these 
studies demonstrate, this is not always the case.
There are multiple incentives for politicizing the military. The armed forces can 
be highly effective strategic partners, particularly when their prestige and competency is 
enhanced by U.S. military aid. For example, if  society holds the military in high esteem, 
then having the military’s support expands the regime’s political base, and may even in 
some circumstances provide economic support for a ruling party. Civilian leaders, 
understanding the military establishment is a potential political competitor, may seek to 
co-opt the military by deliberately pulling officers’ into civil politics in exchange for their 
loyalty. This loyalty might ensure unpopular regimes can use the coercive apparatus of 
the state to intimidate the opposition or quell societal unrest.
The civilian, democratically - elected President Rhee enjoyed external political 
support from the United States, yet rather than establish objective civilian control over 
the military, Rhee deliberately politicized particular factions to reserve the option of 
mobilizing the military against his opposition. He also condoned corruption in exchange 
for the military’s economic and political support. Rhee did not have to politicize all o f the 
officers; many officers resented those who acted on Rhee’s behalf and understood that 
politicization undermined the military’s professionalism. Ultimately this eroded the 
cohesiveness o f the military; Park’s associates were motivated to intervene in 1961 in 
part because of the inability o f the democratically - elected government of Chang Myon 
to remove corrupt officers from their privileged posts.
Park, who retired from military service and was elected president in 1963, also 
benefited from Washington’s political support. Park wanted Korea to have a modem, 
professionalized armed service, but he also chose not to establish objective civilian 
control over the military. Park relied on the military to serve as his political base, and 
wanted to reserve the option of mobilizing select military personnel to suppress his 
political opposition and maintain domestic order. While Park’s political authority
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retained its primacy, he deliberately politicized officers in the “security track” to establish 
networks of loyal supporters within the military and intelligence communities. He 
ensured the loyalty of the rest of the military by protecting its corporate interests, and 
providing special incentives such as privileged positions in government and industry.
Former General Ismet Inonu discouraged the Turkish military from intervening to 
reverse the electoral victory o f Prime Minister Menderes’ Democrat Party at the 
beginning o f Turkey’s multiparty rule in 1950. Rather than establish objective civilian 
control over the military, however, Menderes later tried to mobilize the military on his 
behalf by using military personnel to harass the opposition. The Turkish military’s sense 
o f being above politics and resistance to deliberate politicization is deeply ingrained, and 
the resentment incurred by Menderes’ attempt to politicize the military contributed to the 
military intervention in 1960. No civilian Turkish leader has attempted to politicize the 
military since; unfortunately, the TAF politicized itself by assuming a more assertive 
guardianship role over Turkish politics after the 1960 coup.
Both Park and Egypt’s President Nasser intended to stay in power indefinitely. 
Even though both were retired officers, they never had complete control over their 
respective militaries, and both relied on expanding the military’s reserved domains in 
exchange for political support. Park, however, insulated most o f his military from politics, 
such that by the 1980s, the majority o f Korean military officers were resistant to 
politicization, rendering the military leadership amenable to President Kim Young Sam’s 
reforms in the 1990s. Nasser, however, allowed all of his military to be politicized, with 
disastrous consequences in 1967. After 1967, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak would each be 
determined to keep the military out o f politics. Rather than establish objective civilian 
control, however, they chose to placate the EAF by encouraging the military to develop 
independent economic interests, creating a revenue stream for the military independent of 
the government, and a special interest the military would go to great lengths to protect.
Acquiescence
While not all leaders desire objective civilian control over the military, those who 
do may have difficulty achieving it if the military has already established reserved
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domains in government and industry. This study has discussed how the political 
leadership can take decisive action, even in the presence of an external threat, to de- 
politicize the military. President Kim Young Sam, President Nasser, and Prime Minister 
Erdogan provide examples. Yet in all three cases these leaders were acting from a 
position o f domestic political strength. External support can be useful; U.S. support leant 
legitimacy to Kim’s efforts, Soviet support may have bolstered Nasser, while the EU 
encouraged Erdogan. Yet external support in the absence of domestic political support is 
unlikely to be decisive, and in some cases may be a liability.
For example, the elected civilian prime minister o f South Korea, Chang Myon, 
had incentive in 1960 to establish objective civilian control over the military. He had long 
criticized Rhee’s authoritarian behavior and advocated a return to democratic processes. 
The U.S. had supported Rhee’s resignation and was optimistic that the new regime could 
implement much - needed economic and political reforms. Yet Chang found it difficult to 
rid the military of those officers who had been politicized by Rhee. Rather than expel 
these officers from the military, Chang adopted a policy of acquiescence, angering 
officers like Park who resented military corruption. After Park’s death in 1979, the 
martial law commander and the acting president wanted to establish objective civilian 
control, but under intense pressure from General Chun Doo Hwan and his Hanahoe 
faction, instead allowed Chun to assume the presidency.
Roh Tae Woo, Chun’s close associate who surprised critics by supporting 
democracy activists and advocating for elections in 1987, did not attempt to implement 
civil-military reforms, mindful o f the tenuous nature of military support for liberalization. 
Roh’s decision to peacefully transfer power to the first non-military president in more 
than three decades, Kim Young Sam, helped secure military support for Kim’s successful 
drive to depoliticize the military. In addition to U.S. political support, domestic support, 
support from senior military leaders, and a mandate for reform, Kim’s efforts were 
facilitated by the military’s political weakness following a corruption scandal. While the 
post-Cold War security environment is often credited with Kim’s ability to decisively 
establish objective civilian control over the military, Roh also enjoyed a favorable 
security environment and American political support; Roh’s adoption of a policy of
243
acquiesence was more likely a recognition that his personal political strength still rested 
on the support of the Hanahoe faction within the military.
In Turkey after 1960, the armed services played an active guardianship role in 
government, monitoring the behavior o f civilian politicians and intervening when they 
deemed necessary to restore democratic processes. They maintained the guardianship role 
by expanding their institutional prerogatives, and returning to the tradition o f the 
presidency being held by the former chief of the general staff. After the execution of 
Prime Minister Menderes, Turkey’s civilian leaders understood the hazards o f attempting 
to politicize the military for their own political purposes. In addition, no single civilian 
politician could acquire the personal political strength to challenge the military, as the 
1961 constitution had expanded political participation, and parliamentary politics became 
increasingly unstable as political parties struggled to form coalition governments. Rather 
than attempting to force a military retreat from civil politics, civilian leaders such as 
recurring Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel adopted a policy o f acquiescence, deferring 
to the military’s expanded institutional prerogatives.
While observers have noted Prime Minister Ozal’s ability to assign his preferred 
candidate for the chief of the General Staff, as well as break the post-1960 presidential 
tradition by running for president, Ozal also primarily adopted a policy of acquiescence. 
Ozal enjoyed the backing of the Reagan administration, yet he accepted the military’s 
expanded role in civil affairs exercised through the NSC. The extent to which the military 
retained its formal and informal political power was evident in 1997, when the military 
successfully mobilized civil society groups and the media to pressure Islamist Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. While political support from the EU is credited for 
Prime Minister Erdogan’s ability to implement civil military reforms, his efforts would 
not have been successful if the EU accession process did not enjoy support from the 
Turkish public as well as the military.
After his election victory, President Morsi demonstrated his desire to establish 
objective civilian control over the military when he fired the Defense Minister of twenty 
years, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, who had led the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF), the junta that led Egypt from February 2011 until Morsi’s election.7 Yet
7 Kareem Fahim, "In Upheaval for Egypt, Morsi Forces Out Military Chiefs," ibid., August 12, 2012.
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Morsi, too, ultimately chose a policy of acquiescence, as he lacked the broad-based 
domestic political support necessary to confront the military’s entrenched economic 
interests as well as the institutional prerogatives seized by the SCAF after the resignation 
of President Mubarak. Morsi allowed the military to expand its reserved domains in 
government and protect its autonomy in the revised constitution of 2012, in exchange for 
tacit approval o f the new constitution and Morsi’s presidency.
Discontinuities
External political support did aid those leaders, such as Nasser, Kim, and Erdogan, 
who sought to establish civilian supremacy over the armed forces. External political 
support matters; for example, the Truman administration opted not to act on King 
Farouk’s behalf, and urged the UK not to prevent the Free Officers from seizing power in 
1952. Washington ordered the UN military command in Korea not to use force against 
the coup leaders who displaced the Chang government in 1961, and the decision to 
recognize and provide military aid to the Park and Chun governments paved the way for 
other countries to continue diplomatic, political, and economic ties. The Reagan 
administration’s decision to recognize and support General Evren’s military junta in 
Turkey contributed to its ability to govern and implement economic reforms for nearly 
three years.
Yet American political support is not necessarily a constant, reassuring factor for 
civilian leaders. Political support for allies can be inconsistent from one administration to 
the next, characterized by disconnects between White House and Congressional attitudes, 
and even perceived as a liability when opposition groups accuse incumbents o f being 
overly-eager to serve American interests.
For example, President Eisenhower had established strong relations with Turkey, 
but President Kennedy strained bilateral relations by bargaining away Turkey’s Jupiter 
missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis. That was nothing in comparison to the damage 
done by the infamous Johnson letter, however. The letter, once released to the public, 
outraged Turkish society, which was insulted by the harsh tone toward Inonu, a revered 
statesman. That event fueled anti-American sentiment as Turks increasingly insisted a
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“Greek lobby” was leading to American policies that favored Greek interests at Turkey’s 
expense, particularly with respect to Cyprus. These discontinuities undermined civilian 
leaders who supported pro-American policies, and opened the door for increased political 
contestation, particularly from fringe groups, which ultimately pulled the military into 
politics in 1971 and 1980.
American political support for Egypt was also problematic in the early years of 
the Cold War. The Egyptian public’s resistance to alignment with Western “colonial” 
powers is a primary reason why Egyptian leaders resisted a defense arrangement with the 
U.S. for three decades. In the minds of the Egyptian public, a defense agreement with the 
U.S. was tantamount to colonialism. The legacy of British colonial rule, plus the 
appearance of Congressional and public favoritism vis-a-vis Israel, rendered alignment 
with the U.S. a liability for King Farouk; Nasser would also explain to Washington 
officials that the particularities of Arab politics precluded formal bilateral arrangements.
The 1970s were perhaps the most politically incoherent in terms of the policy 
preferences of the White House and Congress. While Nixon and Kissinger favored a 
pragmatic, unsentimental approach to foreign affairs, and wanted the U.S. to engage in 
international politics from a position of strength, Congress was critical of President 
Park’s authoritarian behavior and Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus. When Secretary of 
State Kissinger tried to forestall the cessation of military aid to Turkey, and President 
Ford pled unsuccessfully with Congress to lift the arms embargo, America’s allies took 
note: no matter the assurances from ambassadors, the secretary of state, or the president 
himself, Congress could halt funding if it so desired. To literally add insult to injury, 
Congressmen could also release unflattering statements that embarrassed friendly 
incumbent regimes, damaging their domestic and international prestige.
Discontinuities in American political support can impact civilian political leaders 
in unpredictable ways that are potentially inimical to objective civilian control. President 
Park drew his military deeper into politics as Congress became increasingly critical of his 
authoritarian behavior in the 1970s, despite Nixon and Kissinger’s assurances. The 
dramatic shift in tone from the Nixon and Ford Administrations to President Carter, who 
sought to elevate the role of American values in the foreign policy agenda, increased 
Park’s insecurity, and he relied more heavily on his inner circle to suppress dissent
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through the use of force. While President Reagan also deplored the Korean military’s 
excesses, his administration believed engagement and continuity would be more 
beneficial to eventual long-term political liberalization than isolation. President Chun 
thus enjoyed strong political support from the U.S., which rendered him more amenable 
to modest political liberalization.
American political support largely served as a stabilizing force for Mubarak, who 
was able to maintain control over the military and Egyptian society for nearly three 
decades. However, President George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda” gave opposition 
forces an opening to challenge Mubarak’s legitimacy after 2001. When tentative political 
liberalization increased pressure on Mubarak’s regime, Mubarak reacted by banning the 
Muslim Brotherhood and restricting the activity of journalists, students and academics 
challenging his rule. His renewed authoritarianism, combined with the designation o f his 
corrupt son Gamal as his successor, prompted the revolution o f 2011 by Egyptians 
inspired by the success of Tunisians the month prior.
Professionalization and the Role of the Military in Civil Politics
U.S. military aid contributes to the professionalization o f foreign armies through 
education and training programs designed not only to increase the technical and 
administrative expertise of foreign military personnel, but also to expose foreign armies 
to American political values. However, in the cases discussed in this study, armies that 
have received extensive U.S. military training intervened directly to unseat 
democratically elected leaders, and encroached on civil affairs by expanding their 
reserved domains in government and industry. This study defines a fully “professional 
army” or “democratic army” as being one that is competent, cohesive, focused 
exclusively on external defense, and respectful of the supremacy of civilian political 
authority. A close examination of civil-military relations in South Korea, Turkey, and 
Egypt allows for a discussion o f how improving some aspects of professionalism through 
U.S. military aid may have undermined others, in some cases leading to a bigger role for 
the military in civil politics. In particular, efforts to increase the competency of foreign 
armies may undermine a military’s cohesiveness and mission exclusivity, particularly in
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those countries challenged by internal security and development issues. Even though 
American instructors highlighted the importance of civilian control over the military, 
officers’ attitudes toward civilian political authority were often shaped by their particular 
domestic political circumstances, where civilian politicians were often viewed as elitist, 
corrupt, and incompetent.
Competency and Coherency
U.S. military aid had a significant impact on the competency, or expertise in the 
management o f violence, of foreign militaries by providing modem defense equipment, 
training and professional military education. In addition, Turkish, Korean, and Egyptian 
troops gained valuable experience by fighting and training alongside American military 
personnel. Operating with American troops contributes to foreign armies’ technical 
capacity and understanding of American military doctrine. However, efforts to improve 
the competency o f foreign militaries may undermine coherency in the short -term  by 
introducing new ideas about military organization, empowering factions within the 
military, and/or inculcating some officers with a sense o f “new professionalism,”8 
leading to tension between officers who seek reforms and/or an expansion of the 
military’s role in society and officers who prefer the status quo. In addition, military 
advisors may find it difficult to overcome or prevent the formation of factions that 
dangerously undermine the cohesiveness of the armed forces.
While substantial U.S. military aid was sent to Korea and Turkey in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, the size o f their forces combined with the poor state of their economies 
resulted in low standards o f living for military personnel. American policymakers grew 
concerned these militaries were unable to absorb all of the arms and equipment being sent 
by the U.S., but civilian leaders were anxious to add state-of-the-art hardware to their 
national capabilities and eager to maintain oversized standing armies that improved their 
regional prestige. The emphasis on hard power capabilities, particularly given the geo­
political context, is understandable. However, in the Korean case, for example, after the 
rapid expansion o f the military during the Korean War years, there were few
8 Stepan, "The N ew  Professionalism o f  Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," 134.
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opportunities for advancement, and younger officers became frustrated by the dearth of 
promotion opportunities, both within the military and the private sector.
Finer points out that “the armed forces have always been -  by the closed and 
intimate nature of the personal relations they foster -  peculiarly susceptible to infiltration 
and the establishment of networks of conspiracy.”9 Identity groupings based on shared 
class interests, regional ties, education, or prior military experience can predominate over 
the creation of a cohesive military institution with a sense o f shared experience and 
national identity. These groupings, or factions, may be particularly effective in organizing 
coups because of their tight networks and intense camaraderie. This was the case with 
Park’s faction in South Korea in 1961, Nasser and his Free Officers in Egypt in 1952, and 
Alparslan Turkes and his fellow officers in Turkey in 1960; in all three cases the officers 
acted outside o f the military hierarchy. American military assistance proved unable to 
prevent the formation of these groups in Turkey and particularly Korea, where the 
Hanahoe faction persisted into the 1990s.
A common narrative regarding South Korea’s democratic consolidation is that 
Korean society became less willing to sacrifice Korea’s democracy for economic growth; 
as civil society became more sophisticated and the middle class grew, they increasingly 
challenged the authoritarianism of the military-aligned leadership. But Korean society, 
with its high literacy rates and history o f Japanese colonialism, demanded democracy in 
the 1950s, through the 1960s and 1970s. It was the public’s opposition to restrictions on 
freedom of speech and assembly that sent them into the streets calling for the resignation 
o f President Rhee in 1960. What changed from 1960 to 1987 was the power o f the 
Hanahoe faction within the armed forces, and the balance of power between hardliners 
and softliners within the Korean military. While one might argue the decades of 
socialization with the American military facilitated this shift, it’s lamentable that it took 
more than thirty years for the softliners to prevail.
Like the Free Officers in Egypt, the Turkish officers wanted to lend legitimacy to 
their coup group by inviting an experienced and highly - respected officer from the senior 
ranks to lead the military junta that supplanted the civilian leadership. Unlike Egypt’s 
Naguib, who was outmaneuvered and eventually ousted by the ambitious Nasser, General
9 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role o f  the M ilitary in Politics, 34.
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Gursel maintained control over the junta by expelling, and exiling, fourteen o f the more 
extreme officers, including Turkes, who advocated extended military rule; Gursel then 
consolidated his control over the military institution by retiring hundreds o f the military’s 
serving officers. While Gursel’s victory over the hardliners was better for Turkish 
democracy -  the new constitution promoted individual rights and expanded political 
participation, and Gursel supervised the return to competitive elections and civilian 
governance - the massive military purge undermined the cohesiveness of the military 
establishment, and led to several more coup attempts. Senior officers thus had to take 
heavy-handed measures to restore ideological cohesion within the armed forces. The 
Turkish military’s cohesion would continue to be challenged through the 1960s and 
1970s, as disgruntled former officers planned unsuccessful coup attempts, and junior 
officers pressured the military to intervene in response to political dysfunction and 
violence.
The case o f Egypt also demonstrates that increasing officers’ competency through 
professional military education is no guarantee against the formation of factions. In the 
mid-1930s, Nasser and his Free Officers were part of the first group of lower-class cadets 
admitted into Egypt’s Military Academy. Finer suggests that Nasser and his associates 
dreamed o f a “purge of the state,” to include expelling foreign troops and reforming the 
army, from the moment they graduated.10 They resented the “effendi class,” the political 
and economic elite that ruled Egypt, whom they later blamed for the military’s defeat in 
Palestine. This helps explain Nasser’s sweeping moves to disband the existing political 
parties and redistribute wealth through his land reforms and socialist decrees. His social 
resentment preceded his military education, but his commission enabled him to challenge 
-  and usurp - the civilian political elite in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the long term, however, U.S. military aid that includes security cooperation, 
joint exercises, education, and training should contribute to an increase in cohesiveness, 
as junior officers advance and there are more shared experiences and recognized norms 
o f behavior within the officer corps. Professional military education reaches a relatively 
small number o f officers and NCO’s year to year. This might make it difficult in the early 
days o f bilateral relations to overcome values, ideologies, and identities carried over from
10 Ibid., 42.
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previous experiences. In the Korean case, factions formed around those with shared prior 
military experience, regional orientations, and/or graduating classes o f the Korean 
Military Academy, and within these factions officers enjoyed a deep sense of 
camaraderie. Because the Korean military lacked a shared historical experience prior to 
the Korean War, building that sense o f camaraderie would take time.
Mission Exclusivity
Huntington argues that as warfare becomes more complex, it is “impossible to be 
an expert in the management of violence for external defense and at the same time to be 
skilled in either politics and statecraft or the use of force for the maintenance o f internal 
order.” "  For this reason this study included “mission exclusivity” in its definition of 
professionalism, to highlight the fact that expanding the military’s presence in 
government or industry detracts from its professionalism by undermining its ability to 
successfully fulfill its primary role, defense from external threats.
U.S. military aid contributed to foreign armies’ competency, particularly through 
professional schools and training to teach recipient militaries how to operate and maintain 
American-made military equipment. Yet an emphasis on how the military might be used 
to meet internal security and development goals may have undermined the military’s 
mission exclusivity by encouraging a sense of “new professionalism of internal security 
and national development.” 12 Military planners in the 1950s and 1960s became 
increasingly concerned with developing states’ vulnerability to Communist subversion, 
and began including counter-insurgency training as well as highlighting the social and 
political conditions conducive to Communist subversion.13 Yet critics worry teaching 
these “internal defense and development” (IDAD) skills encourages military officers to 
assume an expanded internal policing and nation-building role at the expense o f the civil 
sector.14 Stepan argues exposure to this instruction encourages military officers to form
11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory’ and Politics o f  Civil-M ilitary Relations, 32.
12 Stepan, "The N ew  Professionalism o f  Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," 134.
13 Ibid., 136.
14 Taw and M cCoy Jr, "International Military Student Training: Beyond Tactics," 9.
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their own views of national development, rendering them more likely to intervene when 
civilian governments are weak and prove unable to promote economic growth.
The idea of the military playing a constructive role in a state’s development is not 
unique to American policymakers; the conceptualization of the Turkish armed forces as 
drivers o f modernization predates U.S. military aid, and Nasser used his military to 
oversee the nationalization of private enterprise in his effort to build a state-run economy. 
Many analysts have credited Park’s experience in the Japanese Imperial Army, rather 
than U.S. military education and training, with informing his ideas about state-directed 
development. However, it is still worth noting that increasing the military’s expertise in 
internal security and development through U.S. military training can potentially 
encourage the expansion of the military’s role at the expense o f civilians.
The expansion o f the military’s role into the civil sphere involves the expansion 
o f both informal and institutionalized “reserved domains” that undermine the ability of 
democratically - elected civilians to establish objective civilian control. While direct 
intervention draws international attention and is a flagrant violation of civilian supremacy 
over the military, reserved domains are often granted, or taken, quietly, and may be seen 
as a reflection o f routine bargaining between military and civilian elites. Unfortunately, 
they allow the military to gain political power through both formal and informal 
processes, and give the military something to protect, meaning a civilian politician who 
threatens to intrude on these reserved domains is not likely to enjoy the support o f the 
military. Whether the military’s reserved domains are granted by the political authority in 
exchange for loyalty, or seized during periods o f military rule, the special privileges, 
political power, and/or institutional prerogatives will be difficult for future leaders to 
reverse.
Park Chung Hee had strong ideas about the relationship between South Korea’s 
economic development and its security against Communist subversion, and throughout 
his presidency justified the centralization of his authority based on the efficiency needed 
to industrialize and carry out economic reforms. Park granted reserved domains to his 
“security track” officers, including his closest associates within the Hanahoe faction, 
while maintaining the mission exclusivity o f the rest of the Korean military. After Park’s 
unexpected death in October, 1979, the martial law commander and other senior generals
252
announced they would maintain political neutrality as the acting president moved to 
abolish the repressive Yushin Constitution; however, on December 12, “new 
professionals” Chun Doo-Hwan and other members of the Hanahoe faction moved to 
preserve their reserved domains by acting against senior military officers who desired a 
return to the military’s traditional role,15
The power o f the officers from the security track, particularly those from the 
Hanahoe faction, were such that to implement civil-military reforms and reverse the 
reserved domains of the military required a popular civilian leader with a mandate for 
reform, one who enjoyed external support from the U.S as well as the post-Cold War 
easing of tension with China and the former Soviet Union. On top of that, Kim Young 
Sam had the support of senior military leaders, and the military’s political power was 
weakened by a corruption scandal.
The formal and informal reserved domains o f the Turkish military, particularly 
those exercised through the National Security Council, were steadily expanded from 1960 
through the period o f military rule from 1980-1983, and were also difficult to reverse. 
Like in the Korea case, implementing comprehensive civil-military reforms required a 
popular civilian leader with a mandate for reform, external support from the European 
Union and the U.S., plus domestic support from both civil society and the military for the 
EU accession process.
After Egypt’s 1952 coup, Nasser granted a privileged role in government and the 
economy for his military supporters; yet the expansion of the Egyptian military’s 
governance, internal policing, and economic activities undermined its military 
effectiveness, and led to its poor performance in 1967. Nasser was only able to reverse 
the military’s privileges and purge politicized officers after the 1967 defeat, which 
damaged the prestige of the military. Throughout the 1970s, Sadat continued to take 
away the military’s privileges and minimize its reserved domains; however, Mubarak 
allowed for an expanded economic role to discourage officers from seeking a more 
prominent role in politics. Once again, the expansion of the Egyptian military’s reserved 
domains undermined its effectiveness. Despite receiving billions in U.S. military
15 Yong Cheol Kim, "The Shadow o f  the Gwangju Uprising in the Democratization o f  Korean Politics," in 
South Korean Democracy: Legacy o f  the Gwangju Uprising, ed. Georgy Katsiaficas and Na Kahn-chae 
(New  York: Routledge, 2013), 119.
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assistance, DOD officials have noted the military’s lackluster performance, and the EAF 
has been criticized for heavy-handed measures against Islamists. The SCAF expanded the 
military’s reserved domains even further, institutionalizing its autonomy from civilian 
oversight and guaranteeing a privileged role in national security policymaking. These 
reserved domains were impossible for the politically weak Mohamed Morsi to overturn, 
impeding his ability to establish objective civilian control over the armed forces.
Respect fo r  Civilian Political Authority
Previous discussions have noted the importance of political elites establishing 
objective civilian control over the military, rather than adopting strategies of deliberate 
politicization or acquiescence. However, elected leaders will be hard-pressed to 
implement civil-military reforms if the armed forces lack a basic respect for civilian 
political authority.16 While U.S. military and political advisers might emphasize respect 
for civilian political authority as an important aspect of professionalization, domestic 
political circumstances often have greater sway over officers’ attitudes toward civilian 
elites. Prior to 1960, both the South Korean and Turkish militaries were reluctant to 
enforce martial law on behalf o f the ruling political party. This reflects the level of 
professionalism that these militaries had already achieved, but also reveals the sense 
among military officers that their loyalty was to the state, rather than a particular party. 
Observers noted a similar phenomenon during the January uprising in Egypt in 2011; the 
EAF’s loyalty seemed to be to the state, rather than Mubarak’s ruling party.
The attempt to politicize the military, for example by imposing martial law to 
suppress popular demonstrations, or sending armed forces to intimidate opposition 
politicians, puts officers in an untenable position. Either they allow themselves to become 
an instrument of domestic politics by acting on behalf o f one party against another, or 
they disobey the orders o f the civilian leadership, which in some cases may even be their 
commander-in-chief. In either option they violate the liberal-democratic model o f civil- 
military relations, which assumes the civilian leadership will not try to use the military
16 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: M ilitary Coups and Governments, 13.
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for domestic political purposes. The problem becomes more complex when there are no 
alternative institutions capable o f restoring domestic order.
For example, while the Egyptian Armed Forces were perceived as being the only 
institution capable o f restoring order in 2011, suppressing demonstrators on Mubarak’s 
behalf would have been a political act, and the EAF chose to disobey his orders to 
maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of Egyptian society. In doing so they acted 
independently as an institution, ignoring the orders of their civilian leadership. Like the 
Korean and Turkish officers in the 1950s, the military had few options. In all three cases, 
the national police force lacked the capacity to restore order. A military may refuse the 
demands o f the civilian political authority not only because it does not want to use 
violence against society, but also because such interventions undermine morale and 
cohesion, threatening the efficacy of the defense force.
Under these circumstances, however, it is not difficult to see why the military 
might develop a disdain for civilian political authority over time. Unfortunately, this sets 
a dangerous precedent with implications for future civilian leaders’ attempts to impose 
their authority over the military. The perception of civilian corruption, pettiness, and 
incompetency became deeply ingrained within the minds of Korean, Turkish, and 
Egyptian military officers. In all three cases professional officers resented civilian 
politicians’ attempts to co-opt the military, particularly by promoting officers to senior 
positions based on loyalty rather than merit. In addition, officers were put off by 
parliamentary deadlock, ineffectiveness, and opposition fragmentation. Turkey’s generals 
installed technocratic governments in 1971 and 1980, hoping a break from party politics 
would give the country an opportunity to implement much-needed reforms. Park and his 
faction were incensed by Prime Minister Chang’s reluctance to expel corrupt officers and 
politicians and implement economic reforms. While the SCAF governed in Egypt, 
officers were perplexed by the failure of the secular and liberal opposition to put aside 
their differences and advance candidates capable of competing against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In the last decade, Turkey’s military has been frustrated by the opposition’s 
inability to organize a credible campaign to challenge the political hegemony of 
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party.
255
This frustration with the civilian political leadership may lead to a sense of 
entitlement among officers, motivating them to expand the military’s institutional 
prerogatives at the expense of civilians when given the opportunity. In these three cases, 
some officers believed they were uniquely qualified to oversee the government’s political, 
economic, and national security decision-making. American military training that 
increases the expertise of foreign militaries may contribute to this sense of superiority, 
particularly when the civil sector is underdeveloped and the political leadership is 
fragmented and weak. Yet this attitude also stems from the military’s hierarchical 
structure, its emphasis on order and discipline, as well as its sense o f national 
responsibility. Civilian politicians who aim to establish objective civilian control over the 
military will have a greater chance of success if they prove their competency, integrity, 
and discipline to the military officers who will serve them.
Conclusion
Three cases do not provide enough evidence to make sweeping generalizations 
regarding the relationship between U.S. military aid and civil-military relations, or put 
forward new theories on the effect o f U.S. military aid on democratization. The goal of 
this study was not to assert a causal relationship between U.S. military aid and military 
interventions. Rather, in examining the military’s role in civil politics in South Korea, 
Turkey, and Egypt throughout the duration of U.S. military aid, this study sought to 
challenge some o f the assumptions that persist in both the academic and policymaking 
communities. Specifically, that by mitigating the external threat to the recipient’s security, 
providing support for civilian leaders, and professionalizing foreign militaries, U.S. 
military aid will discourage a role for the military in civil politics, enabling civilian 
governments to establish objective civilian control. Establishing objective civilian control 
over the military is a vital precondition for democratic consolidation; in the absence of 
objective civilian control, dominant regimes may use the military against political 
opponents, and dominant militaries can undermine democratically - elected leaders.
U.S. military aid directly impacts the institutions that determine whether or not a 
government will successfully establish objective civilian control over the military.
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Conforming to the liberal model o f civil-military relations requires that the civilian 
political leadership take responsibility for national security policymaking while 
recognizing the professional expertise of the military in the management and application 
o f force. It also requires that the armed forces internalize respect for the supremacy of 
civilian political authority. The durability o f objective civilian control relies upon “the 
maximum possible depoliticization of the military.” 17
What these cases demonstrate is that as military aid strengthens the military as an 
institution, through training, education, and modernization programs, as well as by 
establishing bilateral and multilateral networks of defense professionals, the military 
becomes an increasingly attractive strategic partner for dominant regimes. While co­
opting the military may be easier for a former general with strong ties to the military, 
deliberate politicization is a tempting strategy for any dominant regime. A leader does not 
have to politicize the entire military to preserve the option of using force for political 
reasons. What results may be relatively stable compared to the competitive political 
process, but is inimical to political development. As long as a dominant regime can use 
force against political opponents, opposition groups within society will be hampered in 
their ability to organize and freely express dissenting views.
When states do respect the competitive political process, democratically - elected 
leaders will find it difficult to compete with military institutions whose administrative 
and technical skills have been enhanced through U.S. military aid. Officers whose 
professional competence has been dramatically improved through U.S. military training 
may act against the military hierarchy and incumbent regime if they believe they are 
uniquely skilled to establish order and lead the country’s economic, political, and social 
development.
In both scenarios, if  the military is granted, or assumes, reserved domains in the 
civil sphere, such as a privileged role in national security policymaking or economic 
interests, democratically - elected leaders will find it exceedingly difficult to reverse 
these prerogatives, both formal and informal. The socialization that accompanies the 
administration of military aid has had a limited impact on these militaries’ receptiveness 
to objective civilian control. What appears to be Washington’s historical ambivalence on
17 Ibid., 12.
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this point may just be recognition that there are often few alternatives to military 
participation in politics, as long civilian expertise is lacking, institutions are 
underdeveloped, and opposition forces are weak and disorganized.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation studied three military aid recipients in pursuit of a better 
understanding o f the relationship between U.S. military aid and the implementation of 
objective civilian control over the armed forces, which is a vital precondition for 
democratic consolidation. This issue is particularly important given the high percentage 
of U.S. military aid recipients who are stuck in a political “grey area,” not quite 
dictatorships but not yet fully - functioning democracies. Proponents o f security 
cooperation believe military aid has the potential to support transitions to the liberal 
model o f civil - military relations, by diffusing democratic norms o f professionalism and 
establishing contacts with key political actors who may play a future role in regime 
change. By improving the security environment, supporting the civilian political 
leadership, and professionalizing the military, military aid should render military 
interference in the civil sphere less likely. However, as the three studies demonstrate, this 
is not always the case. This chapter offers some conclusions based on a review of the 
factors that might inhibit the ability of a state to establish objective civilian control over 
its military, with the aim of encouraging future efforts to mitigate the unintended 
consequences o f security cooperation.
The Potential -  and Limitations -  of U.S. Military Aid
Because of the potential for military aid to influence political actors who may 
play a critical role in a country’s democratic transition, it does not make sense to study 
the relationship between foreign aid and democratization and exclude military aid. 
Military aid can play a decisive role in regime survival, as well as the ability o f society to 
freely organize and express opposition to a ruling party. A fragmented, ill-equipped, and 
untrained military will be unable to secure a country’s borders, manage its airspace, or 
protect its coastlines. Without a capable military, governments will be hard-pressed to 
defend their territorial integrity, and vulnerable to the preferences of well-armed internal
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and external actors who challenge the state’s sovereignty. In addition, fragmented 
militaries that lack any sense of professionalism can be exploited by civilians to create 
party armies, militias, or oppressive security agencies, increasing the risk o f violence 
against citizens.
The extensive U.S. military training and education infrastructure enables 
American advisers to take scattered militias and merge them into one national army, 
encourage a sense of unity and responsibility, teach modem administrative and technical 
skills, enhance communication, diffuse democratic norms, and promote positive bilateral 
as well as multilateral relations. U.S. military aid not only bolsters the ability of foreign 
armies to defend their country, but can also provide a collective good by enhancing the 
capacity for foreign armies to manage transnational threats, participate in peacekeeping 
operations, and contribute to collective security arrangements. Military aid is largely non- 
fungible, and can play a positive role in development over time by contributing to the 
establishment o f a defense industrial base, and educating personnel who later take their 
skills into the private sector.
Aid can also provide a lever of influence at critical junctures when Washington 
wants to shape the policy o f a foreign government or the behavior o f a foreign military. 
While this study did not attempt to systematically analyze the effectiveness o f donor 
conditionality, a review of the bilateral relations in these three cases highlights both the 
potential and limitations of American influence. While no aid from the U.S. is 
unconditional, as the Arms Export Control Act outlines the terms and conditions for the 
sale of defense articles, attempts to leverage the role o f military aid donor to shape 
regime behavior has had mixed success.
Keeping in mind the positive impact o f U.S. military aid on a recipient’s ability to 
provide basic national security and contribute to regional security, this study explores the 
possibility that military aid is potentially inimical to political development, as it 
strengthens an institution that has the power to supplant the government using force. 
What did we learn about military aid’s influence on foreign armies’ role in civil politics? 
The three countries featured have very different historical experiences -  two post­
colonial, one of which had no alternative patrons and one that had many; one post­
imperial, with an increasingly beleaguered political elite determined to orient the country
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with the West. Despite their diverse patterns of civil military relations over the past 
seventy years, these three cases, by challenging our expectations about the relationship 
between U.S. military aid and the military’s role in politics, draw attention to the 
limitations in our understanding o f the effect the external threat, strength of the political 
leadership, and the professionalism of the military have on the ability of foreign 
governments to establish objective civilian control over their armed forces.
Security Threats and Objective Civilian Control
The fact that U.S. military aid helps a government manage security threats -  
external, internal, and transnational -  does not necessarily make it more likely that a 
government will attempt to establish objective civilian control. The existence of mutual 
defense treaties, presence of American military personnel, sophistication of the military 
hardware, and extensive education and training, do not discourage those political leaders 
who use security threats as an excuse to delay implementing civil-military reforms that 
include establishing objective civilian control over the military.
This is astonishing, given that a military that a professional military is more 
capable of meeting any threat than one that is politicized or focused on activities 
unrelated to national defense. In addition, the liberal-democratic model of civil military 
relations provides the best guarantee that the military will defer to the judgment of 
civilian experts, fulfilling their duties to the best o f their ability while leaving policy to 
the civilian political leadership. Yet dominant regimes find it tempting to deliberately 
politicize the military, granting reserved domains in exchange for loyalty, and to preserve 
the option o f using force against political opponents.
In all three cases, political elites exploited the security threats to justify the use of 
force against members of the opposition. This linkage between external threats and 
domestic opposition has unfortunately been just as common in the post-Cold War era of 
transnational terrorism as it was when authoritarian leaders justified extreme measures to 
mitigate Communist subversion. Political leaders rely on the coercive apparatus to harass, 
arrest, and incarcerate journalists, intellectuals, activists, artists, and politicians, and 
security threats are used to justify trying civilians in military courts. This behavior
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indicates that a government has no serious intention o f establishing objective civilian 
control over its military, because it wants to preserve the option o f using force to 
maintain social order and suppress dissent. This behavior also reveals that a government 
has no serious intention of transitioning to, or consolidating, democracy.
While this study finds the relationship between the external security threat and the 
decision o f political leaders to establish objective civilian control is weak, an 
improvement in the security environment does make it more difficult for political leaders 
to credibly link security threats with their opposition. If society feels more concerned by 
economic, social, or political issues, it may be less tolerant o f a regime’s heavy-handed 
measures. Unfortunately, this does not naturally lead to liberalization. A regime that 
wants to maintain its dominance and  has the loyalty o f the coercive apparatus o f the state 
-  particularly the military -  retains the option o f using force to quell anti-government 
forces. This was all too evident during the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011. In this case 
the relevant questions will be, how far is the regime willing to go to stay in power, and 
can they get away with it?
Policymakers in the late 1940s and early 1950s believed military aid would be 
just one part of a comprehensive effort to promote not only the security o f recipients, but 
also economic and political development. While this study focused primarily on the 
relationship between military aid and one aspect of political development, the 
establishment o f objective civilian control over the military, the observation that South 
Korea and Turkey may have been motivated to become self-reliant in the defense sphere 
because o f the expectation that U.S. military aid would decline over time warrants further 
study. While U.S. officials throughout the 1950s emphasized that South Korea and 
Turkey would eventually assume the financial burden o f their armed forces, once Egypt 
became a U.S. military aid recipient, there was far less uncertainty regarding American 
annual appropriations. In addition, South Korea and Turkey lacked any serious 
alternative patrons for external defense, whereas Egypt has historically enjoyed far more 
options with respect to material and political support, including Britain, the U.S., the 
Soviet Union, and the wealthy Persian Gulf states. Is there a relationship between aid 
expectations and a government’s motivation to implement certain economic policies that 
will, for example, enhance productivity and develop an indigenous defense industrial
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base? A comprehensive analysis o f the political economy of military aid recipients was 
beyond the scope o f this study; still, a deeper understanding o f how expectations 
regarding future U.S. military aid might affect a regime’s economic policies would be 
useful, particularly given the relationship between economic growth and political 
liberalization.
External Political Support -  a Necessary, if  not Sufficient, Condition
Political support from foreign governments can bolster the credibility o f a state’s 
civilian political leadership. That support demonstrates that the leadership can manage its 
foreign relations, for example by negotiating trade agreements, participating in regional 
security efforts, and helping to solve international problems. In the absence of some type 
of external political support, it will be much more difficult for civilian leaders to establish 
objective civilian control over the military, particularly as the armed forces have a vested 
interest in positive international relations.
Nevertheless, this study highlights the role governing elites have in determining 
whether or not to attempt to establish objective civilian control over their militaries. As 
discussed earlier, the presence of an external threat is a weak predictor o f a regime’s 
attitude toward its military. While one might assume national security is the dominant 
concern for any government, the decision to adopt a strategy o f deliberate politicization, 
acquiescence, or establish objective civilian control is largely driven by domestic political 
circumstances.
There are many incentives for leaders to deliberately politicize their militaries, or 
at least adopt a policy of acquiescence that keeps the military happy. Even popular 
leaders who do not want to yield to the competitive nature o f democratic politics will 
eventually need to rely on the use of force to restrict the opposition. When the military is 
not loyal to a particular party, and not willing to act on a particular leader’s behalf against 
the opposition -  as in South Korea in 1960 and 1987, Turkey in 1960, Egypt in 2011 and 
2013 -  the ruling party is particularly vulnerable to public demand for regime change. In 
addition, authoritarian leaders may be threatened by respected, experienced, and popular 
senior officers who have the potential to siphon political support from the incumbent
263
regime; these leaders may prefer to award senior posts based on loyalty rather than merit, 
to minimize the risk of competition.
Leaders who deliberately politicize the military do so by granting special 
privileges, or reserved domains, in exchange for loyalty. Observers must be mindful of 
the role of reserved domains and institutional prerogatives in obstructing the efforts of 
elected leaders to establish objective civilian control. Because these privileges are often 
taken, or granted, quietly, they do not attract the same degree of international attention as 
a direct intervention. However, these formal and informal arrangements can be terribly 
damaging to efforts to transition to democracy, because they give officers interests to 
protect and thus incentives to derail a transition. In addition, they undermine the 
military’s cohesiveness, as they are rarely distributed equitably within the military 
institution. Those officers who benefit the most from these arrangements are more likely 
to obstruct attempts to establish objective civilian control, in some cases prompting 
elected leaders to instead opt for a policy o f acquiescence.
Adopting a policy of deliberate politicization or acquiescence may be more 
common in developing states because it is so difficult for those who have the greatest 
incentive to establish objective civilian control -  democratically elected civilians -  to 
compete with the armed forces, particularly when the military has received U.S. aid. A 
military organization that receives American military aid gains expertise and experience 
that enhances its prestige over time. The military is often a symbol of the nation rather 
than a political party, particularly because it is usually comprised o f people from all over 
the country. The military can be highly organized, coherent, and disciplined. In contrast, 
democratically - elected leaders often represent a far smaller constituency, particularly in 
a country with many political parties. These leaders scarcely have time to accumulate 
enough political capital to win support for sweeping reforms. Even within a party or 
coalition, other politicians challenge, criticize, and undermine elected leaders to promote 
their own policy preferences.
In those rare cases when a democratically elected leader did manage to reverse 
the institutional prerogatives of the military and move toward the liberal-democratic 
model, the stars aligned, so to speak -  the leaders enjoyed both external and domestic 
political support, had a mandate for reform, and support within both the parliament and
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the military. In addition, the elected leaders were able to take advantage o f the military’s 
political weakness during a scandal, real or alleged, arresting active and retired officers 
and publically holding them accountable.
U.S. Military Aid and Military Professionalism in Foreign Armies
Every year, thousands o f foreign officers receive American military training that 
contributes to their expertise in the management o f force. Training and education 
acquired through IMET and the FMF program improve the competency of the military, 
enhancing the capacity o f foreign armies to protect their country from threats to their 
national security. Because professionalization o f the armed forces is a precondition for 
establishing objective civilian control over the military, U.S. military aid that increases 
the professionalism of foreign militaries should facilitate a transition to the liberal model 
o f civil-military relations.
However, competency is just one aspect o f professionalization, which this study 
defines as a process in which the armed forces work toward achieving the highest levels 
of competency, cohesiveness, mission exclusivity, and respect for civilian political 
authority. The influence military aid has on competence far outweighs the impact it has 
on these other critical aspects o f professionalism. For example, while training may 
quickly contribute to the acquisition o f administrative and technical skills, it is far more 
difficult to overcome ethnic, regional, sectarian, or kinship ties that undermine 
cohesiveness. Factions within the military are potentially dangerous, undermine unit 
cohesiveness, and risk tearing the military apart; in addition, the presence o f factions 
increases the likelihood one might act against the military hierarchy to intervene in 
politics.
In some cases, increasing the competence of military personnel may lead to 
internal dynamics that “push” the military into civil politics. For example, military 
education and training may create tensions within the officer corps that undermine 
cohesiveness, as some officers may be more receptive to new ideas than others who 
prefer the status quo. Exposure to ways in which military personnel can contribute to 
internal development may invite greater participation in the civil sphere that undermines
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mission exclusivity, often at the expense o f the private sector. As a military becomes 
more skilled, and more knowledgeable in matters o f foreign policy and national defense, 
officers may be tempted to expand their institutional prerogatives when given the 
opportunity. These reserved domains, particularly when institutionalized, create obstacles 
to establishing objective civilian control over the military. Increasing the expertise of 
foreign officers may also highlight the incompetence of civilian political authorities, 
engendering resentment or frustration toward the political leadership.
The impact of military-to-military relations on democratic consolidation may be 
limited in the absence of concomitant political, cultural, social and economic ties. While 
a comprehensive analysis o f the bilateral ties between the United States and South Korea 
was beyond the scope of this study, they are known to be broad and deep, whereas 
Egyptian and Turkish relations rarely go beyond the security realm. Yet even in the case 
o f South Korea, it is important to remember the government received military aid for 
more than 40 years before an elected leader even attempted to establish objective civilian 
control. Professionalization is a long-term process, one that may have been hastened in 
post-Cold War Eastern Europe because o f the emphasis on economic, political, and social 
integration through the European Union as well as defense reforms through NATO.
Final Thoughts and Proposals for Future Study
Military aid from the United States enhances foreign armies’ ability to protect 
their populations and their countries’ territorial integrity, and can be a positive influence 
on civil-military relations by diffusing democratic norms of behavior. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that academics and policy-makers attain a clear-eyed understanding of how 
military aid might discourage foreign governments from establishing objective civilian 
control over their armed forces. Militaries whose prestige and experience are improved 
by military aid are attractive strategic partners for dominant regimes that want to preserve 
the option o f using force to stay in power. In addition, officers who have gained technical 
and administrative skills through military aid may be tempted to respond to the weakness 
of civilian leaders by expanding their role in civil politics. Once the military is politicized,
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democratically - elected leaders will find it difficult to reverse the military’s institutional 
prerogatives and establish objective civilian control.
The relationship between U.S. military aid and the role of foreign armies in civil 
politics is far from straightforward, yet its complexity should not deter academics and 
practitioners from seeking a better understanding of the unintended consequences of 
security cooperation. This study is not only concerned with states undergoing transitions 
to democracies, but also those states with relatively static domestic political 
configurations, such as during the Mubarak and Park regimes. In fiscal year 2013, thirty- 
five states that received military aid through the Foreign Military Financing Program 
(FMF) were rated “Partly Free” by Freedom House, while fourteen were rated “Not 
Free.” 1 This paper does not argue these states should not receive aid; the political 
decision to provide military aid is made based on multiple, sometimes competing, 
strategic interests. Rather, this study suggests a more indepth understanding of how 
military aid alters patterns o f civil-military relations would benefit both donors and 
recipients.
Barany, in his study of the military’s role in democratic transitions in seven non- 
Soviet eastern European postcommunist states, observes that transitions were more 
successful in those states in which patterns of civil-military relations were 
“professionalized” rather than “politicized.”2 For example, in Hungary after the late 
1950s, officers benefited from professional military education in the Soviet Union, but 
were excluded from seats in the Politburo. In Romania, however, the authoritarian 
leadership frequently rotated top civilian and military officials to preclude their 
accumulation of personal political power, and underfunded the military. Barany found a 
positive correlation between the “professionalized” pattern o f civil-military relations 
during authoritarian regimes and the absence of military interference in post-authoritarian 
democratic transitions.
This highlights the fact that even authoritarian or dominant regimes can establish 
professionalized patterns of civil-military relations. Recent events in Egypt have 
highlighted how quickly an ally’s political system can shift from one form to another.
1 "Foreign Military Financing Account Summary"; "Freedom in the World Country Ratings and Status."
2 Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," 24.
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Liberalization often takes place in “spurts,” when incentive and opportunity intersect, and 
in that case new governments will require a military willing to accept democratic control. 
Future comparative work could focus on why U.S. military aid promotes professionalized 
patterns of civil military relations in some states but not others.
Aurel Croissant constructs a theoretical model of civil-military relations to inform 
strategies for democratically - elected leaders to establish civilian control over the 
military in transitioning democracies. The study of South Korea, Turkey and Egypt 
demonstrate just how difficult establishing civilian control will be for elected leaders 
when the military has a tradition o f political interference and already has institutionalized 
prerogatives. Croissant’s formalized measures o f civilian control across five major 
decision-making areas -  leadership recruitment, public policy, internal security, external 
defense, and military organization - provide a means to account for positive or negative 
changes in civil-military relations over time, alert academics and practitioners to elites’ 
efforts to expand the military’s role in politics, and avoid simplistic assessments o f civil- 
military relations based on the prevalence or absence of coups3.
To what extent can the U.S. leverage its role as military aid provider to encourage 
professional patterns o f civil-military relations in autocratic, or dominant, regimes? While 
this study has highlighted the limitations of Washington’s influence on recipients’ 
internal political affairs, this does not necessarily mean autocrats dependent on U.S. 
military aid would be unwilling to implement modest institutional changes in an effort to 
improve the efficacy of their armed forces. This effort would depend upon the 
development o f civilian experts in defense matters, something that is absolutely crucial 
for transitioning democracies. To that end, U.S. officials might encourage more civilian 
participation in American institutions, including universities and military schools.
The character of military organizations is shaped over time by internal and 
external forces -  history, culture, alliances, shared experiences, factionalism, regionalism, 
ideology - that predispose the military to adopt particular attitudes toward the state and 
society. Egypt’s military is marked by its internal struggles with religious extremism, 
Korea’s by regionalism and factionalism, Turkey’s by Kemalism. This study has
3 Croissant, "Civilian Control o f  the Military in Emerging Democracies: Theory and Empirical Evidence 
From Asia," 24-27.
268
demonstrated how difficult it is for professional military education and training to 
overcome these forces; but that should not preclude an effort to reconcile these internal 
characteristics with the principle o f civilian oversight, even in undemocratic countries. In 
his study o f civil-military relations in seven Asian countries, Croissant observes that non- 
coercive attempts to encourage the military to accept the supremacy o f civilian political 
leadership is “only possible when military officials [are] inclined toward the view that 
such a set up is morally right and legitimate.”4 Any effort to convince the political 
leadership to make institutional changes that will professionalize civil-military relations 
must be accompanied by the military’s internalization o f the principle o f civilian control.
4 Ibid., 29.
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